Honduras Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 15 May 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T448	FRENTE SANDINISTA DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FSLN)		1960	1996
T804	SANDINISTAS		1960	1995
T1182	FRENTE MORAZANISTA PARA LA LIBERACION DE HONDURAS		1980	1990
T124	CINCHONEROS POPULAR LIBERATION MOVEMENT		1980	1994
T1797	LORENZO ZELAYA REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (LZRF)		1980	1988
T1847	NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE		1987	1990
T300	MORAZANIST PATRIOTIC FRONT (FPM)		1988	1995
T1591	9 MAY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FORCE		1989	1989
T1615	ANTI COMMUNIST ACTION ALLIANCE		1989	1989
T439	REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT MOVEMENT		1989	1989
T520	FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO UNIDO		1989	1989
T1444	EJ_RCITO DE RESISTENCIA PATRI¢TICA		1990	1990
T1697	ELEMENTS POLICE COBRA SQUADRON		1991	1991
T332	LOS JUSTICIEROS DE LA NOCHE		1997	0
T2070	CARTEL DE SINALOA		2004	2010
T2386	GULF CARTEL		2004	2010
T2608	MARA 18 (HONDURAS)		2010	2010

I. FRENTE SANDINISTA DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FSLN)
Torg ID: 448
Min. Group Date: 1960
Max. Group Date: 1996
Onset: NA

Aliases: Sandinista National Liberation Front (Fsln), Frente Sandinista De Liberacion Nacional (Fsln)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Sandinistas." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 249, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit
- GTD Perpetrator 288. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=388
- "Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional." Global Security. N.D. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/centam/fsln.htm
- "Historia del Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN)." La Prensa. 2006. https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2006/10/02/politica/1673801-historia-del-frente-sandinista-de-liberacion-nacional-fsln-3
- Gabriel Garcia. "El Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional." Pacarina del Sur. 2014. http://www.pacarinadelsur.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1084&catid=5&Itemid=9
- United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Nicaragua: Information on Nicaraguan armed groups, 23 January 2002, NIC02002.RIC, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dec9a814.html
- "The Sandinistas." Understanding the Iran Contra Affair Project. Brown University. https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/n-sandinistas.php
- "The Rise of the FSLN." Nicaragua Country Studies. US Library of Congress. N.D. http://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/12.htm
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "Dyad ID 567: Nicaragua vs. FSLN." Non-State Actor Dataset. P. 485-488. 2013. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- Bynum Weathers. "Guerrilla Warfare in Nicaragua." Maxwell Air Force. DTIC. 1984. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a148248.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Sandinista, Sandinista National Liberation Front (Fsln), Frente Sandinista De Liberacion Nacional (Fsln)

Group Formation: 1960

Group End: 1996 (unknown why stopped using violence)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The FSLN was founded by Silvio Mayorga, Tomás Borge, and Carlos Fonseca around 1960 or 1961, but the exact year is disputed (MIPT 2008; US Congress n.d.; La Prensa 2006; Garcia 2014; and Brown University n.d.). They started out as a group of student activists at National Autonomous University of Nicaragua in Managua (US Library of Congress n.d.). The group originally ascribed to Marxist-Leninist ideals and hoped to overthrow the Somoza regime (MIPT 2008). Their first violent incident might be as late as 1967, but it might have been earlier (La Prensa 2006).They used guerilla warfare, which, at first, was not very successful until they began mobilizing more forces in the late 1970s (Gleditsch et. al. 2013, 485). After taking over the Nicaraguan government in 1979, they began fighting against opposition to their ideals, most notably the American-funded Contras (Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch et. al. 2013, 485-486).

Geography

The group attacked Somotillo, Leon, Managua, and Matagalpa, as well as several unknown locations (GTD 2017). No evidence of an external base could be found.

Organizational Structure

The FSLN was founded by Silvio Mayorga, Tomaás Borge, and Carlos Fonseca in 1960 (US Congress n.d.; La Prensa 2006). Fonseca died in 1976 before they took over the government (Garcia 2014).The earliest members of the group were students, but they later recruited peasants and laborers (Brown University n.d.). The group's exact size is unknown, but it was estimated to have around 3,000 members in 1978 (MIPT 2008; Gleditsch et. al. 2013, 487). In 1978, they were led by Daniel Ortega (Gleditsch et. al. 2013, 487). The group created its political wing, the Movimiento Pueblo Unido, in 1979 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 488).

External Ties

The group had external ties to Cuba, Costa Rica, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) before 1979 (MIPT 2008). The group specifically received logistical assistance and weapons from Cuba and Costa Rica, respectively (MIPT 2008; Brown University n.d.). After 1979, they received unspecified support from Libya, weapons from the USSR, and military advisors from Cuba (MIPT 2008; Brown University

n.d.). They were also supported by Panama and Venezuela, both countries supplying them with weapons, the exact time periods in which this occurred are unknown (Gleditsch et. al. 2013, 487; Brown University n.d.). They also sent weapons to rebels in El Salvador beginning in 1980 (Brown University n.d.). They clashed with the American-funded Contras during the Nicaraguan Civil War in the 1980s (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2002; Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch et. al. 2013, 485-486).

Group Outcome

In 1967, the group launched their second major offensive, which marked a turning point in the group's violent behavior (La Prensa 2006). Violence intensified in 1974 when they starting forming rural and urban fronts (Garcia 2014). The group actually ceased to exist as a terrorist organization in 1979, having overthrown the Somoza regime, but chose to help sponsor terrorist activity abroad (MIPT 2008). The group still exists as of 2017, but lost a lot of their political influence when they lost the general election in 1990 (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). There were alleged incidents after 1990, but none of them have been confirmed (MIPT 2008; GTD 2017). In 1995, a reformist faction led by Sergio Ramirez formed Movimiento Renovación Sandinista (Global Security n.d.). The last known violent attacks were in November of 1996 when they were operating as a semi-violent political party (GTD 2017). Today, the group is a democratic socialist political party.

Notes for Iris:
-dynasty regime in Nicaragua at the time
-pretty dictatorial
-standard vanguard party composed of students
-unclear why they would be getting support from the PFLP or Israel
-PFLP is marxist-leninist so they might have had a common ideology which is why they might give support

II. SANDINISTAS
Torg ID: 804
Min. Group Date: 1960
Max. Group Date: 1995
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for the FSLN.

Group Formation: This is an alias for the FSLN.

Group End: This is an alias for the FSLN.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the FSLN.

Geography

This is an alias for the FSLN.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the FSLN.

External Ties

This is an alias for the FSLN.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the FSLN.

III. FRENTE MORAZANISTA PARA LA LIBERACION DE HONDURAS
Torg ID: 1182
Min. Group Date: 1980
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: Morazanist Front For The Liberation Of Honduras (Fmlh), Frente Morazanista Para La Liberacion De Honduras

Part 1. Bibliography

- “FMLH.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4382, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit

- GTD Perpetrator 2178. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2178
- J. Mark Ruhl. “Honduras Militarism and Democratization in Troubled Waters.” Presentation at the Latin American Studies. 1998. http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA98/Ruhl.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FMLH

Group Formation: 1980

Group End: 1995 (group became a political party and never took credit for another attack)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded in 1980 in Honduras when it split from the Party for the Transformation of Honduras (PTH) (MIPT 2008). The group has communist ideals (MIPT 2008). PTH was a splinter group from the Communist Party of Honduras (MIPT 2008). The group was Communist and hoped to use violent means to overthrow the Honduran government as well as oppose US intervention in the country (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998; US State Department 1989). The group’s first violent incident was in 1984 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group originated in Honduras (MIPT 2008). The group moved its operations to Nicaragua in the early 1980s when the Honduran government started to adopt repressive measures to remove leftist insurgencies from the country (MIPT 2008). The group mainly attacked cities in Honduras, including Piedras Azules, Entrerios Mountains, Tegucigalpa, and Amarateca (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

At its height, the group had around 300 members (Ruhl 1998). Its leaders and other information about its organization is unknown.

External Ties

It had ties to Cuba, but lost support for an unknown reason at an unknown date; they did not make any attempts to receive new support or choose different targets (Refworld 1999; Federation of American Scientists 1998). The groups also had unspecified ties to the Nicaraguan government (Federation of American Scientists 1998).

Group Outcome

The Honduran government used indiscriminate violence against the group in the early 1980s; this was part of the catalyst to move to Nicaragua (MIPT 2008). In the 1990s, after the Sandinistas lost the general election, most leftist groups in Central America lost most of their support, causing FMLH to form (MIPT 2008). In 1992, the group renamed itself Morazanist National Liberation Party and combined with the PTH, the Honduran Revolutionary Party, and the Patriotic Renovation Party to create the Democratic Unification Party (MIPT 2008). The group was recognized by the government in 1993 and its last known violent actions were in 1995 (MIPT 2008; Canada IRB 1999).

Notes for Iris:
-unclear reason why it split
-the armed wing of the political party
-Cuba support - boosted their capabilities, but it wasn't the determining factor in whether they could
-Nicaraguan government actively provides sanctuary for leftist groups

IV. CINCHONEROS POPULAR LIBERATION MOVEMENT
Torg ID: 124
Min. Group Date: 1980
Max. Group Date: 1994
Onset: NA

Aliases: Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement, Cinchonero Movimiento Popular De Liberaci¢N (Mpl), Cinchonero People's Liberation Movement

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3987, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F5OaS_pTJg52rjAbH1YPQBazAZ5sSpR29XXjD-p-d9E/edit
- GTD Perpetrator 1723. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1723

- Stephen Sloan and Sean Anderson. “Cinconeros Popular Liberation Movement.” Historical Dictionary of Terrorism. Scarecrow Press. 2009. https://books.google.com/books?id=aVcG7EkuPgAC&pg=PA109&lpg=PA109&dq=Cinchoneros+Popular+Liberation+Movement&source=bl&ots=iix37NDwZK&sig=j--MQaWwTnvFoymE7Y8xJzXuU0Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiX46nbo43XAhVLyWMKHbAYBQ84ChDoAQgnMAA#v=onepage&q=Cinchoneros%20Popular%20Liberation%20Movement&f=false
- US State Department. “Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement.” Terrorist Group Profiles. DIANE Publishing. 1989. https://books.google.com/books?id=55BZmIJ9xd8C&pg=PA78&lpg=PA78&dq=Cinchoneros+Popular+Liberation+Movement&source=bl&ots=Joa2i53toF&sig=rbG_CwX1UZJmqsMXXpfbaN1OyPw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHmMfTo43XAhUK32MKHe7sDSgQ6AEITzAH#v=onepage&q=Cinchoneros%20Popular%20Liberation%20Movement&f=false
- Richard Meislin. “Honduras Locked in Struggle After Years of Relative Calm.” New York Times. 1982a. http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/21/world/honduras-locked-in-struggle-after-years-of-relative-calm.html
- Richard Meislin. “Thousands of Hondurans Protest Taking of Hostages by Guerrillas.” New York Times. 1982b. http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/22/world/thousands-of-hondurans-protest-taking-of-hostages-by-guerrillas.html
- Richard Meislin. “Honduran Rebels Still Holding 80.” New York Times. 1982c. http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/20/world/honduran-rebels-still-holding-80.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1980

Group End: 1994 (repressive Honduran government measures)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded in 1980 (US State Department 1982; MIPT 2008). The group hoped to overthrow the Honduran government and oppose United States’s interest in the country (Sloan and Anderson 2009). The group had Marxist-Leninist and populist ideology (Sloan and Anderson 2009). Cinchoneros were the armed wing of the People’s Revolution Union, which was a splinter of the Honduran Communist Party (Sloan and Anderson 2009). It became known for car bombings and taking hostages, most notably 80 businessmen and government leaders in 1982 (MIPT 2008; Meislin 1982b). Its first

violent attack was in 1980; they hijacked a plane going to New Orleans and flew it to Nicaragua for a hostage exchange (Sloan and Anderson 2009; MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group mainly attacked Tegucigalpa, Honduras, but also had some attacks in Guatemala and Costa Rica (GTD 2017). The headquarters are in Tegucigalpa, Honduaras (US State Department 1982). The group had an external base in Nicaragua (Sloan and Anderson 2009; MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The estimated membership was under 200 people around 1982 (US State Department 1982). Not much else is known about their organization.

External Ties

The group has alleged ties with Farabundo Marti Liberation Front, a leftist organization that opposed the government in El Salvador, which trained and helped forces in kidnappings (Meislin 1982c; Sloan and Anderson 2009). Cinchoneros also had alleged support from Cuba, specifically training, arms, funding, and logistical support, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, who offered them sanctuary in exchange for support fighting the contras (Sloan and Anderson 2009; MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

Honduras responded to the group with massive amounts of indiscriminate violence and repression (MIPT 2008). The group disappeared in the mid-1980s, but made a reappearance in the late-1980s by drawing support from those against the American presence in the country (MIPT 2008). After the end of the Nicaraguan civil war in 1990, the group disappeared (MIPT 2008). The group's last known verified attack was in 1994 (GTD 2017). The group allegedly bombed a bus in 2004, but experts dispute the authenticity of this claim (MIPT 2008).

Notes for Iris:
-no evidence of inter-group competition
-they receive external support from the same resources
-there is a shift in Honduras' opinion right around the end of the Cold War maybe coinciding with the end of the Soviet Union

V. LORENZO ZELAYA REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (LZRF)
Torg ID: 1797
Min. Group Date: 1980
Max. Group Date: 1988

Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2428. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2428
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. “Lorenzo Zalaya Popular Revolutionary Forces.” Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. P. 569. PDF.
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Honduras: Whether a guerrilla group called "Lorenzo Zelaya" exists, and if so, its activities; whether other guerrilla groups exist in Honduras (1995 to May 1999), 1 May 1999, HND31886.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6acff40.html
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Honduras: Information on the Lorenzo Zelaya Group, 1 December 1993, HND16097.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab9548.html
- “General Alvarez Martinez assassinated.” El Pais. 1989. https://elpais.com/diario/1989/01/26/internacional/601772414_850215.html
- Noe Leiva. “Honduran armed forces say Cuba, Nicaragua training Honduran leftists.” UPI. 1984. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/10/29/Honduran-armed-forces-say-Cuba-Nicaragua-training-Honduran-leftists/9780467874000/
- Wilson Ring. “Honduran leftists court revolt, step up attacks on U.S. troops.” Chicago Tribune. 1989. https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1989-07-17-8902170973-story.html
- Honduras Country Study Guide. International Business Publications. 2003. P. 70. https://books.google.com/books?id=0rUtJpRJa4gC&pg=PA70&lpg=PA70&dq=lorenzo+zalaya+alvarez+martinez&source=bl&ots=AiW_L5RTl0&sig=ACfU3U1n7Hupdx-aCeAGhmmmDjcsq7JnAQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi1p7v-86LiAhWOFTQIHVTNAUQQ6AEwD3oECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=lorenzo%20zalaya%20alvarez%20martinez&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Lorenzo Zalaya Popular Revolutionary Forces; Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias Lorenzo Zelaya, FPRLZ, Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias-Lorenzo Zelaya, FPR-LZ, FPR, Lorenzo Zelaya Group

Group Formation: probably 1980 (form, first attack)

Group End: 1988 (possible rapprochement)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary Front conducted its first attack on October 31, 1980, when it detonated an unidentified explosive at the Chilean Embassy in Tegucigalpa (GTD 2018). The group was known for shooting two unarmed U.S. Army and Air Force advisors named Robert L. Smith and Russell L. McFall on September 23, 1981 in Tegucigalpa (GTD 2018; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 569). The group conducted attacks on a wide variety of targets in Tegucigalpa including bombings of government buildings (GTD 2018; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 569).

FPR-LZ was an anti-Soviet communist group (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 569). Others simply describe it as a leftist group (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993; UPI 1984; Chicago Tribune 1989; International Business Publications 2003, 70). It emerged in the early 1980s along with other leftist groups in part as a response to Álvarez Martínez, the staunch anti-communist, powerhungry leader of the armed forces of Honduras, who allegedly violated human rights (El País 1989; International Business Publications 2003, 70). The group also formed in response to the larger wave of leftist groups which emerged in 1980 and 1981 after the Sandinistas lost power (Chicago Tribune 1989).

Geography

FPR-LZ operated in Honduras (GTD 2018; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 569; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993; UPI 1984; International Business Publications 2003, 70). The group conducted most of its attacks in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras (GTD 2018). The group also conducted attacks in other cities in Honduras including San Pedro Sula, El Progreso, and Comayagua (GTD 2018). FPR-LZ members may have received training in Cuba and Nicaragua (UPI 1984). Some members may have been trained at a school in Pinar del Rio, a western province of Cuba (UPI 1984).

Organizational Structure

The leader of FPR-LZ likely was Efrain Duarte until his arrest in 1983 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). Nothing more is known about Efrain Duarte or the leader or leaders who succeeded him. Nothing is known about the group's membership or source of funding.

In the early 1990s, leftist groups like FPR-LZ regrouped as the National Unity Directorate (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993). The National Unity Directorate negotiated with the Honduran government to allow individuals who had been exiled due

to suspected participation in leftist groups to return to the country (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993).

External Ties

The Honduran armed forces alleged that Cuba and Nicaragua trained leftist groups including FPR-LZ (UPI 1984). Specifically, some FPR-LZ members may have been trained at a school in Pinar del Rio, a western province of Cuba (UPI 1984). Some Honduran officials stated that Cuba and Nicaragua were organizing guerilla cells and training armed groups in an effort to spread communism to Honduras and "to systematically attack [Honduras]" (UPI 1984). Officials alleged that Nicaragua was "infiltrating 'armed groups into Honduran territory' and waging a campaign of 'disinformation' against the country" (UPI 1984).

FPR-LZ may have received direct or indirect support from the Nicaraguan Sandinista government as well (International Business Publications 2003, 70). The nature of the potential relationship between FPR-LZ and the Sandinistas is unclear.

FPR-LZ may have had ties to other leftist groups operating in Honduras in the 1980s (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993; International Business Publications 2003, 70). In the early 1990s, FPR-LZ and other leftist groups regrouped as the National Unity Directorate (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993). The National Unity Directorate negotiated with the Honduran government to allow individuals who had been exiled due to suspected participation in leftist groups to return to the country (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993).

Group Outcome

FPR-LZ conducted its last recognized attack in July 1988 (GTD 2018). The reason why the group stopped conducting violent attacks in largely unknown. One source indicates that there may have been a rapprochement between FPR-LZ and the government of Honduras (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). FPR-LZ may have cooperated with the government of Honduras and agreed to stop fighting in exchange for guarantees of the group's safety (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). FPR-LZ is no longer active (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). It stopped using violence in 1988 (GTD 2018). However, the group may have operated nonviolently after that year (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). The year when the group stopped conducting operations is unclear.

In the early 1990s, leftist groups like FPR-LZ regrouped as the National Unity Directorate (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993). The National Unity Directorate negotiated with the Honduran government to allow individuals who had been exiled due

to suspected participation in leftist groups to return to the country (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993).

Notes for Iris:
-what is National Unity Directorate? It is a collection of leftist groups that formed after most of the violent attacks by the individual groups ceased. It was formed to bolster their bargaining position in negotiating the return of militants from abroad to return.
-all of the violent attacks had ended, separate political aim than the original set of group so seems to be independent organization
-the leftist groups in general disappear or are susceptible to police crackdowns. General crackdown against leftist groups.

VI. NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE
Torg ID: 1847
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 516. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=516
- Phil Gunson, Greg Chamberlain, and Andrew Thompson. “Nicaraguan Resistance.” The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of Central America and the Caribbean. Routledge. 2015. https://books.google.com/books?id=tEJACwAAQBAJ&pg=PT228&lpg=PT228&dq=Resistencia+Nicarag%C3%BCense,+RN&source=bl&ots=IaazOkQM84&sig=IpLaaraciJGghgVZF7zfb0VkhjU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjbudCjpvPXAhVG9GMKHQbKANkQ6AEIbzAN#v=onepage&q=Resistencia%20Nicarag%C3%BCense%2C%20RN&f=false
- “The Contra Leadership: A Who’s Who.” Los Angeles Times. 1987. http://articles.latimes.com/1987-08-28/news/mn-3013_1_pedro-joaquin-chamorro
- “Contra Forces in South Split from Rebel Movement.” Los Angeles Times. 1988. http://articles.latimes.com/1988-07-21/news/mn-9237_1_rebel-movement
- “Background: The California Story.” Origin and Development of the Contra Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/cocaine/report/background.html
- David Ronfeldt and Brian Jenkins. “The Nicaraguan Resistance and US Policy.” RAND. 1987. P. 18-23. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3678.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding
Aliases: RN

Group Formation: 1987

Group End: 1990 (The Sandinistas lost the general election)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was founded in 1987 by the United Nicaraguan Organization (UNO) and the Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS) (Gunson et al. 2015). It is a contra umbrella group that replaced UNO and was created in attempts to fix the rift in the UNO leadership (Gunson et al. 2015; Central Intelligence Agency n.d.). It opposed the Sandinista regime (Gunson et al 2015; Los Angeles TImes 1987). The group's first known attack was in 1987 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group attacked many different cities and villages in Nicaragua (GTD 2017). It was not transnational and had no evidence of an external base.

Organizational Structure

The group is headed by a seven person directorate chosen by a 54-member assembly (Gunson et al. 2015). Leaders include Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, Alfredo César, Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Robelo, Aristides Sanchez, Azucena Ferrey, and Enrique Bermudez (Gunson et al. 2015; Los Angeles Times 1987). The group claimed to have 14,000 members, but the Nicaraguan government estimated the group to have only 8,000 members (Gunson et al. 2015). There were around 70 to 80 task-force commanders and 26 regional commanders in the group (Ronfeldt and Jenkins 1987, 19).

External Ties

It has ties to the United States, which gave them $100 million, allowing the group to plan resources and train members (Ronfeldt and Jenkins n.d., 20; Los Angeles Times 1987).

Group Outcome

In 1988, the Contras and the Sandinistas signed a ceasefire agreement (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.). In 1990, the Sandinistas lost the general election, causing both groups to slowly fade away (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.). The group's last violent attack is in 1990 (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:
-the Southern Opposition Bloc is a smaller faction of the Contras, but hasn't come up before
-there were leadership divisions, but it's unclear why they thought merging would resolve (normally they splinter)
-the US only gave financial assistance, but the group was really active
-trends in the attacks: no geographic trends, but mostly military and government-oriented
-this group seems more successful than the FDN even though they aren't active as long. They are much more organized and able to execute more attacks. They had a lot more political resources and command structure. Don't know how to compare sizes.
-also interesting comparison to FARN group: there are really similar size estimates // and also access to similar external resources
-the group 'succeeds' and gets concessions in the long-run
-interesting comparison with FDN (check against Fortna coding)

VII. MORAZANIST PATRIOTIC FRONT (FPM)
Torg ID: 300
Min. Group Date: 1988
Max. Group Date: 1995
Onset: NA

Aliases: Morazanist Patriotic Front (Fpm), Frente Patriotico Morazanista, Morazanista Liberation Front, Morazanista Patriotic Front, Morazano National Liberation Front, Patriotic Morazanista Front (Fpm)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Morazanist Patriotic Front." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4132. MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DAKoEzO9V8oOvn53Je8DzFmxFbTli-zNrkGaoEX8Ndw/edit
- "Morazanist Patriotic Front (FPM)." Federation of American Scientists. 1998. https://fas.org/irp/world/para/fpm.htm
- US State Department. Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans 1989. DIANE Publishing. https://books.google.com/books?id=_GpSz8SozHgC&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=MORAZANIST+FRONT+FOR+THE+LIBERATION+OF+HONDURAS&source=bl&ots=9iwhNfiuUM&sig=ZGCQhH5vfvFDy-J8xqbXyS7p2GM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwje1bfzoI3XAhUBxWMKHW1_AjI4ChDoAQhHMAg#v=onepage&q=MORAZANIST%20FRONT%20FOR%20THE%20LIBERATION%20OF%20HONDURAS&f=false
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Honduras: Whether a guerrilla group called "Lorenzo Zelaya" exists, and if so, its activities; whether other guerrilla

groups exist in Honduras (1995 to May 1999), 1 May 1999, HND31886.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6acff40.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases found

Group Formation: 1988

Group End: 1995 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Morazanist Patriotic Front formed in the late 1980s, but a precise date is not known (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998). FPM was a leftist group (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998).

Despite its affiliations with communist groups and countries, FPM differed from other Honduran groups in that it did not aim to promote Marxist revolution and regime change (MIPT 2008). Instead, the group's main objective was the eradication of U.S. presence and influence in Honduras and Central America (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998). FPM opposed U.S. intervention in the political and economic matters of Honduras (Federation of American Scientists 1998). Moreover, the group resolutely opposed U.S. military intervention in the region (MIPT 2008). For example, American military and financial support for the Contras in their fight against Sandinista forces and the United States's presence in the region thereof "provoked considerable animosity" among many Hondurans and Honduras-based leftist groups like FPM (MIPT 2008). To that end, FPM primarily attacked U.S. nationals in Honduras (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998). The group mainly attacked U.S. service members (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998). The group also attacked some U.S. civilians (MIPT 2008).

FPM's first recognized attack occurred in late 1988, when group operatives killed Leo Mills, an American businessman who had relocated to Honduras (MIPT 2008). The group conducted more attacks in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998). In 1988, FPM conducted a bombing at an office of the U.S. Peace Corps (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998). In February 1989, FPM members shot at a convoy of American and Honduran soldiers in Yoro Province (US State Department 1989, 3-4). In July 1989, FPM operatives threw a grenade into a nightclub in La Ceiba, injuring seven U.S. soldiers (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998). FPM claimed responsibility for an attack in

which snipers injured seven U.S. military personnel on a bus in March 1990 (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998).

Geography

FPM operated in Honduras (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999; US State Department 1989, 3). The group has conducted attacks in Tegucigalpa, La Ceiba, and Yoro Province (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999; US State Department 1989, 3).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the group's leadership.

FPM had a wing called Jacobo Carcomo Command (US State Department 1989, 3-4). According to local police, Jacobo Carcomo Command was responsible for FPM's attack against a convoy of American and Honduran soldiers in Yoro Province (US State Department 1989, 3-4).

No official estimates of the group's membership size exist (Federation of American Scientists 1998). One source states that the group's membership size was "probably relatively small" (Federation of American Scientists 1998).

FPM was funded by the former government of Nicaragua (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998). Honduran authorities suspected that Cuba funded the group as well (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999).

External Ties

FPM had ties to the government of Nicaragua (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998). The group allegedly had ties to Cuba (MIPT 2008; Federation of American Scientists 1998; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). FPM may have had ties to the Honduran Communist Party (MIPT 2008). The group may have had ties to Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (MIPT 2008). One source describes the Sandinistas as an ally of FPM (MIPT 2008). Nevertheless, the relationship between FPM and the Sandinistas is largely unknown. FPM could have also had ties to Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement and Revolutionary United Front Movement (MIPT 2008). Nothing is known about potential ties between FPM and the two aforementioned leftist groups.

Group Outcome

FPM conducted its last known attack in April 1995 when it detonated an explosive near American, Spanish, and German press agencies in Tegucigalpa (MIPT 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). The group stopped its activities in the mid-1990s (MIPT 2008). FPM is no longer active (MIPT 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999).

Notes for Iris:
-what separates this group from FMLH? Both were leftist, but FMLH tried to create a communist regime and FPM mainly opposed the US government (and military service members)
-both opposed the government and operated in different time periods
-FPM outcome is disappearance while FMLH is transition to political party. No evidence that FPM achieved their outcome
-Morazanist refers to (1) two regions in Honduras and (2) Francisco Morazan, a martyr with great military skills who was the “president” of the federal republic of central america (1823-1841)
-there’s a strong likelihood that they both took their names from the same martyr but are otherwise distinguishable

VIII. 9 MAY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FORCE
Torg ID: 1591
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2331. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2331

Note: I found nearly no information about this group.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases found

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 1989 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

9 May People's Liberation Force conducted its only four recognized attacks on July 20, 1989 (GTD 2018). The group conducted four simultaneous attacks: one in La Ceiba and three in Tegucigalpa (GTD 2018). The group attacked the branches of the University of Honduras in La Ceiba and Tegucigalpa, as well as a teacher training facility and Parque Central Tegucigalpa, a park in Tegucigalpa (GTD 2018). There were no casualties in the attacks at either branch of the University of Honduras or at the teacher training facility (GTD 2018). One person was injured at the attack at Parque Central Tegucigalpa (GTD 2018). The attacks were likely bombings or explosions (GTD 2018). Nothing is known about the group's goals or ideology.

Geography

9 May People's Liberation Force operated in Honduras (GTD 2018). The group conducted attacks on three locations in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, and one location in La Ceiba, a northern coastal city (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure, leadership, membership, or source of funding. It is speculation that since the group only conducted four attacks, all on the same day, before fading away, it was probably small (GTD 2018).

External Ties

Nothing is known about the group's ties to other actors.

Group Outcome

Nothing is known about the state's response to the group. 9 May People's Liberation Force conducted its only four recognized attacks on July 20, 1989 (GTD 2018). The group did not conduct any more attacks after that date.

IX. ANTI COMMUNIST ACTION ALLIANCE
Torg ID: 1615
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2325. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2325
- Phil Gunson, Greg Chamberlain, and Andrew Thompson. “Anti-Communist Action Alliance.” Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of Central America and the Caribbean. Routledge. 2015. https://books.google.com/books?id=tEJACwAAQBAJ&pg=PT99&lpg=PT99&dq=honduras+%22anti-communist+action+alliance%22&source=bl&ots=IaeFLbYJ4-&sig=ACfU3U0qo9bSeRgPcIJYlh-d3lyT7zjm5g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjV-pKl-aLiAhVNpZ4KHaRZCbkQ6AEwCXoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=honduras%20%22anti-communist%20action%20alliance%22&f=false
- Richard Boudreaux. “Honduras in Turmoil: The Puzzling Life, Death of Gen. Alvarez.” Los Angeles Times. 1989. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-02-25-mn-207-story.html
- Lindsey Gruson. “Political Violence Sweeping Once-Quiet Honduras.” New York Times. 1989. https://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/27/world/political-violence-sweeping-once-quiet-honduras.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: AAA, Anti-Communist Action Alliance, Alianza de Acción Anticomunista

Group Formation: 1989 (violent), 1988 or 1989 (form)

Group End: 1989 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Anti-Communist Action Alliance conducted its only recognized attack on January 31, 1989, when three group assailants attacked Custudio Laboratory in Tegucigalpa (GTD 2018). The group may have operated as early as 1988 or early 1989 (Gunson, Chamberlain, and Thompson 2015). AAA is a right-wing, paramilitary group (New York Times 1989). The group opposes communism (Gunson, Chamberlain, and Thompson 2015; Los Angeles Times 1989; New York Times 1989). The group denounced leftist politicians and human rights groups for serving as “puppets” of Nicaragua’s Marxist government (New York Times 1989). AAA created death lists and threatened leftist political leaders (Los Angeles Times 1989).

Geography

AAA conducted its only attack in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

AAA was a secretive group and purposely operated clandestinely (Los Angeles Times 1989). As such, nothing is known about the group's organizational structure, leadership, membership, or source of funding. The group was likely very small because it only conducted one attack (GTD 2018).

External Ties

Nothing is known for certain about the group's ties to other actors. AAA may have been affiliated with Álvarez Martínez, the anti-communist leader of Honduras's armed forces (Los Angeles Times 1989).

Group Outcome

AAA conducted only one attack (GTD 2018). After its attack on January 31, 1989, the group did not conduct any more violent attacks (GTD 2018). Nothing is known about why the group stopped using violence. It is likely that the state did not respond to the group. If AAA was indeed affiliated with Álvarez Martínez, the powerful leader of Honduras's armed forces, it is likely that the Honduran government, often described as "little more than a figurehead for the army," would not respond to the group's actions (New York Times 1989).

X. REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT MOVEMENT
Torg ID: 439
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

Aliases: RUFM, Revolutionary United Front Movement, Frente Unido Revolucionario Movimiento

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Revolutionary United Front Movement." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4248. MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DAKoEzO9V8oOvn53Je8DzFmxFbTli-zNrkGaoEX8Ndw/edit

- GTD Perpetrator 100030. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=100030
- GTD Perpetrator 2332. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2332

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: United Revolutionary Front (Honduras)

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 1989 (Revolutionary United Front Movement)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The only attack attributed to Revolutionary United Front Movement occurred on February 18, 1989, when the group detonated an explosive on a bus carrying 28 U.S. soldiers in Comayagua (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018). Five people were injured (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018). RUFM was a leftist group (MIPT 2008). One source classifies RUFM as part of the "pattern of small-scale anti-American terrorism" in 1980s and 1990s Honduras (MIPT 2008).

Frente Revolucionario Unido is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement. RUFM likely adopted Frente Revolucionario Unido as an alias after its first attack. Frente Revolucionario Unido conducted two attacks in Honduras in February 1989 (GTD 2018).

Geography

The only attack attributed to Revolutionary United Front Movement occurred in Comayagua, Honduras (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018). Frente Revolucionario Unido conducted two attacks in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure, leadership, or source of funding. The membership size of RUFM was almost certainly very small (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

Frente Revolucionario Unido is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement. RUFM likely adopted Frente Revolucionario Unido as an alias after its first attack.

RUFM had similar ideologies and goals as Morazanist Patriotic Front, or FPM, and Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement (MIPT 2008). RUFM and the other aforementioned leftist Honduras-based group opposed U.S. presence in the region and attacked U.S. military personnel (MIPT 2008). One source indicates that RUFM could have been a front for FPM or another group (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

Only one attack was attributed to Revolutionary United Front Movement (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018). That attack occurred on February 18, 1989 (MIPT 2008; GTD 2018). The frequency of Anti-American attacks in Honduras decreased beginning in 1990 after the Sandinistas lost political power and the Contras returned to Nicaragua (MIPT 2008). Members of RUFM may have joined other groups in Honduras or perhaps elsewhere in Central America like Nicaragua (MIPT 2008).

Frente Revolucionario Unido conducted two more attacks in February 1989 (GTD 2018).

Note for Iris:
-there is duplicate entry for United Revolutionary Front in India and Honduras. Need to split.

XI. FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO UNIDO
Torg ID: 520
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

Aliases: United Revolutionary Front, Frente Revolucionario Unido, The United Revolutionary Front

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2332. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2332

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement.

Group Formation: This is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement.

Group End: This is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement.

Geography

This is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement.

External Ties

This is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the Revolutionary United Front Movement.

XII. EJ_RCITO DE RESISTENCIA PATRI¢TICA
Torg ID: 1444
Min. Group Date: 1990
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: Patriotic Resistance Army (Erp), Ej_Rcito De Resistencia Patri¢Tica

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Ejercito de Resistencia Patriotica." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4248. MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DAKoEzO9V8oOvn53Je8DzFmxFbTli-zNrkGaoEX8Ndw/edit
- GTD Perpetrator 2011. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2011

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases found

Group Formation: 1990

Group End: 1990 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed. Ejército de Resistencia Patriótica conducted its only recognized attack on March 15, 1990, when it detonated a bomb in a walkway of a shopping center in Tegucigalpa (GTD 2018; MIPT 2008). Three people were injured, one of whom was an American (MIPT 2008). It is unclear whether the American was specifically targeted (MIPT 2008). It is unclear what ERP's political aims were (MIPT 2008). The group may have been leftist (MIPT 2008). The group may have been opposed to American presence and influence in the country (MIPT 2008). The group may have also opposed the United States's support of the Contras (MIPT 2008). None of the claims in the previous three sentences have been substantiated by other sources.

Geography

ERP operated in Honduras (GTD 2018; MIPT 2008). The group conducted its only recognized attack at a shopping center in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras (GTD 2018; MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure, leadership, membership, or source of funding. The group's membership size is unknown (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

Nothing is known about the group's ties to other actors. Nothing is known about the group's political affiliations (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

ERP conducted its only recognized attack on March 15, 1990 (GTD 2018; MIPT 2008). After this attack, ERP did not conduct any more attacks (GTD 2018). Nothing is known

about the state's response to the group, if any. Nothing is known about why the group stopped using violence.

XIII. ELEMENTS POLICE COBRA SQUADRON
Torg ID: 1697
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 1991
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2029. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2029

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: No additional aliases found

Group Formation: 1991

Group End: 1991 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Elements Police Cobra Squadron conducted its only recognized attack on March 9, 1991, when two armed assailants who were allegedly part of the group attacked Copacabana Night Club in Tegucigalpa (GTD 2018). Four people died, and nine people were injured (GTD 2018).

Geography

Elements Police Cobra Squadron conducted its only recognized attack in Copacabana Night Club in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras (GTD 2018).

Organizational Structure

Nothing is known about the group's organizational structure, leadership, membership, or source of funding. The membership size of Elements Police Cobra Squadron was likely very small as it only conducted one attack (GTD 2018).

External Ties

Nothing is known about the group's ties to other actors.

Group Outcome

Elements Police Cobra Squadron conducted its only recognized attack on March 9, 1991 (GTD 2018). The group did not conduct any attacks after that. Nothing is known about the state's response to the group, if any. It is unclear why the group stopped using violence.

XIV. LOS JUSTICIEROS DE LA NOCHE
Torg ID: 332
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Night Avengers, Los Justicieros De La Noche, The Avengers

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Night Avengers." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3650. MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DAKoEzO9V8oOvn53Je8DzFmxFbTli-zNrkGaoEX8Ndw/edit
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Honduras: The current activities of death squads, including what segments of the population they are targeting, under whose instructions are they believed to be acting, the measures being undertaken by the Honduran authorities to control their activities, whether there are avenues of protection available to persons threatened by death squads and whether there are reports of death squad activity in the municipality of El Porvenir against persons fighting for better municipal services (1993 to present), 1 October 1998, HND30322.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac137e.html
- Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1999 - Honduras, 1 January 1999, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa092c.html
- United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Honduras: Update on Human Rights Conditions, 1 September 2000, [PS/HND/00.001], available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3de8d7a64.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Justicieros de la Noche, Vigilantes of the Night, Avengers of the Night

Group Formation: 1997 (form), 1998 (violent)

Group End: 1998 (arrests and trials)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Los Justicieros de la Noche was a right-wing, conservative death squad which reportedly first came to attention in December 1997 in Honduras when it began issuing death threats (MIPT 2008; Amnesty International 1999). The group denounced human rights and human rights groups for providing cover for individuals who they considered criminals (MIPT 2008; Amnesty International 1999). Accordingly, Los Justicieros de la Noche issued death threats against 75 leftist politicians and human rights advocates (MIPT 2008; Amnesty International 1999). The group conducted its only recognized attack in Santa Rosa de Copán in February 1998, when group operatives fatally shot human rights advocate Ernesto Sandoval Bustillo, the regional coordinator of the Comité de Defensa de Derechos Humanos en Honduras (CODEH) [English: Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in Honduras] (MIPT 2008; Amnesty International 1999; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1998; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000). Some sources indicate that in addition to the group's enmity with human rights groups and advocates, the attack may have been motivated by Ernesto Sandoval Bustillo's investigation into the murder of another human rights activist named Cándido Amador Recinos and investigations into human rights violations by Honduran security forces (MIPT 2008; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000).

Geography

Los Justicieros de la Noche operated in Honduras (MIPT 2008; Amnesty International 1999; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1998). The group conducted its only recognized attack in Santa Rosa de Copán (Amnesty International 1999; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000). Santa Rosa de Copán is located in the western part of Honduras (United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000). It is the capital of the Copán province (United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000). More specifically, the assailants shot Ernesto Sandoval Bustillo as he was entering the office of the Comité de Defensa de Derechos Humanos en Honduras (CODEH) [English: Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in Honduras] (Amnesty International 1999; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000).

Organizational Structure

Honduran media sources claimed that the leader of Los Justicieros de la Noche could have been a former agent of a Honduran security organization like Dirección Nacional de Investigación (DNI) [English: National Investigation Department] (MIPT 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1998). According to the group itself, the membership size of Los Justicieros de la Noche was “five active and armed members” (MIPT 2008). Other sources indicate that the group may have had as many as six or seven members (Amnesty International 1999; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000). Nothing is known about the group’s source of funding.

External Ties

Los Justicieros de la Noche could have had ties with Honduran security forces or military personnel (MIPT 2008; Amnesty International 1999; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1998). For example, Honduran media sources alleged that the leader of Los Justicieros de la Noche could have been affiliated with Dirección Nacional de Investigación (DNI) [English: National Investigation Department] (MIPT 2008; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1998). Moreover, one potential motive behind the murder of Ernesto Sandoval Bustillo may have been due to his investigation of human rights violations by Honduran security forces (MIPT 2008; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000). For these reasons, it is likely that the group was affiliated with Honduran security forces.

Group Outcome

Los Justicieros de la Noche conducted its only recognized attack in February 1998 (MIPT 2008; Amnesty International 1999; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1998; United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2000). The group did not use violence after this attack. Due to the murder of Ernesto Sandoval Bustillo and the emergence of death squads like Los Justicieros de la Noche in Honduras, the Dirección de Investigación Criminal (DIC) [English: Directorate of Criminal Investigation] launched an investigation (Amnesty International 1999). Three days after the group fatally shot Ernesto Sandoval Bustillo, there was a shootout between police and seven suspected members of Los Justicieros de la Noche (Amnesty International 1999). One suspect died in the shootout; the other six were arrested and detained (Amnesty International 1999). Ten days after their arrest, the six suspects were released because the police did not have concrete evidence to link them to the murder or any other criminal activity (Amnesty International 1999). However, police eventually uncovered evidence that linked a weapon that was in possession of the group’s leader to the weapon used to shoot Ernesto Sandoval Bustillo (Amnesty International 1999). This was sufficient for an arrest warrant (Amnesty International 1999). The suspects were held in custody until their trial in late 1998 (Amnesty International 1999). The result of the trial is unclear. The group is no longer active (MIPT 2008).

Notes for Iris:
-initial motivation for formation might have been human rights investigation into Cándido Amador Recinos. Recinos was an indigenous environmental activist who demanded the return of tribal lands from the government and the land-owning elite. Recinos had been threatened and died under suspicious circumstances.
-the group formed when it killed the investigator who had been trying to determine who had killed Recinos. The group had opposed environmental/land reform efforts
-the group's political aims were to denigrate and send a signal that they opposed different human rights campaigns. Believed the HR campaigns were "criminal" but no publicly-disclosed evidence why they opposed
-there's no evidence that they oppose the Honduran government. The Honduran military also opposed these HR campaigns.

XV. CARTEL DE SINALOA
Torg ID: 2070
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: Sinaloa Cartel, Cartel De Sinaloa, Cartel De Sinaloa

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Sinaloa Cartel Profile." Insight Crime. N.d. https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/
- Actor ID 775. Uppsala Conflict Data. Last modified 2017. http://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/775
- Patrick Keefe. "Cocaine Incorporated." New York Times Magazine. 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-billions.html
- Seth Harp. "Behind the Scenes of Mexico's Sinaloa Cartel." Rolling Stone. 2017. https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/behind-the-scenes-of-mexicos-sinaloa-cartel-w475345
- "Sinaloa Cartel Cell Convicted." Justice. US Attorney Office. 2018. https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/sinaloa-cartel-cell-leader-convicted
- Darren Foster. "The Sinaloa Cartel is Alive and Thriving without El Chapo." VICE News. 2017. https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/8xmzax/the-sinaloa-cartel-is-alive-and-thriving-without-el-chapo
- David Agren. "Mexico Captures Sinaloa Cartel Boss Who Launched Power Bid after El Chapo arrest." Guardian. 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/02/mexico-captures-sinaloa-cartel-leader-el-chapo
- Paul Wood. "Inside Mexico's Feared Sinaloa Drug Cartel." BBC. 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27427123

Part 2. Basic Coding
Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 2018 (Still Intact and active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group reportedly formed in 1989 under the leadership of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman although its origins are slightly unclear (Keefe 2012; Uppsala Conflict n.d.). The group is often referred to as Mexico’s largest and most powerful drug cartel (Insight Crime n.d.). The group is currently fighting for smuggling routes and control over territory (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017).

The group was founded by a man named Joaquin Guzman-Loera, also known as “El Chapo” (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). He originally started off as an air logistics expert for a group known as the Tijuana Cartel, but he then broke away and started the Sinaloa Cartel (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group reportedly sells cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine (New York Times Magazine 2012). The group reportedly protects the people living in Sinaloa (BBC 2014). It has no political aim.

Geography
The group is based in the Mexican state of Sinaloa (Insight Crime n.d.; New York Times Magazine 2012). It exercises control over a large portion of the Pacific coast (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group has fought another group known as the Gulf Cartel in states such as Guerrero, Nuevo Laredo, Michoacan, and Jalisco (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group has also battled the Juarez Cartel in cities such as Juarez and in the Chihuahua State (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group took control of Juarez in 2010 (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group also reportedly gained territory in the Baja California State (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group was founded by a man named Joaquin Guzman-Loera, also known as “El Chapo” (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017; Insight Crime n.d.). He originally started off as an air logistics expert for a group known as the Tijuana Cartel, but he then broke away and started the Sinaloa Cartel (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The group reportedly at one point or another consisted of various small cartels known as Milenio organization, Los Negros, Los Pelones, and Ismael Zambada, and the Juan Jose Esparragoza

organization (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017). The dominant group is still the Guzman-Loera group (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017).

The number of hitmen in the group reportedly ranges between 150-15,000, but the real number of people in the group is reportedly 15,000 (Harp 2017). A man named Damaso Lopez-Serrano, known as “Mini Lic” was reportedly a leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, but he pleaded guilty and is now in prison (US Attorney Office 2018). Another former leader of the group, Damaso Lopez, was also arrested by Mexican police officers (Guardian 2017).

External Ties

The group makes payoffs to the federal police and military in order to avoid arrests (Insight Crime n.d.; New York Times Magazine 2012). The group reportedly had ties with groups such as the Gulf Cartel (from May 2007-May 2008) and the Juarez Cartel (ended in 2007). The group also had ties with Jalisco Cartel New Generation, La Barredora, and Los Caballeros (Uppsala Conflict Data 2017).

Group Outcome

The group makes payoffs to the federal police and military in order to avoid arrests (Insight Crime n.d.; New York Times Magazine 2012).

El Chapo was arrested multiple times, but he escaped from prison for the first time in 2001, and again in 2015 (Guardian 2017; Insight Crime n.d.). He was finally caught and arrested in 2016 (Guardian 2017; Insight Crime n.d.). However, the group remains powerful and active despite his arrest (BBC 2014).

A man named Damaso Lopez-Serrano, known as “Mini Lic” was reportedly a leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, but he pleaded guilty and is now in prison (US Attorney Office 2018). This act was reportedly a huge blow to the leadership of the group (US Attorney Office 2018). The Mexican government has reportedly declared war on the drug cartels in the country (VICE 2017). However, despite this, the group still remains powerful and intact (VICE 2017).

Notes for Iris:
-Chapo was originally a member of the Tijuana Cartel and splintered away (for unspecified reasons)
-Chapo gets arrested a couple times but doesn’t affect the strength of the group. It’s still considered the strongest.
-it has a huge network with wildly varying ranges
-this group is one of the strongest and effective cartels - leadership is very strong, organized, controlling → key to strength?

XVI. GULF CARTEL
Torg ID: 2386
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: Gulf Cartel, Cartel Del Golfo (Cdg), Golfos

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 30031. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30031
- "Gulf Cartel." InsightCrime. 2017. https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/gulf-cartel-profile/
- Actor ID 782. Uppsala Armed Conflict Data. Last modified 2017. http://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/782
- Christopher Woody. "The breakdown of one of Mexico's most powerful cartels is driving violence in a valuable border city." Business Insider. 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/breakdown-of-gulf-cartel-is-driving-violence-in-reynosa-mexico-2017-11
- "The Gulf Cartel." Drug Cartels. Frontline. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mexico/etc/gulf.html
- Gustavo Castillo Garcia and Armando Torres Barbosa. "The History of the Gulf Cartel." La Jornada. 2003. http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2003/03/15/046n1soc.php?origen=soc-jus.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1984

Group End: 2017 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group has its origins in the 1970s, originally headed by a man named Juan Nepomuceno Guerra who smuggled alcohol in addition to marijuana and cocaine into the United States (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Garcia and Barbosa 2003).

In 1984, Juan Garcia Abrego took control of a drug trafficking business that originally belonged to his uncle and formally established the Gulf Cartel (Insight Crime 2017). He went on to run a marijuana and heroin operation that was relatively small (Insight Crime 2017). Abrego went on to reportedly form a deal with a Columbian group known as Cali Cartel that attempts to search for ways to enter to the United State's market after their Caribbean routes were attacked by the law enforcement of the United States (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Frontline; Garcia and Barbosa 2003). Abrego took on the role of taking care of shipments of cocaine through the border between Mexico and the United States; he took on the entirety of risks as well as half of the profits (Insight Crime 2017).

The group is one of the oldest and largest drug cartels in Mexico (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017). The group is also reportedly fighting another group known as the Sinaloa Cartel for control over territory (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017). It is unknown precisely when the group had its first attack.

Geography

The group launched an attack in the city of Morelia, Mexico (GTD 2017). The group is reportedly based in a state known as Tamaulipas, and its most crucial bases being located in Reynosa, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Ciudad Victoria (Insight Crime 2017; Business Insider 2017). Another crucial base for the group is a city known as Monterrey (Insight Crime 2017).

The group is also reportedly trying to establish itself in cities known as Morelia in Michoacan and Miguel Aleman in addition to the Yucatan peninsula (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017). The group has reportedly shipped products across the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017).

The group has shipped its products in the United States in places such as Texas, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York (Business Insider 2017). The group also reportedly operates in Nuevo Leon, Veracruz, Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Jalisco, Zatecas, Chiapas, and the Federal District (La Jornada 2003).

The group does not conduct any transnational attacks in the United States.

Organizational Structure

The group's origins date back to the 1970s when Juan Nepomuceno Guerra began smuggling alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine into the United States (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Garcia and Barbosa 2003).

In 1984, Juan Garcia Abrego took over the group and formally established the Gulf Cartel (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Frontline; Garcia and Barbosa 2003). A man named Cardenas took on the leadership role afterwards followed by Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez, Antonio Cardenas Guillen, and then Mario Ramirez Trevino (InsightCrime 2017). Loisa Salinas was reportedly a leader of several factions of the drug cartel (Business Insider 2017). The group reportedly has approximately 1000 members (Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017).

External Ties

The group reportedly had ties with a group known as Familia Michoacana; the alliance was reportedly formed to combat the Zetas, a common rival of the two groups (Insight Crime 2017). The group was also formerly allied to groups known as the Tijuana Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel (Insight Crime 2017). The group has reportedly splintered into smaller groups throughout the years (Business Insider 2017).

Group Outcome

The group has reportedly been able to push the Zetas out of some areas, but the Zetas are reportedly holding on tightly to their territory (Insight Crime 2017). One of the group's former leaders, Juan Garcia Abrego, was captured and brought to the United States on criminal charges (Insight Crime 2017; Uppsala Armed Conflict Data 2017; Frontline; Garcia and Barbosa 2003). The group is reportedly still intact and active as late as 2017 (Insight Crime 2017; UCDP 2017) .

XVII. MARA 18 (HONDURAS)
Torg ID: 2608
Min. Group Date: 2010
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: Mara 18 (Honduras), Mara-18 (Honduras)

Part 1. Bibliography

- UCDP Actor 1099. Uppsala Conflict Database. https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1099
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Honduras: The recruitment of Mara Salvatrucha (MS) and 18th Street (Calle 18 or Mara 18) gang members; whether

individuals are forced to participate in gang activity (2007-December 2011), 24 January 2012, HND103938.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f4f2eeb2.html
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Honduras: The presence and activities of the gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS) and Mara 18 in Honduras, including their structure, the role of women, and the effectiveness of anti-Mara government measures (2007-January 2010), 28 January 2010, HND103349.FE, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b8631d919.html
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Honduras: Areas of operation of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Mara 18 (M-18) (also known as the 18th Street gang) in Honduras; domestic and transnational networks; nature of any alliances and whether the maras dispute territory; violence perpetrated by gang members against other gang members (2009-December 2011), 3 February 2012, HND103940.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f4f301c2.html
- "Barrio 18." InSight Crime. 11 March 2019. https://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/barrio-18-profile/
- "Hundreds flee in Honduras due to gang violence between Barrio 18 and MS 13, with no end in sight." South China Morning Post. 2017. https://www.scmp.com/news/world/americas/article/2094459/hundreds-flee-honduras-due-gang-violence-between-barrio-18-and

*focus on gang components in and around Honduras

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: M-18, Mara Dieciocho, 18th Street, 18th Street Gang, Calle 18, Barrio 18, MS-18

Group Formation: 1960s (form in LA as criminal gang), 1990s (form/emerge in Honduras), 1999 (violent)

Group End: 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Mara 18 was formed primarily by Hispanic immigrants as the 18th Street Gang in Los Angeles, California, United States (UCDP n.d.). Due to its decentralized nature in the United States, the exact time of the gang's formation is disputed. M-18 probably formed in Los Angeles in the 1960s (UCDP n.d.). Not much specific information is known about the group's activities in Los Angeles. The group likely participated in the same types of violent and nonviolent activities that it did in Central America as described later in this paragraph. More notably, the 18th Street Gang participated in riots to show their

indignation and resentment with the decision to acquit the police who brutally beat Rodney King, an African-American motorist (InSight Crime 2019). The group's presence in the United States diminished in the mid to late 1990s and spread to other countries (UCDP n.d.). In the 1990s, some gang members returned to Central America and set up M-18 cells in countries including Honduras (UCDP n.d.; InSight Crime 2019). Mara 18 (Honduras) refers to the Central American gang Mara 18 in Honduras (UCDP n.d.; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; InSight Crime 2019; South China Morning Post 2017). M-18 conducts violent attacks, fights with other gangs like MS-13, participates in organized crime schemes, conducts robberies, uses extortion, and engages in drug trafficking (UCDP n.d.; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; InSight Crime 2019; South China Morning Post 2017).

Geography

M-18 operates in Honduras (UCDP n.d.; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; InSight Crime 2019; South China Morning Post 2017). The gang operates in San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, Santa Rosa de Copán, and Tela (UCDP n.d.).

M-18 mainly operates in urban areas (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). For example, in Honduras, the gang operates in the urban slums of San Pedro Sula like Los Bordos, Chamelecón, Choloma, El Roble, Villanueva and Cofradía and of Tegucigalpa (Immigration and Refugee Board 2012; South China Morning Post 2017). Nevertheless, M-18 also operates in rural areas where it is easier to evade authorities and gain control of regions (Immigration and Refugee Board 2012).

M-18 also has cells elsewhere in Central America including El Salvador and Guatemala (UCDP n.d.; InSight Crime 2019). The gang operates in Mexico (UCDP n.d.; InSight Crime 2019). Other mara gangs operate in Nicaragua and Costa Rica (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010). It is unclear whether there are M-18 cells in Nicaragua or Costa Rica.

M-18 was formed as the 18th Street Gang in Los Angeles (UCDP n.d.; InSight Crime 2019). The gang was active in the southern part of California, a western state in the United States (UCDP n.d.). For example, the gang had a significant presence in Los Angeles neighborhoods like MacArthur Park and Koreatown (UCDP n.d.). M-18 may have a presence in twenty states in the United States (InSight Crime 2019). For example, the gang may have a presence in Colorado in addition to California (InSight Crime 2019). M-18 may have one or more cells in Canada (InSight Crime 2019).

The gang may have had a presence in Italy and elsewhere in Europe in the 2000s (InSight Crime 2019).

Organizational Structure

M-18 does not have an overall leader (UCDP n.d.). The gang consists of cells called "cliques" (UCDP n.d.; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; InSight Crime 2019). Each clique generally consists of between fifteen and thirty members (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). Cliques are "highly hierarchical" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). The leader of the clique is called the primera palabra [English: first word] (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). The primera palabra is the de facto leader of each clique (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). The primera palabra of a clique consults with its segunda palabra [English: second word] (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). The segunda palabra effectively functions as an "executive officer" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). Each clique is relatively autonomous (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012).

The gang has approximately 70,000 members (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010). M-18 was formed by Hispanic immigrants from Mexico and Central America (UCDP n.d.). Originally, M-18 was formed in Los Angeles as the 18th Street Gang (UCDP n.d.). As such, the original members of M-18 were members of the 18th Street Gang. Many of the gang's members are youth (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). Many children join gangs like M-18 due to dire socioeconomic situations, family disintegration, poverty, and societal disenfranchisement (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). In addition to benefiting from dire conditions in Central America, M-18 also has been known to use forced recruitment (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). About three in four new gang members were fifteen years old or younger (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). 98% of gang members in Honduras were between 12 and 25 years-of-age (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). M-18 has recruited children as young as eight or nine years old (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). Women occupy about 22% of the membership size of mara gangs like M-18 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010).

External Ties

Honduran M-18 cells were undoubtedly affiliated with M-18 cells in other countries.

M-18 may have been affiliated with the Mexican Mafia (InSight Crime 2019). Some M-18 members joined the Mexican Mafia (InSight Crime 2019).

Mara 18 and Mara Salvatrucha 13 were fierce rivals (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; InSight Crime 2019; South China Morning Post 2017). M-18 and MS-13

have conducted a large number of violent attacks against each other and have fought each other for control of various areas in Central America (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012; InSight Crime 2019; South China Morning Post 2017).

Group Outcome

Government and police forces have been “ineffective at deterring crime” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010). M-18 is “heavily armed” and can successfully combat local police (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010). Additionally, M-18 controls many urban and rural areas and has a large membership size in multiple countries. Not much is known about the Honduran government’s response to M-18. Anti-gang measures have caused M-18 to alter their behavior to avoid being caught (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010). For example, gang members have covered up their tattoos, have begun to wear normal attire, and have ceased using gang hand signals (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010). M-18 is still active in Honduras and elsewhere.

Notes for Iris:
-there is disputed evidence about group’s exact formations, but they originated as a street gang in Los Angeles in the 1950s or 1960s
-they operated in LA as a street gang for a long time until at least 1990s. Eventually, some of them go back to Central America where they set up different cells
-they first emerge in Honduras in the 1990s and then they later turn violent in Honduras in 1999 (they had been violent in the US prior to)
-there’s no evidence of coherent ideology or political aims driving their action
-there’s no evidence of politicized opposition against the Honduran government

<u>Country-Level Trends:</u>
-lot of leftist, Marxist groups which form in partial response to the Sandinista conflict/Nicaraguan civil war
-some groups form in opposition to the US presence (US upped their military intervention in 1980s in Central America due to covert support for Contras)
-later wave of anti-communist, right-wing backlash which forms in the 1990s. Some of them have ties or tacit support from the Honduran military
-more recent violence has been decentralized, criminal violence (although M-18 might be more centralized than MS-13)
-a lot of groups are just one hit wonders or disappear quickly after formation (might be small but there’s no explicit evidence on membership sizes)