Sudan Cases Part 1: 1970-2005
Last Updated: 31 January 2018

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T162	ETHIOPIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (EPRA)		0	0
T618	THE UMMA PARTY		1945	0
T2275	THE BEJA CONGRESS		1957	2001
T481	TAKFIR WAL-HIJRA		1966	2011
T108	BLACK SEPTEMBER		1971	1976
T2257	ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUERRILLAS		1979	2006
T844	ERITREAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (EIJ)		1980	2011
T477	SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (SNLA)	17-May-83	1983	2012
T1304	SUDANESE LIBERATION ARMY		1987	0
T279	LORD'S RESISTANCE MOVEMENT/ARMY (LRM/A)		1987	2012
T1921	SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FORCES		1988	1989
T1621	ANYA-NYA II MILITIA		1988	1988
T508	UGANDA DEMOCRATIC CHRISTIAN ARMY (UDCA)		1988	1994
T28	AL-QAIDA		1989	2012
T617	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF SUDAN	20-Apr-96	1989	2001
T605	ERITREAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT		1989	1990
T512	UMMAH LIBERATION ARMY		1990	1999

T1467	SOUTHERN SUDAN INDEPENDENCE ARMY		1991	2002
T2042	EQUATORIAL DEFENSE FORCE (EDF)		1995	0
T2101	ETHIOPIANS		1995	2001
T484	THE SUDAN ALLIANCE FORCES		1996	1997
T2342	JANJAWEED		1997	2010
T2597	SOUTH SUDAN UNITED MOVEMENT/ARMY		1998	2000
T1983	ERITREAN INITIATIVE GROUP		1999	0
T2489	SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT	9-Apr-03	2001	2012
T2168	JUSTICE AND EQUALITY MOVEMENT (JEM)	4-Oct-03	2001	2012
T2569	POPULAR DEFENCE FORCE (PDF)		2002	2002
T2551	SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY - MINNI MINAWI FACTION	14-Feb-06	2005	2006
T2564	JANJAWEED-BK		2005	2005
T2563	JANJAWEED - M		2005	2005
T2392	NATIONAL REDEMPTION FRONT	29-Jul-06	2006	2006
T2347	SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY-UNITY	1-Aug-07	2007	2008
T2371	MINAWI'S FACTION FORCES		2007	2007
T2500	PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE MOVEMENT		2010	2010
T2613	SOUTH SUDAN DEFENCE MOVEMENT/ARMY (SSDM/A)	12-May-10	2010	2011
T2616	SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT - NORTH	8-Jun-11	2011	2012
T1859	LIBERATION AND JUSTICE MOVEMENT (LJM)		2011	2012
T1986	SOUTH SUDAN LIBERATION	19-Apr-11	2011	2012

	MOVEMENT-ARMY			
T1869	MESSIRIA		2011	2011
T2668	AL-JABHAT AL-THAWRIYAT AL-SUDAN	10-Dec-11	2011	2012
T2673	SUDAN LIBERATION ARMY		2012	2012

I. ETHIOPIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (EPRA)
   Torg ID: 162
   Min. Group Date: 0
   Max. Group Date: 0
   Onset: NA

   Aliases: Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army (Epra), Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Army, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army

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   Part 2. Basic Coding

   Aliases: This is the political wing of the ERPA (Canada IRB 1992).

   Group Formation: This is the political wing of the ERPA (Canada IRB 1992).

   Group End: This is the political wing of the ERPA (Canada IRB 1992).

   Part 3. Narrative

   Group Formation

   This is the political wing of the ERPA (Canada IRB 1992).

   Geography

   This is the political wing of the ERPA (Canada IRB 1992).

   Organizational Structure

This is the political wing of the ERPA (Canada IRB 1992).

External Ties

This is the political wing of the ERPA (Canada IRB 1992).

Group Outcome

This is the political wing of the ERPA (Canada IRB 1992).

II.   THE UMMA PARTY
Torg ID: 618
Min. Group Date: 1945
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Ummah Party, The Umma Party, Umma Party,Ummah

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ummah Liberation Army, Unionist Party (Umma translates to public in Swahili)

Group Formation: formed 1945 (Canada 2012; Global Security n.d.); formed armed wing in 1995

Group End: (stopped) violence in 1999 (GTD 2017); exists to the present (All Africa 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation
The Umma Party (UP) formed in 1945, advocating independence from British colonial rule (Canada 2012; Global Security n.d.). The UP is the political party of the Islamic Ansar movement, and has served as the governing party of Sudan at multiple points in the country's history (LOC n.d.). In the 2000s, they advocated for the repeal of sharia law in Sudan, the implementation of true democracy, and an end to the conflict in Darfur (Canada 2012; Butty 2015). They are referred to as the largest opposition party in Sudan and are credited with advocating for political rights and free speech in the press (All Africa 2017). The party became violent at the beginning of their alliance with groups intending to violently overthrow the government (National Democratic Alliance), and formed their armed wing, the Ummah Liberation Army (ULA), in 1995 (Rone 2003;

5

McGregor 2005). It is unclear how the Ummah Party conducted violent attacks, whether the attacks they are suspected of were conducted through the ULA or through other groups funded by the party.

Geography

The Umma Party has alternated between being the ruling party and a persecuted group (Global Security n.d.; LOC n.d.). Their party headquarters is in Wad Nubawi in Omdurman (All Africa 2017). The group is made up of primarily Ansar muslims, who are mostly located in western Darfur and Kordofan (LOC n.d.). The group operates from western Darfur, Kurdufan, and Blue Nile State (All Africa 2017). The only attack in which they are suspected of directly participating took place in Atbarah in 1999 (GTD 2017).

The group was exiled after the coup that ousted them from government in 1989 (Canada 1998). While they were exiled, the party operated from offices in Cairo and the U.K. (Canada 1998).

Organizational Structure

The Umma Party is organized around their long-time leader and President of the National Umma Party (NUP), Imam Sadig al-Mahdi (Butty 2015; All Africa 2017; Global Security n.d.; Rone 2003 pg.45; LOC n.d.). It is a political organization. The party is substantial, and is referred to as the largest opposition party in Sudan (All Africa 2017). The Umma Party has alternated between being the ruling party and a persecuted group (Global Security n.d.; LOC n.d.). Al-Mahdi served as Prime Minister between 1986 and 1989, when he was overthrown in a coup (Global Security n.d.). Other members of the organization include, "Fadlalla Burma (Vice President); Nasreldin Al Mahdi (Second Vice President); Siidig El Nour (Secretary General); Abdelrahman Al Ghali (Deputy Secretary General); Ali Geilob (Chairman of the Central Committee); Zeinab Ali (Rapporteur of Central Committee); ElSheikh Mahjoub (President of the Monitor and Control Commission); Sarah Nugdallah (Chairwoman of Politburo); Mohammed Al Mahhdi (Deputy Chairperson of Politburo); Abdelrahman Dosa (Rapporteur of Politburo); and Naeema Ajabna (Deputy Rapporteur of Politburo)" (Canada 2012). Leaders of the UP have been accused of planning to overthrow the government and have been arrested for this crime on numerous occasions (Global Security n.d.). The group is made up of primarily Ansar muslims, who are mostly located in western Darfur and Kordofan (LOC n.d.).

The party has three primary political offshoots: the Umma Reform and Renewal Party (URRP), Islamic Umma Party, and Federal Umma Party (Canada 2012). The URRP was the most successful faction of the three, but it rejoined the main branch of the UP in 2011 (Canada 2012). The Islamic Umma Party broke off from the main UP because they advocated for exclusively sharia law, a position no longer held by the UP (Canada 2012).

The Federal Umma Party split off from the UP so that their leader, Ahmed Babiker Nahar, could run for President when the UP was boycotting the presidential elections because of "electoral irregularities" (Canada 2012).

In addition to their political offshoots, the party also developed an armed wing in 1995 called the Ummah Liberation Army (ULA) (Rone 2003; MIPT 2008). The ULA played a supporting role to other NDA armed groups until it became clear to UP leadership that the rest of the NDA was unwilling to conform to a negotiated peace with Khartoum (MIPT 2008). After that, the ULA ceased operations (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

The UP is considered an armed group because of its alliance with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) as part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the UP's activities arming groups in the Darfur conflict (McGregor 2005). For context, the NDA formed after the 1989 coup as a coalition of Sudanese political parties opposed to Bashir. The group they armed was called the Murahalin and was used to place pressure on the Dinkas in southern Darfur in the 1980s without directly tying the UP (then the ruling party) to the conflict (McGregor 2005). It is likely that some of the arms that were supplied to the Murahalin were used in the conflict in neighboring Chad (Global Security n.d.).

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Group Outcome

The group is still active as a political party as of 2017 (Butty 2015; All Africa 2017). They continue to advocate against the primarily one party system used in Khartoum (All Africa 2017). It is not clear if the group continues to be violent as they have been in the past (Butty 2015). They say that they will defend the existence of their party "by all means necessary" from any interference from Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) (Butty 2015). It is not clear exactly how the UP has directly used violence, and it is unclear if they continue to use violence. Their armed wing, the Ummah Liberation Army (ULA), disbanded in 2000 and has not reappeared since (MIPT 2008). The one and only attack they are suspected of occurred Atbarah in 1999 (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:

-originally a political party that turns violent after the coup in 1989

-problem missing conflict data

-tons of fluidity between groups makes it hard to pin size and organizational structure. At 20,000 feet they have organization, but in detail it's hard to understand who is doing what and how they organize (why are some groups more decentralized/fluid than others?)

-unclear whether this group has an armed wing or delegated out to other paramilitary organizations during this time. Strategic to deny armed wing in order to maintain legitimacy.

III. THE BEJA CONGRESS
  Torg ID: 2275
  Min. Group Date: 1957
  Max. Group Date: 2001
  Onset: NA

  Aliases: Beja Congress, The Beja Congress

Part 1. Bibliography
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: formed in 1958 (BBC 2005), pol. org; became violent in 1994 (BBC 2007)

Group End: 2011 (merger to become SRF)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Beja Congress (BC) was formed in 1958 to advocate for the people of eastern Sudan and to ensure that they received their share of the government benefits of Sudan's oil wealth exported through Port Sudan (HSBA n.d.; BBC 2005). While the group generally espouses similar principles to other members of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), they split from the alliance in order to continue fighting the government and extract more concessions for the eastern portion of the country (BBC 2005). The group is made up of ethnically Beja people, and is organized around Beja tribal structures (Global Security n.d.). The organization did not become violent until 1994 (HSBA n.d.; BBC 2007).

Geography

The fighting that the Beja Congress has participated in occurred almost exclusively in eastern Sudan (Small Arms Survey n.d.). The Beja are historically nomadic and, because of government neglect, possess very few permanent structures in the territories they live in (Global Security n.d.). The states where they fought the government are the

Red Sea State, Kassala State, and al-Qadarif State (BBC 2005; Tesch 2005). Cities in which they protested or conducted attacks include: Port Sudan, Kassala, al-Qash, Tokar, Garoura, Hamikaraib, Barka Valley, Port of Bashir, Braniu, Sinkat, and Karary (GTD 2017; BBC 2005; Tesch 2005; Small Arms Survey n.d.; All Africa 2015; Global Security n.d.). When asked if they would give up the fight, members of the Beja Congress alluded to running into the eastern Sudanese mountains (All Africa 2015). Some of the smaller attacks took the form of sabotaging the pipeline between the center of Sudan and Port Sudan, the country's main source of income (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

At their largest point, the Beja Congress "numbered in low hundreds" (Small Arms Survey n.d.). The group is made up of ethnically Beja people and is organized around Beja tribal structures (Global Security n.d.). The Beja are nomadic and lack large population centers to organize around (Global Security n.d.). They did not become violent until 1994 (BBC 2007). While the group generally espouses similar principles to other members of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), they split from the alliance in order to continue fighting the government and extract more concessions for the eastern portion of the country (BBC 2005). The BC gets most of its funding from the government of Eritrea, which sends funds so that eastern Sudan does not achieve its potential as "'a Darfur in the making'" (BBC 2013; Global Security n.d.).

Some important members of the Beja Congress are: the secretary general of the Beja Congress, Abdallah Musa; the Deputy Chairman, Sheiba Dirar; and the chairman and leader of the Eastern Front Ex-Combatants Committee of the Red Sea State, Omar Hashem El Khalifa, Chairman of the Beja Congress and Eastern Front Ex-Combatants Committee of the Red Sea State (BBC 2013; All Africa 2015). The group suffered from internal divisions and leadership often jockeyed against each other (Global Security n.d.; HSBA n.d.). The "Beja Congress military operations were controlled by General Abraha Kassa, Eritrea's chief of security and national intelligence, and Abdel Aziz Adam al Hilu, commander of the eastern-based New Sudan Brigade of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)" (Small Arms Survey n.d.).

External Ties

The Beja Congress was a founding member of the opposition movement, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Small Arms Survey n.d.). The NDA was backed by the government of Eritrea; the BC received much of their funding from the state of Eritrea (Small Arms Survey n.d.).

In 2005, the BC joined with a group of former rivals, the ethnically Arab (Rashaida), primarily Saudi-born, Free Lions, in order to form the "eastern front" (Tesch 2005). Also included in the "eastern front" was the Justice and Equality Movement from Darfur (All

Africa 2015). In 2011, they announced another merger, this time with the "Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLAAW), Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minnawi (SLA-MM)" to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The conflict between the government and the Beja people has endured for nearly three decades (All Africa 2015). In 2006, the Beja Congress signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) with the government in Khartoum (All Africa 2015). The agreement was intended to increase the government services and benefits going to the eastern Sudanese, especially those who are ethnically Beja (All Africa 2015). However, Khartoum did not follow through on their promises and it is likely that fighting continues in the region (All Africa 2015).

In 2011, they announced another merger, this time with the "Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLAAW), Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minnawi (SLA-MM)" to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front (Global Security n.d.).

Notes for Iris:
-they participated in politics during that democratic rule in the 80s
-they only turned violent after the coup again
-their aims were limited: they wanted a democratic government and concessions both when they form and in the early 90s when they turn violent
-they are nomadic so harder to pin down a separatist aim (contrast to Tuaregs)
-generally the Islamist groups received substantial support
-they're not that active in the NDA; they seem internally well-organized, but not coordinating attacks with other groups
-attacks in 90s seem mostly defensive?
-they don't want to interfere with the government
-controls oil port (potential source of funding?)

IV. Takfir Wal-Hijra
Torg ID: 481
Min. Group Date: 1966
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Takfir Wal-Hijra (Excommunication And Exodus), Anathema And Exile, Excommunication And Emigration, Excommunication And Exodus, Martyrs For Morocco, Rejection Of Sins And Exodus, Takfir Wa Hijara, Takfir Wa Hijra, Takfir Wal Hijra, Takfir Wa'l Hijra

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: "late 1960s"

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded in Egypt by Shukri Mustafa either in the late 1960s, or sometime between the 1970's and 1980's, depending on the source; the group resurfaced in 2011 due to the death of Mubarak (Gleis 2005; MIPT 2008). The group was allegedly a splinter of the Muslim Brotherhood (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Godsell 1981). The group rose up again in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (CNN 2011).

Mustafa was heavily influenced by the teachings of Sheikh Ali Ismael; Ismael argued Muslims and Islam were being suppressed by Egyptian President Nasser (Mili 2006). The group does not follow a specific ideology, but rather follows the words of organizational leaders, and punished people by torture who did not follow the way of the group. The group is still theorized to follow a fundamentalist Sunni Islamist ideology, which was then branded as takfiri (Mili 2006; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of

Canada 2004; Kimyungi N.d.; CNN 2011). Mustafa formed the group to punish apostates and wage jihad (Mili 2006; MIPT 2008). He was anti-modernity and Salafi jihadi. Mustafa and his followers moved to the desert in order to practice Islam and get around what they deemed "illegitimate" Egyptian law. The group's aim was to wage jihad, overthrow the existing governments, and create an Islamic state. The date of the group's first violent attack is unknown.

Geography

Al-Takfir wa al-Hira is a transnational terrorist group which provides support to different cells across Europe and northern Africa (Mili 2006; MIPT 2008; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; GTD 2017). The group originally formed in Egypt. The group has been active in Egypt's Sinai as of 2011, and more specifically Sheikh Zuweid (TIMEP N.d.; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004; Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010)

The group conducted attacks in Benghazi, Libya; Rafah, Egypt; Mogadishu, Somalia; Kirkuk, Iraq; and Garaffa, Sudan (GTD 2017). The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013; CNN 2011).

Organizational Structure

The group was originally founded by Shukri Mustafa in Egypt (Gleis 2005; MIPT 2008; TIMEP N.d.; Kimyungi N.d.). Mustafa was heavily influenced by the teachings of sheikh Ali Ismael; Ismael argued Muslims and Islam was being suppressed by Egyptian President Nasser (Mili 2006). Mustafa formed the group to punish apostates, wage jihad, and create an Islamic caliphate (Mili 2006; CNN 2011). He was anti-modernity and Salafi jihadi.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Takfir cells emerged in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Kenya, and Morocco (Mili 2006). The group was composed of Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese, and other Arabs (MIPT 2008). The group was led by Zakaria Miludi at an unknown time (Botha 2008). The group was more recently led by Abdel-Fattah Hasan Hussein Salem (TIMEP N.d.). The group was allegedly an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2010; Godsell 1981).

External Ties

The group may have influenced the ideology of GIA in Algeria as well as Takfiris in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Mili 2006). It may also have had a tacit alliance with the GIA (MIPT 2008). The group was allegedly also linked to as-Sirat al-Mustaqim and Salafia Jihadia (Botha 2008).

Group Outcome

In 1977, Mustafa was executed by Egyptian police after that the group went underground (Mili 2006). The group has periodically engaged in violence. It may have influenced the ideology of GIA in Algeria as well as Takfiris in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Mili 2006). The group was attacked by a Lebanese group in 2000 that led to the death of several of its members (MIPT 2008). The group was responsible for five attacks on worshippers that started in 1994 (Mili 2006). The group was also linked to the death of Theo van Gogh in 2004 (MIPT 2008). On December 31, 2000, several Tafkiri groups coordinated an attack (Mili 2006). As late as 2012, the group operated as a set of decentralized cells with little coordinated oversight (Daymon 2013).

The Egyptian government has typically "turned its head the other way" about violent activities in the Sinai and done little to address the concerns of Bedouins living in the Peninsula about economic discrimination (Daymon 2013). The group re-emerged after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in the Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid regions of the Sinai Peninsula (Daymon 2013). It came to attention through a set of prominent attacks around El Arish, Egypt (CNN 2011). Egyptian intelligence officials said the group had members from Palestinian factions.

There is some confusion over whether Morocco's Salafia Jihadia and Assirat al-Mustaqim are different from ATWAH because the ideology is so similar (Maroc Hebdo 2003; Mili 2008). It is also unclear whether Takfir refers to a single armed group or if it insteads describes an ideology (Gleis 2005). Abdel-Fattah Hasan Hussein Salem was arrested in 2013 (TIMEP N.d.). The group was banned in Kazakhstan in 2014 (RFE/RL 2014). The group's last violent attack was in 2013 in Libya (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:
-somewhat similar to Sunni Islam, but their own ideology
-attacks are typically in defense

V.   BLACK SEPTEMBER
Torg ID: 108
Min. Group Date: 1971
Max. Group Date: 1976
Onset: NA

Aliases: Black September, Black September Organization (Bso), Munazzamat Aylul Al-Aswad

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Fatah

Group Formation: 1970/1971

Group End (Outcome): 1973 (dissolve)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Black September is a transnational terrorist organization, a special secret armed wing of Fatah, named after events of September 1970 (Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 255). It was formed in either late 1970 or early 1971 (Wolf 1973, 37). The group came to attention for their attack during the Munich Olympics in 1972 (Wolf 1973, 5). The group came about after the Jordanian King initiated a massive crackdown against Fatah in September 1970 (Wolf 1973, 6).

Geography

The group's ties to Egypt came about when they assassinated Wasfi al-Tall, Prime Minister of Jordan, on November 27, 1971, in Cairo (Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 255; Global Security). Black September operated out of Lebanon and used this base as an external sanctuary to conduct guerrilla raids and operations into Israel (Wolf 1973, 7).

Organizational Structure

Members were primarily well-educated, from upper-middle class backgrounds, and were born in refugee camps around Europe (Wolf 1973, 8). The group's first leader was Mohammad Mustafa Syein, a former deputy chief of staff to Yasir Arafat (Wolf 1973, 8).

External Ties

The group received training in Jordan at terrorist camps where they may have also interacted with members of the Weather Underground, the IRA, Dev Genc, and Nicaragua's Sandinistas (Wolf 1973, 37)

Group Outcome

Fatah allegedly disbanded Black September in 1973 as it tried to pursue diplomatic negotiations and garner international recognition (Ciment and Hill 2013, 74).

Note: The group is a wing of Fatah and should be combined with them.

VI.   ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUERRILLAS
Torg ID: 2257
Min. Group Date: 1979
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

VII.   ERITREAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (EIJ)
Torg ID: 844
Min. Group Date: 1980
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (Eijm), Abu Sihel Movement, Eijm - As Eritrean Islamic Jihad (Eij), Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement - Abu Suhail Faction, Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement, Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement, Harakat Al Jihad Al Islami - Abu Suhail Faction, Harakat Al Jihad Al Islami Al Eritrea, Harakat Al Khalas Al Islami, Islamic Salvation Movement

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Abu Sihel Movement; Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement (EIRM); Harakat al Khalas al Islami

Group Formation: 1975

Group End: 2003 (political movement?)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement began in 1975 as a splinter off of ELF (EHR N.D). It splintered due to ideological disagreements about how Islamist the Eritrean separatist movement should be. The EIJM's first violent attack occurred in 1975.

It renamed and partially reorganized itself in 1980 when the National Eritrean Islamic Liberation Front, the Islamic Vanguard, the Organization of Eritrean Pioneer Muslims, and the Islamic Awakening merged to create the official organization (BAAD 2015). The date of the group's first violent attack could not be found. The group aims to eradicate the Eritrean government, create an Islamic state with Sharia law in Eritrea, and raise awareness of the discrimination against Muslims in Eritrea (ibid; MIPT 2008). The group had mixed goals when it operated in Ethiopia, but is primarily center-seeking in Eritrea because it wants to abolish the Eritrean government, replacing it with an Islamic caliphate (ibid). The EIJM is a Muslim fundamentalist organization (Canada IRB 1999).

Geography

The EIJM is mainly based in Khartoum, Sudan but also has bases in Eritrea and Ethiopia (MIPT 2008; Canada IRB 1999). It is active in the western Eritrean lowlands near its border with Sudan but does not seem to hold attacks in countries other than Eritrea (MIPT 2008). The EIJM is a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

The EIJM was led by Khalil Mohammed Amer in 2010 and then in 2013 led by his deputy Abu al-Bara' Hasan Salman (BAAD 2015; MIPT 2008). The militant faction of the EIJM which emerged in 1980 is led by Shaykh Abu Suhail aka Muhammad Ahmad, who previously fought in the Afghan jihad against Soviets (EHR N.D). No information could be found on group funding but Sudan has allegedly given the group weapons and training (MIPT 2008). In 1994-1995, the group had an estimated 500-700 members; later on their size remained somewhere in the hundreds (BAAD 2015). The group is comprised of former ELF members, Muslim youths, conservative Eritreans, and Eritrean refugees (EHR N.D; ibid).

External Ties

The group splintered from the ELF in 1975, but maintained no ties or connections to other Eritrean separatist movements. The Eritrean government claims Sudan gives financial support and sanctuary to the EIJM (BAAD 2015). In 1996 the group first established a relationship with Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qa'ida (ibid). Some sources say that only the most radical factions of the EJIM accept Al-Qa'ida's financial, weapons, and training support (MIPT 2008; ibid).

The Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement, the Abu Suhail organization, the Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement, and the Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development are all splinter groups and other names for the EIJM (EHR N.D; FAS 1999). The organization includes members of Eritrean Pioneer Muslim Organization, Eritrean National Islamic Liberation Front, Islamic Defense Committee, Movement of Oppressed Eritreans, and Islamic Uprising (MIPT 2008). The EJIM falls under the Eritrean Solidarity Front [ESF] umbrella organization (BAAD 2015).

Group Outcome

In the early 1990s the ruler of Sudan, Hasan al-Turabi, closed EJIM facilities in the country (EHR N.D). In 2013 the Sudan government arrested 8 EJIM members for unclear reasons (Sudan Tribune 2013). No further information could be found on any important counter-insurgency attempts against the EJIM by the Eritrean government, possibly because of the several names it operates with. The last notable series of attacks by the EJIM occurred in 2003 however the group never became officially inactive (MIPT 2008).

Notes for Iris:
-it is unclear why EJIM escalated in 1997. The Eritrean Constitution was created in 1997 and Ethiopian elections are held, but there is no notable conflict trigger. In 1996, bin Laden left Sudan.
-ESF is a general umbrella group that fights for Eritrean autonomy (Eritrean Solidarity Front) - similar to MEND?
-1998-2000 is start of border war with Ethiopia

VIII.   SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (SNLA)
Torg ID: 477
Min. Group Date: 1983
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 1983

Aliases: Sudan People's Liberation Army (Spla), Sudan Peoples Liberation Army, Sudan People's Liberation Army, Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (Sla), Sudan People's Liberation Army (Sla), Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (Snla), Sudan People's Liberation

Army (Snla), Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (Spla), Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (Splm), Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Splm), Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement Splm, Sudan People's Liberation Movement Splm, The Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement And Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (Splm/Spla), The Sudan People's Liberation Movement And Sudan People's Liberation Army (Splm/Spla), Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (Spla/M), Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (Spla/M)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1983

Group End (Outcome): 2011 (disarm/reintegrated)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The SPLA formed in 1983 to oppose the Sudanese government when Lt. Col. John Garang encouraged a mutiny in southern Sudan rather than quash a local rebellion (FAS 2000). It is an ethno-nationalist group, which challenges the northern Islamic/Arab population (FAS 2000). The group sought independence from the Sudanese government (American University n.d.). Its first violent attack was in 1983.

Geography

Fighting occurred in South Sudan (Global Security n.d.). The group had its headquarters in Juba (Global Security n.d.). The group operated in Uganda in the north and northwest regions as late as 2003 (Australia RRT 2009). This specifically included incidents around Bibia, Elegu, and Atiak, Uganda (Australia RRT 2009).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by Lt. Col. John Garang until his death in 2004 (FAS 2000; American University n.d.). Southern Sudan is primarily animist and/or Christian (FAS 2000). It also is non-Arab (FAS 2000). Members of the SPLA are non-Arab and non-Muslim (American University n.d.). The mutiny originally involved 500 troops and grew to 20,000 by 1989 and 50,000-60,000 by 1991 (FAS 2000). It had 177,000 in 2011 (Global Security n.d.). It forcibly recruited some members and recruited Dinka and Luo members in the Aweil, Gogrial, and Bahr al-Ghazal districts (Canada IRB 1991). The group also had child soldiers although it denied doing so (Canada IRB 1991).

The group was organized along three different factions: SPLA Torit, SPLA Bahr-al-Gahzal, and the South Sudan Independence Movement (FAS 2000). They worked in three different regions. The armed forces were later organized into divisions, brigades, and battalions (Global Security n.d.). The group financed itself through foreign donations and external assistance (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The SPLA received weapons and military assistance from the US in 1996 (FAS 2000). It also received equipment from Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Namibia (Global Security n.d.).

The Ugandan government provided sanctuary, fighters, and other material assistance (Australia RRT 2009). Its fighters may have even fought alongside SPLA forces in southern Sudan (Australia RRT 2009).

Group Outcome

The group reached a power-sharing agreement with John Garang and the Khartoum government in 2004, but he was then killed in an air crash (American University n.d.). The group reached a separate peace agreement in 2005, which led to a referendum and South Sudan's independence (IRIN 2008; Global Security n.d.). Ugandan police have intermittently arrested SPLA officers in the area (Australia RRT 2009).

IX.   SUDANESE LIBERATION ARMY
Torg ID: 1304
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

This is an alias for the SLM/A (T2489).

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for the SLM/A (T2489).

Group Formation: This is an alias for the SLM/A (T2489).

Group End: This is an alias for the SLM/A (T2489).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the SLM/A (T2489).

Geography

This is an alias for the SLM/A (T2489).

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the SLM/A (T2489).

External Ties

This is an alias for the SLM/A (T2489).

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the SLM/A (T2489).

X.   LORD'S RESISTANCE MOVEMENT/ARMY (LRM/A)
       Torg ID: 279
       Min. Group Date: 1987
       Max. Group Date: 2012
       Onset: NA

       Aliases: Lord's Resistance Army (Lra), Lords Resistance Army, Lord's Resistance Army,
       Lords Resistance Army (Lra), Lord's Resistance Army Lra, Lord's Resistance
       Army/Movement (Lra/M), Lords Resistance Movement, Lord's Resistance Movement,
       Lord's Resistance Movement/Army (Lrm/A)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army, UPDCA

Group Formation: 1987

Group End (Outcome): 2012 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) formed in 1987 when it splintered from the Holy Spirit Movement in Uganda (Zapata 2011; Arieff and Ploch 2011, 3). The group claims to want to fight the Museveni government in Kampala and promote the rights of the Acholi people (Zapata 2011). Its goals are not as concrete as other armed groups (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 3). It is ethno-nationalist and Christian fundamentalist (Zapata 2011). The group was originally named the Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army and changed its name to the LRA in 1991 (Zapata 2011).

Geography

The group was active in Katine, Gulu, Kitgum, and other areas around northern Uganda (Rice 2007). It had a base of operations in southern Sudan and later moved to Western Equatoria and the DRC (Bevan 2006, 276).

Organizational Structure

Joseph Kony leads the LRA (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 3). The group claims to promote the rights of the Acholi people, but raids, abducts, and kills Acholi members frequently (Rice 2007). The group primarily acquired new fighters through abduction (Bevan 2006, 275). Senior commanders and fighters were Acholi and other ethnic groups from CAR, DRC, and South Sudan (Bevan 2006; Arieff and Ploch 2011, 4). It had approximately 5,000 fighters by 1997 (Bevan 2006, 275). In 2011, the group reportedly only had a few hundred members (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 4). In 2015, it had 200 combatants (Global Security n.d.). The group is organized along conventional lines and soldiers are 'indoctrinated' to obey their commanders at all times (Bevan 2006, 277). Soldiers also receive training prior to combat (Bevan 2006, 277).

External Ties

The Sudanese government provided sanctuary to the LRA (Rice 2007). Sudan also provided weapons, ammunition, and training in retaliation for Ugandan support of the SPLA (Bevan 2006, 275). In 2002, Sudan partially withdrew its support and allowed Ugandan forces to conduct cross-border raids in pursuit of the LRA (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 6). As of 2010, the group was believed to be operating out of northeastern DRC (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 6).

The LRA also allies and works with the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) in the Congo (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Ugandan government launched a massive counter-offensive in 1991 known as Operation North, but it failed to quash the movement (Rice 2007). This involved separating Acholi residents from the LRA into different settlements, but actually provoked LRA retaliation against the Acholi (Bevan 2006, 275). The government launched a second counter-offensive in 2002 known as Operation Iron First, but this also failed (Rice 2007). The US aided Uganda, DRC, CAR, and Sudanese efforts to combat the LRA (Arieff and Ploch 2011, 5-8).

XI.   SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FORCES
        Torg ID: 1921
        Min. Group Date: 1988
        Max. Group Date: 1989
        Onset: NA

        Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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    - http://keesings.com/index_new.php?page=article&article=caa3e917&search=%22SUDANESE%20PEOPLE%22S%20LIBERATION%20FORCES%20Sudan%22
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    - Al-Bawaba Reporters. 2002. "Russia Concerned about Situation in Sudan." *Al Bawaba*, Sep 04, 1.
      https://search.proquest.com/docview/194782349?accountid=14026.
  - SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FORCES Sudan
- Searched Google: 9 results, top result was GTD

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: first attack 1988 (GTD 2017)

Group End: last attack 1989 (GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Alias for SPLA

Geography

Alias for SPLA

The attacks the Sudanese People's Liberation Forces are credited with occurred in Bor, Shukkaba, Malakal, and at sea (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

Alias for SPLA

External Ties

Alias for SPLA

Group Outcome

Alias for SPLA

Notes for Iris: *Alias for SPLA? I really could not find anything, so I'm pretty sure they must be an alias, but I'm not at all sure who exactly. A lot of these groups are fairly fluid.

XII.   ANYA-NYA II MILITIA
         Torg ID: 1621
         Min. Group Date: 1988
         Max. Group Date: 1988
         Onset: NA

         Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SSLM/A (All Africa 2012), the Friendly Forces (Carey 2013)

Group Formation: first violent action in 1975 while still joined to SPLA (All Africa 2012; HRW 2003), first violent action after split in 1983 (Netherlands 1988).

Group End: 1991 (HRW 2003), disbanded 1993 (Carey 2013)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Anya-nya II militia was originally formed in 1975 as a multi-ethnic separatist group, advocating for an independent South Sudan (Netherlands 2013). Following a dispute in 1983, the Anya-nya split from the newly formed SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Movement) and became the "friendly forces" for the government in Khartoum (LOC 1991; Carey 2013). The Anya-nya II became a proxy militia for the government, and directly targeted the SPLM (LOC 1991). The group has been described as separatist, pro-Western, and Marxist (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The only attack credited to them by the Global Terrorism Database took place in 1988 in Khartoum, but the group participated in violence throughout all stages of its existence (GTD 2017).

Geography

The Anya-nya II primarily operated in the south of Sudan (LOC 1991). While they maintained a headquarters in Khartoum, they also possessed a headquarters in Bilpam (All Africa 2012; LOC 1991). Most of their military actions were concentrated in the south, from Darfur to the Ethiopian border (All Africa 2012; LOC 1991; Netherlands 2013; Carey 2013). Towns in which there was fighting include: Khartoum, Torit, Kapoeta, Mading Bor, Aali Nil, and Malakal (GTD 2017; All Africa 2012; LOC 1991; Netherlands 2013; Carey 2013).

Organizational Structure

Before 1983, the group was joined with what would later become the SPLM/A (LOC 1991). In 1983, the future members of the Anya-nya II mutinied and the two groups split and became directly opposed to one another (LOC 1991; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The Anya-nya II became a proxy militia for the government, and directly targeted the SPLM (LOC 1991). In exchange, the government provided the Anya-nya II with funds and arms to fight the SPLA (LOC 1991; Carey 2013). At their peak they controlled nearly 7,000 troops (All Africa 2012). Most of those members were ethnically Nuer, especially after the split with the primarily Dinka SPLM/A (LOC 1991).

For most of the group's existence it was led by Lieutenant Colonel Sammuel Gai Tut Yang (All Africa 2015). Especially after the group transitioned to support the central government in Khartoum, it followed a military structure and relied on support from

government military bases (LOC 1991). The government also ensured that the group had an active headquarters in Khartoum (LOC 1991). It had no political wing.

External Ties

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by Col. John Garang, split from the Anya-Nya II in 1983 in order to continue pursuing regime change in Khartoum (Netherlands 1988). The Anya-Nya II remained focused on securing independence and self-determination for the south, but confusingly served as a quasi-militia for the central government against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA, armed wing of the SPLM) until the democratic elections in 1985 (Netherlands 1988; All Africa 2012). Defections from the militia to the SPLA became widespread in 1987 (LOC 1991). The majority of funding, training, and arms the Anya-nya II received came from the central government in Khartoum (LOC 1991).

Group Outcome

Originally, when the Anya-nya II were still joined with the SPLM, the government was opposed to their actions (Netherlands 1988). After the split in 1983, the Anya-nya became a proxy force for the government (LOC 1991; Carey 2013). The group was reported to have partially disbanded in 1993, but also has other listed end dates as early as 1991 (Carey 2013; HRW 2003).

Notes for Iris:
-there is a weird switch in sides with this group and other groups from the rebel to the government side here
-unknown exactly when leader died, but might be correlated with switch in side (leader dies in 1984)

XIII. UGANDA DEMOCRATIC CHRISTIAN ARMY (UDCA)
Torg ID: 508
Min. Group Date: 1988
Max. Group Date: 1994
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Alias for the LRA.

Group Formation: Alias for the LRA.

Group End (Outcome): Alias for the LRA.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the LRA.

Geography

This is an alias for the LRA.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the LRA.

External Ties

This is an alias for the LRA.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the LRA.

XIV. AL-QAIDA
Torg ID: 28
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaida in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherds or farmers) (FAS 2005). Bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died earlier or didn't die at all) (CFR 2012). He was from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015). He was replaced by Ayman al-Zawhiri in 2011. (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties

to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today, though it has lost much support to ISIS.

XV.   NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF SUDAN
        Torg ID: 617
        Min. Group Date: 1989
        Max. Group Date: 2001
        Onset: 1996

        Aliases: None

        Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NDA

Group Formation: formed in 1989 (Sudan Tribune n.d.)

Group End: 2005 (Sudan Tribune n.d.)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The National Democratic Alliance of Sudan (NDA) is a coalition of democratically minded opposition groups that formed in response to the al-Bashir coup in 1989 (Sudan Tribune n.d.). The primary member groups of the alliance were the Umma Party, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (Global Security n.d.). While the alliance's existence remained constant, the member groups changed as the conflict and central government morphed (Global Security n.d.). Other member groups include the Communist Party of Sudan (CPS) and the Beja Congress (Global Security n.d.). The single attack the NDA is directly accused of occurred in Kassala in 1999 (GTD 2017). The member groups of the NDA cover nearly the entire territory of Sudan (Salah 1993 pg.15). The group's first attack took place in 1996 (Gleditsch et al. 2013).

Geography

The single attack the NDA is directly accused of occurred in Kassala in 1999 (GTD 2017). The member groups of the NDA cover nearly the entire territory of Sudan (Salah 1993 pg.15). The NDA has offices around the world, including offices in Cairo, Egypt; Asmara, Eritrea; and Washington, D.C. (Canada 1996). While they, and all other political parties, were banned by the al-Bashir dictatorship in 1991, the NDA operated almost entirely from Ethiopia (Canada 1996; Global Security).

Organizational Structure

The National Democratic Alliance of Sudan (NDA) is a coalition of democratically minded opposition groups that formed in response to the al-Bashir coup in 1989 (Sudan Tribune n.d.). The primary member groups of the alliance were the Umma Party, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

(Global Security n.d.). The chairman of the NDA was DUP leader Mohamed Osman Al Mirghani (Global Security n.d.). At one time, the Co-Presidents were listed as Farouk Abu Essa and Bona Malwal (Sudan Tribune n.d.). The NDA has offices around the world, including offices in Cairo, Egypt; Asmara, Eritrea; and Washington, D.C. (Canada 1996). While they were banned by the al-Bashir dictatorship, the NDA operated almost entirely from abroad (Canada 1996). The size of the group was once estimated to be near 2,500 troops (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 288).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support from other state or non-state actors. The NDA has offices around the world, including offices in Cairo, Egypt; Asmara, Eritrea; and Washington, D.C. (Canada 1996). While they were banned by the al-Bashir dictatorship, the NDA operated almost entirely from abroad (Canada 1996). Many of the groups contained within the coalition violently opposed the government (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The alliance disbanded in 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed and the portions of the NDA remaining within Sudan were allowed to participate in the government (Global Security n.d.). Many individuals who were former members of the NDA still serve in various government roles (Global Security n.d.). The single attack the NDA is directly accused of occurred in Kassala in 1999 (GTD 2017). The member groups of the NDA cover nearly the entire territory of Sudan (Salah 1993 pg.15).

Notes for Iris: weird thing in gleditsch:
"The vast majority of the military force represented by the NDA was controlled by the SPLM, which is treated as a separate group." double-counting?

-they're double-counting violence and there are some smaller factions but NDA is never an organized entity
-NDA seems like an unorganized umbrella - Carly says they just had meetings in Eritrea

XVI.   ERITREAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT
Torg ID: 605
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: Eritrean People's Liberation Front (Eplf), Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, Eritrean People's Liberation Front

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1970

Group End: 1991 (political party)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The EPLF began as a splinter group from ELF in 1970 (Canada IRB 2006; FAS 1999). The group aimed to establish an independent Eritrea free from Ethiopian control (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan N.D. p.225). Their first violent attack occurred in 1972 (ibid). Unlike the ELF, the EPLF adopted no specific ideology beyond an ethno-nationalist viewpoint which enabled it to gain more support among various groups (Woldemikael 1991 p32).

Geography

The EPLF eventually grew to operate through all of modern-day Eritrea and moved into Asmara, the port of Assam, and the Dahlak islands (FAS 1999). The group is based in Arota and its militant and political factions operate there (Woldemikael 1991 p34). The EPLF is not a transnational group and did not have an external base.

Organizational Structure

The group had a Central Committee that was composed of 72 members which were elected by representatives during a General Congress. Twelve members of the Central Committee then get elected to lead the Political Committee (Woldemikael 1991 p34-35). Both committees are led by the General Secretary of the EPLF (ibid). The group had a political wing. Members of the EPLF were ex-militants of ELF. Leadership was upper class and well-educated while they recruited fighters from mainly villagers and peasants. The group was originally organized in a series of regional cells.

The first EPLF general secretary was Ramadan Mohammed Nur; in 1999 the EPLF president was Isaias Afwerki and Nur became attorney general (ibid; FAS 1999). The EPLF doesn't gain much funding from other countries but received many of its weapons from combat with the Ethiopian Army (Woldemikael 1991 p34-35). At its peak in 1991, the EPLF was estimated to have 60,000 members (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan N.D. p.225). The group doesn't draw from one specific ethnic or religious membership base due to its secular nature (Woldemikael 1991 p32).

External Ties

The EPLF emerged as a splinter group off of ELF in 1970 then pushed ELF into Sudan by 1980 (Canada IRB 2006). The group has alliances with the TPLF, EPRDF, OLF, and ALM. It also maintains close connections with the bordering countries of Sudan and Somalia including friendly "ties" **(**Woldemikael 1991 p. 40). It is not specified what type of ties this included and whether there was any material support. In 1985, the group decided to cut ties with the TPLF but later mended relations in 1988 (Young 1996 p.117). In 1991, several groups including the EPLF led by the TPLF overthrew the government in Addis Ababa and achieved an independent Eritrean state (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan N.D. p.225; Canada IRB 2006). Then, in 1994, the political core of the EPLF, renamed as the PFDJ, became Eritrea's only political party and seized control of the government (FAS 1999).

Group Outcome

 In 1991 several groups including the EPLF led by the TPLF overthrew the government in Addis Ababa and achieved an independent Eritrean state, which was the EPLF's last official violent attack (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan N.D. p.225; Canada IRB 2006). This led to the dissolving of the EPLF and in place a political party called the

PFDJ emerged retaining the same core organizational structure as the original group (Canada RIB 2006). Former EPLF leader Isaias Afewerki became the new president of Eritrea and the new transitional government was led on a one party system (ibid).

XVII.   UMMAH LIBERATION ARMY
          Torg ID: 512
          Min. Group Date: 1990
          Max. Group Date: 1999
          Onset: NA

          Aliases: Ummah Liberation Army, Ummah Liberation Army (Ula)

          Part 1. Bibliography
          ● GTD Perpetrator 20452. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20452
          ● Jemera Rone. "Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights." Human Rights Watch. 2003. https://books.google.com/books?id=3WQkACoP3FkC&pg=PA45&lpg=PA45&dq=UMMA+LIBERATION+ARMY+party&source=bl&ots=ibUgeBs8ly&sig=pILAi1pBVafzXiAi2-kO6_Gw9fU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiat43p9IPZAhVm74MKHczoAxcQ6AEINzAF#v=onepage&q=UMMA%20LIBERATION%20ARMY%20party&f=false

          Part 2. Basic Coding

          Aliases: This is the armed wing of the Umma Party (Rone 2003).

          Group Formation: This is the armed wing of the Umma Party (Rone 2003).

          Group End: This is the armed wing of the Umma Party (Rone 2003).

          Part 3. Narrative

          Group Formation

          This is the armed wing of the Umma Party (Rone 2003).

          Geography

          This is the armed wing of the Umma Party (Rone 2003).

          Organizational Structure

          This is the armed wing of the Umma Party (Rone 2003).

External Ties

This is the armed wing of the Umma Party (Rone 2003).

Group Outcome

This is the armed wing of the Umma Party (Rone 2003).

XVIII.   SOUTHERN SUDAN INDEPENDENCE ARMY
Torg ID: 1467
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: NA

Aliases: Southern Sudan Independence Movement (Ssim), Movement Of Riak Machar, Southern Sudan Defence Force, Southern Sudan Independence Army, Southern Sudan Independence Army (Ssia), Southern Sudan Independence Movement
Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army (Ssim/A), Sudan Peoples Liberation Army United (Spla United), Sudan People's Liberation Army United (Spla United)

Part 1. Bibliography
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http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/laurabeny/Documents/Book_Review_Politics_of_Liberation.pdf

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Sudan People's Liberation Army - Nasir (SPLA-Nasir) (Rone 1996 pg.xiii)

Group Formation: 1991 (MIPT 2008)

Group End: joined with government forces in 1996 (MIPT 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) was originally a splinter group from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM/A), "created by Dr. Riak Machar in August 1991," (MIPT 2008). The split was due to a coup within the SPLA, orchestrated by Machar, based on differences over whether or not southern Sudan should separate from Sudan if the demands of the southerners were not met by the government in Khartoum (MIPT 2008; Beny 2003). SSIM favored an independent south (MIPT 2008). It is unknown when their first violent attack occurred. It is likely that their first violent attack took place in 1991 (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group was originally based in Nasir, Upper Nile, and also had bases in Waat and Ayod (Rone 1996 pg.xiii; HRW 2003). They operated throughout the South, most likely in Darfur, Kordofan, and the Bahar al-Gazal states (Carey n.d.; Beny 2003).

Organizational Structure

SSIM was formed because of a fairly unsuccessful attempt by Riek Machar and Lam Akol, the leaders of SSIM and former high-ranking members of the SPLA, to unseat Dr. John Garang from the head of the SPLA (Beny 2003). After this rough split, the groups turned on each other (Beny 2003). As a result, the southerners lost much of the oil-rich land they had won from the government in Khartoum and SSIM was forced to turn to Khartoum for assistance in their fight against the SPLA (Beny 2003). "SSIM fighters were mainly of Nuer descent and came from the oil-rich region of the Upper Nile," because they were mostly former members of the SPLA (MIPT 2008). By the end of their tenure,

SSIM was fractured along tribal and geographic lines, and was also responsible for moving the war south and setting back the liberation struggle against the government in Khartoum (Beny 2003). It is unknown how large the group was.

External Ties

SSIM was formed because of a fairly unsuccessful attempt by Riek Machar and Lam Akol, the leaders of SSIM and former high-ranking members of the SPLA, to unseat Dr. John Garang from the head of the SPLA (Beny 2003). After this rough split, the groups turned on each other (Beny 2003). As a result, the southerners lost much of the oil-rich land they had won from the government in Khartoum and SSIM was forced to turn to Khartoum for assistance in their fight against the SPLA (Beny 2003).

Group Outcome

By the end of their tenure, SSIM was fractured along tribal and geographic lines, and was also responsible for moving the war south and setting back the liberation struggle against the government in Khartoum (Beny 2003). The group eventually fractured along tribal and geographic lines, losing all semblance of common action (Beny 2003). The remaining active members joined with the government's forces in 1996 (MIPT 2008).

Notes for Iris:
-Riak Machar tried to coup SPLA leader, fail, and splinters to form SSIA
-why does the coup happen? Unclear. Carly watched a Vice video that made the leader seem crazy.
-this is another group that switches sides. Very loosely organized, faltered due to ethnic fighting, some faction switched sides

XIX.   EQUATORIAL DEFENSE FORCE (EDF)
Torg ID: 2042
Min. Group Date: 1995
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Equatorial Defense Force, Equatorial Defense Force (Edf)

Part 1. Bibliography
- Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell. "Documentation for Equatoria Defence Force (EDF/Khartoum)." Pro-Government Militias. University of Mannehim. http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-public/data/pgag/167/evidence/
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- Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), Profile of Internal Displacement: Sudan, 29 October 2005, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4059b7044.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Equatoria Defense Forces (NRC 2005)

Group Formation: before 1996 (Carey n.d.)

Group End: approximately 2004 merger (Carey n.d.)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Equatorial Defense Force (EDF) was originally founded in the mid-1990s as one of many liberation forces for the south Sudanese (ASAP 2003). The original purpose of the EDF was to oppose the Sudan People's Liberation Army after a turbulent split from the group (SPLA/M) (Carey n.d.). The first signs of them participating in violence took place in 1996 (Carey n.d.).

Geography

The EDF was reported to be active primarily in the Sudanese states of Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazel, and Imatong in the Equatoria region (Carey n.d.). Other locations in which they fought included: Palotaka, Murahiliha, Tirangore, Hidonge, Kitgum (Uganda), Torit, Katire, and Imila (Carey n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The EDF was primarily made up of members of the Acholi, Langi, and Lotuko tribes (Carey n.d.). They were primarily a militia, and were led by Martin Kenyi (ASAP 2003).

The EDF joined the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) in 2004, along with the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIA), which opposed the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA/M) (ASAP 2003; NRC 2005). The SSDF, in 2003, was led by Chief of Staff, Major General Paulino Matip Nhial, and the SSIA was led by Dr. Riek Machar (ASAP 2003). The EDF, while separatist, was supported financially by the government in Khartoum, similar to the SSIA, because of

their opposition to the SPLA as well as the LRA (ASAP 2003). They were party to both the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997 and the Juba Conference in June 2001 (ASAP 2003). The size of the group is not known.

External Ties

The EDF joined the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) in 2004, along with the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIA), which opposed the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA/M) (ASAP 2003; NRC 2005). The SSDF, in 2003, was led by Chief of Staff, Major General Paulino Matip Nhial, and the SSIA was led by Dr. Riek Machar (ASAP 2003). The EDF, while separatist, was supported financially by the government in Khartoum, similar to the SSIA, because of their opposition to the SPLA as well as the LRA (ASAP 2003). Before they joined the SSDF, the EDF was allied with the SPLA, but split due to either tribal or interpersonal causes (Carey n.d.).

Group Outcome

It is not clear whether the group remained active leading up to, and after, the referendum in 2011. The last mentions of the EDF along with violence take place in 2004 when they merged with the SPLM/A (Carey n.d.; NRC 2005). This is a major break from the many years the group was allied with the government in Khartoum, fighting the SPLA and the LRA in Equatoria (Carey n.d.; ASAP 2003).

XX.   ETHIOPIANS
Torg ID: 2101
Min. Group Date: 1995
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

XXI.   THE SUDAN ALLIANCE FORCES
Torg ID: 484
Min. Group Date: 1996
Max. Group Date: 1997
Onset: NA

Aliases: Sudanese Alliance Forces, Sudan Alliance Forces, The Sudan Alliance Forces

Part 1. Bibliography
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  CZmLWlB9_x_g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwimsfPT-oPZAhVq6IMKHcexDJA4ChDoA
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1995 (Connell 1997)

Group End: last attack 1997, leader arrested 2004 (AA 2009)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Along with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) wanted to overthrow the National Islamic Front (NIF) government, which came to power in the 1989 coup (Connell 1997). The group was "politically progressive and secular," with desires to implement self-determination for the south, new free and fair elections, civil rights for all Sudanese, and an independent judiciary to enforce the laws (Global Security n.d.; Kramer 2013). They formed in 1995 (Connell 1997). Their first violent attack was as late as 1996 (GTD 2017).Their strategy, along with the other groups engaged in the fight against the government, was to open up a sufficiently long eastern front of the war while civil unrest could take the center (Connell 1997).

Geography

The Sudan Alliance Forces' reported attacks occurred in Kassala and Ad-Damazin in 1996 and 1997 (GTD 2017). They are credited with starting a new front of the war in the east (Blue Nile region) in 1997, along with the SPLA (Global Security n.d.). Much of that fighting took place near a strategic hydroelectric dam (Global Security n.d.). They also operated from guerrilla bases in Eritrea, with the support of the Eritrean government (Kramer 2013; AA 2009).

Organizational Structure

The Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) were led by Abdel Aziz Khaled, and at their peak consisted of around 300 men, second only to the SPLA (Global Security n.d.; Kramer 2013). Mainly made up of former unionists, professionals, students, and progressive members of the military, SAF's ideology was entirely secular (Kramer 2013). The group was governed by an Executive Committee made up of eight people associated with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Kramer 2013). SAF was a signatory to the Asmara

Declaration, which reaffirmed their ideas for self-determination for the south, new free and fair elections, civil rights for all Sudanese, and an independent judiciary to enforce laws (Kramer 2013). The group was funded through the same channels as the rest of the NDA, primarily by the state of Eritrea, which relied on it for anti-terror services and border protection (Kramer 2013; AA 2009).

In addition to their fighting force and political activity, SAF also administered an active charity organization called Amal ("hope" in Arabic) (Kramer 2013). The charity group operated in the SAF controlled east, with a main base in Asmara, Eritrea (Kramer 2013). Amal mainly focused on educational, health, legal, and reconstruction projects (Kramer 2013).

External Ties

SAF was primarily funded and supported by the government of Eritrea (Kramer 2013; AA 2009). SAF used operational bases and camps in western Eritrea as a starting point for many of their campaigns (Connell 1997). Their connection with Eritrea stemmed from their membership in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) along with the Ummah Party (UP), the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (Kramer 2013). The group unraveled because of poor leadership and infighting, but no clear splinter groups could be identified (AA 2009).

Group Outcome

Despite their high ideals, SAF encountered serious internal strife due to "a totalitarian mentality, favouritism, and the narrow personal interests" among the leadership (AA 2009). In addition, the Eritreans, distracted by their own violent confrontation with Ethiopia, became less and less able to fund and equip the SAF and other groups (AA 2009). The leader of SAF, Abdel Aziz Khaled, was arrested in 2004 (AA 2009). He then reconciled with the NIF government and left for the United States to join his family (AA 2009). The last attack registered with GTD took place in 1997 (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:
-they had a charity front
-they are not violent very long despite how well-organized they are
-leadership in-fighting really wrecks the group and leads to its end

XXII.   JANJAWEED
Torg ID: 2342
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Jerome Tubiana, "The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the 'Darfurization' of Chad," Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2008. https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1002_1257165499_swp-12-chad-sudan-proxy-war.pdf
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- Ahmed Hussain Adam. "In Sudan, the Janjaweed Rides Again." New York Times. 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/opinion/in-sudan-the-janjaweed-rides-again.html?_r=0

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Janjawid, Rapid Support Forces, RSF

Group Formation: mid-1980s to 1987 (Hastrup 1987)

Group End (Outcome): 2014 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Janjaweed formed as the armed wing of the Arab Gathering sometime in the 1980s, but no later than 1987 (Grawert 2008; Hastrup 2013, 87). The Arab Gathering was originally an ethno-nationalist coalition of Arab Tribes that fought for increased rights and representation in Darfur (Hastrup 2013, 87). It frequently clashed with Chadian rebels in Darfur and later became a proxy for the Sudanese army in 2003 (Slate 2005; Amnesty International 2007). It is unknown when the group's first violent attack occurred, but was sometime between 1987 and 2003 (Hastrup 2013). In 2003, the Sudanese military deployed the Janjaweed militia as a proxy force against the JEM and SLA rebel forces in Darfur (Slate 2005; Mans 2004; Amnesty International 2007).

Geography

Janjaweed operates out of northern Darfur. The group's base was in Misteriya in Darfur (Human Rights Watch n.d.). It mainly conducted attacks in the Darfur region (Amnesty International 2007; Human Rights Watch n.d.; Berg 2008).

Organizational Structure

Members initially came from Arab tribes in the Chad and Sudan region (Tubiana 2011; Grawet 2008, 605).

The militias are ethnically Arab and come from both northern Rizeigat and Chadian Arab groups (HRW n.d.; Mans 2004). The government purposely recruits ethnic groups with grievances against Sudanese rebels and those with strong interests in land reform that the government can use to incentivize recruitment (HRW n.d.).

There is no clear leadership although the government uses prominent tribal leaders like Sheikh Musa Hilal to act as de facto leaders (Tubiana 2011, 67; HRW n.d.). Janjaweed operates out of northern Darfur and reports to Sudanese army officers including LTC Abdul Wahid Said Ali Said (HRW n.d.).

Janjaweed was the armed wing of the Arab Gathering, but there are disputes over whether the Arab Gathering was ever a coherent organization (Grawert 2008, 607; Hastrup 2013; Human Rights Watch n.d.). No estimate could be found about the group size. The group funded itself through external support from the Sudanese government (Slate 2004).

External Ties

The group receives most of its supplies and training from the Sudanese government (Slate 2004). The group is financed by the Sudanese government and is also allowed to maintain any resources, cash, or loot taken from villagers during operations (Slate 2004).

Group Outcome

The Janjaweed militia operated during the Sudan civil war (Slate 2005; Amnesty International 2007). The group disarmed in 2004 under the orders of Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir (Adam 2014). Bashir reactivated the group in 2013 as a personal security force and renamed the group the Rapid Support Forces (Adam 2014).

XXIII.   SOUTH SUDAN UNITED MOVEMENT/ARMY
Torg ID: 2597
Min. Group Date: 1988
Max. Group Date: 2000
Onset: NA

Aliases: South Sudan United Movement/Army, Ssum/A

Part 1. Bibliography
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Part 2. Basic Coding
Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998 (IPIS 2014)

Group End: 2002 merger with SPLM (IPIS 2014)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The South Sudan United Movement/Army (SSUM) was started by Maj.-Gen. Paulino Matip Nhial in 1998, after a disagreement over who should maintain military leadership of the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) with Dr. Riek Machar (HRW 2003; IRIN n.d.). The group was a splinter of SSIM (IPIS 2014, 65). From the beginning, the SSUM was allied to the government in Khartoum (HRW 2003). It was a pro-government militia.

Geography

SSUM's short lifespan was characterized by the group's efforts to secure southern oil fields for the government in Khartoum (IPIS 2014). Most of the fighting after the split between SSIM and SSUM was over the Thar Jath oil fields (IPIS 2014). In addition, SSUM actively opposed Dr. Riek Macher's faction of the SSDF, until Machar rejoined the Sudan People's Liberation Army in 2004 after Khartoum backed Maj.-Gen. Matiep as the leader of SSDF (Carey 2013; IRIN n.d.). The group was based in the towns of Bentiu and Mankien and did most of their fighting in Wahdah State (Upper Nile), Unity State, and Leer Province (Carey 2013). They also participated in fighting in Anka, Ankai, Wau, Mayom, and Kalakilah town (Carey 2013).

Organizational Structure

The South Sudan United Movement/Army (SSUM) was started by Maj.-Gen. Paulino Matip Nhial in 1998 after a disagreement over who should maintain military leadership of the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) with Dr. Riek Machar (HRW 2003; IRIN n.d.). In the end, Khartoum decided to side with Maj.-Gen. Matip, and Machar left SSDF with his South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and rejoined the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) (IPIS 2014). From the beginning, the SSUM was allied to, and supported by, the government in Khartoum (HRW 2003). The size of the group is not clear.

External Ties

From the beginning, the SSUM was allied to the government in Khartoum (HRW 2003). The South Sudan United Movement/Army (SSUM) was started by Maj.-Gen. Paulino Matip Nhial in 1998 after a disagreement over who should maintain military leadership of the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) with Dr. Riek Machar (HRW 2003; IRIN n.d.). In the end, Khartoum decided to side with Maj.-Gen. Matip, and Machar left SSDF with his South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and rejoined the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) (IPIS 2014). After Maj.-Gen. Matiep gained back control of the SSDF due to the government intervention, the SSDF/SSUM went back to fighting the SPLA instead of other member groups of the SSDF (IRIN n.d.).

Group Outcome

In 1998, the government in Khartoum "switched support to Paulino Matiep, while Riek Machar rejoined the SPLM with the Nairobi Declaration of 6 January 2002" (IPIS 2014). Paulino Matiep also eventually joined the SPLA as a lieutenant general when he signed the Juba Declaration in January 2006 (IPIS 2014). Lt.-Gen. Matiep died in August 2012 (IPIS 2014).

Notes for Iris:
-Matip splintered from SSDF due to disagreements with Machar
-Matip got external support from government, Machar lost external support from Machar
-Machar switches his aims again (not getting anything from the government anyway) and goes back to SPLM to fight against the government

XXIV.   ERITREAN INITIATIVE GROUP
Torg ID: 1983
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Eritrean Initiative Group, Association Of Eritrean Initiative, Association Of Eritrean Initiative (Aei)

Part 1. Bibliography
- John Pike. "Alliance of Eritrean National Force." Intelligence Resource Program. 1998. FAS. https://fas.org/irp/world/para/aenf.htm
- "Political Parties - Eritrea." Global Security. N.d. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/eritrea/political-parties.htm

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 1999 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information about this group. It is not clear when or why exactly the group formed, but they were active in Khartoum in 1999 when they signed on to the Eritrean National Alliance (ENA) along with nine other groups (Global Security n.d.) The ENA was the Sudanese response to the National Democratic Alliance, an opposition

movement supported by the Eritrean government (Global Security n.d.). They aimed to overthrow the Eritrean government (FAS n.d.).

Geography

The group was based in Sudan and was known to occasionally raid western Eritrea (Global Security n.d.). Otherwise, little is known about their operations.

Organizational Structure

Eritrean Initiative Group leadership could not be identified, but the ENA was led by Abdullah Idriss (Pike 1998). The ENA was the Sudanese response to the National Democratic Alliance, an opposition movement supported by the Eritrean government, and was funded by Khartoum (Global Security n.d.).

The complete list of member groups of the ENA include: the Eritrean Liberation Front, the Eritrean People's Conference, the Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council, the Eritrean Liberation Front-National Council, the Eritrean People's Democratic Liberation Front, the Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic Front, the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Kunama/Eritrea, the Eritrean Democratic Resistance Movement Gash-Setit, and the Eritrean Initiative Group (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The Eritrean Initiative Group was a member of the Eritrean National Alliance (ENA), the Sudanese response to the NDA, established 1999 (Global Security n.d.). Other members of the ENA include: the Eritrean Liberation Front, the Eritrean People's Conference, the Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council, the Eritrean Liberation Front-National Council, the Eritrean People's Democratic Liberation Front, the Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic Front, the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Kunama/Eritrea, and the Eritrean Democratic Resistance Movement Gash-Setit (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

It is not clear when or why the group became inactive. The EIG was part of the ENA, which was supported by the government in Khartoum (Global Security n.d.).

XXV.   SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT
        Torg ID: 2489
        Min. Group Date: 2001
        Max. Group Date: 2012

Onset: 2003

Aliases: Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (Slm/A), Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (Slm/A), Sudan Liberation Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement (Slm)

Part 1. Bibliography
- GTD Perpetrator 20504. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20504
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  http://www.refworld.org/docid/53ce74e64.html
- "Who are Sudan's Darfur rebels?" BBC. 2010.
  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7039360.stm
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  https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/darfur.pdf
- "Darfur Liberation Front." Global Security. N.d.
  https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/darfur.htm
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. Non-State Actor Dataset. 2013. P. 355. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Darfur Liberation Front/Army (DLF/A)

Group Formation: 2001 (ACOORD 2014)

Group End: 2016 (present and active) (Gleditsch 2013; GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The SLA was originally founded in 2001 under the name Darfur Liberation Front/Army (DLF/A), at the time they were led by Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur (ACCORD 2014). The SLA was one of two of the primary groups in the region formed to oppose the government of Sudan (GOS), the other being the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (BBC 2010). The SLA/M's main priorities are separatist and include gaining regional autonomy, or simply greater representation, for Darfur, a region considered to be socially and economically neglected (DOJ 2009). The group's first violent incident occurred in 2001(GTD 2017). Originally, the group represented different ethnic groups and had no clear ideology. After it splinters, the splinter groups harbor ethnonationalist ideologies.

Geography

The SLA/M primarily operated throughout the region of Darfur (BBC 2010; DOJ 2009; ACCORD 2014; Global Security n.d.). Some of their more specific attacks occurred in: Nertiti, Tawilah, Katrom, Sileia, Nina Kass, Ed Dueim, Al-Fashir, Nyala, Deribat, Kuma, Kwajok, Kufra, Gereida, and Kiechkuon (GTD 2017). The SLA-Abdel Wahid is thought to have controlled much of the Jebel Murra mountains after the split (BBC 2010).

Organizational Structure

The SLA was originally founded in 2001 under the name Darfur Liberation Front/Army (DLF/A) and was led by Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur (ACCORD 2014). The SLA was one of two of the primary groups in the region formed to oppose the government of Sudan (GOS), the other being the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (BBC 2010). At their height, the group was thought to have nearly 11,000 troops (Gleditsch 2013). For the most part, members of the group were Fur (Abdel Wahid faction) or Zaghawa (Minni Minawi faction) - the two largest non-Arab tribes in Darfur (BBC 2010; ACCORD 2014). The SLA/M was supported financially by Eritrea, Libya, and Chad (Gleditsch 2013). It had no political wing (Gleditsch et al. 2013).

Throughout the conflict in Darfur, the SLA was plagued with infighting and fractionalization (Gleditsch 2013). The three main splinter groups were the SLM/A - Unity faction, the SLM/A - Minni Minawi (SLA/M-MM) faction, and the SLA/M - Abdel Wahid faction (BBC 2010; Gleditsch 2013). The SLA/M-Unity faction continued to fight until the end of the conflict in 2009, while the SLA/M-MM faction was a signatory of the 2006 Darfur Peace Accords (Gleditsch 2013). After signing, some of the members of Minawi's faction left the group and either joined others to continue the fight or became part of a new group which opposed the agreement called the National Redemption Front (NRF) (Gleditsch 2013).

External Ties

The SLA/M received unspecified support from Eritrea (Gleditsch 2013). The original SLA was a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which opposed the government in Khartoum (Global Security n.d.). Throughout the conflict in Darfur, the SLA was plagued with infighting and fractionalization (Gleditsch 2013). The three main splinter groups were the SLM/A - Unity faction, the SLM/A - Minni Minawi (SLA/M-MM) faction, and the SLA/M - Abdel Wahid faction (BBC 2010; Gleditsch 2013). The SLA/M-Unity faction continued to fight until the end of the conflict in 2009, while the SLA/M-MM faction was a signatory of the 2006 Darfur Peace Accords (Gleditsch 2013). After signing, some of the members of Minawi's faction left the group and either joined others to continue the fight or became part of a new group which opposed the agreement called the National Redemption Front (NRF) (Gleditsch 2013).

Group Outcome

Throughout the conflict in Darfur, the SLA was plagued with infighting and fractionalization (Gleditsch 2013). The three main splinter groups were the SLM/A - Unity faction, the SLM/A - Minni Minawi (SLA/M-MM) faction, and the SLA/M - Abdel Wahid faction (BBC 2010; Gleditsch 2013). The SLA/M-Unity faction continued to fight until the end of the conflict in 2009, while the SLA/M-MM faction was a signatory of the 2006 Darfur Peace Accords (Gleditsch 2013).

After signing, some of the members of Minawi's faction left the group and either joined others to continue the fight or became part of a new group which opposed the agreement called the National Redemption Front (NRF) (Gleditsch 2013). In 2008, an African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation to stabilize Darfur began (DOJ 2009). Their efforts were rendered ineffective for multiple reasons, one of which being that key factions of the SLM boycotted talks (DOJ 2008). It is acknowledged that they remained active into 2010, and their last incidence of suspected violence took place in 2016 (GTD 2017). The group is likely still active.

Notes for Iris:
-SLM had at least three major splinters: SLM/Unity, Mini Minawi, and Wahid factions

XXVI.   JUSTICE AND EQUALITY MOVEMENT (JEM)
Torg ID: 2168
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 2003

Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Justice and Equality Movement," HSBA, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf
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- "Justice and Equality Movement," BAAD Dataset, START/GTD, http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/justice-and-equality-movement-jem
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. Non-State Actor Dataset. 2013. P. 355. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- "Justice and Equality Movement." Sudan Tribune. N.d. http://www.sudantribune.com/+-JEM-Justice-and-Equality-Movement,284-+

- GTD Perpetrator 20255. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified September 2019.
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20255

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2000

Group End (Outcome): 2009 (goodwill agreement)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

JEM was formed in 2000 following the publication of the Black Book by the group's leader Khalil Ibrahim Muhammed (BAAD Profile 2015; Al-Jazeera English 2010). The group promoted an Islamist ideology and fought for the creation of a new state with a rotating presidency in order to ensure all regions in Sudan are represented (Al-Jazeera English 2010). JEM argued that northern elites disenfranchised and discriminated against southern residents (Al-Jazeera English 2010). The group came to attention in 2003 following a large attack on Khartoum (HSBA; BAAD Profile 2015).

Geography

The group came to attention in 2003 following a large attack on Khartoum (HSBA; BAAD Profile 2015). The group operates both in Chad and Sudan. They use Chad as an external base of support and training (Al-Jazeera English 2010).

Organizational Structure

Its members are technically multi-ethnic although most come from the Zaghawa tribe who live in both Chad and Sudan (Al-Jazeera English 2010). It also tries to recruit Arabs from Darfur, including Janjaweed forces (HSBA). Ibrahim was a former government official, former organizer of the paramilitary Popular Defense Forces, and received medical training in Holland (HSBA). Khalil Ibrahim died in 2011 by a government airstrike and was replaced by his brother Jibril Ibrahim (HSBA; BAAD Profile 2015). It was estimated to have 5,000 members prior to 2010 (BAAD Profile 2015). It has an armed wing known as the Islamic Congress.

Despite claims by JEM leaders to consist of 35,000 well-armed fighters, another source estimated to have 5,000 members prior to 2010 (BAAD Profile 2015; Al-Jazeera 2010).

Many of the group's founding members used to be part of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) (BAAD Profile 2015). JEM is allegedly the military branch of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) (BAAD Profile 2015). In 2012, the Justice and Equality Movement - Sudan (JEM-S) splintered from the JEM and signed a peace deal with Sudan in 2013 (BAAD Profile 2015). The splinter group allegedly consists of 40-65% of JEM (BAAD Profile 2015). JEM has undergone a series of group divisions and splinters (BAAD Profile 2015). These splinters include the JEM Collective Leadership (JEM-CL), founded by JEM's former vice president, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda in September 2007 (BAAD Profile 2015). JEM-Bashar is also a splinter of JEM (BAAD Profile 2015). The group's leader is Khalil Ibrahim Muhammed (Al-Jazeera 2010). Beginning in 2007, the group attempted to recruit Darfurian Arabs (Small Arms Survey 2011). JEM, along with the SLA army fought under an umbrella organization known as the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (Ireland RDC 2014).

External Ties

The group operates both in Chad and Sudan. They use Chad as an external base of support and training (Al-Jazeera English 2010). JEM has ties to National Islamic Front leader Hassan al-Turabi (Al-Jazeera English 2010). The group is allied with the SLA, LJM, and Sudan Revolutionary Front (BAAD Profile 2015).

Uganda provided training for the group starting in 2010 as did Libya in exchange for conditional support of the Qaddafi regime (BAAD Profile 2015).

Group Outcome

The Sudanese government responded to JEM through major counter offensives starting in 2003 (BAAD Profile 2015). The Sudanese government argues that Chad provides external support to JEM, but JEM denies any involvement with Chad (Al-Jazeera English 2010). In 2010, Chad expelled JEM due to a cross-border agreement between Deby and Sudanese President al-Bashir (BAAD Profile 2015). Chad accuses Sudan of hosting Chadian rebels which Sudan denies (Al-Jazeera English 2010). Uganda provided training for the group starting in 2010 as did Libya in exchange for conditional support of the Qaddafi regime (BAAD Profile 2015). The group signed a goodwill agreement in 2009 with the Sudanese government, but it by and large still remains active today (HSBA).

XXVII.   POPULAR DEFENCE FORCE (PDF)
           Torg ID: 2569
           Min. Group Date: 2002
           Max. Group Date: 2002
           Onset: NA

Aliases: Difaa Al-Sha'abi, Popular Defence Force, Popular Defence Force (Pdf), Popular Defense Force, Popular Defense Force (Pdf)

Part 1. Bibliography

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  https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/sudan/pdf.htm
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Sudan: The Popular Defence Forces (PDF), including whether it is affiliated with the military; maximum age of conscription into the PDF and whether there are exemptions from service; whether individuals must serve for a three-month period, regardless of age, sex and medical condition, to keep their job and pension; whether those who had served with the PDF for three months had to report to police stations in June 2008 for further service; if so, consequences for not reporting, 18 May 2011, SDN103746.E, available at:
  http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f15182d2.html
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Sudan: 1) Information on whether the Sudan National Popular Defense Forces (NPDF) and the "popular committees" are the same organization; 2) Information on the "popular committees" if different from the NPDF; and 3) Information on the kind of people recruited, military training, and whether the NPDF and the popular committees are Muslim organizations that seek to convert non-Muslims, 1 January 1992, SDN10083, available at:
  http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab238.html
- Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell. "Documentation for Popular Defence Forces." Pro-Government Militia Dataset. 2013.
  http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-public/data/pgag/256/evidence/
- "National Islamic Front." Global Security. N.d.
  https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/sudan/political-parties-nif.htm

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: National Islamic Front (NIF) - military wing (Global Security n.d.), National Congress Party, Islamic Charter Party

Group Formation: 1989 (Global Security n.d.)

Group End: 2013 (Carey 2013)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was formed in 1989 by the Popular Defense Forces Act after the National Islamic Front (NIF) coup that gave power to President Omar al-Bashir (Global Security

n.d.). It was intended to augment the NIF forces as the strong arm of the government (Global Security n.d.). It was a pro-government militia.

Geography

The PDF was active across nearly all of Sudan, especially: South Kordofan, South Darfur, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile states (Global Security n.d.; Carey 2013). The government relied very heavily on the PDF to fill out the strength of the Sudan Armed Forces (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The structure of the PDF was similar to that of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Global Security n.d.; Carey 2013). It was the armed wing of the National Islamic Front, which came into power via a coup in 1989 (Global Security n.d.). While the group was ostensibly filled with volunteers, there was a strong incentive system in place to encourage Arab northerners to join the PDF (Global Security n.d.).

The PDF was "'[s]tructured around a hierarchy of joint military and civilian coordinating committees, with local and state committees reporting to the national coordination council'" (Canada 2011). However, the efforts to centralize control of the group were mostly futile, as the group remained under largely local control (Canada 2011). All of the arms the group used, as well as mandated, regular training paid for by the government in Khartoum (Canada 2011; Global Security n.d.). The number of people in the PDF far outstripped any other armed group, and could have been as high as 10,000 active members and 85,000 reserves in 2004 (Global Security n.d.). The National Service Act of 1992 required that all Sudanese people serve in some way, the primary way being service in the PDF (Canada 2011).

The NIF was a derivative of the original Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Global Security n.d.) The NIF coopted parts of the MB during the period of democracy in the 1980s and renamed itself the NIF (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The PDF was entirely sponsored by the NIF government in Khartoum (Global Security n.d.). The decentralized structure leant itself to fragmentation and disorder, which was represented in the actions of the group (Canada 2011). The group was also very large (85,000 reserves) and was difficult to organize (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

It is not clear if the group exists today at similar numbers as to those in the early 2000s (Global Security n.d.). The violence in Sudan continues as the NIF is still in power in 2018.

XXVIII.   SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY - MINNI MINAWI FACTION
Torg ID: 2551
Min. Group Date: 2005
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: 2006

Aliases: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minawi Faction, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minawi, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Mm

Part 1. Bibliography
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http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/darfurs-armed-groups/darfurs-armed-opposition-groups.html
● Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell. "Documentation for Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minnawi Faction (SLM/A-MM)." Pro-Government Militias. 2013.
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http://www.sudantribune.com/+-SLM-MM-Sudan-Liberation-Movement,190-+
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● "Heart of Darfur: Guide to Factions and Forces." PBS> 2008.
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/interactives-extras/heart-of-darfur-guide-to-factions-and-forces/299/

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minawi Faction (SLM/A - MM)

Group Formation: 2005 (PBS 2008)

Group End: 2015 (GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The SLA/M - MM, "evolved from a Fur–Zaghawa split in the SLA and is led by members of the Zaghawa tribe who took up arms less to oppose the government in Khartoum than to fight the 'janjaweed', their rivals in the lucrative camel trade in North Darfur" (SASS n.d.). The group formally splintered around 2005, after participating in the larger violence as part of the SLM/A, its parent faction that espoused regional autonomy and greater representation in the government (PBS 2008).

Geography

The SLM/A - MM faction of the SLA mostly operated in the northern portion of the Darfur region (SASS n.d.). Specific locations of their attacks include: Dissa, Jebel Hreiz, Uzbah, Mellit, Al-Salam, Bielel, Nyala, Manawashi, Am Dafok, and Alawna (GTD 2017). Minawi operates and controls the group from Juba, South Sudan (IRIN News 2012).

Organizational Structure

At its founding, the SLM/A - MM was led by a former primary school teacher named Minni Minawi. To this day, the group is very divided about their ideology and agenda (Sudan Tribune n.d.). For example, in 2010, when Minawi returned to fighting the government, the SLA-MM split into three factions (Sudan Tribune n.d.). "One that stayed in Khartoum, negotiating disarmament terms with the government; a second in North Darfur, composed of 70–75 men and 12 vehicles, negotiating an alliance with JEM; and a third, still aligned with Minawi," (Sudan Tribune n.d.).

The SLM/A - MM is made up of primarily Zaghawa tribesmen from northern Darfur (SASS n.d.). For a brief period of time, after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006, the SLM/A - MM was financially supported by the government in Khartoum until 2010 (HSB-SS n.d.). That support ended abruptly when the government seized both Minawi and much of the group's physical holdings, and in response the group decided to restart its opposition to the government (HSB-SS n.d.)

External Ties

Before the SLM/A - MM became their own faction, they were part of the larger SLM/A (PBS 2008). After they signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 2006, the group moved under the arm of the government, which even paid their fighters (SASS n.d.).

However, relations soured quickly and the SLA/M - MM returned to opposition of the government (Carey 2013). "On 13 November 2011, SLA-MM, SLA-AW, JEM, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) formed a coalition named the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)" (HSB-SS n.d.). The group's allies are primarily ethnically Zaghawa (HSB-SS n.d.).

Group Outcome

In 2006, the SLM/A signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and the group moved under the arm of the government, which even paid their fighters (SASS n.d.). In December 2010, Minni Minawi rejected the Abuja Agreement, launching the country back into conflict (HSBA n.d.). "On 13 November 2011, SLA-MM, SLA-AW, JEM, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) formed a coalition named the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)" (HSB-SS n.d.). The most recent attack they are credited with occurred in 2015 (GTD 2017). It is likely that the group is still active.

XXIX.   JANJAWEED-BK
         Torg ID: 2564
         Min. Group Date: 2005
         Max. Group Date: 2005
         Onset: NA

         Aliases: Janjaweed

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Group Formation: This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Group End: This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Geography

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Organizational Structure

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

External Ties

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Group Outcome

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

XXX.   JANJAWEED - M
Torg ID: 2563
Min. Group Date: 2005
Max. Group Date: 2005
Onset: NA

Aliases: This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Group Formation: This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Group End: This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Geography

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Organizational Structure

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

External Ties

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Group Outcome

This is a faction of Janjaweed.

Sudan Cases Part 2: 2006-2012
Last Updated: 13 February 2018

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T2392	NATIONAL REDEMPTION FRONT	29-Jul-06	2006	2006
T2347	SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY-UNITY	1-Aug-07	2007	2008
T2371	MINAWI'S FACTION FORCES		2007	2007
T2500	PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE MOVEMENT		2010	2010
T2613	SOUTH SUDAN DEFENCE MOVEMENT/ARMY (SSDM/A)	12-May-10	2010	2011
T2616	SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT - NORTH	8-Jun-11	2011	2012
T1859	LIBERATION AND JUSTICE MOVEMENT (LJM)		2011	2012
T1986	SOUTH SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT-ARMY	19-Apr-11	2011	2012
T1869	MESSIRIA		2011	2011
T2668	AL-JABHAT AL-THAWRIYAT AL-SUDAN	10-Dec-11	2011	2012
T2673	SUDAN LIBERATION ARMY		2012	2012

I. NATIONAL REDEMPTION FRONT
   Torg ID: 2392

Min. Group Date: 2006
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: National Redemption Front, National Redemption Front (Nrf)

Part 1. Bibliography
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- Alaa Shahine. "Sudan says ready for talks with Darfur's NRF rebels." Reuters. 2007. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur/sudan-says-ready-for-talks-with-darfurs-nrf-rebels-idUSL0934222120061109
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- UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, 28 July 2006, S/2006/591, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4537856e6.html
- "Founding Declaration of Darfur's National Redemption Front." Sudan Tribune. 2006. http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16455

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2006 (UNSC 2006)

Group End: 2007 (UCDP 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The National Redemption Front (NRF) was founded in June 2006 "as an instrument for coordinating political, military, diplomatic and media initiatives" in the struggle against the government of Sudan in Khartoum (Sudan Tribune 2006). It was a merger of several existing insurgent groups. The group was a reaction to the Darfur Peace Agreement, brokered by the African Union and agreed to by the faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Minawi (Sudan Tribune 2006). The NRF excluded the SLM faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur (Sudan Tribune 2006). The founding member groups were: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice & Equality Movement - Sudan (JEM), and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) (Sudan Tribune 2006). On the surface, the NRF advocates for democracy and unity, in addition to resource redistribution to Darfur (Sudan Tribune 2006). They "claimed to lead an attack on Government positions in Northern Kordofan on 3 July 2006," which would have been their first attack as a cohesive group (UNSC 2006). They pledged to continue the fight in Darfur against the Sudanese government demanding reforms and semi-autonomy.

Geography

In 2006, the NRF conducted multiple armed attacks in Sudan (UCDP 2017). They occupied the village of "Hamrat el-Sheikh situated on the road between El-Fasher and Khartoum" (UNSC Experts 2006). In addition, they attacked the villages of Malagat, Kutum, Qarqar'a, Sharif, and Damathasa in Darfur (DOJ 2009; UCDP 2017). While they were active, the group controlled a large portion of northern Darfur (DOJ 2009). They may have also operated partially from Chad (BBC 2006; DOJ 2009). The group originally formed in Asmara as an umbrella organization (UN Security Council 2006, 4). There is no evidence they conducted attacks abroad.

Organizational Structure

The group was a reaction to the Darfur Peace Agreement, brokered by the African Union and agreed to by the faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Minawi (Sudan Tribune 2006). It was an umbrella organization of existing groups. The NRF also excluded the SLM faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur (Sudan Tribune 2006). The founding member groups were: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice & Equality Movement - Sudan (JEM), and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) (Sudan Tribune 2006). Major fighting took place between the members of NRF and both the government of Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreements signatories (Minni Minawi's faction) (UNSC Experts 2006). In July 2006, the group was led by Adam Ali Shogar (UNSC Experts 2006). The government of Sudan accused the

government of Chad of supporting the NRF (BBC 2006; DOJ 2009). The number of members of the group is not known.

External Ties

The group was a reaction to the Darfur Peace Agreement, brokered by the African Union and agreed to by a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Minawi (Sudan Tribune 2006). The NRF also excluded the SLM faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur (Sudan Tribune 2006). The founding member groups were: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice & Equality Movement - Sudan (JEM), and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) (Sudan Tribune 2006). The NRF likely received funding from the government of Chad, in accordance with the accusations of financial support leveled by the government of Sudan (BBC 2006; DOJ 2009).

The NRF had one splinter group, the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) (Prunier 2008). The "NMRD was part of the National Redemption Front (NRF), a loose military assembly under Khalil Ibrahim till its dissolution in mid-2007," (Prunier 2008).

Group Outcome

The NRF seems to have vanished from the public eye in 2007 (UDCP 2017). In 2007, the Sudanese government announced its willingness to negotiate with the NRF (Reuters 2007). The NRF has no reported attacks since December 2006 (UDCP 2017). The reasons for the dissolution of the group are not clear.

Notes for Iris:
-good organizational chart at back of UN Experts
-the Darfur Agreement promised a bunch of reforms and access to resources, but don't act on any of these
-these groups give the govt about a year to demonstrate they will abide by the agreement, but govt never takes serious actions to implementing
-Darfur conflict is shorter than the South Sudan, also discover oil in 2005 in the region, which makes it much more valuable and the government is more willing to fight for it
-initially, the groups just wanted to take the government back to the negotiating table and not necessarily fail
-G19 is a splinter group of the Minawi that later forms genesis for NRF
-NRF disappears. It's an ethnically heterogeneous umbrella.
-may have been trying to mimic the National Democratic Alliance

II.   SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY-UNITY
        Torg ID: 2347
        Min. Group Date: 2007

Max. Group Date: 2007
Onset: 2007

Aliases: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Unity, Slm/A-Unity

Part 1. Bibliography

- UCDP ID 472. Uppsala Conflict Database Encyclopedia. Last modified 2017.
  http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/472
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "Sudan vs SLM/A-Unity."
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  updated 2010.
  http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-g
  roups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-SLA-Unity.pdf
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  Sudan Tribune. n.d. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot1355
- Dangerous Companions. "Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Unity." Non-State Armed
  Group Dataset. 2015. https://nonstatearmedgroups.ku.edu.tr/profile.php?id=284
- "Sudan: A who's who of the Darfur groups in Sirte." IRIN. 2007.
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  http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/interactives-extras/heart-of-darfur-guide-to-factions-a
  nd-forces/299/
- "Sudan: Darfur Rebel Leader Censures Rival Over Attack on Capital." 2008.BBC
  Monitoring Middle East, May 24.
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2007 (NAGS 2015)

Group End: 2012 (partial merger with JEM), alternately low activity until 2013 (UCDP 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The SLM/A-Unity formed in 2007 (NAGS 2015). It was originally a splinter group from G-19 (Group of 19) (PBS 2008). Their first violent attack was in in 2007 when they they

attacked an African Union peacekeeper base (PBS 2008). The goals of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army- Unity faction (SLM/A-Unity) were to overthrow the government, and, failing that, receive concessions (redistributed oil revenues) for the region of Darfur (NAGS 2015).

Geography

For the most part, the SLM/A-Unity faction operated in the southern portion of the Darfur region as well as South Kordofan (UCDP 2017; Sudan Tribune n.d.). They attacked Wad Banda, Um Keddada, Tawila, Haskanita, Kharsana, Mellit, and Adila villages/towns between 2006 and 2013 (UCDP 2017; Sudan Tribune n.d.). In addition, they are credited with at least one attack in Northern Darfur (UCDP 2017). They also received support from Northern Darfur in Amarai and Hashaba (HSBA 2010).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the SLA-Unity faction was originally a man named Abdallah Yehya (Zaghawa tribesman) (PBS 2008). However, the group was also described as "an alliance of several leaders of resistance movements," (IRIN 2007). From the beginning, the group was disorganized and politically unfocused (HSBA 2010). The SLA-Unity faction consists of members from multiple tribal backgrounds, primarily of African descent (IRIN 2007; PBS 2008). The SLA-Unity faction was originally a splinter group from G-19 (Group of 19) (PBS 2008). They never joined the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), made up of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the SLA-Minni Minawi, and the SLA-Abdel Wahid (Sudan Tribune n.d.). There is no evidence the group had a political wing (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 363). Some of the members of SLA-Unity briefly split from the group in 2009 to join JEM, but eventually returned (HSBA 2010). There are estimates that the SLA-Unity had 5,000 troops in 2008 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 363; UCDP 2017).

Since Yehya, the group has had multiple other named leaders. These include: Adam Bakhiet (in Sirte negotiations, 2007), Mahjoub Hussein (Zaghawa, former spokesman of SLA-MM and later SLA-Unity, took over after Libyan interference), Ahmad Kubbur (Rizeigat, commander from South Darfur), and Sherif Harir (Zaghawa intellectual with close ties to Chad and Eritrea) (IRIN 2007; HSBA 2010).

External Ties

The SLA-Unity faction was originally a splinter group from G-19 (Group of 19) (PBS 2008). They never joined the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), made up of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the SLA-Minni Minawi, and the SLA-Abdel Wahid (Sudan Tribune n.d.). However, they coordinated with JEM (Sudan Tribune n.d.).

"In April 2012 JEM said that [the SLA-Unity faction] had participated in their attack on the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in two positions in Kharsana near Heglig, South Kordofan," (Sudan Tribune n.d.). The group has received some limited financial support from the government of Libya (HSBA 2010). Some members of the group also had ties to Eritrea and Chad, although it is unclear whether this resulted in any external support (HSBA 2010).

Group Outcome

The SLA-Unity suffered many defections around 2008 and its activities dropped (Gleditsch et al. 2013). However, the group was still conducting attacks in 2012 (Sudan Tribune n.d.). There are reports of the group also still conducting attacks as late as February 2013 in the Mellit district (UCDP 2017).

Notes for Iris:
-there are no clear ties between SLA/U and NRF despite having same splinter parent
-after NRF splinters, JEM returns to being the prominent rebel group in Darfur
-this group then aligns itself from time to time with JEM
-it suffers from defections and is comparatively weaker

III.   MINAWI'S FACTION FORCES
Torg ID: 2371
Min. Group Date: 2007
Max. Group Date: 2007
Onset: NA

Aliases: Minawi's Faction Forces., Minawis Faction Forces, Minawi's Faction Forces

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is likely an alias for SLM/A - Minni Minawi Faction (T2551).

Group Formation: This is likely an alias for SLM/A - Minni Minawi Faction (T2551).

Group End: This is likely an alias for SLM/A - Minni Minawi Faction (T2551).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is likely an alias for SLM/A - Minni Minawi Faction (T2551).

Geography

This is likely an alias for SLM/A - Minni Minawi Faction (T2551).

Organizational Structure

This is likely an alias for SLM/A - Minni Minawi Faction (T2551).

External Ties

This is likely an alias for SLM/A - Minni Minawi Faction (T2551).

Group Outcome

This is likely an alias for SLM/A - Minni Minawi Faction (T2551).

IV.   PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE MOVEMENT
       Torg ID: 2500
       Min. Group Date: 2010
       Max. Group Date: 2010
       Onset: NA

       Aliases: None

       Part 1. Bibliography
- GTD Perpetrator 30151. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30151
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  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-04-27/south-african-peacekeepers-freed-in-darfur/411442
- "Kidnapped four home soon." News 24 Archives. 2010.
  https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Kidnapped-four-home-soon-20100428
- "Four South African peacekeepers released in Darfur." Sudan Tribune. 2010.
  http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=34891
- "Darfur former rebels pledge to release peacekeepers." Sudan Tribune. 2010.
  http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34779

       Part 2. Basic Coding

       Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2010

Group End: 2010 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown precisely when this group formed, but it first came to attention in 2010 for kidnapping four South African police officers in Darfur (News24 2010). It is allegedly a splinter of the Sudan Liberation Movement-Free Will Faction (Sudan Tribune 2010). The group demanded $400,000 in exchange for releasing the officers (News 24 2010; ABC News 2010). The group claimed it mainly wanted to protest upcoming elections in Darfur and demonstrate the region is unsafe (News 24 2010; ABC News 2010; Sudan Tribune 2010).

Geography

The kidnapping occurred in Nyala, Darfur (ABC News 2010). The prisoners were freed after Niertiti in western Darfur (ABC News 2010).

Organizational Structure

Ibrahim al-Dukki was the spokesman for the People's Democratic Struggle Movement (News24 2010). The group's leader was Jibil Bukhari (Sudan Tribune 2010). The group allegedly did not sanction the kidnapping and one member carried out the kidnapping on a whim (News 24 2010). It is unknown how large the group is or their ethnicity.

External Ties

No information could be found about state or non-state actor ties.

Group Outcome

The group held the four peacekeepers hostage for 15 days then released them unharmed in western Darfur (ABC News 2010). The group failed to prevent elections from being held (ABC News 2010). The kidnapping in 2010 is the group's last incident. It is not associated with any more attacks and it is unknown what happens to the group.

V.   SOUTH SUDAN DEFENCE MOVEMENT/ARMY (SSDM/A)
      Torg ID: 2613
      Min. Group Date: 2010
      Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: 2010

Aliases: South Sudan Defence Movement/Army, South Sudan Defence Movement/Army (Ssdm/A), Ssdm/A

Part 1. Bibliography
- Uppsala Actor ID 1108. Uppsala Conflict Database Encyclopedia. Last modified June 2017. http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1108
- C.f. South Sudan Profiles

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is the armed wing of the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDM) (T2672)

Group Formation: This is the armed wing of the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDM) (T2672)

Group End: This is the armed wing of the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDM) (T2672)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is the armed wing of the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDM) (T2672)

Geography

This is the armed wing of the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDM) (T2672)

Organizational Structure

This is the armed wing of the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDM) (T2672)

External Ties

This is the armed wing of the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDM) (T2672)

Group Outcome

This is the armed wing of the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDM) (T2672)

VI.   SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT - NORTH

Torg ID: 2616
Min. Group Date: 2011
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 2011

Aliases: Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, Splm/A - North
Splm/A-North, Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement - North, Sudan People's Liberation
Movement - North, Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army - North, Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army - North, Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army-North,
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North, Sudan Peoples Liberation
Movement-North

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-

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2011 (Global Security n.d.)

Group End: Present, 2017 (Al Jazeera 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army - North (SPLM/A-N) is a splinter group of the SPLM (Refugees international 2011). It formed in 2011 (Global Security n.d.). It also had its first violent attack in 2011 (UCDP 2017). They are primarily ethnically Nuba, and their main goal is to advocate for Nuba people in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (Refugees International 2011).

They formed in response to a preemptive attack by the Sudanese government, and have participated in violence since their formation (Al Jazeera 2017). The Sudanese government invaded the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile areas to suppress a local rebellion, but their tactics were so brutal they incentivized the SPLM/A-North to form (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The SPLA-N primarily operates during the dry season in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (Refugees International 2011; Al Jazeera 2017; SASS 2016). Their attacks have taken place "in South Kordofan, the SPLA-N attacked Abu Jibeiha (bordering northern Upper Nile state), Dallami, Dilling, El Leri, Habila, Kadugli, Kharasana, Rashad, Talodi, and Um Burumbita beginning in September 2015" (SASS 2016). "The SPLA–N and observers on the ground expect attacks around Buram, Kadugli, Talodi, Um Burumbita, and the Lake Jau–Troje corridor in the southern part of South Kordofan in February [2016]" (SASS 2016). Lastly, some other sites listed include: Daldko, Daluka, Surkam, Hiban, the Abyei region, the Nuba mountains, and the Ingessana Mountains (IRIN 2012; Refugees International 2011; IRIN 2012: SASS 2016).

Organizational Structure

The group has both a political and armed wing (ReliefWeb 2017). The SPLM-N is organized into three fronts, each with their own commander: front 1 - "South Kordofan under the command of Gen. Jogood Mukwar," (SPLA-N chief of staff), front 2 - Gen. Joseph Tuka (logistics, primary negotiator) and Gen. Ahmed al Omda (operations, primary negotiator), front 3 - is now dissolved, but used to be the Darfur region (SASS 2016). SPLM-N's spokesman is named Arnu Ngutulu Lodi (IRIN 2012). The leader of the SPLM-N is commander-in-chief, Malik Agar, and the deputy commander-in-chief is

Abdelaziz al Hilu (SASS 2016). Deputy-Chairman Abdel-Aziz Hilu resigned recently from the political group aligned with the SPLM-N, the Nuba Mountains Liberation Council (NMLC), because he wants to keep fighting instead of compromise with the government (Daily Maverick 2017). He also voiced frustration with the lack of democracy in the group, and the weakening of efforts to secure the right of self-determination for the Nuba people (Daily Maverick 2017). The group is plagued with infighting, and has recently undergone changes in leadership that could jeopardize the peace process underway and the safety of many of the internally displaced persons residing in Blue Nile State (Daily Maverick 2017; RW 2017). Front 4 had 2000 fighters in 2015 (HSBA 2016). No other size estimates for the other fronts were found.

The membership of the SPLM-N is primarily Nuba tribespeople (Daily Maverick 2017). One of the primary strategies of the government of Sudan has been to starve the people in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states because of their association with the SPLM-N; due to this, many members of the SPLM-N are subsistence farmers who have lost their livelihoods and homes (Daily Maverick 2017; Global Security n.d.).

The government of Sudan has accused the government of Ethiopia of supplying the SPLM-N with weapons and funds (Al Jazeera 2017).

External Ties

Before they formed the SPLM-N, members of the group were "associated with the now ruling party in independent South Sudan" (Refugees International 2011). The group has been accused of smuggling weapons and funds from Ethiopia and South Sudan (SASS 2016). It is not clear if these international transactions took place. The United States, the African Union, and the United Nations have all intervened politically (and, in some cases, kinetically) in this conflict on behalf of the internally displaced people SPLM-N claims to represent (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

In 2013, both parties expressed support for a temporary ceasefire, but it stalled (Global Security n.d.). The parties tried to hold Two Area talks around 2015, but the Sudan Foreign Minister claimed these fell apart because the SPLM/-A had "unrealistic demands" (Global Security n.d.).

Fighting continued in 2017 while a two-track peace deal negotiation is also underway (RW 2017; SASS 2016). Abdelaziz al Hilu, the former deputy commander in chief, wrote, "the waiver of security arrangements means, in my view, that the SPLA-N is disarmed by means of assimilation into the National Congress partisan army, ending its role as guarantor of any agreement, or as a tool of pressure to achieve democratic transformation and just peace." (Daily Maverick 2017). The United States, the African

Union, and the United Nations have all intervened politically (and, in some cases, kinetically) in this conflict on behalf of the internally displaced people SPLM-N claims to represent (Global Security n.d.). The last reports of violence are from 2017 (Daily Maverick 2017).

Notes for Iris:
-the group suffered a lot of divisions
-when south sudan becomes formally independent, Sudan rushes military to Blue Nile region to suppress an uprising amongst the Nuba. They were originally part of SPLM, but are not Nuer so never gain concessions (are they different EPR?)

VII.   LIBERATION AND JUSTICE MOVEMENT (LJM)
Torg ID: 1859
Min. Group Date: 2011
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Liberation And Justice Movement (Ljm), Liberation And Justice Movement

Part 1. Bibliography
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● Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD), Darfur: COI Compilation, July 2014, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/53ce74e64.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2010 (Small Arms Survey 2012; ARC 2015)

Group End: 2014 (GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) formed as an umbrella group of different Darfur rebel groups for negotiation purposes in 2010 (BBC 2010; Small Arms Survey 2012; ARC 2015). The group, "never had a joint military command, [but relied] mostly on relatively isolated military commanders, many of whom were previously members of the armed factions that resulted from the splintering of the SLA and JEM" (ACCORD 2014). The LJM was a negotiating tool to end the conflict in Darfur, and suffered from internal fractionalization and tension along ethnic lines (ACCORD 2014; BBC 2010). Their first attack took place in 2011 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The LJM operated primarily in the Darfur region (BBC 2010). They are credited with attacks in: the Kabkabiya district, Jebel Hireiz, Mellit, Suntah, Kharoum, Mershing, and Nyala (GTD 2017). It is unclear if the umbrella received military or financial support from beyond the borders of Sudan.

Organizational Structure

LJM was led by Tijani Sese (ACCORD 2014). "LJM never had a joint military command, relying mostly on relatively isolated military commanders, many of whom were previously members of the armed factions that resulted from the splintering of the SLA and JEM" (ACCORD 2014). The LJM top command, in addition to Tijani Sese, was made up of a Secretary General (Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, former leader of the United Resistance Front), a Commander in Chief (Ali Abdallah Karbino), and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Ali Mukhtar Ali) (Sudan Tribune 2010). At the time of the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) with the government in Khartoum, it is estimated that the LJM had between 1,000-7,000 troops (ARC 2015). Another estimate claimed the group had 2,000 fighters (HSBA 2012).

The member groups of LJM were primarily ethnically divided, and varied greatly in their funding, equipment, and troop numbers (ACCORD 2014). Leadership was primarily ethnically Fur (HSBA 2012). Many of those factions gathered funds by trafficking drugs across Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) (ACCORD

2014). In addition, after the Doha agreement, the government promised to feed LJM fighters, but did not follow through on their promise, forcing members of LJM to sell their arms for food (ACCORD 2014). Khartoum has displayed few signs of being a trustworthy ally, and has attacked the LJM before (ACCORD 2014).

External Ties

The LJM, as was its original purpose, was a signatory of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) with the government in Khartoum (ACCORD 2014; HSBA 2012; BBC 2010; Sudan Tribune 2010; Sudan Tribune n.d.). After their signature, the LJM was not able to implement the agreement on the ground because of their relative weakness (ACCORD 2014). The group was "officially backed by the Fur shura council (tribal association)" (ACCORD 2014).

The group allegedly had political endorsements by Libya and the US (HSBA 2012). Members of the LJM include the Libyan-backed Sudan Liberation Revolutionary Forces (SLRF, Tripoli Group) and the Addis Ababa Group (HSBA 2012). The Addis Ababa group was connected to the then US special envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration (HSBA 2012). The Tripoli Group includes: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Field Leadership, SLA-Unity, SLA-Juba, SLA-Khamis Abaker, SLA-Mainstream; and URFF (HSBA 2012). The Addis Ababa Group was more complicated, and contained:

> *"1. SLA-Unity (1). Joined the SLRF in April 2010 after initially opposing the leadership of Tijani Sese; 2. SLA-Juba (1). Joined the LJM in April 2010 after initially opposing Sese's leadership. The decision caused a split between Ahmed Abdel Shafi and his close associate, Babiker Abdalla; 3. United Resistance Front (URF). The best-armed faction in the Addis Ababa Group, the URF has reportedly received small arms from SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) in return for fighting alongside SLA-MM and Darfur-based Chadian armed opposition groups against the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); and 4. SLA-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) dissidents, including Ali Haroun, a former humanitarian coordinator of SLA-AW who hails from the Ain Siro mountains north of Jebel Marra; Abdalla Khalil, formerly deputy head of the political bureau of SLAAW; and Ismail Rifa Jara, a popular commander and former military chief of SLAUnity from the Meidop tribe. In April 2010, Babiker Abdalla was appointed leader of this group; he died in Uganda in December 2010 and was replaced by Ali Haroun." (HSBA 2012)*

Group Outcome

In 2010, the group signed a ceasefire agreement with the Sudan government, but it failed to hold (BBC 2010). In 2011, the group signed the Doha Document for Peace in

Darfur (ACCORD 2014). It failed to stop the violence on the ground (ACCORD 2014). The group has not been credited with an attack since 2014 (GTD 2017). It is not clear if the group is still constituted in any form.

Notes for Iris:
-no clear political shocks in Sudan in 2010
-it's just the successor to NRF, but never actually achieves anything

VIII. SOUTH SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT-ARMY
Torg ID: 1986
Min. Group Date: 2011
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 2011

Aliases: South Sudan Liberation Army (Ssla), South Sudan Liberation Army, South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, South Sudan Liberation Movement-Army

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2011 - turned against the South Sudanese government (HSBA 2013), 1999 originally - fighting alongside SPLM (VOA 2013)

Group End: 2013 (BBC 2013; VOA 2013)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A) was formed by Peter Gadet, a Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) defector, in 2011 when Gadet released the Mayom Declaration (HSBA 2013). The group was formed in opposition to the government of South Sudan, and intended to overthrow the South Sudan government and replace it with a more inclusive and democratic group of people (HSBA 2013). The SSLA's first attacks are suspected of occuring in 2011, the year they were formed (GTD 2017).

Geography

The attacks they are suspected of conducting took place in Mayom and Bentiu (GTD 2017). The group primarily operated within the borders of South Sudan, in Unity State and Mayom district, as well as from bases across the border in Sudan (BBC 2013).

Organizational Structure

The SSLM/A was founded by Peter Gadet, and the SSLA was commanded by Brigadier General Bapiny Monytuel (ARC 2013; VOA 2013). The SSLM was later led by James Gai Yoach and his deputy, Bapiny Montuil after Gadet rejoined the SPLA (Sudan Tribune n.d.). The group was primarily made up of Nuer South Sudanese (BBC 2013). For the most part, Gadet and other members of the SSLM/A were not able to convince other South Sudanese to oppose the SPLA, and were quickly undercut until they surrendered in 2013 (Sudan Tribune n.d.). It is not clear how the group funded itself.

External Ties

The group primarily operated within the borders of South Sudan, in Unity State, as well as from bases across the border in Sudan (BBC 2013). It is not clear if the SSLM had active foreign backers.

Group Outcome

In 2013, the SSLA surrendered to the government and the members were granted pardons (BBC 2013). The last attacks they were suspected of conducting occurred in 2011 (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:
-the group was pretty small
-it did not resonate
-part of new state - civil war relationship, but falls apart quickly because they're so much weaker
-trying to invoke ethnic ties failed to work because Dinka were pretty represented in the government in 2011 so had no grievance

IX.   MESSIRIA
        Torg ID: 1869
        Min. Group Date: 2011
        Max. Group Date: 2011
        Onset: NA

        Aliases: Misseriya Arab Tribesmen, Messiria, Misseriya

        Part 1. Bibliography
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        Part 2. Basic Coding

        Aliases: Baggara

        Group Formation: unknown, 2003 (UCDP 2017)

Group End: 2013 (UCDP 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Messiria are a subset of the Baggara Arab tribal community located along the border region between South Sudan and Sudan (Southern Darfur, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Southern Kordofan, and Upper Nile) (HRW 1999). At multiple points during the succession process, the Messiria have used violence to extract concessions from both the SPLA in South Sudan and the government in Khartoum (BBC 2008; Al Jazeera 2011; Al Jazeera 2010). They are a tribal militia so they have no clear formation date. Their first violent incident was around 2003 (UCDP 2017).

Geography

The Messiriya (or Messiria) are located primarily in the border region between Sudan and South Sudan, in the states of Southern Darfur, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Southern Kordofan, and Upper Nile (HRW 1999; UCDP 2017). They operate in both Sudan and South Sudan. They have also been the target of violence by both the government in Khartoum and by the SPLA government in South Sudan (UCDP 2017).

Organizational Structure

The Messiria are a subset of the Baggara Arab tribal community, located along the border region between South Sudan and Sudan (Southern Darfur, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Southern Kordofan, and Upper Nile) (HRW 1999). "The Baggara are the second largest ethnic group in Western Sudan, [and they extend] into Eastern Chad" (Al Jazeera 2010). They primarily make their living from cattle ranching, and many of their violent disputes recorded as attacks are retribution, or "blood debt", for destruction and theft of their cattle herds (HRW 1999; Al Jazeera 2011). The Dinka, who are primarily subsistence farmers, steal and kill Messiria cattle because the Messiria drive their cattle over lands and roads planted and built up by the Dinka, destroying both and causing substantial financial damages (Al Jazeera 2011).

The most publicized incidence of Messiria violence took place around the time of the referendum in December, 2010 (Al Jazeera 2010). Some young Messiria men took 1,000 people and 150 cars hostage in South Kordofan (Al Jazeera 2010). The convoy was on its way to Khartoum to vote on the referendum (Al Jazeera 2010). This attack was in response to the death of three Messiria shepherds and the theft of multiple cars, and the attackers stated that they would not release the hostages until they were paid damages for the three shepherds by the government of Unity state in Sudan (Al Jazeera 2010).

External Ties

The Messiria are a subset of the Baggara Arab tribal community, located along the border region between South Sudan and Sudan (Southern Darfur, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Southern Kordofan, and Upper Nile) (HRW 1999). "The Baggara are the second largest ethnic group in Western Sudan, [and they extend] into Eastern Chad" (Al Jazeera 2010). It is not clear that their violent actions are influenced or funded by any foreign groups or countries.

Group Outcome

In 2008, the group retaliated against SPLM attacks (BBC 2008). Violence escalated again in 2009, 2010, and 2013 (UCDP 2017). In 2011, violence threatened to worsen over a land dispute between the Messiria and other tribes (Al Jazeera 2011). The Messiria still live in Sudan and South Sudan. The group's last recorded attack occurred in 2013 (UCDP 2017).

Notes for Iris:
-they're just hunting for their cattle. Sorta tribal militia. Not really an armed group.

X.   AL-JABHAT AL-THAWRIYAT AL-SUDAN
     Torg ID: 2668
     Min. Group Date: 2011
     Max. Group Date: 2012
     Onset: 2011

     Aliases: Revolutionary Front, Al-Jabhat Al-Thawriyat Al-Sudan, Sudan Revolutionary Front, Sudanese Revolutionary Front

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-

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SRF

Group Formation: 2011

Group End (Outcome): Last Active in 2015 (NA)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Sudan Revolutionary Front was formed on November 13, 2011, as a coalition of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army factions of Minni Minawi (SPLA/M-N), Abdul Wahid, and the northern factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (HSBA 2013; IRIN 2012). The alliance's first violent attacks occurred in 2012 (HSBA 2013). They aim to overthrow the National Congress Party's Regime and Khartoum government in order to establish a secular liberal state in its place (IRIN 2012). The alliance had no encompassing ideology. There's no evidence of politicized opposition to South Sudan. The group opposes the Sudanese government.

Geography

The SRF is based in Kaoda and the Nuba Mountains (HSBA 2013). The alliance is most active in South Kordofan, Sudan but also operates in the Blue Nile and in states that border South Sudan (ibid). The three Darfur organizations in the alliance operated in Darfur until 2012 (ibid). The SRF also captured Hejlij and conducted an attack in Um Ruwaba, North Kordofan, Sudan (ibid). This is a transnational group with bases in South Sudan.

Organizational Structure

In 2011, there was conflict in the alliance as to whether JEM leader Jibreel Ibrahim or SPLA/M-N leader Malik Agar would be chairman of the alliance (Al-Jazeera, 2011). This briefly split the SRF into two blocks (ibid). Because of their "clientelistic" ties to the South Sudan government the SPLA/M-N initially held the most influence in the alliance (ibid; Gizouli 2015). As of 2012 the organization's chairman is Malik Agar and Jibril sees as vice-chairman (HSBA 2013). The group has a Leadership Council, political wing, secretaries, and deputies, indicating a complex organizational structure (ibid). Abdel Wahid leads the political affairs office, Minni Minawi leads the finance office, and Jibril Ibrahim leads external affairs (ibid). All three leaders are from the Darfur groups and are considered vice-chairmen (ibid).

Three out of the four groups which comprise the alliance are from the Darfur region (HSBA 2013). The estimated size of the SRF militia was 1,500-3,000 fighters in 2013 (McCutchen HSBA).

External Ties

The Sudan Revolutionary Front is a coalition of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army factions of Minni Minawi (SPLA/M-N), Abdul Wahid, and the northern factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Sudan Tribune N.D; IRIN 2012).

South Sudan has been accused of allegedly supporting and giving weapons to the SRF specifically because of its ties to the SPLA/M-N (Gizouli 2015; Al-Jazeera, 2011). The Juba government also has ties to the JEM and the SPLA/M-N (Gizouli 2015).

Group Outcome

In 2003, Khartoum began holding talks with Darfur groups like the JEM (Al-Jazeera 2011). In September 2012, an agreement between the South Sudan and Sudanese government marked the SRF for disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation (Gizouli 2015). The last recorded attack by the SRF occurred in 2015 (GTD 2016).

XI.   SUDAN LIBERATION ARMY
Torg ID: 2673
Min. Group Date: 2012
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Sudan Liberation Army (Sla), Sudan Liberation Army

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This seems like an alias for SLM/A which is still active in 2012. (T2489)

Group Formation: This seems like an alias for SLM/A which is still active in 2012. (T2489)

Group End: This seems like an alias for SLM/A which is still active in 2012. (T2489)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This seems like an alias for SLM/A which is still active in 2012. (T2489)

Geography

This seems like an alias for SLM/A which is still active in 2012. (T2489)

Organizational Structure

This seems like an alias for SLM/A which is still active in 2012. (T2489)

External Ties

This seems like an alias for SLM/A which is still active in 2012. (T2489)

Group Outcome

This seems like an alias for SLM/A which is still active in 2012. (T2489)