Portugal Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 22 July 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T224	IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA)		1922	2011
T219	GROUPES D'ACTION R_VOLUTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONALISTE		1973	1977
T17	AL-FATAH		1974	1998
T1271	REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALIST SOLIDARITY		1975	1975
T248	JUSTICE COMMANDOS FOR THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE		1975	1986
T1249	PORTUGUESE ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT		1976	1976
T972	ACTION GROUP FOR COMMUNISM		1978	1978
T575	ORGANIZACI?N REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO EN ARMAS		1979	1990
T377	FOR_AS POPULARES DO 25 ABRIL (FP-25)		1980	1986
T7	ACTION DIRECTE		1980	1989
T540	ZIONIST ACTION GROUP		1982	0
T1266	REVOLUTIONARY AUTONOMOUS GROUP		1985	1985
T9040	FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF AZORES		1974	1979

I.   IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA)
Torg ID: 224
Min. Group Date: 1922
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Irish Republican Army (Ira), Provisional Irish Republican Army (Pira), Provos

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Part 2. Basic Coding
Aliases: Sinn Fein, Oglaigh na hEireann

Group Formation:
December of 1969

Group End:
On July 28, 2005 the IRA Army Council announced an end to its armed campaign.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PIRA is a splinter group, which formed out of the old IRA in December of 1969 (Global Security n.d.; Reuters 2008; Council on Foreign Relations 2010; Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's ideology can be identified as nationalist because it fights for the geographical and political unity of Ireland and North Ireland (FAS 2005; CFR 2010; Mackenzie Institute 2016). Its political aim is to unify Ireland and force the removal of British forces from Northern Ireland (Reuters 2008; Council on Foreign Relations 2010). Their first documented attack occurred on June 26, 1970 (Council on Foreign Relations 2010; GTD 2017).

Geography

The Provisional IRA focused the majority of its attacks in the boundaries of the United Kingdom, but did attack in Ireland a couple of times (GTD 2017). Their bases were mainly stationed in Northern Ireland, but did operate throughout Ireland and Great Britain (GTD 2017). The PIRA can be identified as a transnational group.

Organizational Structure

They are known to be affiliated as the wing of the politically driven group, Sinn Fein (FAS 2005). The group had a youth wing known as Fianna na h'Eireann (Schmid and Jongman 1988). No information could be found about the membership background. They were organized under an established Army Council made up of 12 members, which was recorded to have met semi-annually (Mackenzie Institute 2016). Notably, the group organized like a conventional army (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The leader of Sinn Fein's political party is Gerry Adams (Global Security n.d). Additional leaders included John Stephenson, Rory O'brady, Leo Martin, Billy McKee, Seamus Twomey, and Francis Card(Schmid and Jongman 1988). The number of troops of the IRA in 1989 is 300 fighters and in 1991 is 250 fighters (Non-State Actor Dataset Narratives 2013). It has also been more generally reported to have several hundred members at an unknown date (FAS 2005; Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group received some partial funding through Irish diasporas in the US (Gleditsch et al 2013). Members were Catholic.

External Ties

The PIRA had many explicit splinters in their group, some that can be identified as the RIRA, Continuity IRA (CIRA), and the ONH (FAS 2005). The group received explicit weapons support from Libya as well an endorsement from Ireland (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 410; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group provided weapons specifically for training to the FARC (FAS 2004). These divisions shared the same motives as PIRA, but differed in a few beliefs, usually in attack. These groups helped further PIRA as a threat to

English army troops based in Northern Ireland, and to even continue to pose as potential threats today(BBC 2013).

Group Outcome

A formal political agreement known as the Good Friday Agreement helped resolve the conflict in 1998 (BBC n.d.; BBC 2013). As part of this agreement, the IRA disarmed in July 2005 (CFR 2010). The group grew when British troops shot peaceful protesters in January of 1972 as part of an event that came to be known as Bloody Sunday (Reuters 2008; BBC n.d.; BBC 2013). Despite this confirmation, the IRA's last attack has been recorded to have occurred in May of 2011 in Londonderry, United Kingdom (Global Terrorism Database n.d.).

Notes for Iris:
-between 1922 and 1969, their initial aim is to remove British forces from Northern Ireland who have been occupying the area since the first Irish revolt. After 1960, the Irish forces are debating over the best strategy to get rid of the British.
-all these different groups are continuously attacking the British forces so they suspend the Irish political rights which becomes the catalyst for the start of the PIRA → goes through 2005 (fighting)
-the PIRA and CIRA/RIRA are divided over different ideologies and resistance to peace talks (ideological)

II.   GROUPES D'ACTION R_VOLUTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONALISTE
        Torg ID: 219
        Min. Group Date: 1973
        Max. Group Date: 1977
        Onset: NA

        Aliases: International Revolutionary Action Group (Gari), Groupes D'action R_Volutionnaire Internationaliste

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Groupes d'action revolutionanaires internationalists, Revolutionary International Action Group, Groupes d'action révolutionnaires internationalistes, Internationalist Revolutionary Action Groups

Group Formation: 1973 (violent), 1974 (official formation)

Group End: 1977 (stopped using violence on its own), 1979 (merger [specifics discussed in "External Ties" and "Group Outcome" sections])

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

When Groupes d'Action Révolutionnaire Internationaliste formed is disputed. Some sources indicate that GARI formed in May 1974 (MIPT 2008). Other sources indicate that the group had already begun to use violence by January 1973 (GTD 2018). GARI formed in either 1973 or 1974 (GTD 2018; MIPT 2008). It is possible that the group conducted attacks as early as January 1973, but officially formed in May 1974 (GTD 2018; MIPT 2008). The first attack attributed to GARI occurred on January 28, 1973, when the group detonated an explosive at the Paris branch of Popular Bank, a Spanish bank, causing the equivalent of approximately 3000 U.S. dollars of property damage (GTD 2018). No one was killed or injured in the bombing (GTD 2018).

GARI may have formed as a splinter of Mouvement ibérique de libération (MIL) [English: Iberian Liberation Movement], an anti-Franco group (Dartnell 2013, 74). In April 1974, Spanish law enforcement killed Puig Antich, a member of MIL (Dartnell 2013, 74). For this reason, other MIL members officially formed GARI, a group dedicated to bringing about the demise of the Franco regime in Spain (Dartnell 2013, 74). Throughout 1974 and the following years, GARI attacked Spanish leaders, businesspeople, and infrastructure in France, Spain, and elsewhere in Europe (GTD 2018; MIPT 2008; Dartnell 2013, 74). The group has conducted bombings, kidnappings, roberries, and assassinations (GTD 2018; Dartnell 2013, 74).

GARI was an anti-Franco group (MIPT 2008; Dartnell 2013, 74; Atkins 2004, 5). The group's main goal was the destruction of the Franco regime (MIPT 2008; Dartnell 2013, 74). GARI used violence to demonstrate its potency and great disdain for the governments and leaders of Spain, France, and Belgium (Dartnell 2013, 74). The group was center-seeking and sought to destroy the dictatorial government of Francisco Franco (MIPT 2008; Dartnell 2013, 74). The group attempted to force the governments of European countries like France and Belgium to change their foreign policies regarding Franco and the government of Spain (Dartnell 2013, 74). The group can be considered anarchist (MIPT 2008; Atkins 2004, 5). The group's ideology can be considered leftist (Dartnell 2013, 74). The group opposed capitalism (MIPT 2008). The group can be considered communist and socialist (MIPT 2008). The group reportedly opposed Leninism (Dartnell 2013, 74). GARI strived for "the liberation of Spain, of Europe and of the world" (MIPT 2008). Since many of the group's members were Basque militants, the group could be classified as a Basque nationalist group (MIPT 2008).

GARI conducted its only attack in Portugal on September 25, 1975, when the group detonated an explosive at the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon and conducted five other attacks simultaneously throughout Europe (GTD 2018).

Geography

GARI is predominantly based in southwestern France (Dartnell 2013, 73). The group was active in and conducted attacks in the French cities of Toulouse, Paris, and Lourdes (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Spain (MIPT 2008). One source indicates that the group's attacks in Spain could have occurred in Madrid and near the border between France and Spain (Dartnell 2013, 74). Nevertheless, the group's activities in Spain and the locations of said activities remain unclear. The group conducted attacks in Belgium in the cities of Brussels, Liege, and Antwerp (GTD 2018). The group conducted one attack in Andorra (GTD 2018). The group conducted one attack in the Netherlands in Den Haag (GTD 2018). The group conducted one attack in Portugal in Lisbon (GTD 2018). The group conducted one attack in Switzerland in Geneva (GTD 2018). The group conducted one attack in Turkey in Ankara (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

The leader of GARI was Jean-Marc Rouillan (Dartnell 2013, 74). Nothing else is known about the group's leadership or organizational structure. Most members of GARI were French, Spanish, or both and may have previously fought for the MIL. Many were Basque militants (MIPT 2008). Many were Spanish expatriates who had resided in southwestern France since they fled from Spain due to the Spanish Civil War (Dartnell 2013, 73). GARI funded itself through robberies, especially in French cities like Toulouse and Béziers (Dartnell 2013, 73).

External Ties

Groupes d'Action Révolutionnaire Internationaliste allegedly had ties to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) [English: Basque Homeland and Freedom] (MIPT 2008). ETA was an ethno-nationalist Basque separatist group that also operated in both France and Spain (Encyclopædia Britannica n.d.). ETA adopted Marxist positions and viewed revolutionary socialism as their ultimate goal (Encyclopædia Britannica n.d.). Moreover, since the membership of GARI was composed of Basque militants, it is likely GARI had ties to ETA (MIPT 2008). ETA allegedly was involved in GARI's bombing on a train from Madrid to Paris (MIPT 2008).

In 1979, Groupes d'Action Révolutionnaire Internationaliste and Noyaux armis pour l'autonomie populaire (NAPAP) [English: New Arms for Popular Autonomy *or* Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy] merged to form Action Directe (AD) [English: Direct Action] (Dartnell 2013, 73; Atkins 2004, 5; State Department 1989, 42-43). NAPAP was "a Maoist group of Parisian urban guerillas" (Atkins 2004, 5). AD was founded by Jean-Marc Rouillan, the leader of GARI, and Nathalie Menignon (Atkins 2004, 5). AD was based in Paris, Lyons, and somewhere in Belgium (Atkins 2004, 5-6; State Department 1989, 42-43). AD was committed to the destruction of societal institutions, the end of Western imperialism, the eradication of U.S. influence in Europe, and conducting attacks for anti-Zionist causes (State Department 1989, 42). The group ceased using violence in 1987 following a police crackdown on the group and arrests of key members (State Department 1989, 43).

Group Outcome

In September 1974, local police stopped GARI members, Michel Camillieri and Mario Innes Torres (Dartnell 2013, 74). Upon discovering that Camillieri and Innes Torres were members of GARI, they were arrested and subsequently imprisoned (Dartnell 2013, 74). In December 1974, more group members including the leader Jean-Marc Rouillan were arrested (Dartnell 2013, 74). These arrests significantly precluded GARI from conducting meaningful operations until a legal loophole saved the GARI (Dartnell 2013, 74). In 1976, a French court dismissed charges that GARI members threatened government

authority (Dartnell 2013, 74-75). In May 1977, Rouillan, Camillieri, Innes Torres, and other group members were released (Dartnell 2013, 75).

GARI most likely stopped using violence in 1977 (GTD 2018). The group conducted its last recognized attack on May 22, 1977 when it detonated an explosive at the Paris branch of the Bank of Bilbao, a location it had previously attacked (GTD 2018; Dartnell 2013, 74).

In 1979, Groupes d'Action Révolutionnaire Internationaliste and Noyaux armis pour l'autonomie populaire (NAPAP) [English: New Arms for Popular Autonomy *or* Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy] merged to form Action Directe (AD) [English: Direct Action] (Dartnell 2013, 73; Atkins 2004, 5; State Department 1989, 42-43). NAPAP was "a Maoist group of Parisian urban guerillas" (Atkins 2004, 5). AD was founded by Jean-Marc Rouillan, the leader of GARI, and Nathalie Menignon (Atkins 2004, 5). AD was based in Paris, Lyons, and somewhere in Belgium (Atkins 2004, 5-6; State Department 1989, 42-43). AD was committed to the destruction of societal institutions, the end of Western imperialism, the eradication of U.S. influence in Europe, and conducting attacks for anti-Zionist causes (State Department 1989, 42). AD ceased using violence in the late 1980s following a police crackdown on the group and arrests of key members (State Department 1989, 43).

Notes for Iris:
-what are the aims of this group? Mostly center-seeking to oppose Franco
-the group's relationship with ETA was slightly unclear. It might have been strategically useful to put pressure on the
-ETA and GARI had ideological similarities, Basque membership similarity, both were transnational
-the group didn't oppose Portugal, it opposed the Spanish Embassy

III.   AL-FATAH
Torg ID: 17
Min. Group Date: 1959
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Fatah, Al-Asifa, Fatah, Fateh, Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Watani Al-Filastini, Harekat At-Tahrir Al-Wataniyyeh Al-Filastiniyyeh, Palestinian National Liberation Movement

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: al‑Fath, Fath

Group Formation: 1959 (Jones and Libicki 2008, 172)
First year of activity in Jordan: 1967 or perhaps even earlier (Michalak n.d., 108-109; Global Security n.d.)
First year of violence in Jordan: Fatah likely conducted guerrilla attacks as part of the PLO as early as 1967 (Michalak n.d., 109; Global Security n.d.).

Group End: Formally renounced violence in a peace deal with Israel in 1993, however Fatah still retains militant commanders and groups and engages in military clashes with its rival Hamas (Pearson 2011, 198). In 2007 Fatah lost military control of the Gaza strip due Hamas militants, however as of 2011 PLO still had political control of the West Bank (BBC).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Fatah/Al-Fatah is the name of two Palestinian Liberation Organization factions. One faction is headed by Yasir Arafat (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989). Arafat formally founded Fatah in 1963, but it existed as early as 1959 (Jones and Libicki 2008; Pearson 2011, 198). It conducted its first violent attack in 1967 when it repulsed Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, attack. The Fatah Party primarily opposes Israel (Global Security n.d.). The group's political aim is to destroy the Israeli state (Jones and Libicki 2008, 144). However, the group signed a peace deal with Israel in 1993 and agreed to consider coexistence with Israel (BBC 2011). Fighting renewed during the Second Intifada in 2000.
By late 1968, guerilla groups shifted their aim to the overthrow of King Hussein of Jordan (Global Security n.d.). Civil war nearly transpired in 1968, but was averted by a compromise that favored the Palestinians (Global Security n.d.). By 1970, there were at least seven Palestinian guerilla groups in Jordan (Global Security n.d.). Fighting resumed with more intensity in 1970 between Jordanian forces and the guerilla groups (Global Security n.d.).

Geography
The group headquartered in Tunisia after it left Israel and later also had bases in Lebanon and Jordan (Global Security n.d.). The group committed terrorist attacks and trained insurgents in Western Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa during the 1960s and 1970s (Ibid.).

The group operated in Jordan, especially after the year 1967 (Michalak n.d., 108-109; Global Security n.d.). The group operated on the East Bank of the Jordan River, as well as in major cities like Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid (Nevo 2008, 221).

Organizational Structure

The group's membership is estimated at 6,000 to 8,000 (Global Security). The leading political body within Fatah is the Central Committee, with a parallel structure known as the Revolutionary Committee, which is in charge of organizing armed attacks (Global Security).

Fatah joined the PLO in 1968 and won the leadership role in 1969 (Global Security; Pearson 2011, 198). Fatah has historically remained the most influential faction within the PLO (Pearson 2011, 198). The Chairman of the PLO and president of Palestine is Mahmoud Abbas, sworn in as president in 2005 (Global Security; Pearson 2011, 199).

Three militias have split from Fatah and are considered offshoots: the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which continues to advocate violent attacks against Israel despite the late 1990s/early 2000s peace deals, Force 17, a personal security force for PLO leadership, and the militia Tanzim (Global Security). There is also a pro-Syrian Fatah Revolutionary Council (Fatah "uprising" or "rebels") which opposes Arafat's faction. (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989)

External Ties

The Fatah party has historically clashed with Hamas party of Palestine, although they briefly formed a national unity government in 2007 (Global Security). This unity government promised to honor the peace agreements with Israel signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization, however this commitment was tenuous due to Hamas' reluctance to acknowledge Israel (Global Security). The splintering of the PLO-Hamas government later in 2007 led to the dominance of President Abbas, who also received support from the EU and the Arab League (Global Security). When PLO again took over full control of the Palestinian government, Israel and the United States also slightly softened their criticism since Hamas was no longer in political power (Ibid.).

Fatah has close political and financial associations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan (Global Security). They received weapons, explosives, and training from the former USSR. It is also alleged that China and North Korea have provided weapons, however this claim is less clearly substantiated (Global Security). Fatah helped train other insurgent groups in Western Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa during the 1960s and 1970s (Global Security; Pearson 2011, 198).

In the June war of 1967, Israel added large regions of land to its territory (Michalak n.d., 106). Among the regions that Israel annexed was the West Bank, which previously was in the possession of Jordan (Michalak n.d., 106; BBC n.d.; BBC 2018). To resolve the regional chaos that followed, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242, which prohibited territorial acquisition, required a cessation of interstate violence and hostilities, called on governments to recognize each others' sovereignty, and ordered Israeli forces to leave the Gaza

Strip, West Bank, and the Golan Heights (Global Security n.d.; Michalak n.d., 107). A large influx of Palestinian refugees into neighboring countries like Jordan, the oppressive rule that came with Israeli occupation, a general state of chaos, and sentiments of injustice about losing their land all triggered a revitalized Palestinian resistence movement (Michalak n.d., 107; Global Security n.d.). Many Palestinians, disgruntled that they had to leave their homes and often times their families, crossed the Jordan River into Jordan, where organizations like Fatah began using guerilla warfare against Israel (Michalak n.d., 108; Global Security n.d.). The refugee influx presented a new problem to Jordan, given that the government already had to respond to losing the West Bank, a region which contributed to 40% of the country's GDP through the agriculture and tourism sectors (Michalak n.d., 108-109). Beginning in 1967 and continuing until the end of the Jordanian civil war, the Jordanian government fought with Palestinian guerilas for control of important areas of land like Amman and other major cities (Global Security n.d.). Members of the guerillas, or fedayeen, established "a state within a state" and conducted operations freely and with impunity from Jordan (Global Security n.d.; Nevo 2008, 221).

Forced to make compromises, King Hussein of Jordan provided the guerillas with more freedom and land for training; nevertheless, the tensions between the guerillas and the government of Jordan intensified (Global Security n.d.). Under the command of its leader Yasir Arafat, some members of Fatah operated in Jordan before 1967, but decided to cross the Jordan River into the West Bank to conduct operations in Israeli territory (Michalak n.d., 109). Due to the Israeli invasion of the West Bank, Arafat and his fighters returned to Jordan in 1967, where in 1969 he became leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO (Michalak n.d., 109; Global Security n.d.). Fatah continued to conduct attacks against Israel, and in retaliation, Israeli forces attacked Al Karamah, the hub of Palestinian guerila operations in Jordan (Michalak n.d., 110 ; Global Security n.d.). Fierce fighting ensued and continued for more than fifteen hours as Jordanian forces fired at attacking Israeli forces (Michalak n.d., 110). Both sides sustained many casualties; however, guerilla groups were empowered by the fact that they successfully repelled Israeli forces (Michalak n.d., 110; Global Security n.d.). In the following months, Israel attacked other guerilla strongholds in Jordan (Global Security n.d.).

By late 1968, guerilla groups shifted their aim to the overthrow of King Hussein of Jordan (Global Security n.d.). Civil war nearly transpired in 1968, but was averted by a compromise that favored the Palestinians (Global Security n.d.). By 1970, there were at last seven Palestinian guerilla groups in Jordan (Global Security n.d.). Fighting resumed with more intensity in 1970 between Jordanian forces and the guerilla groups (Global Security n.d.). Throughout the summer, guerilla groups expanded their control of important locations in Jordan and in some places had more authority than the government of Jordan (Global Security n.d.; Nevo 2008, 221). Jordanian forces fought back and attacked guerilla camps (Michalak n.d., 114).

Guerilla groups called for the overthrow of the Jordanian government and attacks on Jordanian people (Michalak n.d., 114; Global Security n.d.; Nevo 2008, 221-223). One guerilla group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, hijacked four airplanes on September 6, 1970 (Michalak n.d., 114-115; Global Security n.d.). This event began "Black September." King

Hussein viewed this as the beginning of a genuine attack to Jordan's authority, so he reinstated martial law (Global Security n.d.). Ten days of fighting followed during which about 3,500 people died (Global Security n.d.). Jordanian forces cracked down on Palestinian resistance in Amman and throughout the country (Global Security n.d.). "Black September" began the reduction of Palestinian influence in Jordan (Michalak n.d., 117). Fatah was forced to leave Jordan, and the Black September Organization emerged from it (Encyclopædia Britannica n.d.; Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Fatah party eventually became the leading player in the Palestinian government, through its membership in the PLO coalition (Global Security). Fatah formed a more moderate political wing in the late 1980s (Pearson 2011, 198). This shift to relatively more moderate, political advocacy within the PLO earned criticism of Fatah from a splinter group, the militant group Fatah Revolutionary Council (Ibid.) In 1998, Fatah and Arafat successfully convinced the PLO coalition to formally acknowledge Israel's right to coexist with Palestine (Pearson 2011, 198). Pearson claims this acknowledgement was an early sign of PLO and Fatah denouncing terrorism (Ibid.).

Fatah has modified its ideology since its founding and recognized Israel, signing an interim peace deal with Israel in 1993. (BBC 2011). Fatah also disavowed terrorists attacks on Israeli citizens as part of the peace agreement (BBC 2011).

Fatah has declined since Arafat died in 2004, suffering from in-fighting and pushback (political and armed clashes) from Hamas (BBC 2011; Pearson 2011, 199). In June 2006, Fatah lost parliamentary elections to Hamas (BBC 2011). Fatah was largely pushed out of the Gaza strip in 2007 after violent clashes with Hamas (BBC 2011). Its last violent attack was around 2008 (GTD 2017). The group is not thought to have recently carried out terrorist attacks (Global Security).

Note: UCDP says "These bouts of fighting are however not coded as an armed conflict by the UCDP due to the lack of an incompatibility."

IV.   REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALIST SOLIDARITY
       Torg ID: 1271
       Min. Group Date: 1975
       Max. Group Date: 1975
       Onset: NA

       Aliases: Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity Group, Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity

       Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 3810. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018.
  https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3810
- Spanish embassy in lisbon bombed on basques' behalf. (1975, Sep 11). New York Times (1923-Current File) Retrieved from
  https://search.proquest.com/docview/120218956?accountid=14026

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: International Revolutionary Solidarity

Group Formation: 1975

Group End: 1975 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity conducted its only three attacks at approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 11, 1975 in Lisbon (GTD 2018; New York Times 1975). The group detonated three explosives (GTD 2018; New York Times 1975). One explosive was detonated at the entrance to the office of Royal Air Maroc, a Morroccan airline (GTD 2018; New York Times 1975). This bombing occurred near the office of Iberia Airlines, a Spanish airline (New York Times 1975). It is unclear whether the target of this bombing was the office of Iberia Airlines, the office of Royal Air Maroc, or both (New York Times 1975). The second attack occurred at Sheraton Hotel, a hotel which is owned by an American company (GTD 2018; New York Times 1975). Finally, the last explosive was detonated at the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon (GTD 2018; New York Times 1975). No one was killed or injured in the attacks (GTD 2018). Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity stated that it conducted the attacks to demonstrate its opposition to Spain's planned execution of two Basques who were convicted for the murder of a law enforcement official of the Civil Guard (New York Times 1975).

The group stated that it believed that its use of violence could be effective in forcing the release of the two aforementioned Basques (New York Times 1975). The group opposed the dictatorship and "capitalistic regime" of Francisco Franco (New York Times 1975). The group's self-stated objective was to achieve "the liberation of the Spanish people" (New York Times 1975).

Geography

Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity conducted its only three attacks in Lisbon, the capital of Portugal (GTD 2018; New York Times 1975).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure, leadership, membership, or source of funding. Members may have been Basque, but there is no secondary evidence to confirm this.

External Ties

Nothing is known about the group's ties to other actors.

Group Outcome

Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity conducted its only three attacks on September 11, 1975 (GTD 2018; New York Times 1975). After that date, the group did not conduct any more attacks (GTD 2018). It is unclear why the group stopped using violence. Nothing is known about the state's response to the group, if any.

Notes for Iris:
-its unknown who the Basque people in this group were and their charge was that they killed a Civil Guard member
-no evidence to tie this group to GARI or ETA (despite LeT/Hamas similarities in terms of momentary splintering/one hit missions)

V.   JUSTICE COMMANDOS FOR THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
Torg ID: 248
Min. Group Date: 1975
Max. Group Date: 1986
Onset: NA

Aliases: JCAG-ARA, Armenian Revolutionary Army

Part 1. Bibliography

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- GTD Perpetrator 3292. Global Terrorism Dataset. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3292

- "Global Terrorism: The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide." Central Intelligence Agency. 1984, 2. Released 2009 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85S00315R000200060002-3.pdf
- "Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia." CIA/FOIA. 1984, 1. Released 2010. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000400030009-2.pdf
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: JCAG, Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

Group Formation: 1975

Group End: 1985 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide was a right wing, Armenian nationalist and separatist group (MIPT 2008; Central Intelligence Angency 1984, 1; Gunter 2007, 110; Wilkinson 1983, 346; Chalk 2013, 383). JCAG was formed by the Dashnak Party, an Armenian political party that is more commonly known as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or ARF (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2013, 383). The group's main goal was to use violence to coerce the government of Turkey into accepting responsibility for the Armenian genocide of the early twentieth century, in which 1.5 million Armenians were killed (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii; Chalk 2013, 383). Moreover, JCAG reportedly attempted to make other countries around the world recognize the Armenian genocide (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii). The group strived for the formation of a separate and autonomous Armenian state (MIPT 2008). The group had profound enmity for Turkey, and accordingly, attacked Turkish interests and assassinated Turkish diplomats (MIPT 2008; Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2; Gunter 2007, PAGE; Chalk 2013, 383). JCAG conducted its first attack on October 22, 1975, when three group operatives assassinated Danis Tinaligil, the Turkish ambassador to Austria (GTD 2018; Gunter 2007, 115; Chalk 2013, 383).

The group conducted its first attack in Portugal on June 7, 1982, when a group member fatally shot a Turkish administrative attache and his or her wife (GTD 2018).

Geography

JCAG conducted attacks throughout the world (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Austria in the city of Vienna (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in France in the cities of Paris and Marseilles (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Switzerland in the cities of Zurich and Bern (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Italy in the city of Rome (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Belgium in the city of Brussels (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in the United Kingdom in the city of London (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Spain in the city of Madrid (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in the Netherlands in the city of Den Haag (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in the United States in the cities of Los Angeles, New York City, Cambridge, Somerville, and Philadelphia (GTD 2018; Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii). In the United States, the group maintained a particularly large presence in Los Angeles and elsewhere in California (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii; New York Times 1982). The group conducted an attack in Australia in the city of Sydney (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in Denmark in the city of Copenhagen (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks in Portugal in the cities of Linda-a-Velha and Lisbon (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in Canada in the city of Ottawa (GTD 2018; New York Times 1985). The group conducted an attack in Bulgaria in the city of Burgas (GTD 2018). The group conducted an attack in Turkey in the city of Istanbul (GTD 2018). The group allegedly conducted an attack in Lebanon in

the city of Beirut (GTD 2018). The group allegedly conducted an attack in what was then Yugoslavia in the city of Belgrade (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

JCAG was a part of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or ARF; JCAG often functioned as an armed wing of ARF (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2-4). The structure of ARF is hierarchical and pyramidal (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2). ARF consisted of many regional chapters throughout the world (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2-4). Each chapter was led by a central committee, which was generally responsible for that chapter's operations and members (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). Each chapter's central committee reported to a geographic bureau, which consisted of about five of the most important ARF members of that region (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). The geographic bureau made important decisions, received funding, and directed important facets of activities (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). The entire ARF was led by the world bureau (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). The world bureau was elected every four years by delegates from local chapters (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4). Nothing is known about the organizational structure or leadership of JCAG itself. JCAG consists of members of the Armenian diaspora around the world (MIPT 2008; Gunter 2007, 111). JCAG was funded privately and not by states (MIPT 2008). The group is primarily funded by the Armenian diaspora around the world (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2013, 383).

External Ties

The Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide had ties to Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsuthium (MIPT 2008; Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 2-4; Gunter 2007, PAGE; Chalk 2013, 383). Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsuthium is more commonly known as the Dashnak Party, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or ARF (Gunter 2007, 113). ARF, an Armenian political party, was the parent organization of JCAG (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, iii). JCAG was formed by the ARF in 1975 (MIPT 2008; Chalk 2013, 383). JCAG functioned as a military wing of ARF (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 4).

The Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide had a fierce rivalry with another Armenian group called Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, or ASALA (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 5). ASALA, like JCAG, used violence to increase recognition of the Armenian genocide and to achieve liberation for the Armenian people (MIPT 2008; CIA/FOIA 1984, 1). Nevertheless, ASALA posed a larger threat to American interests than JCAG did (MIPT 2008; CIA/FOIA 1984, 1). Unlike the right wing JCAG, ASALA was a Marxist and Leninist group, which had ties to the U.S.S.R. and Palestinian nationalist groups which attempted to form an independent Palestinian state (MIPT 2008; Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 6; CIA/FOIA 1984, 1; Chalk 2013, 383).

JCAG was succeeded by the Armenian Revolutionary Army, or ARA (MIPT 2008). Armenian Revolutionary Army was an alias that the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide adopted in July 1983 (MIPT 2008; Gunter 2007, 110).

JCAG likely did not have ties to any governments.

Group Outcome

In a technical sense, JCAG's violent activities ended in 1983 (MIPT 2008). In July of that year, the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide adopted the alias Armenian Revolutionary Army, or ARA (MIPT 2008; Gunter 2007, 110). The ARA used violence until 1985 (MIPT 2008; Gunter 2007, 110, 115-116; Chalk 2013, 383). For this reason, it can be determined that JCAG used violence after 1983, albeit under a different name. In March 1985, the group attacked the Turkish Embassy in the Canadian city of Ottawa (Gunter 2007, 115; Chalk 2013, 383). A security guard was killed (Gunter 2007, 115; Chalk 2013, 383). This was likely the group's last violent attack. The ARA reportedly has shifted its goals to campaigns in other places like Azerbaijan, where it is attempting to win Nagorno-Karabakh, a region in which many Armenians reside (MIPT 2008). It is unclear why the ARA ceased conducting attacks targeting Turkish diplomats and interests.

VI.   PORTUGUESE ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
Torg ID: 1249
Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1976
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography
● GTD Perpetrator 3649. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018.
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3649
● Marvine Howe. "Communists are the Target of New Violence." New York Times. 1976.
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/01/08/archives/communists-are-the-target-of-new-violence-in-portugal.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases found

Group Formation: 1976

Group End: 1976 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Anti-communist violence escalated in Portugal in early 1976 following the Carnation Revolution and violence by the ACA (New York Times 1976). In January 1976, communist and leftist politicians, lawyers, businesspeople, and foreigners were attacked in northern and central Portugal (New York Times 1976). Though these attacks are not attributed to Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement, they could have inspired the group to conduct its only attack. Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement conducted its only recognized attack on April 22, 1976, when it detonated an explosive at the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon (GTD 2018). Two people died, and five people were injured (GTD 2018). The attack resulted in the equivalent of approximately 5000 U.S. dollars of property damage (GTD 2018). The group is anti-communist as demonstrated by its name and its choice to attack the embassy of Cuba, a communist nation governed by Fidel Castro, the then-prime minister. Nothing else is known about the group's goals or ideology.

Geography

Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement conducted its only recognized attack in Lisbon, the capital of Portugal (GTD 2018). Though not attributed to the group, other anti-communist violence occurred in northern Portuguese cities including Braga, Braganca, Guarda, and Viseu and in central Portuguese cities including Leiria (New York Times 1976).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure, leadership, membership, or source of funding. It is likely that the group is very small because it only conducted one attack.

External Ties

Nothing is known about the group's ties to other actors.

Group Outcome

Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement conducted its only recognized attack on April 22, 1976 (GTD 2018). After that date, the group conducted no more attacks. It is unknown

why the group stopped using violence. The state's response to the group, if any, is unclear.

Notes for Iris:
-Shantanu does not code this as an organized group because none of the violence could be directly attributed to a singular "anti-communist" group. He notes: Note: I found no information about this group except for the one entry in GTD. There is no reason to believe the attacks found in the New York Times article above could be attributed to Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement.
-not a lot of evidence of organized violence by the group and it's unclear whether other anti-communist violence was sanctioned or not

VII.   ACTION GROUP FOR COMMUNISM
        Torg ID: 972
        Min. Group Date: 1978
        Max. Group Date: 1978
        Onset: NA

        Aliases: None

        Part 1. Bibliography
        ● GTD Perpetrator 3909. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018.
          https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3909
        ● John Jessup. "Armed Revolutionary Action." An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution.
          https://books.google.com/books?id=hP7jJAkTd9MC&pg=PA624&lpg=PA624&dq=ara+po
          rtugal+armed+revolutionary+action&source=bl&ots=PHvsfReg2R&sig=ACfU3U3VL-ZYB
          l7a4UGaODuD1Gc35x88lw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjCn7ie2snjAhUYsp4KHW4JC
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          %20action&f=false
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Acção Revolucionária Armada, ARA, Armed Revolutionary Action, Revolutionary Armed Action Group

Group Formation: 1970

Group End: 1984 (last confirmed violent attack) or perhaps even later (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The time of formation and the purpose of Acção Revolucionária Armada are heavily disputed. Best evidence suggests that the Portuguese Communist Party, or PCP, formed Acção Revolucionária Armada in 1970 (Lusotope 2008). Sources disagree on the reason PCP formed ARA. One source indicates that ARA was formed as an armed wing of PCP (Lusotope 2008). Another source states that ARA was intended as a propaganda wing (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 652). ARA conducted its first attack on October 26, 1970, when it attacked Cunene, a ship docked in Lisbon (Chilcote 2012, 41). It is unclear whether this was the group's first attack. Later in 1970, the group attacked a police training center, a munitions depot from which arms would be sent to Portuguese troops in Africa, and the cultural center of the U.S. Embassy (Chilcote 2012, 41).

The PCP supported communism. The PCP was reportedly Stalinist (Global Security n.d.). The PCP was a revolutionary leftist group (Global Security n.d.). The PCP opposed democracy (Global Security n.d.). The PCP opposed the dictatorial governments of Antonio Salazar and Marcelo Caetano (Global Security n.d.; Los

Angeles Times 2005). The PCP opposed colonialism (Lusotope 2008). The PCP opposed war, especially Portugal's colonial wars in Africa (Lusotope 2008). The PCP opposed the perestroika and glasnost reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev, who was the leader of the U.S.S.R. (Los Angeles Times 2005).

The PCP had many aims. The PCP wanted to overthrow the dictatorial governments of Antonio Salazar and Marcela Caetano (Global Security n.d.; Los Angeles Times 2005). The PCP wanted Portugal to exit NATO and diplomatically align with Russia (Los Angeles Times 2005).

Geography

ARA operated exclusively in Portugal (GTD 2018; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 652; Jessup n.d., 624; Chilcote 2012, 41). ARA conducted attacks in Lisbon, the capital of Portugal (GTD 2018; Jessup n.d., 624; Chilcote 2012, 41).

Organizational Structure

ARA was a de facto wing of PCP (Lusotope 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 652). ARA can be described as "an urban guerrilla group" (Jessup n.d., 624). Nothing is known about the organizational structure or leadership of ARA specifically.

The PCP operated clandestinely until 1974 due to the dictatorial government's repression of communist groups and arrests of important PCP leaders (Global Security n.d.). In 1974 following a coup that overthrew the dictatorial government of Marcelo Caetano, prominent PCP leaders returned from exile (Global Security n.d.). Alvaro Cunhal, the overall leader of the PCP, was one of those who returned from exile (Los Angeles Times 2005). Cunhal served as the leader of the PCP until his death in 2005 (Los Angeles Times 2005). Not much else is known about the organizational structure of the PCP.

External Ties

ARA undoubtedly had close ties to the PCP. ARA was a de facto wing of PCP (Lusotope 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 652). The PCP was reportedly involved in the planning of ARA's attacks (Chilcote 2012, 41). The PCP may have had ties to Soviet/Russian communist officials (Global Security n.d.; Los Angeles Times 2005).

Group Outcome

In 1971, the government of Portugal began to perceive ARA as a genuine threat (Jessup n.d., 624). Security forces began a crackdown on the group (Jessup n.d., 624). Many suspected group members were arrested, and 31 were tried (Jessup n.d., 624). This

crackdown was sufficient to temporarily hinder ARA's violent efforts, but insufficient to preclude the group from attacking again (Jessup n.d., 624).

It is unclear when ARA stopped using violence. Sources disagree on when the group stopped using violence. One source suggests that the group was still operating as late as 1984 (Jessup n.d., 624). The source indicates that ARA expanded its operational area and claimed responsibility for the murder of a member of the staff of the Turkish ambassador in that year (Jessup n.d., 624). It is unclear exactly when and why ARA stopped using violence.

Notes for Iris:
-PCP originally created the ARA as a 'de facto' armed wing and the ARA conducted violent attacks on behalf of the PCP

VIII.   ORGANIZACI?N REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO EN ARMAS
Torg ID: 575
Min. Group Date: 1979
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: Organisation Of People In Arms (Orpa), Organizacion Revolucionario Del Pueblo En Armas, Organizaci_n Revolucionario Del Pueblo En Armas, Revolutionary Organization Of People In Arms, Revolutionary Organization Of People In Arms (Orpa)

Part 1. Bibliography
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1972 (form), 1979 (first attack)

Group End: 1982 (merger with URNG)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The ORPA formed in 1972 (Canada IRB 1993). The ORPA is a splinter group of the Rebel Armed Forces; it has been alleged that this breakaway was due to ideological disputes (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group had its first attack in 1979 (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013). The initial goals of the group could be considered central-seeking because it wanted to overthrow the Guatemalan government. It espoused both leftist and ethno-nationalist views claiming to fight for "the development of the indigenous people's culture" (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 566).

Geography

The ORPA has conducted its areas of operations in Sierra Madre, Lake Attilan, and the San Marcos province (Schmid and Jongman 1988; GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The leader of ORPA is a man named Rodrigo Asturias (Refworld 2000). The group was started by ex-militants from the Rebel Armed Forces (Canada IRB 1993).

There is no explicit information about the membership of the group, but once source stated that the group is "weaker than the Guatemalan army" (Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013). In February 1982, ORPA became one of the four groups to join the URNG (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013). There is no information about how the group receives its source of funding.

It has been alleged that ORPA has its own splinter group called the People's Rebel Front but there has been no additional information to back this statement up (Refworld 2000).

External Ties

The ORPA, EGP, PGT, and FAR were all a part of the URNG (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013). The ORPA is a splinter group of the Rebel Armed Forces; it has been alleged that this breakaway was due to ideological disputes (Schmid and Jongman 1988). It has been alleged that ORPA has its own splinter group called the People's Rebel Front but there has been no additional information to back this statement up (Refworld 2000).

Group Outcome

In July 1981, the government cracked down on the group by demolishing the local fronts established by ORPA (Schmid and Jongman 1988). The group merged to join the URNG in 1982 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 80).

IX.   FOR_AS POPULARES DO 25 ABRIL (FP-25)
       Torg ID: 377
       Min. Group Date: 1980
       Max. Group Date: 1986
       Onset: NA

       Aliases: Popular Forces Of April 25, For_As Populares Do 25 Abril (Fp-25)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Peoples Forces of April 25, Forcas Populares do 25 Abril, FP25, Forces Populares 25 de Abril, FP-25 de Abril, April 25 People's Forces, Forças Populares 25 de Abril, Armed Revolutionary Organization (ORA), Global Project

Group Formation: 1980

Group End: 1986 (repression, arrests, trials, possible splinter)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Forças Populares do 25 Abril first came to attention in April 1980, when it detonated more than 100 leaflet bombs (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9). FP-25 reportedly formed from two other groups: Liga de Uniao e Accao Revolucionária (LUAR) [English: League of Union and Revolutionary Action] and the Revolutionary Brigades (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). The group's first wave of organized violence was in May 1980, when group members killed a police officer, unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap Anibal Cauaco e Silva, Brazil's Minister of Finance, killed a Portuguese businessman, bombed an office of British Airways, and attacked the Royal Club in Lisbon (GTD 2018; US State Department 1990, 55). The group assassinated and kidnapped politicians and

businesspeople, bombed military and civilian targets, robbed banks, used extortion, attacked NATO installations, and attacked American targets in Portugal including the U.S. Embassy throughout its six years of operation (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653; Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9).

Forças Populares do 25 Abril was named for the peaceful coup of April 1974 that overthrew the right wing government of Marcello Caetano (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653; US State Department 1990, 55). This coup was led by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the leader of FP-25 who was a lieutenant colonel in the Portuguese army (MIPT 2008; US State Department 1990, 55). FP-25 was a left wing, socialist group which aimed to overthrow the "fascist" government of Portugal and replace it with a Marxist state (US State Department 1990, 54; Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9). The group opposed U.S. and NATO influence in Portugal (US State Department 1990, 54). Moreover, the group planned to "use armed force against imperialism" and inspire a Marxist-style revolution against the Portuguese state (US State Department 1990, 54).

Geography

FP-25 operated exclusively in Portugal (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018; US State Department 1990, 54). The group reportedly is headquartered in the following cities: Lisbon, Porto, and Barcelos (US State Department 1990, 54). FP-25 conducted attacks in the following cities: Lisbon, Malveira, Porto, Cascais, Estremoz, Covilha, Fundao, Leiria, Cacilhas, Seixal, Setubal, Evora, Sao Marcos, Montemor-o-Novo, and Barreiro (GTD 2018).

Group members may have received training abroad, but it is unknown where (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9). After Portuguese security forces began a large-scale crackdown on the group, several FP-25 members fled to Mozambique and elsewhere (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 10).

Organizational Structure

The de facto leader of FP-25 was Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, a former lieutenant colonel in the Portuguese army (MIPT 2008; US State Department 1990, 55). He was one of the key leaders in the peaceful coup of April 1974 that overthrew the right wing government of Marcello Caetano (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653; US State Department 1990, 55). In June 1984, a large coalition of Portuguese government and security forces arrested more than 40 group members including Otelo (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9). Otelo was tried in 1985 along with 71 other alleged FP-25 members (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). He was convicted for leading a terrorist group that attempted to overthrow the government and destroy democracy (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). Otelo was sentenced to 15 years in prison (US State Department 1990, 55).

The group's other known key leader was Joao Carlos de Macedo Correia (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). He may have been the group's "chief of operations" (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). He was arrested in 1984 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653).

Not much is known about the group's organizational structure (US State Department 1990, 54). Two suspected group members said that the group consisted primarily of cells (US State Department 1990, 54). Armed militants were exclusively allowed to assume positions of leadership with FP-25 (US State Department 1990, 54). The group reportedly took extensive measures to ensure its security and to prevent law enforcement from infiltrating the group (US State Department 1990, 54).

According to estimates, FP-25 had between 6 and 10 "hardcore members" and had between 100 and 200 followers around 1989 (US State Department 1990, 54).

Some reports alleged that Libya provided funding to FP-25 (MIPT 2008; US State Department 1990, 54-55).

External Ties

FP-25 was suspected of having external ties to Libya (MIPT 2008; US State Department 1990, 54-55). Some reports alleged that Libya provided financial support to FP-25 (MIPT 2008; US State Department 1990, 54-55).

FP-25 had close ties to the Popular Unity Force, or FUP, the Portuguese left wing party created in 1980 by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho (Manuel 1996, 56; Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9). One source classifies FUP as the political front of FP-25 (Manuel 1996, 56). Another source classifies FP-25 as the covert armed front of FUP (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9). Another source classifies FP-25 and FUP as aliases of the same organization (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 654).

FP-25 likely had ties to the Irish Republican Army, or IRA (MIPT 2008). FP-25 bombed an office of British Airways and attacked the Royal Club in Lisbon (GTD 2018; US State Department 1990, 55). The two aforementioned attacks were reportedly conducted to support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (US State Department 1990, 55).

FP-25 was suspected of having connections to the Baader-Meinhof Group and the Red Brigades (MIPT 2008).

Forças Populares do 25 Abril may have had ties to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) [English: Basque Homeland and Freedom] (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 10; Keesings Record of World Events 1987, 35391). ETA was an ethno-nationalist Basque separatist group that also operated in both France and Spain (Encyclopædia Britannica

n.d.). Similar to FP-25, ETA had a Marxist ideology and viewed revolutionary socialism as their ultimate goal (Encyclopædia Britannica n.d.). Moreover, on October 15, 1984, group members placed five bombs and successfully detonated two of them at French business installations in Portugal (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 10). FP-25 took responsibility for the bombings and declared their support to ETA (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 10).

Revolutionary Autonomous Group, or GAR, was reportedly a faction of a Portuguese leftist group called Forças Populares do 25 Abril, or FP-25 (MIPT 2008). Revolutionary Autonomous Group could have formed as a splinter from FP-25 (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653).

Group Outcome

On June 19, 1984, a large coalition of Portuguese government and security forces including the Judiciary Police, the Security Police, and the National Police began a large-scale crackdown on FP-25 (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9). During this crackdown, at least 40 group members were arrested (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9). Among those that were arrested were prominent group leaders Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and Joao Carlos de Macedo Correia (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 9; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). The crackdown on FP-25 lasted months. The government of Portugal charged 77 people as suspected members of FP-25 (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 10). Otelo was tried in 1985 along with 71 other alleged FP-25 members (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). He was convicted for leading a terrorist group that attempted to overthrow the government and destroy democracy (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). Otelo was sentenced to 15 years in prison, and other group members also received prison sentences (US State Department 1990, 55). Nevertheless, several FP-25 members fled Portugal to places like Mozambique, allowing them to successfully evade authorities and live without fear of arrest for months or even years (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 10).

FP-25 members eventually returned to Portugal where they resumed their violent attacks, most prominently multiple attempts to attack the U.S. Embassy (Central Intelligence Agency 1985, 10). The Portuguese government of Mário Soares passed counterterrorism legislation that gave law enforcement officials significantly greater authority to surveil suspected militants, wiretap telephones, and search documents without a warrant (Manuel 1996, 57). The last set of attacks attributed to a group called Forças Populares do 25 Abril occurred near the middle of July in 1986, when group members attacked a post office in Setubal and allegedly attacked a landowner, a government building, and a diplomat in Evora (GTD 2018). In July, August, or September of 1986, Forças Populares do 25 Abril adopted the alias, Armed Revolutionary Organization, or ORA (US State Department 1990, 56). ORA bombed tourist resorts near the south of Portugal in September 1986 (US State Department 1990, 56). Otelo

and other group members have been released and rearrested on numerous occasions (MIPT 2008). In 1992, the government of Portugal decided to issue amnesty for members of FP-25 (MIPT 2008).

Notes for Iris:
-interesting evolution of the government's strategy towards FP-25 over time.
-see if there is evidence of a political shock in between when the group originally ended and when the group received its major concession in 1992 by the government
-limited progress towards their political aims otherwise

X.   ACTION DIRECTE
Torg ID: 7
Min. Group Date: 1980
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: AD, Direct Action, Accion Directe, Group Bakunin Gdansk Paris Guatemala Salvador (GBGPGS)

Group Formation: 1979

Group End: 1987 (arrests, repression, possible splinter)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1979, Groupes d'Action Révolutionnaire Internationaliste (GARI) [English: International Revolutionary Action Group] and Noyaux armis pour l'autonomie populaire (NAPAP) [English: New Arms for Popular Autonomy *or* Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy] merged to form Action Directe (AD) [English: Direct Action] (Dartnell 2013, 73; Atkins 2004, 5; State Department 1989, 42-43). GARI was a leftist, anarchist, center-seeking, anti-Franco group, whose main goal was the destruction of the dictatorial regime of Francisco Franco (MIPT 2008; Dartnell 2013, 74; Atkins 2004, 5). GARI attacked Spanish leaders, businesspeople, and infrastructure in France, Spain, and elsewhere in Europe, as well as conducting bombings, kidnappings, roberries, and assassinations (MIPT 2008; Dartnell 2013, 74). NAPAP was "a Maoist group of Parisian urban guerillas" (Atkins 2004, 5).

Action Directe conducted its first officially recognized attack in May 1979, when group members armed with machine guns fired on the office of the National Council of French Employers, a French business organization, in Paris (MIPT 2008; State Department 1989, 43). Some group members may have conducted attacks before that as early as March 1979, when group members allegedly unsuccessfully attempted to assassinated a French minister (Atkins 2004, 5). AD was committed to the destruction of societal institutions, the end of Western imperialism, the eradication of U.S. influence in Europe, and conducting attacks for anti-Zionist causes (State Department 1989, 42). The group was Marxist-Leninist (MIPT 2008).

AD conducted its only attack in Portugal on April 10, 1986, when the group detonated an explosive in the Lisbon office of Air France (GTD 2018).

Geography

AD had two wings based in different parts of France: Action Directe Internationale, or ADI, and Action Directe Nationale, or ADN (Atkins 2004, 5). ADI was headquartered in Paris, and ADN was headquartered in Lyons (Atkins 2004, 5-6; State Department 1989, 42-43). AD primarily operated in France (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018; State Department 1989, 42). AD conducted attacks in the French cities of Paris, Toulouse, Issy-Les-Moulineaux, Montrouge, Saint-Cloud, Le Vesinet, and Libourne (GTD 2018). ADI allegedly also operated in Belgium (State Department 1989, 42-43). AD conducted one attack in Canada in the city of Toronto (GTD 2018). AD conducted one attack in Germany in the region of Rhein-Main near Frankfurt (MIPT 2008). AD conducted one attack in Portugal in the city of Lisbon (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

AD was founded by Jean-Marc Rouillan and Nathalie Menignon (Atkins 2004, 5). AD had two wings based in different parts of France: the Paris-based international wing, Action Directe Internationale, or ADI, and the Lyons-based domestic wing, Action Directe Nationale, or ADN (Atkins 2004, 5-6; State Department 1989, 42-43). ADI wanted to expand AD's violence internationally to combat imperialism, westernization, and U.S. influence throughout the world (Atkins 2004, 5-6). ADI was led by Jean-Marc Rouillan and Nathalie Menignon (Atkins 2004, 5). ADN was led by Andre Olivier and Maxime Frerot (Atkins 2004, 6). ADN wanted to remain exclusively committed to bring about the downfall of the French government (Atkins 2004, 6). ADI was more violent and killed and injured more people than ADN (Atkins 2004, 6; State Department 1989, 43). Other key AD leaders were Georges Cipriani, Frederic Oriach, Regis Schleicher, Joelle Aubran, and Eric Moreau (Atkins 2004, 5; State Department 1989, 42).

When AD was initially formed, the group operated in a very decentralized manner (Atkins 2004, 5; Dartnell 2013, 75). The group consisted of individual groupuscules, or strike forces (Atkins 2004, 5; Dartnell 2013, 75). Over a few months, the group evolved to the organizational structure explained above.

There are no concrete estimates of the group's membership size (MIPT 2008; State Department 1989, 42). Nevertheless, French authorities estimated that neither of the group's wings, ADI or ADN, ever exceeded 250 members (Atkins 2004, 6). The group had 25 known members (Atkins 2004, 6).

AD's source of funding was unknown (MIPT 2008). The group had no known state sponsors (State Department 1989, 42).

External Ties

AD had no known state sponsors (State Department 1989, 42).

After the election of socialists François Mitterrand and Pierre Mauroy in 1981, AD lost much of its ability to use violence in the name of fighting for socialism (MIPT 2008). Nevertheless, after negotiating peaceful terms with the government of France for a while, AD resumed using violence especially against U.S. and western interests, often using the alias, Group Bakunin Gdansk Paris Guatemala Salvador, or GBGPGS (MIPT 2008).

ADI had ties to Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), a Belgian group, and Red Army Faction (RAF), a German group (MIPT 2008; State Department 1989, 43). Collectively, ADI, CCC, and RAF formed the Anti-Imperialist Armed Front, which fervently opposed the "Americanization of NATO" and proposed the formation of an "international proletarian urban combat organization" (State Department 1989, 43). ADI and RAF coordinated on attacks including the bombing at Rhein-Main Airbase, an American air force base near Frankfurt, Germany, in 1985 (MIPT 2008; State Department 1989, 43). Authorities alleged that AD and RAF had "strong logistical and perhaps even operational links" (State Department 1989, 43).

AD allegedly had ties to and cooperated with the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (MIPT 2008; State Department 1989, 43). AD may have had ties to the Italian Red Brigades (State Department 1989, 43). AD may have had ties to the Irish National Liberation Army (State Department 1989, 43). AD allegedly supplied arms and explosives to the Irish National Liberation Army (State Department 1989, 43).

AD had ties to Affiche Rouge, which was reportedly a faction of AD (MIPT 2008).

Committee for Liquidation of Computers, or CLODO, and Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action were suspected of being splinter groups of AD (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

In November 1986, AD conducted one of its last and most well known attacks when it assassinated Georges Besse, the chairman of Renault Corporation, a large French car company (MIPT 2008; State Department 1989, 44; The Telegraph 2008). As a result of the investigation into the assassination of Besse, law enforcement officials arrested important AD leaders including Jean-Marc Rouillan, Nathalie Menignon, Georges Cipriani, Joelle Aubran, and Maxime Frerot (MIPT 2008; State Department 1989, 42). Frederic Oriach, Andre Olivier, Regis Schleicher, and others were reportedly arrested as well (State Department 1989, 42). 22 of AD's 25 known members received prison sentences (Atkins 2004, 6). AD ceased using violence in 1987 following successful police crackdowns on the group in 1986 and 1987 and arrests of key members (State Department 1989, 43). Some sources indicate that residual members of AD who had not been arrested during police crackdowns may have conducted one attack after 1987 on

October 7, 1989 in Libourne, France (GTD 2018). In 1990, French authorities classified AD as inactive (Atkins 2004, 6).

Notes for Iris:
-is there an official end to the group? The GTD 1989 attack might be unorganized or unsanctioned violence
-what are their political aims? They had transnational aims to overthrow regimes and oppose 'western' (American) influence in the country. In an ideal world they wanted to overturn the government and would also settle for some policy changes at the very least.

XI.   ZIONIST ACTION GROUP
Torg ID: 540
Min. Group Date: 1982
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography
● "Zionist Action Group." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4324. MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1EkPQm5Oh4lNcWpYXII1Cu95pelB2y4b-5e5RPiM5TWA/edit
● Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Portugal." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. PDF.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ZAG, GSC (alleged [elaborated upon in the "Group Outcome" section])

Group Formation: 1982

Group End: 1982 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Zionist Action Group first came to attention as a violent group on August 15, 1982 (MIPT 2008). The group conducted its only two attacks in 1982, when it attacked the Lisbon offices of Air France and Lufthansa (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 654). ZAG stated that it opposed the foreign policies of the governments of France and Germany regarding Israel (MIPT 2008). Given the French and German governments' recent

opposition to Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the group might have opposed this specific policy (MIPT 2008). The specifics of the group's ideology and goals are unclear. The group was Zionist and likely Jewish (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group operated in Portugal (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 654). ZAG conducted its only two attacks in Lisbon, the capital of Portugal (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 654).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure, leadership, membership, or source of funding. ZAG's membership size and source of funding is unknown (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

Zionist Action Group may have had ties to the Jewish Defense League, or JDL (MIPT 2008). One source classifies JDL as a suspected ally of ZAG (MIPT 2008). Nothing else is known about the potential relationship between ZAG and JDL.

Group Outcome

Zionist Action Group conducted its only two attacks in 1982 (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 654). After that, ZAG did not conduct any more attacks. It is unclear why the group stopped using violence. Some reports allege that ZAG adopted the alias GSC and operated after the year 1982 (MIPT 2008). It is unclear whether this is true or if GSC conducted violent attacks.

XII.   REVOLUTIONARY AUTONOMOUS GROUP
Torg ID: 1266
Min. Group Date: 1985
Max. Group Date: 1985
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography
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- "Bomb Hits S. Africa Embassy in Lisbon." Los Angeles Times. 1985.
  https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-07-28-mn-5450-story.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Autonomous Revolutionary Groups, GAR, FP-25

Group Formation: 1985

Group End: 1985 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Revolutionary Autonomous Group was reportedly a faction of a Portuguese leftist group called Forças Populares do 25 Abril [English: Popular Forces of April 25], or FP-25 (MIPT 2008). Revolutionary Autonomous Group could have formed as a splinter from FP-25 (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). Revolutionary Autonomous Group conducted all of its attacks in 1985 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). The group's first attack was a bombing of a government housing office on April 10, 1985 to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the government's plan to lift a 50-year rent freeze (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). The group's second attack and the one it came to prominence for was the bombing of the South African Embassy in Lisbon in July 1985 (MIPT 2008). On July 27, 1985, the group detonated a bomb outside the South African Embassy in Lisbon (GTD 2018; Los Angeles Times 1985). No one was killed or injured (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018). Revolutionary Autonomous Group stated that the attack was "an act of solidarity" with the people of South Africa (MIPT 2008; Los Angeles Times 1985). The group said that it conducted the attack to protest the recent visit of Louis Nel, the Deputy Foreign Minister of South Africa, to Portugal (MIPT 2008). One potential motive behind the attack was to demonstrate fervent opposition to South Africa's apartheid system (MIPT 2008). According to a spokesperson for the group, Revolutionary Autonomous Group was a leftist group (MIPT 2008).

Geography

Revolutionary Autonomous Group operated in Portugal (MIPT 2008). The group conducted at least one and as many as all three of its attacks in Lisbon, the capital of Portugal (MIPT 2008). The previous sentence's ambiguity regarding how many of the group's attacks took place in Lisbon is due to the ambiguity of the only available sources.

Organizational Structure

It is disputed whether Revolutionary Autonomous Group was a faction of Forças Populares do 25 Abril, or FP-25, or whether it formed as a splinter of FP-25 (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653).

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure or leadership. Though no official estimates of the group's membership size exist, the membership size of Revolutionary Autonomous Group was likely very small as it was a "little-known" group and only conducted three attacks, all of which were "small" (Los Angeles Times 1985; MIPT 2008). Nothing is known about the group's source of funding (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

It is disputed whether Revolutionary Autonomous Group was a faction of Forças Populares do 25 Abril, or FP-25, or whether it formed as a splinter of FP-25 (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653).

Group Outcome

Revolutionary Autonomous Group conducted its third and final attack in December 1985, when it detonated a bomb at an office of Iberia, a Spanish airline (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). After this attack, the group ceased using violence. It is unclear why. It is unclear if the state responded to the group. Revolutionary Autonomous Group is "almost certainly inactive" (MIPT 2008).

Notes for Iris:
-MIPT speculates that this group is a faction of FP-25
-Schmid and Jongman speculate the group is a splinter

XIII.   FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF AZORES
          Torg ID: 9040
          Min. Group Date: 1974
          Max. Group Date: 1979
          Onset: NA

          Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FLA, Frente Libertacao dos Acores, Front For the Liberation of the Azores, Azores Liberation Front

Group Formation: 1975

Group End: 1979 (last recognized violent attack), probably active (though has not conducted any recognized violent attacks since 1979) (possible indictments and surveillance)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Front for the Liberation of Azores was a right wing, separatist, nationalist group whose main objective was to achieve political and economic independence/"liberation" for Azores from Portugal (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653; Keesings Record of World Events 1987, 35391; AP 1986; Portugal Resident 2014; Central Intelligence Agency 1975, 2).

FLA likely formed in 1975 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653; AS10001Noites 2014). FLA was an autonomy-seeking group which wanted Azores to have greater control of its own affairs (Central Intelligence Agency 1975, 2). The group was largely motivated by "discriminatory economic practices" and economic inequities between mainland Portugal and Azores (Central Intelligence Agency 1975, 2). The group believed that Portugal's dominance of Azores was colonialist, and as such, wanted self-determination and absolute independence from it (AS10001Noites 2014; The Economist 1986, 2). An integral event in the history of FLA occurred on June 6, 1975 when Azorean demonstrators in Ponta Delgada protested for independence (AS10001Noites 2014; Portugal Resident 2014). Shortly after, FLA attempted an unsuccessful coup and attacked the offices of leftist parties and the homes of socialist politicians (AS10001Noites 2014).

Geography

FLA operated in Azores (GTD 2018). Azores is an archipelago in the Atlantic Ocean that is approximately 750 miles west of the Iberian Peninsula (Minahan 2000, 82). Most of the archipelago's islands are mountainous (Minahan 2000, 82). Azores has nine populated islands divided into three groups: northwestern, central, and eastern (Minahan 2000, 82). Flores and Corvo are the northwest islands (Minahan 2000, 82). Terceira, São Jorge, Pico, Faial, and Graciosa are the central islands (Minahan 2000, 82). São Miguel and Santa Maria are the eastern islands (Minahan 2000, 82). Azores has thriving agricultural, dairy, and wine industries (Minahan 2000, 82). FLA conducted at least one attack in Ponta Delgada, an Azorean city on São Miguel Island, and conducted multiple attacks at unclear locations in Azores (GTD 2018). FLA was officially established in London, England by Jose de Almeida (AS10001Noites 2014). Jose de Almeida resided in Fall River, Massachusetts, United States, where many of his supporters attempted to establish a government in exile (AS10001Noites 2014).

Organizational Structure

Jose de Almeida founded FLA (AS10001Noites 2014). He was a former representative of National People's Action (AS10001Noites 2014). Almeida was a high school teacher (AP 1986). Jose de Almeida resided in Fall River, Massachusetts, United States (AS10001Noites 2014). Manuel Bento may have also been a leader of FLA (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). The members of FLA were Azorean. FLA was supported by the Azorean diaspora in places like the United States, Canada, and Brazil (Schmid and

Jongman 1988, 653). It is unknown if members of the Azorean diaspora financed FLA. Nothing else is known about the group's organizational structure, membership, or source of funding.

External Ties

FLA probably had no state sponsors as of 1975 (Central Intelligence Agency 1975, 3). The group reportedly reached out to foreign countries including France for assistance, but those countries reportedly did not provide any assistance (AS10001Noites 2014; Central Intelligence Agency 1975, 3). FLA received Belgian arms from an unknown source (Central Intelligence Agency 1975, 4). FLA reportedly received armed assistance from local military units called Azorean Patriots in the Garrisons, or PAG (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 653). The Movement for the Self-Determination of the Azores, or MAPA, was a group with similar ideologies and goals as FLA that eventually joined FLA (AS10001Noites 2014). FLA had ties to the Separatist Student Movement, which also wanted autonomy for Azores (AS10001Noites 2014). FLA may have had ties to the Paço do Milhafre Association, a recently developed group of Azorean independence advocates which has developed plans to make Azores economically independent (AS10001Noites 2014).

Group Outcome

In 1976, the government of Portugal granted some degree of autonomy to Azores (AS10001Noites 2014). FLA conducted its last recognized attacks on January 29, 1979 when it attacked a government vehicle and the houses of government officials (GTD 2018). In 1986, the government of Portugal prepared to indict Jose de Almeida due to his statements that he would fight for the independence of Azores by any means necessary (AP 1986). In 2012, FLA resurfaced and resumed its campaigns for an independent Azores (AS10001Noites 2014). In recent years, the group has operated clandestinely as the government of Portugal banned all separatist groups (AS10001Noites 2014). FLA may have had ties to the Paço do Milhafre Association, a recently developed group of Azorean independence advocates which has developed plans to make Azores economically independent (AS10001Noites 2014). FLA, the Paço do Milhafre Association, and other Azorean separatist groups may have been and may continue to be surveilled by authorities (AS10001Noites 2014).

Notes for Iris:
-the ideology was right-wing? Schmid and Jongman cite that they oppose the leftist government (ongoing during the Carnation Revolution?) -- might want to think about the ideological orientation during the transition in 1975
-is the FLA different today? Has the same political aims but there's no evidence of any ties to de Almedia or any original and no violent activities.

-in the 1970s, the group was relatively violent. Today the group has been active in public statements, but has not been violent.

Country-Level Trends:
-there was a large amount of communist/anti-communist violence particularly concentrated in the 1970s/early 1980s
-a lot of groups were transnational that did not originate in Portugal (mostly French or Spanish). Interesting ties to Basque or Catalonia groups
-apart from the FLA, most groups were center-seeking
-Portuguese groups were not organized and a lot of violence was rather decentralized (not oriented around leadership)
-significant political shocks related to military coups and peaceful coups
-leaders related to armed groups