Tanzania Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 28 May 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1446	PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRP)		1975	1975
T1860	PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS (PAC)		1979	1992
T2436	SUNGU SUNGU		1982	2007
T28	AL-QAEDA		1989	2012
T1269	CIVIC UNITED FRONT		1992	2001
T2308	FORCES FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY (FDD)		1994	2002
T8800	DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA (FDLR)		1994	2012

I. PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRP)
Torg ID: 1446
Min. Group Date: 1975
Max. Group Date: 1975
Onset: NA

Aliases: People's Revolutionary Party (Prp), Popular Revolutionary Party (Prp), Zaire's People's Revolutionary Party, Zaire's People's Revolutionary Party, PRP

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: 1965 (Kisangani 2016, 496) or 1967 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2001; Appiah and Gates 2010, 623)

Group End (Outcome): 1977 (military defeat) (Appiah 2010, 623)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation
Laurent-Désiré Kabila was born in the Katanga province and comes from the Luba ethnic group (Panafrican News Agency 2001). Kabila was involved in opposing the Congolese government for three decades, before leading a coup in 1997 and becoming military leader and president of Congo (Appiah 2010, 623). Kabila governed Congo from 1997-2001 (Ibid.). He was educated in France where he became an advocate of Marxism (Ibid.) Kabila formed the PRP in 1965 (TORG dataset; Kisangani 2016, 496) or 1967 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2001; Appiah and Gates 2010, 623). Sources agree that, by 1967, PRP was an established group. According to Schmid and Jongman (1988, 699), by 1967 PRP controlled strongholds in the area of Fizi Baraka. The group's ideology was leftist (Panafrican News Agency 2001) and they were willing to use violence to overthrow the then-dictator of Congo, Mobutu Sese Seko (Onwar).

The PRP gained international attention in 1975, when it held three American students and a Dutch citizen hostage for 67 days (Appiah 2010, 623; Kisangani 2016, 496).

Geography

In the 1970s, the PRP established a "liberated zone" in southeastern Kivu, specifically the mountainous Fizi, in present-day Sud-Kivu (Appiah 2010, 623). The PRP ruled this "liberated zone" as a Socialist state for two years, however the group was ultimately forced to flee by Congolese government forces (Ibid.). PRP members fled to Tanzania in 1977 where they operated in exile (Ibid.)

Organizational Structure

The group's founding leader was Laurent Kabila (Onwar). Other leaders included Gabriel Yumu, Kashimu, and Gaston Spamalot (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 698). The PRP's armed branch was formed in 1969 and named Forces Armées Populaires (FAP) (Ibid.). In 1980, the PRP joined an umbrella organization called the Council for the Liberation of the Congo-Kinshasa (Ibid.). The PRP's estimated group size was approximately 3,000 members (Ibid.).

The PRP funded itself through gold mining and ivory trading (Global Security). The Zairian officers positioned in Kivu, who were supposed to drive the PRP out of power in the region, often smuggled out ivory, gold and other commodities which enriched both themselves and the PRP (Onwar).

External Ties

The PRP regularly received funding from China (Appiah 2010, 623). Members fled to Tanzania after defeat in 1977 (Ibid.). Prior to founding the PRP, Laurent-Désiré Kabila had been educated in France and in 1965 had briefly collaborated with Che Guevara in connection with an insurrection in eastern Congo (Ibid.).

Group Outcome

In 1977 President Mobutu's troops forced the PRP to abandon their liberated Zone and the PRP members fled (Appiah 2010, 623). According to Kisangi (2016, 496) the PRP re-emerged in October 1996 as part of the umbrella organization Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), however the connections between PRP and the later AFDL are not entirely clear. The AFDL successfully conducted a coup in May 1997 and Kabila then became president of Congo until 2001 (Ibid.)

II.   PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS (PAC)
       Torg ID: 1860
       Min. Group Date: 1979
       Max. Group Date: 1992
       Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), Poqo (Matchili 2017)

Group Formation: 1959 (Global Security n.d.)

Group End: 1994 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

PAC formed as a splinter group from the ANC (African National Congress) in 1959 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 657; Stapleton 2012). They broke off from the ANC because they disagreed with ANC plans to include communists and "the white Congress of Democrats" in the struggle against the apartheid government (Global Security n.d.). PAC, at one point, has plans to overthrow the apartheid regime in 1963 (Stapleton 2012). PAC is a pan africanist group that focuses on land reform and self-determination for the benefit of politically African people, or native African people (Ebrahim 1990). PAC's first major political action were protests against the pass system in which black Africans were forced to carry passes with them always (Global Security n.d.). These actions led to the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 where police opened fire and killed 69 people (Nelson Mandela Organization n.d.b; Stapleton 2012).

Poqo ("a Xhosa expression meaning 'alone' or 'pure'"), the first military wing of the PAC, was "formed in the aftermath of the bloody and brutal Sharpeville and Langa massacres of 1960" (Ebrahim 1990; Matchili 2017; Stapleton 2012). Its first violent incident was in 1960.

Geography

PAC's military wing, Poqo/APLA, conducted attacks throughout South Africa. Cities targeted include Queenstown, Evaton, Soweto, and Dar es Salaam in neighboring Tanzania (GTD 2017). The APLA was successful at recruiting young South Africans and training them across the northern border, however the exact locations of those training camps are unclear (Global Security n.d.). The military wing, APLA, had training bases in Zambia and Tanzania as well (Global Security n.d.). PAC was especially popular in Cape Town, the Vaal Triangle, Pretoria, and the Boland region (Lissoni 2010). Most of the ideological leaders were imprisoned after the Sharpeville protest, leaving the geographically dispersed PAC without clear direction (Lissoni 2010). They continued to conduct scattered, low level attacks until they were unbanned in 1990 (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

PAC was founded by former members of the ANC and led by Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe (Global Security n.d.). In 1960, both the PAC and the ANC were exiled from the Republic of South Africa and many of their top officials were imprisoned (Lissoni 2010). After their exile, PAC was able to regroup and found its first headquarters under new leadership outside of South Africa in Maseru, Lesotho (Lissoni 2010). The exact organizational structure of the group is unclear, but positions such as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Chairman, and Secretary General appeared throughout the sources listed in the bibliography.

PAC was considered to be the political center of a larger group with two military wings, Poqo and the APLA. Poqo was formed after "the Sharpeville and Langa massacres of 1960," and played an important role in PAC activities in Lesotho and the surrounding parts of South Africa (Rudzani 2017; Lissoni 2010). It is unclear exactly the distinction between Poqo and APLA. An underestimate of the membership of the APLA at the time of military integration in 1993 was 6,000 members (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

PAC primarily operated out of Zambia and Tanzania because they were banned from South Africa by the apartheid government. The military wing, APLA, had training bases in Zambia and Tanzania, as well as additional training in Ethiopia and Egypt between 1961 and 1963 (Global Security n.d.; Stapleton 2012). PAC's first headquarters after their exile in 1960 was in Maseru, Lesotho (Lissoni 2010). PAC maintained very close relations with the Basuto Congress Party (BCP) throughout their tenure in Maseru, which ended in 1965 because of sustained harassment by the Basutoland police (Lissoni 2010).

Group Outcome

PAC's first major political action were protests against the pass system in which black Africans were forced to carry passes with them always (Global Security n.d.). These actions led to the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 where police opened fire and killed 69 people (Nelson Mandela Organization n.d.b; Stapleton 2012). Shortly after the massacre, the South African government banned PAC and the ANC and arrested most of the PAC leadership (Nelson Mandela Organization n.d.b). After their exile, PAC continued to operate and were targeted by South African special forces and local police (Global Security; Lissoni 2010). In one such instance, Chairman Potlako Leballo car was bombed in front of his home in Maseru, Lesotho (Lissoni 2010). On multiple occasions, the Resident High Commissioner for Basutoland (Sir A.F. Giles) enacted policies directly targeting Poqo, such as the Public Order Proclamation Act (Lissoni 2010). After the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of PAC and the ANC in 1990, PAC went against the ANC and demanded black control over the government

(Global Security n.d.). Their last violent incident was in December of 1992 in Queenstown (GTD 2017).

When they were unsuccessful, PAC refused to participate in the electoral process until 1994 when they, "announced [the] group's suspension of its armed struggle," and allowed members to run for office (Global Security n.d.). As of 2017, PAC continues to operate as a political party in the South African government (Rudzani 2017).

III.   SUNGU SUNGU
Torg ID: 2436
Min. Group Date: 1982
Max. Group Date: 2007
Onset: NA

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation : 1998 (Abrams 1987)

Group End : August 23, 2007 (GTD 2018)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Sungu Sungu was founded in 1998 in the Kuria region of Kenya (Canada IRB 2013). They are self-proclaimed vigilantes who believe the government has not dealt with local crime adequately (Canada IRB 2013). As a result, the group organized as local militias that aimed to take up arms and defend the community (Canada IRB 2013). They were initially created to help protect their villages from cattle theft and administer punishment within their community (Abrams 1987). While the first confirmed violent incident was in 2007 in Kenya, it is believed the group might have used violence earlier on (GTD 2018).

Geography

The Sungu Sungu operate in regions throughout Kenya and Tanzania (Abrams 1987). The most dominant regions include Kuria and Kisii (Canada IRB 2013). Another area in Tanzania of major Sungu Sungu presence is the Nyamwezi village of Busangi (Abrams 1987). They generally operate in the rural areas of Nyamwezi, Sukuma, Mwanza, Shinyanga, and Tabora Regions (Abrams 1987). They have also launched an attack in Bonyamasicho (GTD 2018). They are not transnational and are confined to their regions (Abrams 1987).

Organizational Structure

The Sungu Sungu have different groups in different villages (Abrams 1987). They do not report under an umbrella but rather operate independently within their communities (Abrams 1987). There is speculation as to if the founder of the group is Kishosha Mang'ombe or Nkanga son of Iyumbu (Abrams 1987).They both started Sungu Sungu groups with similar missions of protecting villages against cattle (Abrams 1987).

Within the organization of the group, there is a chief and second in command (Canada IRB 2013). There are medicine creators who rank high in the group (Abrams 1987). Their responsible for creating necessary medications to sustain members when protecting themselves against attacks (Abrams 1987). There are secretaries and various members who are responsible for recruitment to group meetings (Abrams 1987). The majority of members belong to the armed group, usually young males, who are responsible for carrying out perceived justice (Lance 2016). The Kuria ethnic group located on the Tanzania-Kenya border was the first group to include the Sungu Sungu (Canada IRB 2013). Most members of all age groups in the community participated in Sungu Sungu activities, as participation was often mandatory (Canada IRB 2013). The Sungu Sungu host iritongos,community meetings, where they discuss issues formally such as raiding or where they interrogate thieves in custody (Canada IRB 2013). These meetings are ruled by the elders and all men are given opportunities to participate (Canada IRB 2013). Inchaama is a group of ritual leaders that usually meet in secret to deal with the issues often dealt with in iritongos and override the Sungu Sungu (Canada IRB 2013). The Inchaama rarely participate in the iritongos (Canada IRB 2013).

Following iritongos, the Sungu Sungu carry out punishments such as whippings and beatings (Canada IRB 2013). In the Kisii region where the Sungu Sungu operates, they actively extort money from members of the public for security services (Canada IRB 2013).

External Ties

The group operates in Tanzania and Kenya, but do not have bases outside of these countries (Abrams 1987). They have multiple groups within each village that operate independently (Abrams 1987). Sungu Sungu does not appear to have external bases or allies outside of Kenya and Tanzania (Canada IRB 2013). It is believed they operate either in conjunction to local police groups (Lance 2016).

Group Outcome

The government of Kenya has acknowledged the Sungu Sungu as a "criminal gang" and have been using grueling tactics such as torture, in an attempt to infiltrate the armed vigilantes (Canada IRB 2013). However, as a result of improvements in crime rates within the Kisii region due to the Sungu Sungu, they quickly became an asset to powerful people within Kenya (Canada IRB 2013). Throughout Kenya's government, there is a lack of consistent or sustained reprisal or praise of the Sungu Sungu as threat assessment of them wavers frequently (Canada IRB 2013).

 Within the Kuria district, they often receive protection and support from locals due to their assistance fighting crime in the area (Canada IRB 2013). However, this later began to change. They do not pose a global threat as they are confined within Kenya and Tanzania (Abrams 1987). In 2009, the Kenyan government provided Sungu Sungu with the power to encode their own laws and consequences (Canada IRB 2013). Sungu Sungu does not appear to have external bases or allies outside of Kenya and Tanzania (Canada IRB 2013). The group's last attack was in August 2007 (GTD 2018). However, it is believed they are still operating either in conjunction or as supplements to local police groups (Lance 2016). Youths have shown increasing participation carrying the group towards a more radical phase (Lance 2016).

IV.   QAIDAT AL-JIHAD
Torg ID: 28
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qaeda, Al Qaeda, Al-Qaida, Al Qaida, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qaedat Al-Jihad, The Base

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Al-Qaeda, Al Qaeda, Al-Qaida, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat
Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Qaeda was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US Embassy in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). The group has a radical Sunni muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherd or farmers) (FAS 2005). The group's leader Bin Laden has had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group conducted attacks around the globe including Tanzania, Kenya, the United States (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their principal leader until his assassination in 2011 (CFR 2012). He was originally from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015) He was later replaced by Ayman al-Zawhiri in 2011 after bin Laden was killed by an American raid (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012)

The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). As of 2015, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The major state leader of global response to Al-Qaeda is the United States (FAS 2005). Initially, bin Laden sought support from the Saudi Arabian government who allied with the US in exchange for troops. He sought refuge in Sudan until he was exiled (FAS 2005). The Clinton Administration closely monitored Afghanistan, as Al-Qaeda maintained a base there while allying with the Taliban (FAS 2005) . Shortly after the attacks on US soil on September 11, 2001, the US began to occupy Afghanistan (FAS 2005). Following the death of bin Laden, Al-Qaeda was perceived as a lesser threat (McCormick 2014). Zawahiri quickly emerged as a leader in 2012 and called for Al-Qaeda's participation in the turmoil in Syria (McCormick 2014).

The Al-Qaeda in Iraq merges into and forms ISIS and begins to fight other Al-Qaeda affiliates (McCormick 2014). The group is still active and is believed to be rebuilding and developing underground while curating a more moderate social media image for recruitment (CFR 2018). Zawahiri has sustained the global network and jihadist supporters of Al-Qaeda (CFR 2018). The last known violent incident of Al-Qaeda was in early 2018 in Timbuktu on a Malian army base (CEP).

V.   CIVIC UNITED FRONT
Torg ID: 2308
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: People's Party Chama Cha Wananchi (Canada IRB 2016)

Group Formation: 1991 (Canada IRB 2016) or 1992 (Glickman 2011)

Group End: Active (Canada IRB 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

During the 1950s, a separatist movement emerged in Zanzibar to establish an independent state and stop being a British protectorate (Mpangala 2006). Within Tanzania, four nationalist parties emerged and competed in elections several times in the 1950s and early 1960s. These elections always provoked violence between the different political parties, culminating in the 1963 election which killed 68 and killed hundreds more (Mpangala 2006).

The Civic United Front is a political party in Zanzibar that formed in 1991 or 1992 when the Zanzibar government announced that it would again begin to allow other political parties to compete in politics (Glickman 2011; Canada IRB 2016; BBC 2018). It is generally seen as the main opposition party in Tanzanian politics (Mohammad 2015). The primary political party in Tanzania was Chama cha Mapinduzi (Mpangala 2006).

The political party's political aim is to promote the rights of Arabs in Tanzania and assert Zanzibar's sovereignty in Tanzanian politics (Glickman 2011; Canada IRB 2016). Zanzibar is legally part of Tanzania, but maintains its de facto independence with its own government (Mohammed 2015). When it participated in national elections, the group campaigned on a platform of combating poverty, creating jobs, and promoting Islamic law (Glickman 2011; Canada IRB 2016).

Tensions began to arise again as the CUF and the principal political party alleged that elections were rigged and undemocratic (Mpangala 2006). Violence erupted when the government began to transition to multi-party political system. The group first clashed with police on January 31, 1993, killing one person (Minorities at RIsk Project 2004). After the 2000 elections were marred by allegations of fraud, the Tanzanian army

clashed with CUF supporters during a protest of the recent election results in January 2001 (HRW 2002; Mpangala 2006). The event caused 2000 Zanzibar refugees to flee to Kenya for almost a year (HRW 2002).

Geography

The CUF operates primarily out of Pemba Island, which is a small island outside of Tanzania (Glickman 2011). The CUF does not have a lot of mainland support as that is where the ruling party CCM carries major influence (Cook 2017). There are areas of support in northern Tanzania, the west coast, and Zanzibar Town as well (Cook 2017). Clashes took place on the island of Pemba (Minorities at Risk 2004).

Organizational Structure

The group's founder was James Mapala, the previous head of the National Convention for Constitution and Reform-Maguez (Canada IRB 2016). Between 1995 through 2010, Seif Sharif Hamad was the leader of the Civic United Front (Canada IRB 2016; Cook 2017). His partner and chairman of the CUF party is Ibrahim Lipumba(Canada IRB 2016). In the elections, they were both candidates for presidency (Canada IRB 2016). Within the party, there is a Director of Mass Communication, Vice Chair, and Secretary General (Canada IRB 2016). The group has a mass grassroots supporters and protestors that demonstrate around the time of elections (Glickman 2011). The CUF has a pseudo paramilitary armed wing known as the Blue Guard police force, which aims to protect party members from Tanzanian police (Glickman 2011).

The group receives a lot of support from the Arab population in Tanzania (Glickman 2011).

External Ties

The CUF is a part of a larger opposition alliance called Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi or UKAWA which opposes the ruling CCM party (Cook 2017). The CUF is not known to have ties to outlying states and it is unclear where they receive funding from (Cook 2017). However, a primary ideology of the CUF is encouraging and growing Islam within Tanzania (Glickman 2011). Saudia Arabia has allegedly donated money to rebuilding Islam in Zanzibar for building temples and councils (Glickman 2011). The CUF has a pseudo paramilitary armed wing known as the Blue Guard police force, which aims to protect party members from Tanzanian police (Glickman 2011). It is unclear where the CUF received their funding (Glickman 2011).

Group Outcome

Although the Tanzanian government authorized the CUF's formation in 1992, the government has still taken measures to curtail the CUF's influence. The group first clashed with police on January 31, 1993, killing one person (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). In 1995, after the CUF picked up 20 Parliamentary seats on the island of Pemba, the police arrested CUF members (Minorities at Risk 2002). The CUF might have fought back as the resulting clash was described as bloody (Glickman 2011). In 1998, police arrested several CUF supporters and tried to break-up several protests (Minorities at Risk 2004). The two parties agreed to negotiate a way to reduce violence from February 1998 to June 1999 resulting in the Muafaka I agreement (Mpangala 2006).

In 2001, the Tanzanian army clashed with CUF supporters during a protest of the recent election results (Glickman 2011; HRW 2002). The parties again tried to negotiate a resolution to the crisis leading to the Mufakat II agreement. It included creating a permanent voter registration and creating key safeguards to ensure elections were free and fair. The agreement soon became a part of the Zanzibar constitution (Mpangala 2006). Violence abated.

In 2015, Zanzibar held their own elections outside of Tanzania's general elections (Cook 2017). Seif from the CUF won that election over the ruling party CCM (Cook 2017). Due to accusations of cheating and false votes, the electoral commision voided the election results (Cook 2017). CUF refused to recognize the re-election or its results and accused the ZEC of being biased towards the ruling party (Throup 2016). Following the 2015 election, CUF supporters protests became increasingly violent (Throup 2016). The CUF claims they are victims of an abusive government and bias (Throup 2016). In 2016, they claimed to experience a hate crime as multiple CUF members had their houses burned down (Throup 2016). There has been minimal activity since the 2015 election (Cook 2017).

VI. FORCES FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY (FDD)
Torg ID: 2308
Min. Group Date: 1994
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is the armed wing of the CNDD (T1190).

Group Formation: This is the armed wing of the CNDD (T1190).

Group End: This is the armed wing of the CNDD (T1190).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is the armed wing of the CNDD (T1190).

Geography

This is the armed wing of the CNDD (T1190).

Organizational Structure

This is the armed wing of the CNDD (T1190).

External Ties

This is the armed wing of the CNDD (T1190).

Group Outcome

This is the armed wing of the CNDD (T1190).

VII. DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA (FDLR)
Torg ID: 8800
Min. Group Date: 1994
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Democratic Front For The Liberation Of Rwanda (Fdlr), Democratic Liberation Forces Of Rwanda, Ex-Far, Ex-Far (Armed Forces Of Rwanda), Fdlr, Forces Démocratiques De Libération Du Rwanda, Forces Démocratiques De Libération Du Rwanda, Interahamwe, Pâlir, Peuple En Armes Pour La Libération Du Rwanda

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FDLR, Front for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: active - last incident in 2016 (GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The FDLR is a notably violent Hutu rebel group created in 2000 in opposition to Rwandan President Paul Kagamé's government (UN 2004; Boisselet 2015; Canada IRB 2007). The group is a merger between ALiR and other Hutu rebel groups. Président Paul Kagamé represented the RPF, a Rwandan political party responsible for ending the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 (BBC 2011; History 2009). The group seeks to overthrow the current Rwandan government (Buchanan 2015). It is unclear when the group committed its first attack. The group incited its first attack in 2005 in the DRC, but was likely violent earlier (Global Terrorism Database 2017).

Geography

The FDLR is based in eastern DRC (Canada IRB 2007). According to the Agence France-Presse (AFP), the group controls an estimated 50 percent of the North and South Kivu provinces of the DRC (Canada IRB 2007).

Attacks incited by the FDLR occurred throughout the DRC and Rwanda (Global Terrorism Database 2017). A steep majority of attacks occurred within the DRC (Global Terrorism Database 2017).

Organizational Structure

The FDLR is led by Ignace Murwanashyaka and military leader Sylvestre Mudacumura - a Rwandan wanted by the International Criminal Court for inciting war crimes in eastern Congo (Canada IRB 2007; Buchanan 2015). Members of the group primarily consist of exiled people responsible for the Rwandan Genocide and ex-militants from the ALIR (Canada IRB 2007). These individuals include former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces and ex fighters of the *interahamwe* - a Hutu militia who incited the mass murder of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the Rwandan Genocide (Canada IRB 2007, Lister 2011). Sources differ widely on estimates of FDLR membership, however, estimates range around several thousand (Canada IRB 2007). Membership has declined to around 1,000-1,500 since 2009 (Buchanan 2015). As of 2004, the group consisted of an estimated 3,000 members (Global Security n.d.).

The FDLR has an armed wing known as FOCA (Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi) operating in South Kivu (Buchanan 2015).

The Rastas is a splinter group of the FDLR known for its allegations of kidnapping and demanding ransom (Canada IRB 2007). The group operates in FDLR-held areas (Canada IRB 2007). The FDLR denies any ties to this group (Canada IRB 2007).

External Ties

The FDLR is a shared enemy of Rwanda and Congo (Boisselet 2015). No sources stating external support were found.

The Rastas is a splinter group of the FDLR known for its allegations of kidnapping and demanding ransom (Canada IRB 2007). The group operates in FDLR-held areas (Canada IRB 2007). The FDLR denies any ties to this group (Canada IRB 2007).

Group Outcome

In 2005, the Congolese government launched an offensive against the FDLR (Canada IRB 2007). However, the offensive was halted in 2007 due to a fear of increasing ethnic

tensions in eastern Congo and an inability to distinguish between the Congolese Army and FDLR soldiers (Canada IRB 2007).

The group is criticized by Amnesty International and the United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks for inciting human rights violations including pillaging, rape, ethnicity based mass murder, kidnapping, and the mobilization of child soldiers and continues to be a driving force in the instability and violence against the Congolese people (Canada IRB 2007; Buchanan 2015). The group continued to incite attacks on citizens and the media as late as 2016 (Global Terrorism Database 2017; Buchanan 2015).