Tunisia Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 25 June 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T263	KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEFENSE CONGRESS		1974	2012
T208	HEZBALLAH		1982	2012
T28	AL-QA`IDA		1989	2012
T82	ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP		1992	2011
T9021	TUNISIAN ARMED RESISTANCE		1980	1980
T499	JAMAA COMBATTANTE TUNISIENNE (JCT)		2000	0
T9022	ANSAR AL-SHARIA IN TUNISIA		0	0
T9023	OKBA IBN NAFAA BRIGADE		0	0
T9027	MOUVEMENT DE LA TENDANCE ISLAMIQUE		0	0
T9028	MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE REVOLUTIONNAIRE (MPR)		0	0

I.   KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEFENSE CONGRESS
Torg ID: 263
Min. Group Date: 1974
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Kurdistan Workers' Party (Pkk), Argk, Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan (Argk), Kadek, Kongra Gele Kurdistan, Kongra-Gel (Kgk), Kongreya Azadi U Demokrasiya Kurdistan, Kurdish Workers' Party (Pkk), Kurdistan Freedom And Defense Congress, Kurdistan Freedom And Democracy Congress, Kurdistan National Liberation Front (Ernk), Kurdistan National Liberty Army, Kurdistan People's Conference, Kurdistan Workers Party, Kurdistan Workers' Party, Kurdistan Worker's Party, Kurdistan Workers Party (Pkk), Kurdistan Worker's Party (Pkk), Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (Pkk), People' S Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), Peoples Congress Of Kurdistan, People's Congress Of Kurdistan, Peoples Defense Force, People's Defense Force, Peoples Liberation Army Of Kurdistan, People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan, Peoples Liberation

Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (Argk), Pkk/Kongra-Gel, The Peoples Congress Of Kurdistan, The People's Congress Of Kurdistan

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: KADEK, Kurdistan Halk Kongresi (KHK)

Group Formation: 1974

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PKK began in 1974 in Diyarbakir by a group of Kurdish students organized as the National Liberation Army (UKO) (karaca 2010, 38). The UKO was renamed to be the PKK in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan with a goal to fight for an independent Turkish state (Australian National Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Ocalan was inspired by Marxist ideology (Mackenzie Institute 2016). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the group began to emphasize Kurdish nationalism more than Marxism (Karaca 2010, 37). The

group came to attention in 1984 when it launched an armed struggle against the Turkish state (Mackenzie Institute 2016; Australian National Security n.d.).

Geography

The group claims territory in southeastern Turkey as part of Kurdistan including Hakkari province, Siirt, Adiyaman, Sirnak, and Agriman (Australian National Security n.d.). The PKK bases are located in the "PUK and KDP-controlled regions of the KRG" (Karaca 2010, 76). The HPG operates out of the Qandil mountains (Karaca 2010, 35).

The group primarily operated out of southeastern Turkey until 1991 when it began to move into western Turkey (Karaca 2010, 39).

Organizational Structure

PKK was initially led by Abdullah Ocalan who decided to form the PKK with other students while a university student in the 1970s (Mackenzie Institute 2016). After his arrest, he was replaced by Murat Karayilan (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The PKK has evolved into a very well-organized group. The armed wing is called the People's Defence Forces (HPG) (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The Central Executive Committee oversees everything including the Military Wing (ARGK), External Wing (ERNK), and other subcommittees (Karaca 2010, 33). The ERNK is in charge of propaganda, training, funding, contacts with other armed groups, and intelligence on Turkish security forces (Karaca 2010, 34). It has a women's wing called YAJK as well.

From 1984-1986, the PKK purposely targeted noncombatants that did not support their movement (Karaca 2010, 38).

It had approximately 7000 members at an unknown date (Mackenzie Institute 2016). It primarily funds itself through donations from supporters throughout Kurdistan as well as a Kurdish diaspora in Europe (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Members are primarily drawn from the Kurdish ethnic group and in rural areas often through personal connections (Australian National Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group primarily fought against other armed groups in the late 1970s (Karaca 2010). It had an alliance with DHKP/C from 1991 to 1998 (Karaca 2010, 39).

The group received external support from Greece including diplomatic, political, and funding, Syria, Russia, Iran, and Armenia (Karaca 2010, 46-51).

Group Outcome

Until 1980, the PKK namely fought against other armed groups in Turkey and Kurdish tribal leaders (Karaca 2010, 38). After the 1980 military coup, the PKK reorganized to create a formal military wing and in 1984 launched its "people's revolution" against the government (Karaca 2010, 38). Turkish counter-terrorism was largely ineffective at destroying the PKK until 1991 when it launched a series of offensives which pushed the PKK out of villages and towards the Qandil mountains (Karaca 2010, 40-41).

Ocalan was arrested by Turkish police in 1999 and sentenced to death, but it was later commuted (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The arrest had little effect on the group's actions. In 2013, the PKK announced a ceasefire with Turkish forces (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

II.   HEZBALLAH
       Torg ID: 208
       Min. Group Date: 1982
       Max. Group Date: 2012
       Onset: NA

Aliases: Hizbullah, Hizbollah, Hezbollah, Hezballah, Hizbullah, The Party of God, Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), Islamic Jihad Organization, Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Ansar al-Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansarollah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansar Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance), Organization of the Oppressed, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of Right Against Wrong and Followers of the Prophet Muhammed, Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Islamic Jihad Organization

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hezbollah was formed in 1982, in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, as a splinter of the prominent Shiite political party Amal (Martin 2011, 254; Masters 2014; Christian Science Monitor 2012). It formed in reaction to Israel's invasion of Lebanon (NCTC n.d.; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah supported the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon and the Palestinian fight against Israel (Martin 2011, 254; BBC 2016). It ascribes to a Shiite ideology and believes the eventual Islamic state should also be Shiite (Mackenzie Institute 2016; Global Security n.d.; Al Jazeera English 2016; Christian Science Monitor 2012). The group is strongly opposed to the influence of western countries as well as Israel's involvement in the Middle East (Masters 2014; Al Jazeera English 2016). The group's first violent incident is generally considered to be the bombing of military barracks in Beirut in 1983 (GTD 2017; Martin 2011, 255; Global Security n.d.).

Today, the group is involved in the Syrian civil war; they support the Assad regime (Masters 2014; BBC 2016).The group is also involved in Lebanese politics as a result of the Taif agreement; they competed in the 1992 elections (Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; BBC 2016). The group has reportedly moved from having deep Khomeinist roots to embodying a greater Islamic nationalist ideal (Masters 2014). The group removed Saad Hariri's

government, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and rooted in Sunni ideals (Masters 2014). The group also aims to liberate Jerusalem (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly targets Jewish individuals (BBC 2016).

Geography

The group came to attention in 1983 with the bombing of US military barracks in Beirut (Martin 2011, 255; Global Security n.d.). The group operates out of Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley), southern Beirut, and Ba'albek in Lebanon (Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; Christian Science Monitor 2012). Hezbollah also maintains external bases and cells around the world including Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe (Global Security; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.). The group has also carried out attacks in the Shebaa Farms zone which is disputed by the group and Israel (Masters 2014; BBC 2016). The group has also carried out attacks in Israel (Masters 2014).

Organizational Structure

The group was founded by a man named Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, as well as Imad Fayez Mughniyeh, and Muhammad Hussein (Counter Extremism Project). The group reportedly consists of a seven member council called the Shura Council (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial leader was Sheikh Sobhi Tufeili; he was replaced by Abbas Musawi in 1992 (Martin 2011, 254; Mackenzie Institute 2016). After Musawi was assassinated, Hassan Nasrallah replaced him as the leader of the group (Masters 2014; Mackenzie Institute 2016; Al Jazeera English 2016; Christian Science Monitor 2012). Naim Qassem was second-in-command of the group, and a man named Hussein al-Khalil was a top advisor to the leader of the group politically (Masters 2014). Another official of the group was a man named Imad Fayez Mugniyah, who was killed in 2008 (Masters 2014).

The group has developed a strong political wing which has even engaged in Lebanese politics placing members in Parliament continuously since 1992 (Martin 2011, 254-255). It organized a series of cells across southern Lebanon, but consolidated into a political party organization in 1985 when it released a formal manifesto (CFR 2014). The group gained popular support in the 1980s by fighting against occupying IDF forces in southern Lebanon and other communist militias (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah is led by the Shura Council including the group's leader, the Secretary General (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group estimates it had 5,000-10,000 different fighters and additional supporters as of 1993, but this has since dropped to about 500 (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly has ties with a group called Imam al-Mahdi, made up of youth that eventually join Hezbollah (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group coordinates with Tanzim, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP (Global Security

n.d.). It may have also provided external support to Tanzim in the Palestinian territories to fund their actions. President Reagan publicly agreed to not negotiate with Hezbollah following the events, but privately set up a secure channel and secured an arms-for-hostages deal (Martin 2011, 256). It is well known that the IRGC supports Hezbollah with money, weapons, training, and other aid totaling up to $200 million/year (CFR 2014; Masters 2014; Global Security n.d.; New York Times 2011). Syria and Iran also support Hezbollah (Global Security; Masters 2014). Syria is a key ally of Hezbollah, providing both a supply of arms into Lebanon and a safe haven for some of the group's leaders (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah explicitly states their allegiance to Iran, especially to their supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini (until his death in 1989), and to the current leader, Khamenei (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The group also has a charity and collects support through a Shi'a diaspora around the world (Global Security). The EU and the United States have accused the group of receiving support from the Qud Force of Iran (Masters 2014). The group is also reportedly allied with Iraq (Global Security n.d.). The group offers support for the Syrian president (Global Security n.d.; Masters 2014; New York Times 2011; Christian Science Monitor 2012). The group also reportedly has ties with Afghanistan (Global Security n.d.). The group also reportedly has ties with a group called Imam al-Mahdi, made up of youth that eventually join Hezbollah (Global Security n.d.). The group uses tactics such as hijacking, kidnapping, mortar or rocket attacks, tunneling, firearm attacks, suicide bombing, assassination, and explosive devices (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group has also exploited fundraising in Europe, the United States, and Arab Peninsula (Mackenzie Institute 2016; BBC 2016).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack was reportedly in 2017 when Hezbollah assailants allegedly kidnapped a Saudi citizen living in the Lebanese city Al-Aqiba (GTD 2017). Earlier that year, gunmen opened fire on the Wadi Hamid refugee camp in the town of Arsal, Lebanon, killing three Syrian refugees (GTD 2017). No group has taken responsibility for either of these attacks, but sources agree that it was most likely conducted by Hezbollah (GTD 2017). These were the last reports of Hezbollah allegedly conducting violent attacks. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has allegedly planned numerous attacks since then. For example, it has set up vast networks of cells, who have allegedly planned attacks in places around the globe like the UAE, Venezuela, and New York (Gulf News 2019; FP 2019; Times of Israel 2019). Hezbollah is still active today, primarily by maintaining a strong presence in Lebanese politics (Global Security n.d.). Hezbollah's political wing is recognized as a political party, and it performed well in the 2018 Lebanese elections, with its Shiite bloc gaining a majority in the parliament (The Guardian 2018).

Recently, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah has warned Israel and the United States that it has a stockpile of missiles capable of striking targets in Israel, perhaps indicating that Hezbollah still develops missiles and other arms (Haaretz 2019). Various state actors have taken measures to both militarily and diplomatically combat Hezbollah. Israel has conducted

airstrikes on Hezbollah's arms supply chain in Syria and fights with them Syria in an attempt to prevent the group's ally Iran from asserting regional hegemony (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Global Security n.d.). Israel and Hezbollah have a long history of conflict, beginning in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, when the latter employed guerrilla tactics (The Tower 2016). Experts predict that another violent confrontation between Israel and Lebanon is looming and will be more destructive than ever (The Tower 2016). The United Nations passed UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006, which presented a plan to end the war between Israel and Hezbollah, citing the violence and impact on civilians it caused; moreover, it required Hezbollah to disarm (United Nations 2006; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The resolution had little effect as Hezbollah continued to stockpile weapons (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The Lebanese government, tasked with the disarmament of Hezbollah, could not control the armed group as it was focused on improving the abysmal economic situation of the country (Global Security n.d.).

In 2015, the United States passed the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA), which sanctioned organizations, businesses, and people that support or do business with Hezbollah or any of its affiliates (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Lebanon did not take similar actions because Hezbollah forms a key part of its economy; sanctioning the group would make the poor economic situation worse (Counter Extremism Project n.d).

Notes for Iris:
--since 2017, there has been an organizational shift in Hezbollah's operations. It has adopted larger networks of cells -- whether these are ex ante cells or new cells -- is slightly unusual.
--the cells that are operational are not conducting violent attacks, but they do signal an increase in the transnational presence of the group

III.   AL-QA`IDA
       Torg ID: 28
       Min. Group Date: 1989
       Max. Group Date: 2012
       Onset: NA

       Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Qaida was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence and ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida attempts to achieve a state governed by sharia law and a conservative interpretation of Islam (FP 2012).They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology and ascribes to Salafi jihadist ideas (CFR 2012; Global Security n.d.; Blanchard 2007, 6).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherd or farmers) (FAS 2005). The group's leader Osama bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991 to 1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Organizational Structure
Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was the group's sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (CFR 2012). He was originally from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2015). His father, Mohammed bin Laden, moved from southern Yemen to Saudi Arabia, where he worked his way up from being a menial laborer to gaining favor with the royal family and constructing palaces and mosques for King Faisal (The Guardian 2015; PBS 2001). Osama bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia as one of fifty children (The Guardian 2015). After returning from a trip to Peshawar, Pakistan, he vocally advocated for support for the mujahideen (PBS 2001).

After collecting monetary donations for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, bin Laden first went to Afghanistan in 1982 and eventually fought in battles and established camps, which eventually

attracted more Saudis to the country (PBS 2001). Eventually, bin Laden established Al-Qa'edah, or "The Base" as the center of his mujahideen operations. After the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, bin Laden again went to Afghanistan (PBS 2001). He was unable to leave the country as he had been banned from travel for trying to spread jihad to Yemen (PBS 2001). In response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, bin Laden argued that all Arab mujahideen should be brought to defend the country (PBS 2001). Then, bin Laden learned that the United States would enter the conflict in Kuwait (PBS 2001). This was a turning point for bin Laden. He gathered religious support and led 4000 people to receive jihadist training in Afghanistan (PBS 2001). He spent a short while in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but eventually escaped from Saudi and Pakistani authorities to Sudan where he received temporary refuge (PBS 2001). In 1996, he left Sudan and returned to Afghanistan, where he conducted attacks against civilians and American forces on the Arabian Peninsula (PBS 2001). After the Taliban took over the Afghan city of Jalalabad, bin Laden joined the group (PBS 2001). The Saudis and the U.S. tried unsuccessfully many times to kidnap bin Laden (PBS 2001). He was finally defeated when American Navy SEALS raided his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan (History 2018).

Following his death, he was replaced as leader by Ayman al-Zawhiri in 2011 (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex decentralized, or cell-based, organizational structure in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head (RAND 2008). Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS 2001). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security n.d.). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). As of 2015, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary wildly by source (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Both the government of Saudi Arabia and the US Central Intelligence Agency allegedly provided money and supplies to the mujahideen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan before al-Qaida formally organized (Crenshaw 2015). Some reports claim that the CIA itself sent more than $600 million to mujahideen associated with bin Laden (Crenshaw 2015). Some reports allege that Saudi Arabia funded Al-Qaida through drug trafficking and diamonds, though these claims are now considered to have been falsified and invalid (Crenshaw 2015). Bin Laden maintained ties with key members of the Saudi royal family; some, including Prince Faisal, allegedly provided Al-Qaida with large monetary donations (Crenshaw 2015; CNN 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaida to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, The

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS 2001).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a U.S. raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

Notes for Iris:
-check to see if there's evidence of AQ wanting to move away from Afghanistan in the late 90s

IV.   ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP
      Torg ID: 82
      Min. Group Date: 1992
      Max. Group Date: 2011
      Onset: NA

      Aliases: Armed Islamic Group (Gia), Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah Al-Musallah, Armed Islamic Group, Gia [Armed Islamic Group], Groupes Islamiques Armes (Gia)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Armed Islamic Group; Groupe Islamique Armé; al Muwahhidun, Groupe Islamique Armée; GIA; Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallah; Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallah; Green Khmer; Groupe Islamique Arme; Groupement Islamique Arme; Jama'a Islamiya Moussalaha

Min. Group Date: 1992

Max. Group Date: 2005

Part 3. Narrative

As of 2012, the group was inactive. The Salafist group's goal was to create an Islamic state in Algeria. The group's media releases also specified, unlike their contemporary AIS, that violence was necessary to the creation of this state as the current government was tainted both by infidels and French influence.

Group Formation

The GIA formed in 1992 by Afghan veterans to fight the Algerian government after they nullified the results of the 1991 elections (FAS 2004). The group came to attention for its first violent attack the same year (FAS 2004). The group was a more radical Islamist group than other factions in the Algerian Civil War (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Its political

aim was to overthrow the Algerian government and establish an Islamic state (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

Geography

The group primarily operated in the center of Algeria. It allegedly had cells in Europe as well including France, Belgium, and Italy (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

The group operated violently in, broadly, two ways: within Algeria, they conducted a form of guerrilla warfare that included burning entire villages for having AIS sympathizers and massacring even children in order to control regions. Outside of Algeria, notably in France, they conducted a more traditional cell-based terror campaign, such as when they hijacked an Air France plane in 1994 or the 1995 Paris Métro bombings. The group was primarily urban and based in the center of the country (as opposed to AIS, which operated primarily outside of city centers).

The group may have had a transnational base of operations in Morocco, but this is never confirmed (Gleditsch et al. 2013).

Organizational Structure

Members of the group were ex-fighters from the Soviet-Afghanistan War (FAS 2004). In 1994, the group was recruiting approximately 500 members a week although it is unknown how many fighters this entailed (Mackenzie Institute 2015). In 2003, the group had fewer than 100 members (FAS 2004; Mackenzie Institute 2015). In 1996, it was forcibly recruiting young men to join its ranks (Canada IRB 1996). By 1999, it was no longer forcibly recruiting members (Canada IRB 1999). The group had a propaganda wing known as Al-Ansar (Canada IRB 1996). The group primarily funds itself through extortion and criminal activities (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

The group had a number of leaders over the years, including Abdelhak Layada, Djafar al-Afghani and Cherif Gousmi. After Gousmi's death in 1994, the group's most well known leader, Djamel Zitouni, gained control. Zitouni was the son of a chicken farmer in Algiers. He began the phase of attacks on French soil. After his death, the group split: one faction condemned the group's continued senseless violence and formed the GSPC, led by Hattab; the other faction, led by Antar Zouabri, continued with their mission though with many fewer fighters (CFR 2009). The group operated in a cell-based fashion the group started as a political movement based on the beliefs of Salafi Islam that very quickly became violent and does not have a formal political wing. The group has strong support in urban areas.

External Ties

In 1998, a faction of the GIA splintered off to form the GSPC (CFR 2009; c.f. AQIM profile). The group originally assisted the FIS, but stopped after the FIS created its own armed wing, the AIS, in 1993 (Hafez 2000).

The group explicitly received support from Sudan in 1997 (Gleditsch et al. 2013). The group also allegedly received support from Iran but this is not specified.

Group Outcome

State responses were harsh: the Algerian government went so far as to detain and torture suspected GIA fighters and used media to vilify the group. The French also arrested, detained and questioned hundreds of people in the wake of attacks.

In 1998, the GIA lost many members when the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat splintered from the GIA (CFR 2009). In 2002, the Algerian Civil War ended when the FIS announced a ceasefire (CFR 2009). In 2004, the Algerian government launched a counterterrorism campaign, which involved a repressive crackdown against the GIA and led to the arrest of 400 members (CFR 2009). The group's last known violent attack was in 2005 (Mackenzie Institute 2005).

V. TUNISIAN ARMED RESISTANCE
    Torg ID: 9021
    Min. Group Date: 1980
    Max. Group Date: 1980
    Onset: NA

    Aliases: NA

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: RAT, Résistance Armée Tunisienne, Resistance Arme Tunisienne, Rsistance Arme Tunisienne

Group Formation: 1980

Group End: 1980 (executions)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Tunisian Armed Resistance first came to attention when group operatives crossed the border from Algeria to Tunisia on January 27, 1980 and took control of the police and military headquarters in Gafsa (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523). The attackers, armed with rifles, automatic firearms, and grenades, violently stormed the police barracks and nearby buildings, killing between 41 and 48 people and injuring about 100 others (GTD 2018; DADM n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523). After a day of fierce fighting, Tunisian forces regained control of the barracks and the town (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523). Sources disagree wildly about how many group operatives were involved in this attack. One source indicates it was 29, another indicates that it was about 50, and another

indicates that approximately 100 people were involved (DADM n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; GTD 2018). RAT said that the attack was the start of a broader revolution to overthrow the government of Tunisia (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523). Schmid and Jongman (1988, 673) confirm the main facts, but date the incident to January 27, 1981.

Geography

RAT operated in Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; Alexander 2010, 19; Zoubir and Dris-Aït-Hamadouche n.d., 33). The group primarily operated in Algeria, where it was based before its seizing of and attack in Gafsa (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; Alexander 2010, 19; Zoubir and Dris-Aït-Hamadouche n.d., 33). The group conducted its first and only known attack when it crossed the border from Algeria into Tunisia and attacked the city of Gafsa in western Tunisia (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; Lea and Rowe 2001, 445). RAT used Libya as an external sanctuary, where the Libyan government allegedly provided them support (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523). In Libya, operatives were allegedly trained in 20 Libyan camps (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's leadership. Estimates about the group's membership size vary wildly from about 50 to 300 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 524; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). Additionally, some sources indicate that approximately 7000 were affiliated to RAT (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). The group reportedly consisted of soldiers and militants from Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Mali, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Senegal, Ivory Coast, the Philippines, Pakistan, South Korea, and Ireland (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). Muammar Gaddafi's Libyan government allegedly supported the group financially and militarily and may have been RAT's main source of funding (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; DADM n.d.).

Sources disagree wildly about how many group operatives were involved in this attack. One source indicates it was 29, another indicates that it was about 50, and another indicates that approximately 100 people were involved (DADM n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; GTD 2018).

External Ties

RAT was allegedly supported financially and militarily by Muammar Gaddafi's Libyan government (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; DADM n.d.). RAT operatives were allegedly trained in camps in Libya (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). Tunisian authorities alleged that the attack in Gafsa was carried out on the orders of the Libyan government (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523). The Libyan government denied these allegations (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523).

Group Outcome

After RAT seized the military barracks in the early morning of January 27, 1980, Tunisian forces fought the group and won back the barracks and other buildings by night (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523). In response to RAT's attack in Gafsa, the Tunisian government was quick to blame the Libyan government for supporting and potentially ordering the attack (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; DADM n.d.). The day after the attack, the Tunisian government requested military assistance from the government of France (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; DADM n.d.). The government of France promptly provided Tunisia with combat planes, helicopters, and warships, as well as military advisors (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523; DADM n.d.). The French government also decreased its diplomatic relations with Libya by temporarily closing the Libyan Embassy in Paris, as well as removing the Libyan ambassador from France (DADM n.d). Three days after the attack, the government of Tunisia ended diplomatic relations with the government of Libya (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 523). The government of the United States accelerated its transfers of arms and armored vehicles to Tunisia to help the nation cope with the group (DADM n.d.). On April 17, 1980, thirteen people, allegedly a part of RAT, were executed for involvement in the attacks in Gafsa (DADM n.d.; Lea and Rowe 2001, 445). The group is no longer active.

Notes for Iris:
-what went wrong for this group? The state's quick response was critical. Tunisian forces quickly mobilized and were able to take back the barracks. France was also quick to respond and provided Tunisia key military assistance to prevent groups from launching attacks like this again. The group gets arrested or destroyed.
-there is interesting origin of US-Tunisian arms transfer; the US had already been selling arms to the country, but increased after this one attack
-France also increased its sales to Tunisia after this one incident

VI.   JAMAA COMBATTANTE TUNISIENNE (JCT)
      Torg ID: 499
      Min. Group Date: 2000
      Max. Group Date: 0
      Onset: NA

      Aliases: Tunisian Combatant Group (Tcg), Groupe Combattant Tunisien, Jama A Combattante Tunisienne (Jct), Jamaa Combattante Tunisienne (Jct), Jama'a Combattante Tunisienne (Jct), Tunisian Combat Group, Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group

      Part 1. Bibliography
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ansar al Sharia Tunisia

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: 2012 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Tunisian Combatant Group reportedly formed around 2000 with the primary objective of creating an Islamic state in Tunisia (FAS 2003; MIPT 2008). The group's first attack was the assassination of a Northern Alliance leader on September 9, 2001 (Joscelyn 2012; Arieff and Humud 2014). The group allegedly plotted an attack in Rome in December 2001, but failed to carry it out (FAS 2000).

Geography

JCT operated in Afghanistan and Western Europe (FAS 2003; MIPT 2008). Most of its violent activities occurred in Afghanistan (Arieff and Humud 2014). The group had cells in France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UN

2018). The group pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida at a meeting in Khost, Afghanistan (UN 2018).

Organizational Structure

The group's leaders are Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine (FAS 2003). The group's members are Tunisian (FAS 2003). The group's organizational structure consisted of cells reportedly in Afghanistan and Western Europe (MIPT 2008). Many members received training in Al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan before operating in Europe (UN 2018).

External Ties

JCT was associated with Al Qaeda and pledged support to them (FAS 2003; UN 2018). Many members received training in Al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan before operating in Europe (UN 2018). Operatives trained in Al-Qaida camps (UN 2018). The group had unspecified ties with Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, or GSPC, and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM (FAS 2003; UN 2018). The group coordinated its activities with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (UN 2018).

Group Outcome

In 2000, the UN imposed sanctions on the group for their affiliation with Al-Qaida (FAS 2003). In 2001, Belgian police arrested Maaroufi (FAS 2003; MIPT 2008). In 2002, the US government placed JCT leadership on the SDN list (Arieff and Humud 2014). In 2003, an Italian court convicted several JCT members (MIPT 2008). In the same year, Turkey arrested Hassine on charges being affiliated to Al-Qaida (UN 2018). In 2011, a group operative, Abou Iyadh, renamed the group Ansar al Sharia Tunisia after his release from prison (Arieff and Humud 2014). Maaroufi also left prison in 2011 and returned to Tunisia (Arieff and Humud 2014). In 2012, the group launched an attack against a school in Tunis (Joscelyn 2012).

VII.   ANSAR AL-SHARIA IN TUNISIA
Torg ID: 9022
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: AST, AAS-T, Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia), Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia, Supporters of Islamic Law, Ansar al-Shariah (Tunisia), Ansar al-Shariah in Tunisia, Al-Qayrawan Media Foundation, Ansar al-Shari'ah, Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia, Ansar al-Shari'ah in Tunisia, Partisans of Islamic Law in Tunisia, Partisans of Sharia in Tunisia, Shabab al-Tawhid, ST, Supporters of Islamic Law in Tunisia, Supporters of Sharia in Tunisia, Ansar al Sharia

Group Formation: 2011 (form), 2012 (violent)

Group End: 2014 (stopped using violence), 2015 (stopped conducting meaningful operations) (repression, arrests, possible splinter, rise of other armed groups)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Along with other jihadist and Salafi groups, Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia formed in April 2011 in the midst of the chaos that followed the Tunisian revolution in which Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the leader of Tunisia, fell (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Washington Institute 2018; Petre 2015, 1). Especially in its first year of operation, AST participated in dawa, the Islamic practice of social, charitable, and religious work, and proselytization as key means of spreading its influence and establishing Sharia law (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; War on the Rocks 2014; Jadaliyya 2013; Middle East Monitor 2015). The group conducted its first violent attack on September 14, 2012 when group operatives committed arson by using incendiary explosives to set fire to the U.S. embassy in Tunis, the capital of Tunisia; the group also attacked a nearby American school (GTD 2018; Arieff and Humud 2014, 2; Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; United States Department of State 2018; United Nations Security Council n.d.; Petre 2015, 2; New York Times 2019; International Crisis Group 2013). 4 people died, and 46 were injured (GTD 2018).

AST was a Salafi jihadist group, whose main objective was the formation of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; War on the Rocks 2014; Jadaliyya 2013; Middle East Monitor 2015; Petre 2015, 1). An anonymous AST member stated that the group wanted a return to "pure Islam" (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The group reportedly opposes democracy, a

system it believes to be functionally incompatible with Sharia law (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

Geography

AST primarily operated in Tunisia (GTD 2018; Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; United States Department of State 2018). It conducted many attacks in Tunis, the capital city (GTD 2018). The group also conducted attacks in Kasserine, Ghardimaou, Goubellat, Sidi Ali Bin Aoun, Sousse, and Monastir (GTD 2018). AST also operated in Libya (GTD 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; United States Department of State 2018). Group members may have received training in Libya at unspecified camps (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). In 2014, the group conducted two attacks in Tripoli, Libya (GTD 2018). Members of the group may have fought in Syria; however, it is unknown whether AST itself operated there (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Washington Institute 2018; Middle East Monitor 2015; Petre 2015, 2).

Organizational Structure

AST had many wings including a dawa wing, a media wing, and a violent armed wing (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Petre 2015, 2-3).

Some reports state that the group was centralized; others say that it was unorganized and consisted of decentralized cells (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Each local branch, consisting of approximately twenty people in a city, had a degree of autonomy (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Many AST members have highlighted the individual groups' small size and autonomy as crucial to the group's success (Global Extremism Project n.d.; Jadaliyya 2013). Despite these small, decentralized units, the central leadership of AST had control over all of its branches and wings (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

AST was founded by Seifallah Ben Hussein, who is also known as Abu Iyad al-Tunisi (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; United States Department of States 2018; United Nations Security Council n.d.). Hussein was originally a member of Al-Qaida and fought in Afghanistan (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Hussein was reportedly associated with bin Laden (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). He was arrested and subsequently imprisoned in 2001 after escaping from Tora Bora (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). He was released in 2011 and founded AST soon after (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Hussein was the group's leader until June 2015, when he was killed in an airstrike in Libya (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

Kamel Zarrouk was the deputy leader of the group until 2014, when he died in Syria fighting for IS (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Wael Amami succeeded Zarrouk as deputy leader (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Seifeddine Rais was the group's spokesperson until July 2014 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Petre 2015, 2). He was affiliated with IS (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Hassan Ben Brik was the leader of the dawa committee (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Youssef Mazouz was the leader of AST's recruitment and youth wing (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Ahmed al-Akrami managed the medical and humanitarian aspects of the group (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Sami Ben Khemais Essid and Mehdi Kammoun were high-ranking officials of AST, who were also affiliated with Al-Qaida in Italy (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

AST's key to its success in recruitment was due to expanding of its influence. Through robust dawa, or charitable, efforts, AST was able to expand its influence by materially changing people's dire conditions (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The group also took advantage of Tunisians' disappointment in the government (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). AST's provision of social services made many people sympathetic towards their cause (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). The group primarily focused on recruiting students (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). It did this in two ways. First, AST members set up "preaching tents" on school campuses to recruit students (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Second, the group's media division, al-Qayrawan Media Foundation, used social networking platforms like Facebook and Twitter to garner and consolidate its support (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

The group's size estimates vary wildly from 1000 in 2013 to 70,000 in 2014 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

AST had many sources of funding. Tunisian charities donated money to the group (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Approximately 120 legal charities, both Tunisian and foreign, funded the group (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). In addition, many organizations illicitly transferred money and goods to the group (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). High-ranking U.S. and Tunisian officials alleged that AST received funding from Al-Qaida and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Tunisian officials alleged that AST was illicitly financed from unnamed sources in , Yemen, Libya, and Mali (Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, or ASL, may have funded the group (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

External Ties

Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia had ties to its namesake group in Libya, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, or ASL (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Washington Institute 2018). AST and ASL both participated in dawa and seemed to have

similar goals and ideologies (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Though both AST and ASL operated fairly independently, ASL may have funded and/or transferred arms to AST (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Much remains unknown about the groups' connections to each other (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

AST may have started as a front for Al-Qaida (Washington Institute 2018). Seifallah Ben Hussein, AST's leader, personally knew top Al-Qaida leaders like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Hussein was a member of Al-Qaida and fought in Afghanistan (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). He reportedly fought alongside bin Laden in Tora Bora (Mapping MIlitant Organizations 2018). Two high-ranking AST officials, Sami Ben Khemais Essid and Mehdi Kammoun, coordinated Al-Qaida operations in Italy (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). AST expressed their support for Al-Qaida on their Facebook page in 2013 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). High-ranking U.S. and Tunisian officials alleged that AST received funding from Al-Qaida (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

The United Nations officially determined that AST "participat[ed] in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of" the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (United Nations Security Council n.d.). Seifallah Ben Hussein pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). He allegedly worked with Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who was a commander of AQIM (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). High-ranking U.S. and Tunisian officials alleged that AST received funding from Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (Counter Extremism Project n.d.).

AST was allegedly linked to Katibat Uqbah Ibn Nafi, an armed group that operated near the border between Algeria and Tunisia (War on the Rocks 2014). The primary reason why AST may have had ties with Katibat Uqbah Ibn Nafi was to maintain ties with AQIM (War on the Rocks 2014).

AST and many of its key leaders and members were linked to Islamic State (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; United Nations Security Council n.d.; Washington Institute 2018; Middle East Monitor 2015; Petre 2015, 3). The group's spokesperson, Seifeddine Rais, pledged support for IS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.). Many members of AST fought for IS prior to or after their involvement in AST (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

It is unusual for a group to both be affiliated with Al-Qaida and IS due to their different religious views and ideologies. Nevertheless, AST had ties to Al-Qaida and IS and explicitly supported both (Middle East Monitor 2015). It was difficult for AST to choose a

side due to the ideological divide between Al-Qaida and IS (Middle East Monitor 2015). Instead, AST chose to remain neutral (Middle East Monitor 2015).

In the AST's early days, it had ties to al-Nadha, a political party (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). However, this relationship began to fade away as AST increased its use of violence and al-Nadha gained more political power (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). To maintain its legitimacy, al-Nadha began to recognize AST as a terrorist organization in 2013 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

There is no evidence about potential ties between Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and two of its namesake groups, Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen and Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen and Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt seem to only have been affiliated to AST through the shared name, similar ideologies, and use of dawa (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). AST, as well as its namesake groups, appear to be independent (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

Group Outcome

In 2013, the assassinations of leftist, secular Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi drew attention. Members or followers of AST were allegedly responsible. Soon after, the Tunisian government commenced a large effort to suppress the group (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Middle East Monitor 2015; Petre 2015, 2-3; War on the Rocks 2014). On August 27, 2013, the government of Tunisia classified AST as a terrorist organization (Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Washington Institute 2018; Middle East Monitor 2015; Petre 2015, 3; War on the Rocks 2014). During this large effort to suppress the group, many AST members were arrested, and others were forced to flee (Petre 2015, 3). For example, Hussein allegedly fled to Libya, where he was reportedly killed in an airstrike (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Petre 2015, 3). Many of the group's members joined other groups like Islamic State, Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Katibat Uqbah Ibn Nafi, Jabhat al-Nusra, and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (Washington Institute 2018; Petre 2015, 3). The Tunisian government successfully prevented the group from conducting violent or proselytizing practices ever again (Petre 2015, 3). Nevertheless, the downfall of AST coincided with the rise of other militant groups, like IS and Al-Qaida, in Tunisia (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018; Counter Extremism Project n.d.; Washington Institute 2018; Petre 2015, 3; New York Times 2019). The group is no longer active. AST conducted its last known attack on July 16, 2014, when it attacked Tunisian soldiers near Tunisia's border with Algeria (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

Notes for Iris:
-dual relationship with AQ and IS is unusual. Extent of AQ ties are through the leader's historical background and foreign fighter training in Afghanistan. AST members were also previously foreign fighters from IS in Syria. A lot of people had pledged support.

Contemporary AQ support via AQIM and historical AQ support via Al Qaeda (the base) and bin Laden. Allegations of AQIM funding for AST.

-govt had some operations against AST pre-2013, but the political assassination was a huge turning point in the scale of the operations against the group

-Belaid was the leader of a top-ranking opposition party and Brahm was in office (also a top-ranking official)

-intensity of operations increased in 2014 (not whether any operations or not)

VIII.   MOUVEMENT DE LA TENDANCE ISLAMIQUE
Torg ID: 9027
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: MTI, Le Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique, Mouvement de tendance islamique, ITM, Islamic Trend Movement, Islamic Tendency Movement

Group Formation: 1981

Group End: 1987 (last year of violence) (repression, arrests, fleeing of leaders), active (Al-Nahda, the group's political party, remains active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique was officially formed on May 31, 1981 in Tunis (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). The group formed primarily due to the modernist reform policies and the dismantling of religious institutions and norms by the government of Habib Bourguiba, the then-president of Tunisia (Boulby 1988, 591).

Nevertheless, the group allegedly used violence before May 1981. The group's first series of attacks occurred in February 1981 when MTI members reportedly led, participated in, and/or encouraged violent demonstrations at Tunisian schools and colleges (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673; Alexander 2010, 19). The group has also been attributed to conducting bombings at hotels (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673; Alexander 2010, 19).

The group's ideology can be described as Islamic fundamentalist (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673; Alexander 2010, 19). MTI advocated for a shift back to a more radical Islamic

"tendency" and a stricter, more literal interpretation of the Quran (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). The group may have been center-seeking and allegedly was part of a larger plot to overthrow the Tunisian government (Zoubir and Dris-Aït-Hamadouche n.d., 33). MTI opposed secular government, particularly that of Habib Bourguiba, the then-president of Tunisia, and believed that the government should act in accordance with and be focused on maintaining a traditional interpretation of Islam (Boulby 1988, 590). Shortly after declaring itself a political party, MTI explained that its main goals were to spur a renewal of traditional Islamic thought and principles in Tunisia, reorganize life "along humanitarian guidelines," and fight for rights and freedoms for Tunisians (Boulby 1988, 604).

The concept and goal of democracy has been one on which MTI has struggled to take a firm stance (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Boulby 1988, 604-605). The group purported its support for democracy (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Boulby 1988, 604-605). However, MTI leaders including Rachid Ghannouchi have stated that the ideals of democracy may be incompatible with the Quran (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Boulby 1988, 605).

Geography

MTI was a domestic armed group and likely operated exclusively in Tunisia (Alexander 2010, 19). The group officially formed in Tunis, the capital of Tunisia (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). In addition to conducting attacks and violent demonstrations in Tunis, MTI also conducted bomb attacks at hotels in Sousse and Monastir (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673; Alexander 2010, 19).

Organizational Structure

The founders of MTI included Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdel Fattah Mourou (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). The group's leaders may have been former members of the Tunisian Quranic Preservation Society, or the Association for the Preservation of the Koran (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Boulby 1988, 602).

Rachid Ghannouchi was regarded as a sheikh and was a member of the ulema, a class of Tunisia's religious elite (Boulby 1988, 591-593). Due to the land, educational, and religious reform policies of the secular president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, Ghannouchi and other sheikhs departed from Tunisia (Boulby 1988, 593). Ghannouchi went to Syria to study (Boulby 1988, 593). He returned to Tunis in 1970, where he became involved with halqa, or seminars, about Islam that were being facilitated by other sheiks including Abdel Fattah Mourou and Ahmed ben Miled (Boulby 1988, 599).

Throughout the 1970s, the group continued expanding by forming a temporary liaison with the Association for the Preservation of the Koran and by gaining influence in more than 300 mosques by setting up seminars and discussions about Islam (Boulby 1988, 599). In the late 1970s, the group expanded its message from purely social and religious ideas to political ones as well (Boulby 1988, 603).

In 1981, when MTI officially formed, it declared itself a political party, but it had already begun to use violence (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Boulby 1988, 603-604).

Due to Ghannouchi condonation of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, some MTI leaders including Abdel Fattah Mourou left the group (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). This exodus of Mourou and other leaders from MTI allowed Ghannouchi to become the de facto and later official leader of Al-Nahda (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994).

MTI and its current political incarnation, Al-Nahda, have operated clandestinely (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). As such, little is known about the group's organizational structure (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994).

At an unclear point in MTI's evolution, Al-Nahda, its political wing, became the predominant operational body of the group. At this point, the group no longer used violence, and instead operated more as a political party.

MTI operated its own journal called El Maarifa (Boulby 1988, 603).

The concept and goal of democracy has been one on which MTI has struggled to take a firm stance (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Boulby 1988, 604-605). The group purported its support for democracy (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Boulby 1988, 604-605). However, MTI leaders including Rachid Ghannouchi have stated that the ideals of democracy may be incompatible with the Quran (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Boulby 1988, 605). Additionally, the group allegedly had a wing explicitly committed to resistance to democracy (Boulby 1988, 605).

MTI mostly consists of educated youth (Boulby 1988, 605). Many of the group's members are from "the families of urban and rural labourers or of the petit bourgeoisie" (Boulby 1988, 605). Many of the group's members received a Western education (Boulby 1988, 605). Many had been disillusioned with their Western education because it had failed to help them attain upward economic mobility (Boulby 1988, 605). Most MTI members were from more urban regions such as the greater Tunis area and the northeastern Sahel (Boulby 1988, 606). Many of the group's members were students who were attending college (Boulby 1988, 606).

Not much is known about the group's source of funding. Tunisian authorities alleged that the group had ties to Iran (Boulby 1988, 611; Zoubir and Dris-Aït-Hamadouche n.d., 33). MTI may have been financed by Iran (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994).

External Ties

MTI was inspired by and reportedly had close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Al Jazeera 2011; Al Jazeera 2011; Lounnas 2019, 98). Some members of MTI reportedly were members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994; Lounnas 2019, 98). In the early 1980s, some MTI members who wanted to use violence to achieve political goals left the Muslim Brotherhood (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994).

In an interview, Rachid Ghannouchi said that "[t]he Turkish experience remains closest to the Tunisian situation" (Al Jazeera 2011). He stated that the ideology of the AKP was "the closest comparison" to that of Al-Nahda (Al Jazeera 2011). The AKP, or Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, is also known as the JDP, or Justice and Development Party (Oxford Islamic Studies Online n.d.). The AKP is a conservative Islamic party in Turkey, which was formed by Recip Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, and Bülent Arınç in 2001 (Oxford Islamic Studies Online n.d.). It won a majority the next year in the 2002 Turkish elections (Oxford Islamic Studies Online n.d.). Like MTI, AKP follows a strict interpretation of Islam (Oxford Islamic Studies Online n.d.).

Though they were eventually attributed to members of MTI, the Habib Dhaoui Group claimed responsbility for bombings of hotels in Sousse and Monastir on August 2, 1987 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). For this reason, MTI may have had ties to the Habib Dhaoui Group.

Tunisian authorities alleged that MTI had external ties to Iran (Boulby 1988, 611; Zoubir and Dris-Aït-Hamadouche n.d., 33). In 1989, MTI was charged with plotting with Iran (Zoubir and Dris-Aït-Hamadouche n.d., 33). Some MTI members reportedly made trips to Iran (Boulby 1988, 611).

Group Outcome

In July 1981, Tunisian authorities began a crack down on MTI and other Islamist groups in the country (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). During this time, Tunisian authorities arrested many Islamic fundamentalists including members of MTI (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). Many important members of MTI evaded authorities and subsequently fled the country; many MTI leaders went to France (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673).

In September 1981, 61 MTI members were arrested (Boulby 1988, 609). The group's leaders were tried for "propagating false information, belonging to an illegal organi[z]ation and defaming the state" (Boulby 1988, 609). Most individuals who were arrested were given short prison sentences (Boulby 1988, 609). In an attempt to take advantage of the arrests, Habib Bourguiba's government increased regulations on the press and the media, banned certain Islamic practices, and attempted to further secularize Tunisia (Boulby 1988, 609). Nevertheless, the arrests and increased societal regulation were insufficient to quell MTI's potency and influence (Boulby 1988, 609).

Following the bombings at hotels in Souuse and Monastir, six suspected members of MTI were arrested and interrogated (Boulby 1988, 611). The suspects initially denied affiliation with MTI (Boulby 1988, 611). However, after being subjected to torture, the suspects divulged that they were members of MTI (Boulby 1988, 611).

In March 1987, authorities arrested, tried, and charged MTI leaders for "instigating violent demonstrations of fundamentalist students" (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673).

Another period of repression against MTI began in 1991 due to allegations that the group was plotting a conspiracy to overthrow the government (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). No evidence exists that substantiates this conspiracy. In reality, the government of Tunisia likely cracked down on the group because the group's 1989 parliamentary elections performance made the ruling party perceive Al-Nahda as a potential threat to its power (Arieff and Humud 2014, 6). This period of repression was more successful than the previous ones (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). The group arrested Abdel Fattah Mourou (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). As a result of the repression, Al-Nahda began to operate even more clandestinely (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). In 1992, Rachid Ghannouchi was tried and sentenced to life in prison for conspiring against the state (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). In 1993, Ghannouchi fled to the United Kingdom, where he resided for a while under refugee status (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). Al-Nahda remains committed to the original goals of MTI (Al Jazeera 2011). In 2011, the interim government of Tunisia permitted Al-Nahda to be recognized as a legitimate political party (Al Jazeera 2011). Al-Nahda performed well in the 2011 elections (Arieff and Humud 2014, 6). Al-Nadha still maintains a presence in Tunisian politics (Arieff and Humud 2014, 6; Al Jazeera 2011).

Notes for Iris:
-al-Nahda is the political wing or outward-facing component of the group
-at some point, MTI → al-Nadha and stopped using violence. They had operated as a political organization before (and participated in 1989 election) but were then banned from participating due to their unexpected success. In 1989, group suffered another crackdown from the government. After the Arab Spring, al-Nadha they had more political legitimacy and were permitted to run as an "official" party.

IX.   MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE REVOLUTIONNAIRE (MPR)
       Torg ID: 9028
       Min. Group Date: 0
       Max. Group Date: 0
       Onset: NA

       Aliases: None

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  YTU1SF9eo6Y22hRoVA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwijxvqVmYXjAhXbJDQIHYR7CisQ
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  60FB224F13?doi=10.1.1.214.7790&rep=rep1&type=pdf

       Part 2. Basic Coding

       Aliases: Popular Revolutionary Movement

       Group Formation: early 1980s, 1982 or earlier

       Group End: 1982 (arrests)

       Part 3. Narrative

       Group Formation

       Mouvement Populaire Revolutionnaire was formed in the early 1980s (Alexander 2010,
19). It first came to attention as a violent group in 1982 when Tunisian police arrested 10 MPR
members (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). The group allegedly plotted attacks in Tunis
(Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673; Alexander 2010, 19). MPR may have also been involved in
plots to conduct attacks and "criminal acts" throughout the greater Tunis area, both in the
metropolitan city center and the suburbs (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). Not much is known
about the specifics of these plots. The most specific source describes the plots as targeted

against "certain institutions" in Tunis and the suburban area surrounding it (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). Sources describe the nature of the plots as "criminal" and "terrorist" acts (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673; Alexander 2010, 19). Nothing is known about the group's ideology or political goals.

Geography

MPR operated in Tunisia (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673; Alexander 2010, 19; Zoubir and Dris-Aït-Hamadouche n.d., 33). The group allegedly plotted attacks in Tunis (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673; Alexander 2010, 19). MPR may have also been involved in plots to conduct attacks and "criminal acts" throughout the greater Tunis area, both in the metropolitan city center and the suburbs (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the organizational structure, leadership, membership, or source of funding of MPR. The group was likely small. Its membership size was likely in the "10s" in 1982 as the arrest of ten suspected MPR members was seemingly sufficient to preclude the group from meaningfully operating (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673).

External Ties

Nothing is known about MPR's ties to other actors. It was operating at the same time at MTI and RAT, but there is no evidence of any connections to these groups.

Group Outcome

In November 1982, ten members believed to have been members of MPR were arrested on charges of "preparing criminal acts against certain institutions in the capital and its suburbs" (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 673). This was likely sufficient to prevent MPR from conducting any violent attacks.

Notes for Iris:
-they seem foiled before they actually commit violence
-terrorist/criminal adjectives used interchangeably
-target of attacks is very ambiguous/unclear

X.   OKBA IBN NAAFA BRIGADE
       Torg ID: 9023
       Min. Group Date: 0
       Max. Group Date: 0
       Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Katibat Uqba Ibn Nafi

Group Formation: 2012 (first attack)

Group End: probably 2016 (counterterrorism operations)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade first came to attention as a violent group in 2012 (Wilson Center 2017). The group conducted attacks on security forces in the Chaambi Mountains region near Tunisia's border with Algeria (Arieff and Humud 2014, 7; United States Department of State 2017; United States Department of State 2016; Wilson Center 2017). Since then, the group started conducting attacks on civilian targets in nearby towns (United States Department of State 2016; Reuters 2017).

Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade was a jihadi and Salafi group (Arieff and Humud 2014, 7; Malka 2014, 92-93). Unlike some jihadi-salafi groups like Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade did not pursue humanitarian and religious efforts to expand its influence (Malka 2014, 92). Rather, the group utilized "Al-Qaida's traditional method" of guerrilla fighting (Malka 2014, 92). This entailed shadowy, yet organized, guerrilla tactics in which "bands of underground fighters … launch[ed] violent attacks against security forces and the government" (Malka 2014, 92). One of the group's goals may have been to replace the government of Tunisia with an Islamic state (Malka 2014, 93).

Geography

Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade's cell is based in the Chaambi Mountains region, a mountainous, remote region in northwestern Tunisia (Arieff and Humud 2014, 7; Wilson Center 2017; Reuters 2017; Malka 2014, 92). The group operated in the Chaambi Mountains region as well as other locations near Tunisia-Algeria border (Arieff and Humud 2014, 7; Wilson Center 2017; Reuters 2017; Humud 2015, 1; Malka 2014, 92). Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade also operated in the city of Kasserine, just east of the Chaambi Mountains region (GTD 2018; Malka 2014, 93, 109). In addition to the Chaambi Mountains region and Kasserine, the group conducted attacks in Henchir Attel, Sidi Ali Bin Aoun, Henchir Tella, Tourief, Tunis, Sousse, Bou Chebka, Jelma, and Firyanah (GTD 2018). Some members of Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade may have received weapons training in Derna, Libya at a militant camp associated with IS (Arieff 2015, 2).

Organizational Structure

The group utilized "Al-Qaida's traditional method" (Malka 2014, 92). This entailed shadowy, yet organized, guerrilla tactics in which "bands of underground fighters … launch[ed] violent attacks against security forces and the government" (Malka 2014, 92).

Due to its location in the remote Chaambi Mountains and its aforementioned guerrilla-style attacks on security forces, Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade was able to operate clandestinely (Arieff and Humud 2014, 7; United States Department of State 2017; United States Department of State 2016; Wilson Center 2017; Malka 2014, 92). As such, not much is known about the organizational structure of the group.

In about 2015, Mourad Gharsalli became the leader of Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade (Al Jazeera 2015). Another key leader of the group was Lokman Abou Sakhr, an Algerian jihadist who died in 2015 while attempting to escape apprehension by authorities (United States Department of State 2016; Jamestown Foundation 2015).

Nearly nothing is known about the group's membership. It is likely that all or nearly all of the group's members were Tunisian or Algerian.

Nothing is known about the group's source of funding.

External Ties

Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade had strong ties to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (Arieff and Humud 2014, 6; United States Department of State 2017; United States Department of State 2016; Wilson Center 2017; Al Jazeera 2015; Humud 2015, 1; Malka 2014, 98).

Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade was allegedly linked to Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, another Tunisian jihadi-salafi groups (War on the Rocks 2014; Malka 2014, 92). Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade helped AST maintain ties with AQIM (War on the Rocks 2014).

Islamic State cells in Tunisia claimed responsibility for attacking the Bardo National Museum in Sousse (Wilson Center 2017). However, some Tunisian officials alleged that Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade may have been involved in the Bardo attack (Wilson Center 2017). It is unclear if the group had ties to IS. Some members of Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade may have pledged allegiance to IS (Wilson Center 2017). Others may have trained in militant camps outsider Derna, Libya (Arieff 2015).

Group Outcome

In response to Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade's pseudo-insurgency against Tunisian security forces, the government ramped up counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Security forces conducted counterterrorism operations in mountainous regions like the Chaambi Mountains where Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade operated (Jamestown Foundation 2015). Security forces also conducted counterterrorism operations in Kasserine (Jamestown Foundation 2015). In 2015, the Tunisian parliament passed a counterterrorism law that "str[uc]k a better balance between the protection of human rights and fighting terrorism" (United States Department of State 2017). The government

took measures to prevent money laundering, suspicious transactions, and other methods of financing armed groups (United States Department of State 2017; United States Department of State 2016). The government increased funding for border security (United States Department of State 2016). This was especially crucial for combating armed groups like Okba Bin Naafa Brigade which operated near Tunisia's border with Algeria (Arieff and Humud 2014, 7; United States Department of State 2017; United States Department of State 2016; Wilson Center 2017).

Additionally, the Tunisian government enlisted assistance from foreign countries to increase counterterrorism and security capabilities (United States Department of State 2017). The government of the United States increased security support for Tunisia (United States Department of State 2017). With international support from countries like the United States, Tunisia was able to begin a complete overhaul of their security infrastructure in 2016 (United States Department of State 2017). Later in 2016, Tunisia's Ministry of Interior proposed and adopted a National Counterterrorism Strategy (United States Department of State 2017). The government increased funding and regulatory capabilities for counterterrorism operations (United States Department of State 2017). This allowed security forces to infiltrate terrorist cells and stop terrorist plots (United States Department of State 2017). The Tunisian government participates in transnational counterterrorism organizations like the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (United States Department of State 2017; United States Department of State 2016). In 2016, the Tunisian government augmented its earlier border security efforts by constructing a 125-mile fence along its border with Libya and deploying more people near the border with Algeria (Wilson Center 2017). In 2017, the Tunisian government pursued educational and media programs to prevent radicalization (Wilson Center 2017).

Okba Ibn Naafa's last recognized attack occurred in November 2016 in Kasserine (GTD 2018). The group is probably no longer active and appears to have been sufficiently defeated by counterterrorism operations.

Notes for Iris:
-what differentiates Brigade from AST? Brigade seems to have closer relationships with AQIM and might even introduce AST
-Brigade largely unaffected by 2014 crackdown on AST. Brigade primarily operated along border with Algeria and in mountainous region which meant they were able to avoid the government
-they were also more decentralized than AST which meant they were harder to completely destroy in the same period
-external support from countries like the US and Germany played a huge role in bolstering Tunisia security forces and helping to modernize CT planning. They tried to increase more surveillance technology to identify militant groups.

-also join local CT leagues with other North African/Sahel countries and US (Security Initiative)
-big factor to address the threat but not the whole picture. Tunisia already had a huge

Country-Level Trends:
-multiple Islamic and Salafist groups
-lots of ties to AQ and AQIM
-IS became a bigger influence in the region towards the end of the time period when these groups were operating (2014-2016) -- increased salience and threat factor?
-lots of CT operations saw external assistance (not seen in Jordan and Saudi cases)
-two shocks of groups: early 1980s (huge grievance against Tunisian president) and 2011. Groups originally gained huge influence through dawa and islamic charitable organizations.