Colombia Cases Part 1: 1964-1977
Last Updated: 22 June 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T412	REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC)	1964	1964	2012
T318	NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (COLOMBIA)	1966	1964	2012
T380	POPULAR LIBERATION ARMY (EPL)	1984	1967	2011
T662	RED BANNER		1969	1996
T80	FUERZAS ARMADAS DE RESISTENCIA NACIONAL (FARN)		1975	1979
T199	GUERRILLA ARMY OF THE POOR (EGP)		1975	1994
T1178	MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA		1975	1975
T121	CHE GUEVARA BRIGADE		1976	1990
T69	APRIL 19 MOVEMENT (M-19)	1978	1976	1997
T365	PEDRO LEÓN ARBOLEDA (PLA)		1977	1980
T1346	WORKER'S SELF-DEFENSE MOVEMENT (MAO)		1978	1981
T457	SHINING PATH		1978	2012
T977	ALFARO VIVE		1983	1991
T773	NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC FORCE		1983	1987
T500	TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)		1983	1997
T1689	DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE (ARDE)		1983	1991
T581	RICARDO FRANCO FRONT (DISSIDENT FARC)		1984	1988
T596	QUINTIN LAME		1985	1989
T460	SIMON BOLIVAR NATIONAL GUERRILLA		1986	2003

	COORDINATING BOARD (CNG)			
T1026	BANDERA NEGRA		1986	1987
T1611	AMERICA BATTALION		1986	1988
T1740	INSURGENCY COMMUNE		1987	1987
T1786	LATIN AMERICAN ANTI-FASCIST COMMAND		1987	1987
T487	LOS EXTRADITABLES		1987	1999
T1678	COMUNEROS		1987	1987
T1843	NATIONAL SOCIALIST CIVIC WORKER'S MOVEMENT		1988	1988
T1768	JORGE ELIECER GAITAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT		1988	1989
T1686	DEATH TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS		1988	1988
T235	JAIME BATEMAN CAYON GROUP (JBC)		1989	1999
T1685	DEATH TO BAZUQUEROS		1989	1990
T1659	CALI NARCOTICS CARTEL		1989	1991
T1946	WORKER'S FORCES OF LIBERATION		1989	1989
T1665	CLEANSING HAND (LA MANO QUE LIMPIA)		1990	1990
T1666	COLOMBIAN REVOLUTION		1990	1990
T454	LAS AUTODEFENSAS CAMPESINAS DE CORDOBA Y URAB (ACCU)		1990	1998
T1176	MEDELLIN DRUG CARTEL		1991	1992
T1878	POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDOS		1991	1991
T1791	LIBARDO MORATORO FRONT		1992	1992
T1667	COMANDO INDEPENDIENTE REVOLUCIONARIO		1992	1992
T200	EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO GUEVARISTA (ERG)		1993	2000
T371	PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP)		1997	2005

T521	COLOMBIAN UNITED SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS (AUC)		1997	2009
T630	CASANARE SELF-DEFENSE GROUP		1998	0
T2323	HUMAN RIGHTS RENEWAL MOVEMENT (RENOVACION POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS)		1999	1999
T2288	COLOMBIAN PATRIOTIC RESISTANCE		1999	1999
T2286	CIVIL ASSOCIATION FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA, ASOCIPAZ		2000	2001
T583	JOSE MARIA MORELOS Y PAVON NATIONAL GUERRILLA COORDINATING GROUP		2000	2000
T268	LATIN AMERICAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (EPLA)		2001	0
T706	BLACK EAGLES		2009	2012
T2682	LOS RASTROJOS (COLOMBIA)		2009	2009
T2498	PARAGUAYAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (EPP)		2010	2012

I. FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA - EJERCITO DEL PUEBLO (FARC-EP)
Min. Group Date: 1964
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 1964

Aliases: Revolutionary Armed Forces Of Colombia (Farc), Armed Revolutionary Forces Of Colombia (Farc), Bolivarian Movement For A New Colombia, Farc, Farc [Armed Revolutionary Forces Of Colombia], Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia - Ejercito Del Pueblo (Farc-Ep), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia (Farc)

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- “Profile: Colombia’s Armed Groups.” BBC. 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950
- GTD EventID 19960706001, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199607060001

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Southern Bloc, Ejército del Pueblo

Group Formation: 1964 (new)

Group End (Outcome): 2017 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The FARC formed in 1964 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party (BBC 2016). Responding to the “La Violencia” period and the Marquetalia Massacre, the group sought to overthrow the central government (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The FARC’s primary grievances were income inequality and perceived discrimination against rural communities by the Colombian government (BBC 2016; Crenshaw 2015). The group follows a Marxist-Leninist ideology (BBC 2016). Its first violent attack occurred in 1964 after the Marquetalia Massacre (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group primarily operates in rural areas in Colombia (BBC 2016). It controls territory in eastern and southern Colombia (BBC 2013). This includes the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Chocó, and Antioquia (InSight Crime n.d.). It originally operated out of their stronghold in Marquetalia, Tolima (InSight Crime n.d.).

The FARC is a transnational group and has a presence in Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, and Panama (Crenshaw 2015). It receives sanctuary in Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador (Global Security n.d.). FARC perpetrated one attack in Iquitos, Peru in 1996 (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

Manuel Marulanda and Jacob Arenas founded FARC in 1964 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party. In 2016, Rodrigo Londono Echeverri led the group. The FARC recruits farmers, peasants, and other "land workers" as fighters. Recruits include both men and women. There are disputed reports about whether it recruits members forcibly (BBC 2016). Approximately 20-30% of FARC members are minors when they join (Mackenzie Institute 2015). When it started in 1964, the group had approximately 50 members, but this figure quickly grew (Crenshaw 2015; InSight Crime n.d.). The group had approximately 18,000 fighters in 1999; 20,000 fighters in 2002; and 6,000-7,000 fighters in 2016 (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016). Furthermore, FARC relies on a large cadre of civilian support which numbers or possibly outnumbers the total active fighters it has (BBC 2016).

The group has a political wing known as the Patriotic Union, which it created in 1985 to participate in legislative elections (Crenshaw 2015). The political wing fell apart due to a series of high-profile assassinations and kidnappings of UP members during the 1980s and early 1990s (Crenshaw 2015). The group is organized regionally into small platoon-like divisions, which are organized into regional brigades (BBC 2016). The group has a very hierarchical structure (InSight Crime n.d.). There is a leadership council composed of a dozen individuals known as the High Command or Secretariat group (Mackenzie Institute 2015; BBC 2016). One senior military commander is Jorge Briceno (Global Security n.d.).

The group primarily funds itself through extortion, drug trafficking, and kidnapping (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016). One report estimates that it collects $150-500 million per year from drug trafficking (InSight Crime n.d; Renwick and Felter 2017; UN n.d.).

External Ties

The group fought against Colombian paramilitary groups, including Death to Kidnappers and the United Self-Defense Force of Colombia (Crenshaw 2015). There are conflicting reports about FARC's relationship with the ELN. Although the FARC fought against ELN from 2005-2009, the FARC cooperated with and received support from the ELN during an unknown time frame (InSight Crime n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2015).

FARC received funding from Cuba and Venezuela (Crenshaw 2015). Chavez was a well-known advocate for FARC and lobbied for it to be recognized as one of the "belligerents," which provides certain international legal protections (Global Security n.d.; Crenshaw 2015).

The FARC has allegedly “been in contact and worked together in the drug trade” with Shining Path in Peru (Crenshaw 2015). The group may also coordinate bomb training techniques with the IRA and Sinn Fein (Global Security n.d.).

The FARC was a member of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board, which was an umbrella group of Marxist groups in Latin America, from 1987 to 1991. Members included ELN, EPL, and M-19 (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

The FARC initially emerged from the Marquetalia Massacre. It engages police, military, and pro-government paramilitary forces (BBC 2016). In 1982, the group and the Colombian government held their first peace talks, which resulted in the Uribe Accords (Crenshaw 2015). The resulting ceasefire fell apart when private Colombian citizens began creating their own right-wing paramilitary groups (Crenshaw 2015).

In 2002, President Alvaro Uribe launched an intense and highly successful counterinsurgency offensive against the FARC (BBC 2013). Although the group remained intact for many years, the death of key leaders and Plan Colombia (the U.S. plan to train and equip Colombian security forces) severely damaged the group’s capacity to fight (BBC 2016). FARC leader Manuel Marulanda died in 2008, and his successor, Alfonso Cano, died soon after in 2011 (BBC 2016). In 2008, Colombian forces also killed Raul Reyes, a military leader and influential member in the Secretariat (Crenshaw 2015).

The demobilization and deaths of many fighters eventually led the FARC to renew peace talks with the Colombian government in 2012 (BBC 2013; BBC 2016). The group signed a formal ceasefire agreement with the Colombian government in June 2016 (Global Security n.d.).

II. NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (COLOMBIA)
Min. Group Date: 1964
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: 1966

Aliases: National Liberation Army Of Colombia (Eln), Ej_rcito De Liberaci_n Nacional, Ejercito De Liberacion Nacional (Eln), National Liberation Army (Colombia), National Liberation Army (Colombia) (Eln)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: January 7, 1965 (Crenshaw 2015)

Group End: 2016 (still active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The National Liberation Army (ELN) formed in July 1964. The brothers Fabio and Manuel Vazquez Castaño initially led the ELN (Crenshaw 2015; Insight Crime 2017). On January 7, 1965, the group conducted its first violent attack when it invaded the Simacota Village in Santander (Insight Crime 2017). The ELN sought to overthrow the Colombian government and establish a government for the people (Mackenzie Institute

2015). Largely inspired by the Cuban Revolution, this center-seeking group adopted revolutionary, Marxist, and leftist ideologies (Soler Madrid, 2010, 37).

Geography

The ELN is mostly active in northeastern Colombia (Renwick and Felter 2017). The ELN claimed responsibility for the bombings in Bogota, Colombia in 2011 (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Crenshaw 2015). While the ELN has conducted most of its attacks in Colombia, the ELN is transnational and has conducted some operations, including a kidnapping, in Venezuela along the Colombian-Venezuelan border (InSight Crime 2017).

Organizational Structure

The ELN originally comprised university students, rural peasants, and Catholic extremists (Soler Madrid 2010, 37; Mackenzie Institute 2015). Two students -- the brothers, Fabio and Manuel Vazquez Castaño -- founded the group (Crenshaw 2015). Che Guevara and the Cuban revolution inspired the group. As a result, the Castro government invited the group to Cuba to train for their Marxist revolution (Uribe 2016).

The group's funding originally came from kidnapping and extortion. Beginning in the 1980s, the group also acquired funding from illegal mining, drug trafficking, and the extortion of oil companies (Uribe 2016).

The Central Command (COCE) of the ELN oversees all of the organization's operations. Under the Central Command is the National Directorate, which comprises 23 members that serve as liaisons between the COCE and the ELN's Fronts (Crenshaw 2015).

Antonio García, the ELN's current leader, joined the group in the 1970s. His areas of responsibility include military strategy and weaponry. He also participated in peace negotiations in 2006 (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Crenshaw 2015).

Initially, the ELN had an estimated 8,000 members. This figure eventually decreased to 5,000 in 1998 (Crenshaw 2015). The current size estimate of the ELN is about 3,000 members (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The National Liberation Army was under an umbrella group named the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board, which included M-19, FARC, and ELN (Crenshaw 2015). The umbrella group disbanded in 1991.

Prior to officially forming the group, a team of students went to Cuba for training (Uribe 2016).

ELN is allied with the group Rastrojos, which is a drug trafficking organization (Insight Crime 2017).

Group Outcome

The National Liberation Army has had three peace negotiations with the Colombian government (Uribe 16). All three proved disastrous. The 1992 talks resulted in no progress and the kidnapping of a foreign minister by the ELN. The 1998 talks halted after the ELN's hijacking of a domestic plane. The 2008 and most recent attempt at peace talks failed when the ELN refused to accept President Uribe's offer to pay the group to stop kidnapping (Uribe 16). The group's last prominent attack occurred on July 3, 2011, when the group set off two bombs in Bogota (Crenshaw 2015). The group, however, remains active and continues to conduct attacks (GTD 2017).

III. POPULAR LIBERATION ARMY (EPL)
Min. Group Date: 1967
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: 1984

Aliases: Popular Liberation Army (Epl), Ej_rcito Popular De Liberaci_n, Ej_rcito Popular De Liberaci_n (Epl), Jose Solano Sepulveda, Libardo Mora Toro, People s Liberation Army, People s Liberation Army (Epl), People's Liberation Army, People's Liberation Army (Epl), Popular Liberation Army

Part 1. Bibliography

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successful in combating EPL initiatives (2002 - February 2003), 14 February 2003, COL40490.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4d791c.html
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: April 1967 (El Tiempo 1994)

Group End: Supposedly disbanded in 1991 due to agreement with Colombian government but a smaller part of the EPL continues to be active and was last noted active in 2015 (Canada IRB 2003; GTD 2017).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) formed in 1967 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party (BBC 2014; Crenshaw 2015). Francisco Carballo, the founder, believed that war and violence were the only way to achieve the group's goals (El Tiempo 1994). The group adhered to Marxist, Maoist, and leftist ideologies (BBC 2014). The group seeks to overthrow the Colombian government and replace it with a more leftist regime. The group's first act of violence occurred eight months after its formation on December 7, 1967, when it launched a peasant insurrection in Alto Sinú (El Tiempo 1994; Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The EPL operates in Norte de Santander near the Venezuelan border (Uribe 2016). The group has launched attacks in Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Caldas, and La Guajira (Canada IRB 2003; Crenshaw 2015). The group is based in Northwest Antioquia (Crenshaw 2015). In 2002, the EPL allegedly allied with the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) in an attack on the town, Hacari (START 2015; Crenshaw 2015).

Organizational Structure

Francisco Caraballo founded the EPL (El Tiempo 1994). Caraballo was a member of the Communist Party in Columbia. Caraballo formed the EPL, as he advocated for the use of war as a means to form a leftist regime (El Tiempo 1994). At its peak, the group had 4,000 members (BBC 2014). The EPL receives its funds from drug trafficking. Megateo, the only current visible head of the organization, said in an interview that the group collects “taxes” (now known to be kilos of cocaine) from the peasants (Semana 2013; BBC 2014).

External Ties

In 1987, the EPL joined the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB) along with FARC and the National Liberation Army (ENL) (Crenshaw 2015). The CGSB exploited Colombian oil companies until 1991 when they disbanded (Crenshaw 2015). There is no clear evidence as to why they targeted oil companies. After many members disbanded in 1991, the members that had not yet disbanded allied with FARC to attack disbanded EPL members for “betraying their mission” (Crenshaw 2015). In 2002, the EPL was allegedly allied again with the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) in an attack on a town named Hacari (START 2015; Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

In 1990, the group signed an agreement with the government to demobilize (Uribe 2016). In 1991, some members of the EPL decided to uphold the agreement and demobilize (Crenshaw 2015). The faction of the EPL that pursued disarmament formed a splinter group named Esperanza Paz y Libertad. Members of the EPL and FARC that believed disarmament betrayed the EPL’s original goals participated in the murder of individuals involved in the splinter group (Uribe 2016). Since these members rejected the peace treaty, the state views them as criminals. In 2002, the group was involved in a mass kidnapping (Canada IRB 2003). In the 1980s, many members of the EPL broke off to form their own drug cartels (Uribe 2016). The group’s only current visible head is Megateo, and in 2003, the group had an estimated 500 members (Semana 2013; Crenshaw 2015). As of 2014, the EPL has advocated for nonviolence and ended violence against other guerilla groups (BBC 2014). Its last violent attack occurred in 2015 (GTD 2017).

IV. RED BANNER
Min. Group Date: 1969
Max. Group Date: 1996
Onset: NA

Aliases: Red Flag (Venezuela), Bandera Roja, Red Banner

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Frente Américo Silva, GBR (Diane 1989 P.77)

Group Formation: 1969 (Diane 1989 P.77)

Group End: The Red Flag’s last reported incident took place in 1996 (GTD 2017).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Red Banner/Flag formed in 1969 as a splinter of the Venezuelan Movement for the Revolutionary Left (Diane 1989, 77). The group had a far left, Marxist-Leninist ideology (Diane 1989, 77). The Red Flag’s political aims were center-seeking. The group sought to overthrow the Venezuelan government and replace it with a dictatorship that represented the popular majority of the Venezuelan people (Diane 1989, 77). The group’s first recorded attack occurred in 1972, when the group kidnapped Carlos Dominguez Chavez for ransom (Diane 1989, 77).

Geography

The group was very active in the state of Guercio, Venezuela (DIANE 1989, 77). The group conducted attacks in the Colombian states of Aragua and Valencia (DIANE 1989, 77). The group mainly operated along the Venezuelan Colombian border and the east of Venezuela (DIANE 1989, 77). The group is considered transnational, as it conducted attacks in other countries. The group, however, did not have any known bases outside of Venezuela.

Organizational Structure

Carlos Betancourt and Gabriel Puerta Aponte initially led the group (MIPT 2008). The Red Flag's members originated from the political party, the Venezuelan Movement for the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (MIPT 2008). The group had an estimated 50 armed members in 1989 (DIANE 1989, 77). The group received funds by raiding Venezuelan towns (DIANE 1989, 77). The GBR also accumulated income from the ransom of kidnappings (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

In 1972, the group cooperated with its former group, the MIR, to kidnap the Caracas native industrialist, Carlos Dominguez Chavez (DIANE 1989, 77). In the 1980s, the group had a shared training center in Venezuela with ETA, a Basque revolutionary group (MIPT 2008). The group allegedly received additional financial support from guerilla groups in El Salvador (MIPT 2008). The group received financial support from Cuba until 1990 (MIPT 2008; DIANE 1989, 77). The group allegedly received support from the Colombian guerrilla groups, National Liberation Army (ELN) and the April 19 Movement (M-19). The type of support provided by these groups could not be found.

Group Outcome

The Red Flag's last major violent incident occurred in 1987 or 1988, when the group invaded 240 farms in northeastern Venezuela to collect $200,00 (Canada IRB 2003). Between 1994 and 1995, some of the group's members were arrested. Overall criminal activity, however, has decreased (Canada IRB 2003). The Red Flag's last reported incident took place in 1996 (GTD 2017).

The Red Flag remains a political organization, but no longer conducts armed attacks (Canada IRB 2003). In 1994, the group requested to become an official political party, but the government has not yet accepted the request (Canada IRB 2003).

V. FUERZAS ARMADAS DE RESISTENCIA NACIONAL (FARN)
Min. Group Date: 1975
Max. Group Date: 1979
Onset: NA

Aliases: Armed Forces Of National Resistance, Armed Forces Of National Resistance (Farn), Fuerzas Armadas De Resistencia Nacional (Farn), National Resistance, Resistencia Nacional (Rn)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Note (CS): Unclear connection to Colombia if any. There is not a lot of information about the individual group since it joined an umbrella organization early on in the El Salvador Civil War.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Group Formation: 1975

Group End: 1980 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

FARN formed in 1975 after splintering from the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 532; MIPT 2008). FARN's leader split from the ERP shortly after ERP members killed the FARN's leader Roque Dalton (CIA 1984, 22). The group's earliest documented attack was on June 28, 1976 (GTD 2017). FARN considered itself a "Marxist-Leninist proletarian army" (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 532). The group staunchly opposed imperialism, which they viewed as exported by foreign governments and corporations (MIPT 2008). It wanted to overthrow the government (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 532).

Geography

FARN was an urban terrorist group (MIPT 2008). Of recorded incidents, the two cities with the most frequent attacks were San Salvador and Santa Ana (GTD 2017). FARN's stronghold was located on the Guazapa volcano, which is north of San Salvador (Gunson et al. 2015).

Organizational Structure

Middle-class citizens, who often had associations with the Christian Democratic Party's youth movement, made up most of the FARN's coalition (MIPT 2008). The group's political front organization, the United Popular Action Front (FAPU), brought in support of urban trade unionists (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 532; Gunson et al. 2015). In 1980, the group had 800 fighters (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 532). By 1984, the CIA estimated that the FARN possessed between 1,400 and 1,550 combatants. The forces were organized in "at least two battalions" (CIA 1984, 22).

Before it splintered from the ERP, FARN was led by Roque Dalton Garcia (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 532). Roque Dalton was a noted poet and former Communist Party member (CIA 1984, 22). After Roque Dalton's death, the next prominent leader of FARN was Ferman Cienfuegos (CIA 1984, 22). Cienfuegos (born in Costa Rica) came from a middle-class Salvadoran background and briefly worked as a teacher. He joined the ERP then FARN. Cienfuegos was seen to be more moderate and open to non-Marxist connections (New York Times 1982).

The group received its money from kidnapping business executives (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

FARN partnered with FAPU, its political wing, in 1975. FAPU became FARN's mass front organization (CIA 1984, 22). FAPU enabled FARN to gain the support of urban trade unionists (Gunson et al. 2015).

In 1980, FARN joined the FMLN, an umbrella organization of five left-wing Salvadoran terrorist groups: the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), ERP, Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), Communist Party of El Salvador/ Armed Forces of Liberation (PCES/ FAL), and Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers/ Popular Liberation Revolutionary Armed Forces (PRTC/ FARLP) (CIA 1984, 2). The FMLN sought to coordinate insurgent activities.

During FARNs independent stage, records do not indicate that the group received direct material aid from external state actors. Cuba and the Soviet Union, however, later provided support to the FMLN, of which FARN was a member (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

As guerilla attacks increased during the 1970s, the Salvadoran military government responded with force. Between 1979 and 1981, army-backed death squads resulted in the death of more than 30,000 people (BBC News 2017). FARN's last recorded attack as an independent insurgent group was on December 11, 1979 (GTD 2017). In Autumn of 1980, FARN joined other left-wing guerrilla groups to form a unified organization, known as the FMLN (Gleditsch et al. 2013). The FMLN signed a peace agreement with the Salvadoran government in 1991. Today, the FMLN no longer conducts terrorist activities and is one of El Salvador's two major political parties (MIPT 2008).

VI. GUERRILLA ARMY OF THE POOR (EGP)
Min. Group Date: 1975
Max. Group Date: 1994
Onset: NA [URNG onset?]

Aliases: Guerrilla Army Of The Poor (Egp), Ejército Guerrillero De Los Pobres (Egp), People's Guerrilla Army

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: January 19, 1972 (Leonard 2005, p. 726)

Group End: 1982 - merger with other groups to form URNG (Global Security N.D.)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Guerilla Army of the Poor first came to attention as a violent group on January 19, 1972, when it invaded a jungle in Ixcan, Guatemala (Leonard 2005, 726). Ricardo Moran founded the group. Moran espoused a leftist ideology similar to Fidel Castro's ideologies. The group had center seeking political aims during the Guatemalan Civil War (Leonard 2005, 727; Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The EGP mostly recruited landless peasants in the northeast of Guatemala, in an area known as Ixcan (Leonard 2005, 727). The EGP later moved south to the highland parts of Guatemala, known as the Maya-Quiche and Maya Ixil (Leonard 2005, 727). In 1966, guerrilla groups opposed to the government launched a series of attacks on Guatemala City (Global Security n.d.). The group conducted additional attacks in Tecpan, Guatemala City, and San Juan Cotzal (GTD 2016). It was involved in two isolated transnational incidents in Lima, Peru in 1982 and San Vicente de Chucuri, Colombia in 1984 (GTD 2016). Although the EGP participated in transnational activities, the group did not have known bases outside Guatemala.

Organizational Structure

Ricardo Moran founded the EGP in response to Guatemalan political turmoil, especially the 1954 coup of president Arbenz (Leonard 2005, 727; Global Security n.d.). The EGP mostly recruited landless peasants in the northeast of Guatemala, in an area known as Ixcan (Leonard 2005, 727). Members were often poor workers from Guatemala's highlands and were primarily indigenous Mayans (Leonard 2005, 727).

The EGP's organizational structure consisted of a hierarchy of power (Leonard 2005, 727). The group had four to eight military divisions. Representatives in the group's governing body, Direccion Nacional, governed these divisions (Leonard 2005, 727). Under the military divisions, was an armed villagers wing named the FIL. Lastly, the group had an unarmed villagers wing dedicated to education (Leonard 2005, 727). The EGP attained 400 members in 1983 (Leonard 2005, 727). The EGP used propaganda to gain support (Leonard 2005, 727).

The group's source(s) of funding could not be found.

External Ties

In 1982, four guerilla groups allied in order to fight the Guatemalan government, forming the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) (Global Security n.d.). The four groups included the Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) (Global Security n.d.). The URNG used violence to attack the government's members, installations, and economy (Global Security n.d.). The EGP used propaganda to gain international support as well. The effectiveness of the EGP's tactics is unknown (Leonard 2005, 727). The URNG was an enemy of the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA), which captured and tortured anyone suspicious of supporting leftist movements (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

President Julio Cesar Montenegro initiated a counterinsurgency program in 1966. The effort lowered the amount of guerilla attacks in the countryside but not in cities, such as Guatemala City (Global Security n.d.). Later, President Rins Mott sought to attack guerillas in a more notorious manner. Mott said that "if you are with us we will feed you; if you are against us we will kill you" (Global Security n.d.). As president, Mott instituted local civilian defense patrols, known as the PAC's, to fight leftist organizations (Global Security n.d.).

In 1986, President Cerezo worked to use internal forces to lower violence but still did not put the violation of human rights to trial (Global Security n.d.). Finally, in 1994, the UN proposed peace to the URNG (Global Security n.d.). The 1996 ceasefire declared that the guerilla forces in Guatemala could only use their arms in defense of their country from external threats (Global Security n.d.; Leonard 2005, 727). The broader 1996 peace agreement came into effect in 1997 (Leonard 2005, 727). The EGP dissolved in 1997, and the URNG became a political party (Leonard 2005, 727).

VII. MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA
Min. Group Date: 1975
Max. Group Date: 1975
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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    - "MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA"
    - MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA

- Searched gScholar:
    - “MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA”
    - MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA
- Searched Proquest:
    - “MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA”
    - MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA
- Searched Lexis
    - “MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA”
    - MILITARY LIBERATION FRONT OF COLOMBIA

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1975 (START 2016)

Group End: 1975 - the group disappeared (START 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Military Liberation Front first came to attention as a violent group in 1975, when it set a bomb off in Bogota, Colombia. The attack resulted in one casualty (START 2016). More information on the group's formation, goals, or ideology could not be found.

Geography

The Military Liberation front operated in Colombia and conducted an attack in Bogota (START 2016).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group’s organizational structure.

External Ties

No information could be found about this group’s external ties.

Group Outcome

In 1975, the Military Liberation Front set a bomb off in Bogota, Colombia, causing one casualty. No information could be found about this group’s outcome (START 2016).

VIII. CHE GUEVARA BRIGADE
Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: Che Guevara Brigade, Che Guevara International Brigade

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: 1976

Group End (Outcome): 1990 (unknown)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

La Brigada Che Guevara was a left-wing group active from 1976 until 1990 (TOPS 2008, ID 3982; GTD, START 2016; Jones and Libicki 2008, 153). The group's initial goal was to target officials allegedly involved in the death of transnational guerrilla Ernesto "Che" Guevara (TOPS 2008, ID 3982). The group also sought leftist social revolution and later attacks (circa 1990) targeted U.S.-based businesses in Buenos Aires (GTD, START 2016; Jones and Libicki 2008, 153; U.S. Department of State 1991, 4-5, 8).

La Brigada Che Guevara is allegedly responsible for several well-known attacks, however little is known about the group's organizational structure or external ties (TOPS 2008, ID 3982). La Brigada Che Guevara first came to international attention when a representative claimed responsibility for the assassination of former Bolivian President and leftist general Juan Jose Torres González in Paris in June 1976 (2008, ID 3982). According to TOPS, La Brigada Che Guevara targeted González in Buenos Aires because González allegedly led the military operation that killed Guevara in Bolivia (2008, ID 3982).

Geography

Within Argentina, the group conducted attacks in Buenos Aires (START 2016, GTD). The group allegedly conducted attacks in Paris, France, Bogota, Colombia, and the Italian cities of Brindisi and Rome, however many of these are disputed (START 2016, GTD).

Organizational Structure

La Brigade Che Guevara reportedly had less than 100 members (Jones and Libicki 2008, 153). The group's targets tended to be officials involved in the death of Che Guevara or sites linked to the Argentine government or United States (START 2016, GTD).

External Ties

In November 1999, the Argentine Government ruled González's killing part of Operation Condor, claimed partial responsibility, and awarded $320,000 in compensation to González's widow (Kohut and Vilella 2010, 309). The Argentine government raised uncertainty about La Brigada Che Guevara's involvement, questioning whether the groups had connections to Latin American governments participating in Operation Condor.

Some sources say La Brigada Che Guevara claimed credit for the assassination of General Joaquín Zenteno Anaya in Paris on May 11, 1976 (TOPS 2008, ID 3982; Greisman 1977, 306; Parry 1976, 253). However, GTD does not attribute La Brigada

Che Guevara with Anaya's assassination (START 2016). Calloni claims that the state actors behind Operation Condor assassinated Anaya, but blamed La Brigada Che Guevara in order to avoid attribution (May 1999, 85). However, Calloni claims that La Brigada Che Guevara never existed at all, which contradicts the entries in GTD and TOPS (Calloni May 1999, 85; TOPS 2008, ID 3982; START 2016, GTD).

A 1991 C.I.A. report noted that some Argentine guerrillas, described as "possibly" La Brigada Che Guevara members, traveled to Peru in mid-July 1990 (NSA Archive 2002, MORI DocID 766907, 4). Once in Peru, the suspected Che Guevara Brigade members allegedly contacted the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which had a similar Marxist-Leninist and anti-imperialist (anti-U.S.) ideology (Ibid.). However, the nature of the alleged communication is unknown. The C.I.A. report classifies the link between the La Brigada Che Guevara and the MRTA as "suspected" but unconfirmed (Ibid.).

Group Outcome

La Brigada Che Guevara is associated with a bomb explosion at a U.S.-owned Parke-Davis Laboratories in Buenos Aires (START 2016, GTD 198803060001). The explosion caused property damage but the extent is unknown (START 2016, GTD 198803060001). *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1988* and TOPS claim that La Brigada Che Guevara claimed responsibility in a communiqué accusing the U.S. of supporting the British military in the Falkland Islands (TOPS 2008, ID 3982; Gardela and Hoffman 1988, 41). However, GTD says it is unknown if La Brigada Che Guevara claimed responsibility, contradicting the RAND report and TOPS (START 2016, GTD 198803060001).

La Brigada Che Guevara allegedly detonated a bomb at a branch of the state telephone company Entel in the Florencio Varela suburb of Buenos Aires on June 30, 1990, causing significant property damage and lightly injuring two employees (U.S. Department of State 1991, 8). According to a U.S. State Department report, La Brigada Che Guevara claimed responsibility for the bombing in a call to a local radio station (1991, 8). However, a 1991 report from the Canadian government's Immigration and Refugee Board discounted the group's claim of responsibility for bombing Entel and instead concluded the "true identity of the terrorists has not been determined" (IRB 1991). The attack was reportedly protesting the Argentine government's approval for the sale of Entel to two foreign firms including U.S. Bell Atlantic (U.S. Department of State 1991, 8; TOPS 2008, ID 3982). The U.S. State Department report lists two other 1990 incidents in which La Che Guevara bombed U.S.-owned businesses in Buenos Aires (a CitiBank and GTE-owned subsidiary) (U.S. Department of State 1991, 4-5). A purported representative of the group claimed responsibility in a telephone call to local media following both attacks (U.S. Department of State 1991, 4-5). The group splintered in 1990 and is not associated with any attack following 1990 (Jones and Libicki 2008, 153; START 2016, GTD).

The 1991 IRB report also noted that the same or other groups using a similar-sounding name were claiming responsibility for various terrorist acts "lacking a clear political purpose" around that time in Argentina (IRB 1991, ARG7522).

Following the 1989 La Tablada attack (cf. MTP), a military intelligence source named La Brigada Che Guevara as among a series of groups posing imminent threats (Schneider 1989, 9). However these predicted attacks never occurred (Ibid.). Contemporary Argentine journalist Joe Schneider claimed that competing liberal/leftist and nationalist factions of the military purported these warnings to fan public distrust of opposing political factions (1989, 9).

The name “Che Guevara Brigade” is also used by a pro-Castro regime group that organizes international trips to Cuba, volunteer work, and transnational communication with leftist activists (Alekseeva and Fitzpatrick 1990, 58; Pagliccia 2014, 87, 89-91, 237; ALBA Movimientos 2014). This pro-Castro group does not appear connected to the terrorist group Che Guevara Brigade in Argentina.

IX. APRIL 19 MOVEMENT (M-19)
Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1997
Onset: 1978

Aliases: M-19 (Movement Of April 19), 19 April Movement, April 19 Movement, April 19 Movement (M-19), M-19, Movimiento 19 De Abril, Movimiento 19 De Abril (M-19)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ADM-19, Acción Democrática-Movimiento 19 (Democratic Action-Movement 19), ADM-19, Alianza Democrática M-19, Democratic Alliance M-19

Group Formation: 1972/1973

Group End (Outcome): 1989 (disarm, create a political party)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

M-19 formed between 1972 and 1973 in Colombia in response to what members perceived as a “stolen” presidential election (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). The group retroactively declared its birth as April 19, 1970 (Idaho State n.d.). The group fought to overthrow the government and replace the leader they believed had stolen a previous election (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003; Crenshaw 2015). The group first came to attention for a series of violent robberies in 1973 and the January 1974 robbery of Simon Bolivar’s sword (Crenshaw 2015). The group ascribed to Marxism-Leninism and a populist ideology (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group primarily operated in Colombian cities (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). The group’s operations concentrated in the Southern front in Putumayo and the Western front in Caldas, Cauca, Valle de Cauca, Quindio, and Tolima (Crenshaw 2015). The group is tied to one attack in Lima, Peru, where it kidnapped an Italian diplomat. However, there is no evidence of other violent activities in Peru or other countries beyond Colombia (GTD).

Organizational Structure

One of the group’s leaders - Jaime Bateman Cayon - was a former member of FARC. Ivan Marino Ospina also had a leadership role in the movement. Alvaro Fayad was the group’s chief military and political strategist (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

Members came from middle to upper middle class backgrounds and included university students, unions, doctors, and families with ties to the government (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). The organization had approximately 1,500-2,000 members in 1985. These numbers decreased to 500 in 1987 (Crenshaw 2015).

The group's political wing, the ADM-19, later splintered and became a legitimate political party (Crenshaw 2015).

The M-19 organized itself along two military fronts: one in the south of Colombia and the other in the west. The group subdivided the fronts into smaller units, which operated in different cities (Idaho State University n.d.).

The group funded itself through drug trafficking and kidnapping (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

External Ties

The group fought MAS, a paramilitary group that participated in drug trafficking (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

The group received military training in guerrilla warfare from Cuba (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

In 1980, the Colombian army arrested M-19 leader Jaime Bateman, which triggered an Embassy hostage crisis in Bogota (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

In 1984, the Colombian government negotiated a disarmament deal with several factions, which led to the creation of the ADM-19 political group (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

In 1985, when the political agreement fell apart, the Colombian government launched a major counterinsurgency offensive against the M-19 in Bogota (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). In 1987, security forces killed Alvaro Fayad, which hurt the group's ability to continue operations (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

In 1989, the government and M-19 negotiated a secondary political agreement. The agreement led most members to disarm by 1990. Many former M-19 members joined the ADM-19 political group (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

X. PEDRO LEÓN ARBOLEDA (PLA)
Min. Group Date: 1977
Max. Group Date: 1980
Onset: NA

Aliases: Pedro Leon Arboleda Movement, Pedro Leon Arboleda, Pedro Leon Arboleda (Pla), Pedro Le_n Arboleda (Pla), Pedro Le_n Arboleda Movement

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1976 (Semana 1984)

Group End: 1986 (MIPT 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA) Movement formed in 1976 after splintering from the EPL (MIPT 2008; Semana 1984).
Like the EPL, the PLA was a communist, center-seeking group (MIPT 2008). Around 1976, the PLA committed its first act of violence: the assassination of Nicolas Santana, a militant member of the PCC (Semana 1984).

Geography

The PLA was largely active in the city of Medellin, Colombia (Gomez 2015, 124). The group conducted attacks in Bogota, Colombia. The group was primarily seen as an urban guerrilla movement (CIA 1984, 22).

Organizational Structure

The group does not appear to have a political wing. In 1984, the PLA had about 350 members (CIA 1984, 22). Many PLA members were former EPL members, as the group had splintered from EPL (CIA 1984, 22). Carlos Nino and Hugo Patino led the group early on (Semana 1984).

The group received funding from ransom payments (Semana 1984). Other sources of funding for the group could not be found.

External Ties

The PLA broke off from the EPL because the PLA believed in a more Maoist interpretation of Communism than the EPL (MIPT 2008). The government attempted peace negotiations with the PLA, ELN, and EPL (Semana 1984).

Group Outcome

The Colombian government took measures to stop the PLA, including the detention of Carlos Reyes Nino and the subsequent release of pictures depicting the government's torture of Nino. The revelation of the government-sponsored torture shocked the public and unintentionally generated sympathy for the PLA. In the early 1980s, negotiations of a ceasefire with the government began (Semana 1984). The PLA's last known attack occurred in 1986 (MIPT 2008). It is unclear why the group stopped using violence (Semana 1984).

Colombia Cases, Part 2: 1978-1986
Last Updated: 16 June 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1346	WORKER'S SELF-DEFENSE MOVEMENT (MAO)		1978	1981
T457	SHINING PATH		1978	2012
T977	ALFARO VIVE		1983	1991
T773	NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC FORCE		1983	1987

T500	TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)		1983	1997
T1689	DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE (ARDE)		1983	1991
T581	RICARDO FRANCO FRONT (DISSIDENT FARC)		1984	1988
T596	QUINTIN LAME		1985	1989
T460	SIMON BOLIVAR NATIONAL GUERRILLA COORDINATING BOARD (CNG)		1986	2003
T1026	BANDERA NEGRA		1986	1987
T1611	AMERICA BATTALION		1986	1988

I. WORKER'S SELF-DEFENSE MOVEMENT (MAO)
Min. Group Date: 1978
Max. Group Date: 1981
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Autodefense Obrera, ADO, Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera, Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera (MAO)

Group Formation: The date is disputed - the group either started in 1976 (Avellenda 2009) or 1978 (GTD 2016; Schmid and Jongman 1988 p 526)

Group End: Last attack in 1981 (GTD 2016) Peace agreements with President Bentacur in 1984 (Aierta 2012)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Worker’s Self-Defense Movement (MAO) formed between 1976 and 1978 under the leadership of Juan Manuel Gonzalez Puentes (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 526; Avellaneda 2009, 86). Juan Manuel Puentes was a member of the Brazilian military. After Puentes fled to Colombia, he founded the MAO (Avellaneda 2009, 86). The group splintered from the Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA) Movement, which was another leftist guerrilla group in Colombia (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 526). MAO first came to attention as a violent group in 1978 after a bombing in Bogota, Colombia (GTD 2016). MAO’s ideologies were leftist and pro-Chinese (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 526). The group maintained the PLA’s center-seeking political aims.

Geography

Most of MAO’s attacks took place in Bogota, Colombia, with the exception of a 1980 attack in Medellin, Colombia (GTD 2016). MAO was also active in San Carlos, Colombia, in which the group interrupted a play to publicize themselves (Avellaneda 2009, 87). The group also stole from urban companies, such as Carulla, for food and supplies. Furthermore, the group flocked to rural areas to hide from the police (Avellaneda 2009, 86). Nevertheless, most attacks took place in the cities. MAO is not transnational.

Organizational Structure

Juan Manuel Gonzalez Puentes founded MAO in either 1976 or 1978 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 526; Avellaneda 2009, 86). Juan Manuel Puentes was a member of the

Brazilian military. After Puentes fled to Colombia, he founded MAO (Avellaneda 2009, 86). Puentes found his first recruits among the working class (Avellaneda 2009, 86).

Originally, the group stole arms from the police and acquired funding from bank robberies (Avellaneda 2009, 87). MAO also stole food and office supplies from companies, such as Carulla and Prodelbo (Avellaneda 2009, 86).

In September 1978, the group split from the Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA), which was another leftist guerrilla group in Colombia (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 526). The group later became independent in 1978.

At an unknown date, Edgardo and Abelaida Rey, Hector Fabio, and Alfredo Camelo Franco joined the leadership of MAO (Avellaneda 2009, 86). They tried to gain support from labor unions but failed to do so (Avellaneda 2009, 86). In the long term, the group sought to create Frentes de Autodefensa Popular (FAP), which would include smaller combatant groups with rural, student, and worker wings (Avellaneda 2009, 87). In August 1980, the group had an estimated 20 members (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 526).

The group attempted to publicize themselves and spread group propaganda by interrupting a play in San Carlos and disrupting the airing of a soccer game on the radio (Avellaneda 2009, 87).

External Ties

In September 1978, the group splintered from the Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA), another leftist guerrilla group in Colombia (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 526). MAO did not receive external support from any political party (Avellaneda 2009, 87).

Group Outcome

In 1979, Alfredo Carmelo, a leader of the MAO, was captured and held for trial and questioning. During his trial, Carmelo confirmed the involvement of MAO in many violent and disruptive activities (Avellaneda 2009, 100). The last known violent incident from MAO occurred in 1981 (GTD 2016).

When Belisario Bentacur came to power as president of Colombia (1982-1986), he initiated many efforts to reach peace agreements with guerrilla groups, including the FARC, EPL, M-19, and MAO (Aierta 2012). MAO split between members who desired to continue armed activities and those who wanted to demobilize (Avellaneda 2009, 114). After many negotiations, Betacur finally signed a ceasefire agreement with MAO, M-19, and EPL in August 1984 (Aierta 2012).

II. SHINING PATH
Min. Group Date: 1978
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Shining Path (SI), Sendero Luminoso (SI), Shining Path

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Shining Path, Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Partido Comunista del Peru, Communist Party of Peru, The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the Thoughts of Chairman Gonzalo, Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru – By Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui, PCP – por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui, PCP and PCP-SL

Group Formation: 1980

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Shining Path was established by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor at the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho with a goal to overthrow the Peruvian government (Graun 2008, 6-7). The group initially formed “in the 1960s” through a series of student meetings at the local university (Gregory 2009). Its first violent incident occurred in 1978 in Ayacucho, Peru (GTD 2016). The group formally launched their armed campaign against Peru in 1980 (Graun 2008, 7). In 1983, it escalated its attack when it began to kill both noncombatants and political officials (Gregory 2009). SL ascribed to a Marxist-Leninst ideology (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 7).

Geography

The group began in Ayacucho at the university where Guzmán taught (Gregory, Katherine). The group’s primary base of operations was in Ayacucho and Huanta as well as Vilcabamba, Peru (COHA 2008).

Organizational Structure

Guzmán was the sole leader of the Shining Path and a leftist university professor (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 4-5, 9). SL funded itself through extortion, kidnapping, and drug-trafficking (COHA 2008; Gregory 2009). SL believed in a foco-style of revolution, which could eventually inspire rural communities to rise up and join the fight (

Guzmán drew most of his followers from his former students and other peasants in the area, most of whom were Quechua-speaking natives (Graun 2008). SL had approximately 5,000-1,0000 members at its peak in 1989-1993 (Gleditsch et al. 2009, 315; Mackenzie Institute 2016). It was organized around a hierarchical structure (COHA 2008).

Despite his veneration of communists like Mao and Lenin, Guzmán could be extremely contemptuous of the very rural poor he was trying to recruit. He once ordered the slaughter of an entire village for suspected collusion with the government (Starn n.d.).

External Ties

Guzman was averse to outside influence and did not receive any type of external support from other actors (Gregory 2009; Templeman 2009; Gleditsch et al. 2009). The group competed against the MRTA for supporters and resources (Gregory 2009). There is evidence that Guzman visited China in the mid-1960s, but there is no evidence whether this is involved training in guerrilla warfare or other types of education (COHA 2008).

Group Outcome

Initially, SL had large success against the Peruvian government, aided in part by the Peruvian military's indiscriminate use of violence against noncombatants (Graun 2008). In 1988, "the tide had begun to turn" and the military was able to start gathering better intelligence and use force discriminately (Graun 2008, 13). In 1991, the Army implemented a wide-standing reform program including the Civil Defense Committees to train and organize local communities to resist SL (Graun 2008, 13-14).

Guzmán was captured and imprisoned in 1992 where he remains to this day (Graun 2008, 7; Gregory 2009). Support for the group turned as it continued to employ indiscriminate violence against combatants (Graun 2008; MIPT 2008). Membership for the group shrunk from 10,000 members at its max to approximately 500 as of 2008 (MIPT 2008). Several other high-ranking revolutionaries of the Shining Path began being released from prison in 2012 after serving long sentences (Economist 2012). The group still conducts intermittent attacks today from a small base along the Peru-Brazil border (Economist 2012).

- Note for Iris: "Despite his veneration of communists like Mao and Lenin, Guzmán often disregarded the rural poor he sought to recruit. He once ordered the slaughter of an entire village for suspected collusion with the government (Starn n.d.)." [Exclude? Cannot find corroboration for the first sentence.]

III. ALFARO VIVE
Min. Group Date: 1983
Max. Group Date: 1991
Onset: NA

Aliases: Alfaro Lives, Damn It, Alfaro Vive, Alfaro Vive Carajo (Avc)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Fuerzas Revolucionarias del Pueblo Eloy Alfaro (Jimenez and Franchi 2016 p 61), Fuerzas Armadas Populares Eloy Alfaro, FAPEA (Resumen 2015)

Group Formation: 1983 (Resumen 2015; Jimenez and Franchi 2016 p 59).

Group End: 1991 - part of the group disarms; 1993 - AVC (whole party) signs a peace treaty with President of Ecuador

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Alfaro Vive Carajo (AVC) first came to attention on August 11, 1983, when the group stole the swords of Alfaro Eloy from the Municipal Museum of Guayaquil (Resumen 2015; Jimenez and Franchi 2016, 59). Arturo Jarrin led the group (Resumen 2015). The Cuban revolution greatly inspired AVC ideology, which was leftist and nationalist (Jimenez and Franchi 2016). Overall, the AVC longed for the Ecuador government to adopt more economic freedoms, democracy, and increased social justice (Resumen 2015). The group’s political aims were center seeking. No evidence exists of the group opposing the Colombian government.

Geography

In 1983, the AVC went to various destinations to train, including Libya, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Colombia (Jimenez and Franchi 2012, 61). The AVC conducted 48 attacks in Quito, Ecuador, and 18 attacks in Guayaquil, Ecuador (Jimenez and Franchi 2016, 62). Within Quito and Guayaquil, attacked locations included: Cuenca, Pimampiro, Sangolqui, Esmeraldas, Carchi, Ibarra, Triunfo, and El Empalme (Jimenez and Franchi 2016, 63). The AVC also had two transnational attacks in Colombia in the cities of Spiales and Iquira (GTD 2016). Although the group perpetrated transnational attacks, the group did not have any known bases outside of Ecuador.

Organizational Structure

The group mainly comprised university students who disliked the government of Leon Febres Cordero (1984-1988) and desired social justice (Resumen 2015). Though the AVC also had a small base with rural people and a few workers, the group was mainly composed of youth (Resumen 2015). Arturo Jarrin led the group (Resumen 2015). The AVC often robbed banks for funding (an estimated 21 times) (Jimenez and Franchi 2012, 62). The AVC also famously kidnapped an Ecuadorian businessman, Nahim Isaias, in hopes of high ransom, but failed (Jimenez and Franchi 2012, 62). Furthermore, the AVC intercepted the media and attacked the police in hopes of gaining power (Jimenez and Franchi 2012, 62). The group released a newspaper with all the group's goals and proclamations and distributed it throughout the country (Resumen 2015). When the group disarmed in 1991, it had an estimated 50 members (Canada IRB 1994).

External Ties

The AVC had an explicitly close friendship with the M-19 and America Battalion, who supplied the AVC with arms and advice throughout their entire time active (Jimenez and Franchi 2016, 61). An unnamed faction group emerged in 1991, when some members of the AVC refused to disarm. There is no evidence this group splintered (Canada IRB 1994).

Group Outcome

In 1991, the government of Panama caught AVC leader, Arturo Jarrin. Allegedly, the government of Panama later killed Jarrin (Resumen 2015). That same year, the group laid down its weapons. One AVC faction, however, refused to disarm (Canada IRB 1994). After disarmament, many AVC members formed a political party (Canada IRB 1993). Finally, in January 1993, President Sixto Dur Ballens signed a treaty with the remaining armed members of the AVC and allowed them to form a political party (Canada IRB 1994).

IV. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC FORCE
Min. Group Date: 1983
Max. Group Date: 1987
Onset: NA

Aliases: Nicaraguan Democratic Force, Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fdn)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, FDN, Contras

Group Formation: 1981 or 1982 (Canada IRB 2000)

Group End: 1990 (Canada IRB 2000), allegedly disbanded after winning the election

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The unification of guerilla groups with bases in Honduras, including the Nicaraguan Democratic Union and the Nicaraguan Democratic Alliance, resulted in the formation of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) (Canada IRB 2000). The group formed between 1981 and 1982. It first began operating in Nicaragua in 1982 (Canada IRB 2000). The FDN originally sought to overthrow the dictatorship of Somoza and replace it with a democracy (Canada IRB 2000). The group later worked to overthrow the

Sandinista government (Canada IRB 2000). The FDN's political aims are center-seeking. The group's ideology is anti-communist, right wing, and pro-democracy (Mendez 2010).

Geography

The Nicaraguan Democratic Force was based first in Honduras and later in Nicaragua (Canada IRB 2000). The FDN executed a large number of attacks in Nicaragua. The group attacked the cities of El Tortuguero, Condega, Quilalí, San Carlos, Panali, San Fernando, Pavona, Cuapa, Esteli, Las Colinas, San Sebastian de Yali, Abisinia, Acoyapa, La Patriota, Mancotal, Presillas, San Isidro, La Campana, Juigalpa, Cepillo del Cerro, Cerro Quemado, Rancho Grande, Mesas de Carbonales, San Jose de Bocay, Santo Tomas, Cedro, Miraflores, Kilambe, Acoyapa, El Nispero, Wiwili, Bilambil, El Limon, Aguas Gatar, San Jose de Murra, Comalapa, La Union, Asturias, Bocana de Paiwas, El Almendro, and Santa Clara, among other cities (GTD 2016).

The FDN was transnational. It conducted an attack in Colombia in the city of Cali in 1987 (GTD 2016). The FDN also launched attacks in Honduras in the city of La Zompapera in 1987 (GTD 2016).

The FDN was involved in drug trafficking in both the United States and Central America (Canada IRB 2000).

Organizational Structure

Colonel Enrique Bermudez led the FDN (Canada IRB 2000). The group had a political wing, which later combined into the Civil-Military wing. Alfonso Calero later led the political wing (Canada IRB 2000). Bermúdez, the FDN's leader, also led the Military Affairs wing within the FDN (Canada IRB 2000).The FDN trafficked drugs in both the United States and Central America (Canada IRB 2000). The FDN received financial, strategic, and military support from the US and allegedly Argentina as well (Kinzer 2015; Canada IRB 2000). In 1986, the FDN had 10,000 armed individuals (Canada IRB 2000). The FDN usually recruited from the poor class in Nicaragua (Canada IRB 2000).

External Ties

The unification of guerilla groups with bases in Honduras, including the Nicaraguan Democratic Union and the Nicaraguan Democratic Alliance, formed the FDN (Canada IRB 2000). In 1986, the US Congress agreed to aid the FDN with $100 million in order to defeat the Sandinista government and attack communism (Kinzer 2015). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the government of Argentina assisted the FDN with attack strategy and planning. Some sources report that the CIA allegedly created the FDN (Kinzer 2015; Canada IRB 2000). The FDN military allegedly had contained members of the National Guard and past military of Somoza's presidency (Canada IRB 2000).

Group Outcome

The FDN's last recorded attack occurred in 1983 (GTD 2016). Whether or not the FDN remains active could not be determined. In 1987, subcommander Jose Gonzales reported that the guerrilla wing of the FDN had about 200 men (Kinzer 2015). In 1990, the group committed its last recorded violent act and allegedly disbanded afterwards (Canada IRB 2000). In 1999, the FDN announced that it was now a political movement (Canada IRB 2000). Nevertheless, in a 2010 report, a few ex-members of the FDN announced that they would continue being a force to fight for democracy (Mendes 2010).

V. TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)
Min. Group Date: 1983
Max. Group Date: 1997
Onset: NA

Aliases: Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Mrta), Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Mrta)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1984 (Templeman 2009).

Group End (Outcome): 1997 (military) (Templeman 2009)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The MRTA emerged from the remnants of the MIR via a political organization known as the PSR-ML-MIR-EM (Templeman 2009, 23). The organization emerged in 1980 and was renamed the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in 1984 (Templeman 2009, 23). It first came to attention for an attack on a US security guard residence in 1983 (CIA 1991, 1).The group ascribed to a Marxist ideology and sought to overthrow the Peruvian government (Gregory 2009; Templeman 2009).

The three founding leaders: Victor Polay, Miguel Rincon and Nester Cerpa like De La Puente, had been part of the political party APRA (Baer 2003). The group published their 12 part platform in 1984 and then retroactively stated they had taken their first armed action in 1982 despite no evidence supporting this (Templeman 2009).

Geography

It was initially active in Lima, Peru (McCormick 2005). It was also very active in the northern region including the towns of San Martin, Lambayeque, and La Libertad (McCormick 2005).The MRTA launched its rural operations in 1987 (McCormick 2005; Baer 2003).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by three men, Victor Polay, Miguel Rincon, and Nester Cerpa. Victor Polay and Miguel Rincon were classic middle class revolutionary leaders, but Nester Cerpa was from a working-class family and had previously participated in other reform attempts (Baer 2003). It mainly wanted to target wealthy elites to demonstrate the inequalities of the system (Templeman 2009). The group funded itself through drug-trafficking sales, extortion, and robberies (CIA 1991, 2; Baer 2003). Jones and Libicki state the group had “tens” of members but the CIA estimated the group had approximately 1,000 hardcore members (Jones and Libicki 2009, 182; CIA 1991, 2). Members were middle and upper-class and included peasants, students, professors, and lawyers (CIA 1991, 2). The group was never very well-organized and had a difficult time

recruiting members (McCormick 2005). It originally was urban-based and operated as a set of cells (McCormick 2005). Operations later shifted to be a series of five different wings including Political, Military, Communications, Logistics, and Intelligence (CIA 1991, 2).

External Ties

The group was "Cuban-inspired" and a child of the MIR (Gregory 2009). It allegedly received training, arms, and funding from Cuba (CIA 1991, 2). It may have also had training and travel support from Libya in the late 1980s (CIA 1991, 2). They were competing for prominence and followers with the Shining Path and had difficulty acquiring the necessary resources, members, or community support to thrive and sustain an insurgency as effectively as SL (Templeman 2009, 24).

It provided some training and coordination with Colombia's ELN and CNPZ/ELN in Bolivia (CIA 1991, 2).

Group Outcome

The group enjoyed varied success between 1984-1987 due to the military's simultaneous fight with SL (McCormick 2005). The CIA reported "resource constraints, poor intelligence, rampant corruption, and interservice rivalry limit its [counterterrorism] effectiveness" (CIA 1991, 2-3). Due to beginning their revolution slightly after the Shining Path, the MTRA underestimated how adept the Peruvian army had become at dealing with groups such as these (Templeman 2009). As a last effort to revive the movement, the MTRA occupied the Japanese embassy in December 1996 and took 72 hostages for four months (Gregory 2009). The Peruvian government responded with Operation Chavin de Huantar, which killed all 14 MRTA members and effectively killed the movement (Templeman 2009).

VI. DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE (ARDE)
Min. Group Date: 1983
Max. Group Date: 1991
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nicaragua: Current information on ARDE, 1 April 1997a, NIC26642.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab5928.html
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- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nicaragua: Information on the contras of the Frente Sur, part of ARDE, including its activities from 1986 to 1993, 1 January 1994b, NIC16199.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ace250.html
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nicaragua: Information on former contra commanders, whether they have been holding any government positions or have been politically active, on their integration into society in peacetime, and whether there were any successful programs established to assist former contras, 1 May 1997b, NIC26842.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad9220.html
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- Oswaldo Bonilla. “Sandinistas claim ARDE rebels in disarray.’ http://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/05/24/Sandinistas-claim-ARDE-rebels-in-disarray/6949454219200/

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1983 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1991 (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) first came to attention as a violent group in 1983, when it conducted an attack in Nicaragua (GTD 2016). The center-seeking groups sought to overthrow the Sandinista government. The ARDE claimed that the Sandinista government did not adhere to its original ideology (Hopfensperger 1983). ARDE was counter-revolutionary, right wing, and anti-imperialist (Hopfensperger 1983).

Eden Pastora Gomez, Alfonso Robello Callejas, and Brooklyn Riviera, a Miskito Indian, led the group. Pastora formerly served the Sandinista government, and Rogelio was a former member of the National Reconstruction Junta (Hopfensperger 1983).

Geography

ARDE had a base in San Jose, Costa Rica (Hopfensperger 1983). ARDE conducted most of its attacks in Nicaragua in cities, including Managua, Camoapa, Rio Rama, Yacamali, Wayawas, Cerro Campana, Tigre de la Sarapiqui, La Pavona, San Lucas, La Milpa, San Isidro, La Esperancito, and San Miguelito (GTD 2016). In 1985, ARDE conducted an attack in Yumbo, Colombia (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

Eden Pastora Gomez, Alfonso Robello Callejas, and Brooklyn Riviera, a Miskito Indian, led the group. Pastora formerly served the Sandinista government, and Rogelio was a former member of the National Reconstruction Junta (Hopfensperger 1983).

In 1984, the group's membership ranged from 2,000 to 3,000 members (New York Times 1984). The CIA funded the ARDE, as it did for the FDN (New York Times 1984). The group had a political wing, while it was active (New York Times 1984).

External Ties

ARDE leader Pastora announced that the group refused to join forces with the FDN since they had militants that had supported Somozas infamous presidency (Bonilla N.D.; New York Times 1984). The CIA allegedly funded the ARDE, as it did for the FDN (New York Times 1984). The CIA threatened to cut the group's funding if Pastora did not agree to form an alliance with the FDN (New York Times 1984).

Group Outcome

In 1984, the Nicaraguan government allegedly set off a bomb about a mile from San Carlos, Nicaragua that seriously injured ARDE leader Pastora and a few Costa Rican journalists (New York Times 1984). The group's last recorded attack occurred in 1991 in Nicaragua. The contras, however, had begun to demobilize in 1990 (Canada IRB 1990; GTD 2016). In 1992, the government offered cash money for any contras who still had weapons and turned them in (Canada IRB 1997). In reward for demobilization, the government gave 373 farms to the contras, including this group (Canada IRB 1997). In 1996, Pastora formed a political party (Canada IRB 1997). By 1996, some sources report that the party had about 1000 members (Canada IRB 1997).

VII. RICARDO FRANCO FRONT (DISSIDENT FARC)

Min. Group Date: 1984
Max. Group Date: 1988
Onset: NA

Aliases: Ricardo Franco Front, Dissident Farc, Ricardo Franco Front (Dissident Farc)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Ricardo Franco Front." US State Department. DIANE Publishing. 1989. P. 104-105. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=55BZmIJ9xd8C&pg=PA104&dq=ricardo+franco+front&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzlvPI28LUAhWJL8AKHRl6D68Q6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=ricardo%20franco%20front&f=false
- Stephen Sloan and Sean Anderson. "Ricardo Franco Front (RFF)." Historical Dictionary of Terrorism. Scarecrow Press. 2009. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=aVcG7EkuPgAC&pg=PA603&dq=ricardo+franco+front&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwil9L_228LUAhVJKsAKHQIjCwYQ6AEILzAC#v=onepage&q=ricardo%20franco%20front&f=false
- GTD Perpetrator 584, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=584

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Frente Ricardo Front, RFF

Group Formation: 1984 (DIANE 1989 p104)

Group End: 1986, trouble within group leads to internal fighting and splintering (DIANE 1989 p 104; GTD 2016); last attack is 1988 (GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1984, the Ricardo Franco Front (RFF) splintered from the FARC. The FARC's truce with the Colombian government had upset the group. Jose Fedor Rey Alvarez led the RFF (DIANE 1989, 104). The RFF kept most of FARC's leftist and anti-American ideologies. Like the FARC, the RFF had center seeking political aims, as it sought to overthrow the Colombian government (Sloan and Anderson 2009, 604; DIANE 1989, 104). The group's first attack occurred in 1984 (DIANE 1989, 104)

Geography

The group's headquarters are in Valle del Cauca, Colombia (DIANE 1989, 104). The group conducted attacks in Medellin and Bogota, Colombia (Sloan and Anderson 2009,

603). The RFF conducted all of its attacks in Colombia (GTD 2016). Other cities in Colombia that the group attacked were: Jambalo, Corinto, Ipiales, Pitayo, CAli, La Laguna, Bucaramanga, Alto de la Rosa, Vergel, Uriber, Santander, and Florida (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

Jose Fedor Rey Alvarez led the RFF (DIANE 1989, 104). In 1989, the group had an estimated 100 members (DIANE 1989, 104). The RFF attempted kidnapping an oil company owner in hopes of achieving funds through ransom, but its efforts failed (Sloan and Anderson 2009, 603). Information about the group's funding could not be found.

External Ties

The RFF was a splinter of FARC (DIANE 1989, 105). The RFF was strongly anti-American and often attacked American-owned companies (Sloan and Anderson 2009, 603). In 1985, the RFF worked together with the National Liberation Front and the M-19 (Sloan and Anderson 2009, 603).

Group Outcome

In 1985, grievances within the RFF led to in-fighting that resulted in the death of 100 of the group's members (DIANE 1989, 104). In reaction to this attack, other guerrillas, such as the M-19, refused to work or fight alongside the RFF. After that attack within the RFF, the RFF abandoned its activities as a militant group and became a criminal group (DIANE 1989, 104). The group's last known attack occurred in 1988 (GTD 2017).

VIII. QUINTIN LAME
Min. Group Date: 1985
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

Aliases: Quintin Lame Command, Quintin Lame

Part 1. Bibliography

- Ed. Cynthia Amson. "Quintin Lame." Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America. Stanford University Press. 1999. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1hi9GaWBf58C&pg=PA200&lpg=PA200&dq=Quintin+Lame+Command&source=bl&ots=Ch_uej84Tr&sig=vZ88zO6Ebbn31CF926Vz3W1EV-8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzqOr35cLUAhWpCsAKHfFtD3MQ6AEIPTAE#v=onepage&q=Quintin%20Lame%20Command&f=false
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- Amnesty International, Political violence in Colombia: Myth and reality, 1 March 1994, AMR 23/001/1994, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9e60.html
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- Joanne Rappaport and Michael M. Tavuzzi. The Politics of Memory: Native Historical Interpretation in a Colombian Andes. Duke University. 1998. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=DbvW8xUFklkC&pg=PA152&lpg=PA152&dq=Quintin+Lame+Command&source=bl&ots=OdwoWjOOLX&sig=OODEAbEqFhHsk2aGVo8N1psbOyE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzqOr35cLUAhWpCsAKHfFtD3MQ6AEIMjAB#v=onepage&q=Quintin%20Lame%20Command&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Quintin Lame Armed Movement, Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame, MAQL

Group Formation: 1984 (Amson 1999 p 200)

Group End: 1990 last year active due to peace negotiations that were achieved in 1991 (Los Angeles Times 1991; Amson 1999, 2000).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Quintin Lame formed in 1984. The group sought greater political representation for the indigenous community in Colombia (Amson 1999, 200: Rapport and Tavuzzi 1998, 152). In 1984, 100 units of the Colombian national police attacked 150 indigenous families, resulting in 43 wounded, 42 detentions, and four indigenous deaths (Vazquez 2016). Later that year, the government murdered a beloved father, Alvaro Ulcue Chocle, who was also an indigenous Colombian (Vazquez 2016). This event prompted the Quintin Lame Command to conduct its first attack and take over the Castilla sugar factory by assault in November of 1984 (Vazquez 2016). The group’s political aims are center-seeking. It adhered to an ethno-nationalist ideology, as it fought on behalf of the rights of the indigenous community (Amson 1999, 200).

Geography

The group formed in Cauca, Colombia and remained active in south central Colombia (Amson 1999, 200). More specifically, the group was active in the north of Cauca (Centro de Memoria Historica 2015).

Organizational Structure

The group's members were natives from Cuaca (Rapport and Tavuzzi 1998 p 152). The group kidnapped farmers and took what was on their land for supplies (Boudreaux 1991). In 1991, when the group disarmed, the group had 130 members (Boudreaux 1991). Information about group funding, leadership, and structure could not be found.

External Ties

Quintin Lame opposed the FARC and ELN because of the poor treatment their guerilla fighters usually showed to the indigenous community (Centro de Memoria Historica 2015). Nevertheless, in 1985, Quintin Lame joined the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Group (CNG), an umbrella organization for various Colombian armed groups (Amson 1999, 200). In 1991, Quintin Lame left the CNG after reaching a peace agreement with the government (Amson 1999, 200).

Group Outcome

In 1990, the group initiated negotiations with the Gaviria presidency (Amson 1999, 200). In 1991, the group demobilized after it reached a peace accord with the government (Canada IRB 1994). Its goals were achieved, as the 1991 Constitution addressed and incorporated indigenous rights (Amson 1999, 200). Quintin Lame became an official political party and participated in 1992 elections in Colombia (Canada IRB 1994).

IX. SIMON BOLIVAR NATIONAL GUERRILLA COORDINATING BOARD (CNG)
Min. Group Date: 1986
Max. Group Date: 2003
Onset: NA

Aliases: Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (Cgsb), Coordinadora Guerrillera Sim¢N Bolivar (Cgsb), CGSB, Simon Bolivar Guerilla Coordinating Board (Cgsb), Simon Bolivar National Guerrilla Coordinating Board (Cng)

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Ed. Cynthia Amson. “Quintin Lame.” Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America. Stanford University Press. 1999. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1hi9GaWBf58C&pg=PA200&lpg=PA200&dq=Quintin+Lame+Command&source=bl&ots=Ch_uej84Tr&sig=vZ88zO6Ebbn31CF926Vz3W1EV-8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzqOr35cLUAhWpCsAKHfFtD3MQ6AEIPTAE#v=onepage&q=Quintin%20Lame%20Command&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Simon Bolivar Coordinating Committee (Amson 1999 p 200), National Guerrilla Coordinating Board (Jones 2016, 107)

Group Formation: 1985 (Jones 2016 p 107)

Group End: 1997, most member groups disarmed

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The National Guerrilla Coordinating Board, an umbrella organization, formed in 1985 at the behest of several guerrilla groups in Colombia (Jones 2016, 107). The group included the EPL, ELN, M-19, PRT, and Quintin Lame (Amson 1999, 200). The group was leftist with center-seeking aims. It sought to coordinate the leftist guerillas’ peace accords with the government of Colombia (Jones 2016, 107). In 1987, the group was renamed the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Group (CGSB) (Jones 2016, 107; Amson 1999, 200). The group kept the same groups and aims as when they were the CNG. The CGSB, however, also included the membership of the FARC (Jones 2016, 107; Amson 1999, 200).

Geography

The CGSB is based in Colombia (Jones 2016,107). Member groups primarily directed their attacks in Colombia, although some groups conducted transnational attacks.

Organizational Structure

The CGSB included the FARC,M-19, ELN, EPL, PRT, and Quintin Lame Command (Jones 2016, 107; Amson 1999, 200). The CGSB did not have a central command structure. Instead, the group was an umbrella organization that did not control an individual group's attacks (Amson 1999, 200). No information could be found about the group's source of funding, leadership, or membership.

External Ties

The CGSB was an alliance among the FARC,M-19, ELN, EPL, PRT, and Quintin Lame Command (Jones 2016, 107; Amson 1999, 200).

Group Outcome

Throughout the 1990s, the CGSB conducted peace talks with the government (MIPT 2008). The peace talks almost failed multiple times because of attacks waged by the FARC and ELN (MIPT 2008). In 1989, the M-19 began negotiations and officially disarmed in 1990 (MIPT 2008; Amson 1999, 200). By 1991, all member groups except the FARC and ELN had disarmed (Amson 1999, 200). By 1997, the CGSB was no longer active (Amson 1999, 200). The CGSB did not become a political party of Colombia.

X. BANDERA NEGRA
Min. Group Date: 1986
Max. Group Date: 1987
Onset: NA

Aliases: Black Flag, Bandera Negra, Black Flag (Bandera Negra)

Part 1. Bibliography

- Albert Jongman and Alex Schmid. "Colombia." Political Terrorism. 1988. P. 524. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=NgDks1hUjhMC&lpg=PP1&dq=political%20terrorism&pg=PA524#v=onepage&q=colombia&f=false
- GTD Perpetrator 2507, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2507

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1986 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1987, reason unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Bandera Negra's first came to attention as a violent group in 1986 (GTD 2016). The group targeted ex-convicts in Colombia (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 524). The group's signature was leaving a small black flag (Bandera Negra) in their victims' wounds (Jongman and Schmid 1988, 524). It had no clear politicized opposition to the state.

Geography

Bandera Negra conducted attacks within Colombia in the cities of Cali and Bogota (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

Information about Bandera Negra's organizational structure and funding could not be found.

External Ties

Information about the Bandera Negra's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

The group's final recorded attack occurred on September 17, 1987 (GTD 2016). Other information about the group's outcome could not be found.

XI. AMERICA BATTALION
Min. Group Date: 1986
Max. Group Date: 1988
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "28 die in Colombia as rebels fight army." New York Times. 1986. http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/05/world/around-the-world-28-die-in-colombia-as-rebels-fight-army.html

- GTD Perpetrator 2470, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2470
- "Latin Rebels Merge." 1986. Newsday. https://search.proquest.com/docview/285380622?accountid=14026.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1986 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1988 (GTD 2016), reason unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The American Battalion was a triple alliance of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, M-19, and Alfaro Vive (Newsday 1986). This Colombian-Ecuadorian-Peruvian alliance consisted of anti-American leftist groups (Newsday 1986). The group seeks to stop the spread of American imperialism (Newsday 1986).

The American Battalion first came to attention as a violent group in February 1986, when it attacked the town of Morales in Cauca, Colombia (New York Times 1986). Colombian government soldiers fought back and killed 21 rebels. The rebels killed seven soldiers (New York Times 1986).

Geography

The group's first attack occurred in Morales, located in southwestern Colombia (New York Times 1986). The group also attacked other towns in Colombia including Bogota, Jamundi, Pereira, Belalcazar, and Inza (GTD 2016). The group conducted all of its attacks in Colombia. It is unknown whether the group also had bases in Ecuador or Peru.

Organizational Structure

The American Battalion is an alliance and not an independent organization. Other information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The American Battalion is a triple Alliance consisting of members of Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, the M-19, and the Alfaro Vive (Newsday 1986). The American Battalion conducted attacks with the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) in 1986 and the Omar Torrijos a Comando for Latin American Dignity in 1988 (GTD 2016).

Group Outcome

The group's last attack occurred in Bogota in 1988 (GTD 2016). Other information about the group's outcome could not be found.

Colombia, Part 3: 1987-1989
Last Updated: 24 June 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1740	INSURGENCY COMMUNE		1987	1987
T1786	LATIN AMERICAN ANTI-FASCIST COMMAND		1987	1987
T487	LOS EXTRADITABLES		1987	1999
T1678	COMUNEROS		1987	1987
T1843	NATIONAL SOCIALIST CIVIC WORKER'S MOVEMENT		1988	1988
T1768	JORGE ELIECER GAITAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT		1988	1989
T1686	DEATH TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS		1988	1988
T235	JAIME BATEMAN CAYON GROUP (JBC)		1989	1999
T1685	DEATH TO BAZUQUEROS		1989	1990
T1659	CALI NARCOTICS CARTEL		1989	1991
T1946	WORKER'S FORCES OF LIBERATION		1989	1989

I. INSURGENCY COMMUNE
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1987
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2837, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2837
- Searched Proquest
    - “Insurgency commune” colombia
    - Insurgency commune colombia
- Searched gScholar
    - “Insurgency commune” colombia
    - Insurgency commune colombia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1987

Group End: 1987 - unknown why it stopped using violence (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Insurgency Commune first came to attention as a violent group in 1987, when it attacked the Ministry of Defense in Bogota, Colombia (GTD 2016). Information about the group’s goals and ideology could not be found.

Geography

The group’s initial attack occurred in Bogota, Colombia (GTD 2016). There is no evidence the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group’s organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

Information about the group’s external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

The group's only violent attack occurred in 1987, when it attacked the Ministry of Defense in Bogota, Colombia (GTD 2016). The group is not heard from again. Information about why the group stops using violence could not be found.

II. LATIN AMERICAN ANTI-FASCIST COMMAND
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1987
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2836, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2836
- Searched Proquest
    - "Latin american anti-fascist command"
- Searched gScholar
    - "Latin american anti-fascist command"

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1987 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1987- unknown why group stopped using violence (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Latin American Anti-Fascist Command first came to attention as a violent group in 1987. The group conducted an attack in Cali, Colombia (GTD 2016). The name of the group suggests that the group's ideology was anti-fascist.

Geography

The group has three documented attacks, all which took place in Cali, Colombia (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that suggests the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.
The group conducted three attacks in 1987. The group targeted journalists, businesses, and the government (GTD 2016).

External Ties

Information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

The group conducted its final attack on September 24, 1987, the same day as its other two attacks (GTD 2016). Other information about the group's outcome could not be found.

III. LOS EXTRADITABLES
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: The Extraditables, Los Extraditables

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Los Extraditables." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4284, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dbf5n9nS6k1aWmypsBAxszbOxLRHBaDvklRdprXFMPY/edit
- "Los extraditables rompen con Escobar." El Pais. 1990. http://elpais.com/diario/1990/04/17/internacional/640303203_850215.html
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- "Killing Pablo." CNN. 2003. http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/25/cp.00.html
- Vanessa Buschschluter. "Should drug lord Guzman have been extradited to the U.S.?" BBC. 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-33506562

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1987 (MIPT 2008) but it's first attack is in 1989- the assassination of Weldemar Franklin Quintero, colonel police of Antioquia (El Tiempo 1991).

Group End: 1991- Treaty against extradition

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Los Extraditables formed after the Turbay administration in Colombia, when members of the Medellin Cartel announced they would extradite cartel leaders to the United States (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 1991). The group initially formed as a faction of the cartel and did not operate independently. In 1991, the group became an independent faction (El Tiempo 1991).

The group opposed the US Extradition treaty of 1987 and employed violence to lobby the Colombian government to change it (MIPT 2008). Pablo Escobar, the most important drug trafficker in the Medellin Cartel, became one of the main leaders of Los Extraditables (MIPT 2008; El País 1990). The group's motto was "we prefer a grave in Colombia than a jail in the US" (El Pais 1990; The Economist 2015). The group aimed to amend the Constitution, which allowed them to be extradited. The group has no clear ideology.

Geography

The group operated in Colombia and was based in Medellin (CNN 2003). Escobar operated from the prison, La Catedral, located in Medellin, Colombia (CNN 2003). It is unclear specifically where the cartels distributed or sold drugs.

Organizational Structure

Los Extraditables formed from members of the Medellin Cartel (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 1991). The most well-known leader is Pablo Escobar, despite the fact that the group in 1990 said that Escobar was not helping their mission and that he was responsible for the violence (El Pais 1990; El Tiempo 1991).

Escobar, one of the most notorious narcos, led the cocaine trade in Colombia, as a leader of the Cartel Medellin (later Los Extraditables) (El Pais 1990; El Tiempo 1991; CNN 2003).

Los Extraditables usually targets journalists and politicians that advocated for extradition of its members (MIPT 2008). The group usually kidnapped and murdered high profile victims (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 1991; CNN 2003). The victims include Colombian

presidential candidates, including Luis Carlos Galán. The group allegedly plotted to assassinate US president George W. Bush (CNN 2003). The group offered $4,300 for the death of a police officer and $10,500 for any member of the special forces fighting drugs (El Pais 1990).

The group often sent out messages throughout the country to communicate their resentment against the government (El Tiempo 1991; El Pais 1990).

External Ties

Los Extraditables formed from members of the Medellin Cartel (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 1991). The group despised the Cartel de Cali and their leader Rodríguez Orejuela (El Tiempo 1991). The Cali Cartel allegedly bribed Colombian politicians to vote against extradition. Consequently, the next constitution prohibited extradition (Rempel 2007).

Group Outcome

In 1990, the group sent a message to the Colombian president that said the group blamed Pablo Escobar for the war against the government (El Pais 1990). In 1991, the group announced it would stop taking military action to fight against extradition (El Tiempo 1991). The group became independent of the Medellin Cartel (El Tiempo 1991). At first Escobar was jailed in La Catedral. He conducted crimes from jail and was thus transferred to Bogota in 1992 (CNN 2003). Escobar later escaped from Bogota and was shot in 1992 (Buschschluter 2015; CNN 2003). In December 1997, bribes by the Cartel de Cali led the Colombian government to ban extraditions to the US (Buschschluter 2015; MIPT 2008; Rempel 2007). Nonetheless, cartel members still feared extradition. The group dismantled by the end of the 1990s (MIPT 2008). The specific year the group fell apart could not be found.

IV. COMUNEROS
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1987
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2498, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2498
- Search Proquest
    - comuneros colombia cali 1987
    - Comuneros colombia 1987

- Search gScholar
    - Comuneros colombia 1987

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1987 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1987-reason for ending violence unknown (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Comuneros first came to attention as a violent group in 1987. The group conducted an attack against a business in Cali, Colombia (GTD 2016). More information about the group's formation and ideology could not be found.

Geography

The group conducted its first attack in Cali, Colombia in 1987 (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that this group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure and funding could not be found.

External Ties

Information about the group's external ties could not be found

Group Outcome

Very little is known about this group. The group only conducted one attack, which occurred in 1987 (GTD 2016). Further information about the group's outcome could not be found.

V. NATIONAL SOCIALIST CIVIC WORKERS MOVEMENT
Min. Group Date: 1988
Max. Group Date: 1988
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2572, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2572
- Search Proquest
    - “NATIONAL SOCIALIST CIVIC WORKERS MOVEMENT”
    - NATIONAL SOCIALIST CIVIC WORKERS MOVEMENT colombia
- Search gScholar
    - “NATIONAL SOCIALIST CIVIC WORKERS MOVEMENT”
    - NATIONAL SOCIALIST CIVIC WORKERS MOVEMENT colombia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1988 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1988- reason for stopping use of violence unknown (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The National Socialist Civic Workers Movement first came to attention as a violent group on March 4, 1988. The group conducted an attack in Uraba, Colombia that resulted in 21 fatalities (GTD 2016). The group's name suggests the group had a leftist and socialist ideology. Other information about the group’s formation could not be found. .

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Colombia in the cities of Uraba and Bogota (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that this group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group’s organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group directed its known attacks at private citizens, private property, and a business (GTD 2016). Other information about the group’s external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group. The group's second and last act of violence occurred on March 28, 1988 in Bogota, Colombia (GTD 2016). Other information about the group's outcome could not be found.

VI. JORGE ELIECER GAITAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Min. Group Date: 1988
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2318, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2318
- Other news to note: [3 STAR edition 4]. 1988. Orlando Sentinel, Apr 14, 1988. http://proxygw.wrlc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/other-news-note/docview/277298315/se-2?accountid=11243 (accessed March 10, 2021).
- Sun-Sentinel, wire services. 1988. THATCHER DECLARES WELFARE CHANGES: [SUN-SENTINEL EDITION]. Sun Sentinel, Apr 12, 1988. http://proxygw.wrlc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/thatcher-declares-welfare-changes/docview/389516273/se-2?accountid=11243 (accessed March 10, 2021).

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1988 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1989- reason for stopping violence is unknown (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Jorge Eliecer Gaitan Nationalist Movement first came to attention as a violent group in 1988, when it conducted an attack in Ibague, Colombia (GTD 2016). Its first attack was the kidnapping of former Governor of Tolima Dept, Eduardo Alzate. The group said the kidnapping was to protest the Governor's negligence for a volcano eruption several

years earlier (Orlando Sentinel 1988; Sun Sentinel 1988). The group's name is an homage to Jorge Eliercer Gatan whose assassination in 1948 prompted La Violencia in Colombia. It was described as having a leftist ideology (Orlando Sentinel 1988; Sun Sentinel 1988). Other information about the group's formation could not be found.

Geography

The group conducted attacks in Colombia in the cities of Ibague and Medellin (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group targeted its attacks towards the government (GTD 2016). Other information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

In 1988, the governor was released unharmed after a few days (Orlando Sentinel 1988; Sun Sentinel 1988). The group's last attack occurred in 1989 (GTD 2016).

VII. DEATH TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS
Min. Group Date: 1988
Max. Group Date: 1988
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2575, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2575
- "Car Bomb Kills Two, Wounds Five, Destroys Homes." Associated Press. 1988. http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1988/Car-Bomb-Kills-Two-Wounds-Five-Destroys-Homes/id-0c9eaeac2a01c20489ef479f56e8edc7

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1988 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1988-reason for stopping the use of violence is unknown (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

"Death to Drug Traffickers" first came to attention as a violent group in 1988 (GTD 2016; Associated Press 1988). This anti-drug trafficking group allegedly set a car bomb that damaged a building owned by the infamous drug trafficker Pablo Escobar (Associated Press 1988). More information about the group's formation could not be found.

Geography

The group conducted an attack in Medellin, Colombia (GTD 2016; Associated Press 1988). There is no evidence that this group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

"Death to Drug Traffickers" allegedly set off a car bomb that damaged a building owned by the infamous drug trafficker Pablo Escobar (Associated Press 1988). Further information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little information about this group. The group only conducted one attack -- in 1988 (GTD 2016; Associated Press 1988). Other information about the group's outcome could not be found.

VIII. JAIME BATEMAN CAYON GROUP (JBC)
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Jaime Bateman Cayon Group.” Terrorist Organization Profile No. 57, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dbf5n9nS6k1aWmypsBAxszbOxLRHBaDvklRdprXFMPY/edit
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Colombia: Jaime Bateman Cayón group, including its activities, affiliation to any other group and treatment of its members by the authorities (2001 - March 2002), 15 March 2002, COL38367.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be2330.html
- GTD Perpetrator 426, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=426
- Martha Crenshaw. “April 19 Movement.” Mapping Militants Project. 2015. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/91
- IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Relations between the Jaime Bateman Cayón (JBC) group and the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) [COL41240.E], 26. Mai 2003 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
- http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/90143/189124_de.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Bateman Cayon Group (Crenshaw 2015)

Group Formation: 1990 (Crenshaw 2015; Canada IRB 2002)

Group End: last violent attack 2001 (Crenshaw 2015; Canada IRB 2003)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Jaime Bateman Canyon (JBC) Group, originally a militant faction of M-19, splintered in 1990, after M-19 reached a peace agreement with the Colombian government (Crenshaw 2015). Jaime Bateman helped found the M-19 but died in 1983 (Crenshaw 2015). In 1990, a group of members known as the JBC faction refused to demobilize and splintered from the M-19 (Crenshaw 2015; Canada IRB 2002; MIPT 2008). After Bateman’s death, Alfonso Morales Restrepo and Alonso Granales Lemus led the JBC (Canada IRB 2002). Jaime Bateman and the M-19 believed in Marxist-Leninist, leftist ideologies (Crenshaw 2015; Canada IRB 2002). The group sought to overthrow the Colombian government and believed the peace accord did not make sufficient overtures to meet its interests (MIPT 2008). The group’s first violent attack could not be found but occurred as late as 1994 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The JBC conducted all of its operations within Colombian borders. The group conducted attacks in the Colombian cities of Florida, Bogota, Corinto, Cali, and Caicedonia (GTD 2016; Canada IRB 2002). There is no evidence that the group had bases in other countries.

Organizational Structure

Jaime Bateman helped found the M-19 and led the JBC until 1983, when he died (Crenshaw 2015). After Bateman's death, Alfonso Morales Restrepo and Alonso Granales Lemus led the JBC (Canada IRB 2002). In 2001, Alonso Arrobio Villegas led the JBC (Canada IRB 2002). Under the leaders, the group also had commanders, including Kleiner Stanley Benavides (Canada IRB 2002).

The group has an estimated 50 to 200 members (Canada IRB 2002). Members of this group are ex-M-19 militants.

The group organized several prominent kidnappings (Crenshaw 2015; Canada IRB 2003). More information about group funding is unknown.

External Ties

The group allegedly conducted attacks with the FARC in 2000 (Canada IRB 2002). In 2001, the group worked with the FARC in an attack on Florida, Colombia (Canada IRB 2002). The JBC also allegedly planned on uniting with the ELN and FARC to discuss peace agreements with the government through the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (Canada IRB 2002). The JBC often came into contact with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a government-sanctioned paramilitary group (Canada IRB 2003). Starting in 1999, the group moved into areas occupied by the FARC, JBC, and ELN as an intimidation effort (Canada IRB 2003). In 1999, the FARC, JBC, and ELN joined forces to attack the AUC (Canada IRB 2003).

Group Outcome

The JBC often came in contact with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which was a government-sanctioned paramilitary group (Canada IRB 2003). Beginning in 1999, the group moved into areas occupied by the FARC, JBC, and ELN to challenge their presence (Canada IRB 2003). Starting in March 2001, the government captured the main leader at the time, Alonso Arrobio Villegas, and continued capturing commanders in the following months (Canada IRB 2002). In September 2001, the government captured two more leaders of the JBC: Jairo Agudelo and Jairo Pito. The leaders said that the JBC had almost completely demobilized (Canada IRB 2002; Crenshaw 2015). After the arrest of these leaders, the group became inactive.

IX. DEATH TO BAZUQUEROS
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2035, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2035
- Searched Proquest
    - "DEATH TO BAZUQUEROS"
    - DEATH TO BAZUQUEROS Colombia
- Searched gScholar
    - "DEATH TO BAZUQUEROS"
    - DEATH TO BAZUQUEROS Colombia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1989 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1990- reason for ending violence is unknown (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

“Death to Bazuqueros” first came to attention as a violent group on January 5, 1989, when it conducted an attack in Popayan, Colombia (GTD 2016). The group conducted two more attacks that same day in Popayan, Colombia (GTD 2016). The group directed its attack at private citizens and property. The attacks did not result in injuries or deaths (GTD 2016). More information about the group’s formation could not be found

Geography

The group conducted all its attacks in Popayan, Colombia (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group directed its attack at private citizens and property (GTD 2016). More information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

The group's only documented attacks occurred on July 7, 1990 (GTD 2016). All three attacks took place in Popayan, Colombia (GTD 2016). The group's reasons for ceasing violent activities could not be found.

X. CALI NARCOTICS CARTEL
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1991
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- "The Colombian Cartels." *Drug Wars.* Frontline. 2000. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Colombia: Information on the current status of the Cali drug cartel and its competition and of the extended family of cartel leader Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, 1 October 1995, COL21691.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab6950.html
- William Rempel. "A daring betrayal helped wipe out Cali cocaine cartel." Seattle Times. 2007. http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/a-daring-betrayal-helped-wipe-out-cali-cocaine-cartel/
- Evan Perez. "US declares victory over Cali Cartel." CNN. 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/19/politics/us-cali-cartel/index.html
- GTD Perpetrator 2241. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2016. https://www.start.umdo.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2241

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1989 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 2005 (Rempel 2007) - captured by government (Perez 2014; Rempel 2007)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Cali Narcotics Cartel first came to attention as a violent group when it conducted an attack in Buenaventura, Colombia in 1989 (GTD 2016). The Orejuela brothers and Santacruz Londono founded this Colombian-based group (Frontline 2000; Canada IRB 1995). The group did not have political aim but engaged in narco-terrorism and drug trafficking (Perez 2014)

Geography

The group had numerous hiding places in Cali and Cauca (Canada IRB 1995). The group shipped cocaine to the US, Colombia, Panama, Asia, and allegedly Bolivia (Frontline 2000; Canada IRB 1995; Rempel 2007). The group conducted attacks in Cali and Buenaventura, Colombia, and in New York City (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

The Cali Cartel was one of the main controllers of the cocaine trade (Frontline 2000). The group mainly received funds from the drug trade (Frontline 2000). Group leaders made sure that workers for the Cali Cartel knew little about each other (Frontline 2000). The Orejuela brothers and Santacruz Londono founded the group (Frontline 2000; Canada IRB 1995).

The leaders paid top notch lawyers to investigate the plans of the DEA and Colombian government. They also funded renowned engineers to create equipment that would make the group's operations harder to detect (Frontline 2000). Furthermore, the Cali Cartel invested in legitimate successful businesses for the sake of political protection (Frontline 2000; Canada IRB 1995).

The group had a strong rivalry with the Medellin Cartel and its leader, Pablo Escobar (Frontline 2000). The group later formed the People Against Pablo Escobar (PEPES) and provided the Colombian police information about Escobar (Frontline 2000).

The group had neither a centralized board of leaders nor a hierarchy (Canada IRB 1995). Instead, the group was cartel-based (Canada IRB 1995).

External Ties

The group had a strong rivalry with the Medellin Cartel and its leader, Pablo Escobar (Frontline 2000). The group later formed the People Against Pablo Escobar (PEPES) and provided the Colombian police information about Escobar (Frontline 2000). The group allegedly bribed some Colombian politicIans to vote against extradition. Consequently, when Colombia formed a new constitution, extradition was not allowed (Rempel 2007).

Group Outcome

A former Cali Cartel leader, Jorge Salcedo, grew tired of the horrible drug empire environment and helped the DEA track down the group (Rempel 2007). The US continued pressuring the Colombian government to track down the groups and extradite their members to the US (Rempel 2007). The group allegedly bribed some Colombian politicIans to vote against extradition. Consequently, when Colombia formed a new constitution, extradition was not allowed (Rempel 2007). In 1995, the US and the Colombian police, with the help of Salcedo, captured Miguel Orejuela, the group's main leader at the time (Rempel 2007). In the following months, the authorities began cracking down on the group's drug empire and arrested hundreds of members (Rempel 2007; Perez 2014). In 2005, Miguel and Gilberto Orejuela were extradited to the US, where they pleaded guilty (Rempel 2007; Perez 2014).

XI. WORKER'S FORCES OF LIBERATION
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2365. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2016. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2365
- Searched Proquest
    - "WORKERS' FORCES OF LIBERATION"
    - WORKERS' FORCES OF LIBERATION Colombia
- Searched gScholar
    - "WORKERS' FORCES OF LIBERATION"
    - WORKERS' FORCES OF LIBERATION Colombia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1989 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1989 - reason for stopping violence is unknown (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Worker's Forces of Liberation first came to attention as a violent group in 1989. The group conducted an attack targeted at religious figures and institutions in Bogota, Colombia (GTD 2016). More information about the group's formation could not be found.

Geography

The group conducted an attack in Bogota, Colombia (GTD 2016). There is no evidence to suggest that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group conducted an attack in 1989 aimed at religious figures and institutions (GTD 2016). Other information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group. The group only conducted one attack, which occurred in 1989 (GTD 2016). Reasons why the group stopped using violence could not be determined.

Colombia Cases, Part 4: 1990-1997
Last Updated: 1 July 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1665	CLEANSING HAND (LA MANO QUE LIMPIA)		1990	1990
T1666	COLOMBIAN REVOLUTION		1990	1990

T454	LAS AUTODEFENSAS CAMPESINAS DE CORDOBA Y URAB (ACCU)		1990	1998
T1176	MEDELLIN DRUG CARTEL		1991	1992
T1878	POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDOS		1991	1991
T1791	LIBARDO MORATORO FRONT		1992	1992
T1667	COMANDO INDEPENDIENTE REVOLUCIONARIO		1992	1992
T200	EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO GUEVARISTA (ERG)		1993	2000
T371	PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (COLOMBIA)		1997	2005
T521	COLOMBIAN UNITED SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS (AUC)		1997	2009

I. CLEANSING HAND (LA MANO QUE LIMPIA)
Min. Group Date: 1990
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2030, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2030
- Searched proquest
    - Cleansing hand colombia
    - “La mano que lumpia” colombia
- Searched gScholar
    - Cleansing hand colombia
    - “La mano que lumpia” colombia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1990 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1990- reason for ending violence unknown (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Cleansing Hand (La Mano Que Limpia) first came to attention as a violent group in 1990. The group conducted an attack targeted at private citizens and property in Envigado, Colombia (GTD 2016). More information about group formation and ideology could not be found.

Geography

The group's first and only attack occurred in Envigado, Colombia (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that the group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group targeted its 1990 attack at private citizens and property (GTD 2016). More information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group. The group's only attack occurred in 1990 (GTD 2016). The group's reasons for stopping violence are unknown.

II. COLOMBIAN REVOLUTION
Min. Group Date: 1990
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2014. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2014
- Searched gScholar
    - "colombian revolution" 1990 turbo

- Searched proquest
    - "colombian revolution" 1990 turbo

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1990 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1990- reasons for stopping violence unknown (GTD 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Colombian Revolution first came to attention as a violent group in 1990, when the group conducted an attack in Turbo, Colombia (GTD 2016). The group targeted its attack against the police. More information about group formation and ideology could not be found.

Geography

The group's first and only attack was in Turbo, Colombia (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group targeted its 1990 attack at police (GTD 2016). More information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group. The group only conducted one attack (GTD 2016). More information about the group's outcome could not be found.

III. LAS AUTODEFENSAS CAMPESINAS DE CORDOBA Y URAB (ACCU)
Min. Group Date: 1990
Max. Group Date: 1998
Onset: NA

Aliases: Peasant Self-Defense Group (Accu), Autodefensas Campesinas De Cordoba Y Uraba, Autodefensas Campesinas De C_rdoba Y Urab_, Autodefensas Campesinas De Cordoba Y Uraba (Accu), Autodefensas Campesinas De C_rdoba Y Urab_ (Accu), Las Autodefensas Campesinas De Cordoba Y Urab (Accu), Las Autodefensas Campesinas De C_rdoba Y Urab_, Peasant Self-Defense Group Of Cordoba And Uraba, Peasant Self-Defense Group Of C_rdoba And Urab_, Self-Defense Groups Of C_rdoba And Urab_, Self-Defense Groups Of Cordoba And Uraba (Accu)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "LAS AUTODEFENSAS CAMPESINAS DE CORDOBA Y URAB." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 109, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dbf5n9nS6k1aWmypsBAxszbOxLRHBaDvklRdprXFMPY/edit
- "ACCU." Verdad Abierta. N.D. http://www.verdadabierta.com/masacres-seccion/483-timeline/5158-creacion-de-las-auto defensas-campesinas-de-cordoba-y-uraba-accu
- "Paramilitary Violations of International Humanitarian Law." Human Rights Watch. 1998. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/colombia/Colom989-04.htm
- Julian Eduardo Barbosa Vargas. "CONFIGURACIÓN DIFERENCIADA DE LAS AUTODEFENSAS CAMPESINAS DE CÓRDOBA Y URABÁ EN EL URABÁ: Norte de Urabá, Eje Bananero, Sur del Urabá antioqueño y Urabá chocoano*" Analisis Politico. 2015. http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0121-47052015000200003
- "AUC." InsightCrime. 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/auc-profile
- GTD Perpetrator 709. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=709
- "Terrorism Review." 1997. Central Intelligence Agency. Declassified. P. 19. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000622189.pdf
- McGirk, Jan. 2006. "Obituaries: CARLOS CASTANO ; Colombian Paramilitary Leader." The Independent, Sep 06, 32. https://search.proquest.com/docview/311052088?accountid=14026.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1994 (Vargas 2015)

Group End: 1997 (“merged” with the AUC), 1998 last attack (GTD 2017),2004 (McGirk 2006)- peace agreement signed in 2006 (Insight Crime 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1994, Carlos Castaño formed Las Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Uraba (ACCU). The ACCU first came to attention as a violent group in 1995 (GTD 2017).

After peace negotiations with the EPL in 1992, the Castaño family disarmed and focused instead on assisting families attacked by the guerrilla group (Human Rights Watch 1998; Vargas 2015). In 1994, Fidel Castaño was kidnapped. This event inspired Carlos Castano to ACCU in order to fight against guerrillas (HRW 1998). Under the ACCU, Carlos Castaño worked with remaining paramilitary leaders, who also desired to continue fighting FARC and guerrilla sympathizers (Verdad Abierta N.D.; MIPT 2008; Human Rights Watch 1998; Insight Crime 2015).

The ACCU was right-wing and sought to destroy the leftist guerrilla groups in Colombia. The ACCU did not oppose the Colombian government and military and government (Human Rights Watch 1998; Vargas 2015).

Geography

The group largely bases its operations out of Colombia. The group was very active in northwestern Colombia and along the border with Panama (1997). Within Colombia, the group operated in Uraba, Guaviare, Putumayo, Bolivar, Magdalena, Cesar, Valencia, and Tierralta (Vargas 2015; Human Rights Watch 1998).

The group was transnational. The group entered Panama in pursuit of guerrillas there (Human Rights Watch 1998). The ACCU also conducted an attack in Panama (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group had a central command, led by Carlos Castaño, and smaller teams for different regions affected by guerillas (Human Rights Watch 1998). Each regional team had local and mobile groups, which had better training (Human Rights Watch 1998). Regional groups were paid for by the civilians of that region, if they desired a group there for protection (Human Rights Watch 1998). Many former EPL members joined the regional groups (Human Rights Watch 1998). All members received supplies and a salary (Human Rights Watch 1998).

The Castaño family is also allegedly linked to drug trafficking. Money from the drug trade may have provided funding to the ACCU (Human Rights Watch 1998; MIPT 2008).

In 1996, the group leaders claimed to have 6,000 members (Human Rights Watch 1998). At its peak, the ACCU had an estimated 31,000 paramilitary fighters (McGirk 2006),

External Ties

Under the leadership of the Castaño brothers, the ACCU originally operated in the early 1990s as a non-violent local militia for the self-defense of northwestern Colombia. In 1994, Carlos Castaño formed the ACCU and then the AUC, an umbrella organization, in 1997. The ACCU later operated under the AUC (MIPT 2008).

In 1996, “Bloque Elmer Cardenas” joined the ACCU (Verdad Abierta n.d.). The group also became increasingly violent, taking responsibility for 90 deaths within 22 days that year (Human Rights Watch 1998). This outraged the Colombian government. The US allegedly offered money to the Colombian government to assist in the capture of Carlos Castaño (Human Rights Watch 1998).

Group Outcome

In 1996, the group became increasingly violent, taking responsibility for 90 deaths within 22 days (Human Rights Watch 1998). This outraged the Colombian government. The US allegedly offered money to the Colombian government to assist in the capture of Carlos Castaño (Human Rights Watch 1998). Nevertheless, the Colombian government could not find him. Carlos continued attacking civilians on account for their alleged support of guerrilla groups (Human Rights Watch 1998). The ACCU conducted their last attack in 1998 (GTD 2017).

In 2004, Castaño participated in peace talks with the Colombian president (McGirk 2006). That same year, a fight broke out between group members and government bodyguards, resulting in Castaño’s death (McGirk 2006). In 2006, the entire AUC -- the umbrella organization which the AUCC now operated under -- signed a peace agreement with the government (Insight Crime 2015). The government, however, did not have enough manpower to verify the organization’s compliance with the accord. As a result, many AUC members splintered into paramilitary, narco groups or joined existing ones, including Urabeños, Rastrajos, and Águilas Negras (Insight Crime 2015).

Notes for Iris:
-1996 timing of attack prompts large government response and tied soon to 1997

- government COIN decimates the group's organizational capabilities and incentivizes them to merge with other paramilitaries → increase violence

IV. MEDELLIN DRUG CARTEL
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 1992
Onset: NA

Aliases: Medellin Cartel, Medellin Drug Cartel

Part 1. Bibliography

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- "Extraditables: Fin de la Terror." El Tiempo. 1991. http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-114707

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: mid 1970's (Frontline 2014)

Group End: 1993 (McDermott 2013) - capturing of cartel officials is suspected reason for halting violence

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Medellin Cartel formed in the mid-1970s (Frontline 2014). This narco-terrorist group had no clear ideology or political aim (McDermott 2013). The leaders and founders of the Medellin Cartel included the infamous Pablo Escobar, who started a petty criminal; the Ochoa brothers, who came from a rich and respected family; and Jose Gonzalez Rodriguez Gacha, who had worked in the Colombian emerald trade (Frontline 2014; McDermott 2013). It is unknown when the group first started engaging in violent activities.

Geography

The Medellin Cartel was transnational and had an extensive cocaine empire (McDermott 2013). The group had two cocaine bases in Peru and Bolivia, though the group processed the cocaine in the jungles of Colombia (McDermott 2013). With the help of marijuana smuggler Carlos Lehder, the group also shipped great amounts of cocaine to the US (McDermott 2013; Frontline 2014: Woody 2016). The group allegedly had islands in the Caribbean that it used to refuel planes to the US (Frontline 2014).

Organizational Structure

The group primarily acquired its funding through cocaine trade, earning on average $60 million daily (McDermott 2013; Llana 2010). The group also held responsibility for homicides, resulting in the highest violence rates in Medellin that ever occurred (Llana 2010). Members of the group were primarily criminals (Frontline 2014; McDermott 2013).

Carlos Lehder led the cocaine shipping operations (Frontline 2014: Woody 2016). The group's main leader was Pablo Escobar (Frontline 2014; McDermott 2013).

In 1987, Escobar formed Los Extraditables, a faction of the cartel. The faction fought against the government for the 1987 US Extradition treaty that threatened to extradite drug lords like Escobar to the US (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 1991; Frontline 2014). In 1991, the faction officially splintered and worked independently from the Medellin Cartel (El Tiempo 1991).

The group had different members in charge of shipping, lab work, and selling of cocaine across a diffuse cell structure (Frontline 2014; Woody 2016; McDermott 2013).

External Ties

The Cali Cartel and PEPES (People Against Pablo Escobar) often attempted to sabotage the group's activities. These groups competed with the Medellin Cartel. The Cali Cartel also sought to disrupt Medellin's activities, as Escobar killed Cali Cartel leaders (McDermott 2013).

Carlos Ledher confessed in court that Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian dictator, had helped the Medellin Cartel with money laundering (Woody 2016). In 1987, Escobar turned in Ledher for shooting one of his men (Woody 2016). Ledher was then given a life sentence and extradited to the US (Woody 2016).

In 1987, Escobar formed Los Extraditables, a faction of the cartel. The faction fought against the government for the 1987 US Extradition treaty that threatened to extradite drug lords like Escobar to the US (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 1991; Frontline 2014). In 1991, the faction officially splintered and worked independently from the Medellin Cartel (El Tiempo 1991).

Group Outcome

In 1987, Escobar formed Los Extraditables, a faction of the cartel. The faction fought against the government for the 1987 US Extradition treaty that threatened to extradite drug lords like Escobar to the US (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 1991; Frontline 2014). In 1991, the faction officially splintered and worked independently from the Medellin Cartel (El Tiempo 1991).

When Escobar was first jailed in La Catedral, he was able to conduct crimes from jail. In 1992, Escobar consequently transferred to Bogota (CNN 2003). He later escaped from Bogota and was shot in 1993 (Buschschluter 2015; CNN 2003; Frontline 2014).

In the 1990s, the three Ochoa brothers turned themselves in to the Colombian government and were promised lighter sentences in return (Frontline 2014). Meanwhile, the Colombian police shot Rodriguez Gacha (Frontline 2014). After the murders of its group leaders, the Medellin Cartel became inactive (MIPT 2008). The last known group activity took place in 1993, when Escobar was shot (Buschschluter 2015; CNN 2003; Frontline 2014; McDermott 2013).

Notes for Iris:
-leadership decapitation plays a big role in explaining group violence here
-after Escobar's death, then there is no replacement

V. POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDOS
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 1991
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 1610, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1610
- Searched gScholar
    - POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDOS
    - "POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDOS" Colombia
- Searched Proquest
    - POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDOS
    - "POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDOS" Colombia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1991 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 1991 (GTD 2016) - reason for stopping violence is unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Popular Revolutionary Commandos first came to attention as a violent group in 1991, when it conducted an attack targeted at a business in Cartagena, Colombia (GTD 2016). More information about group formation and ideology could not be found.

Geography

The group's two attacks took place in Cartagena, Colombia (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group's attacks in 1991 were targeted at businesses (GTD 2016). More information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group. The group conducted its second and final attack the same day as its first in 1991 (GTD 2016). Information about the group's outcome could not be found.

V. LIBARDO MORATORO FRONT
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 5085, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=5085
- "Victor Navarro, alias 'Megateo,' InsightCrime, 2016, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/megateo-epl
- "Colombian drug kingpin 'Megateo' slain in military operation." San Diego Union Tribune. 2015. http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/hoy-san-diego/sdhoy-colombia-drug-kingpin-megateo-slain-in-military-2015oct02-story.html
- Martha Crenshaw. "Popular Liberation Army." Mapping Militants. 2015. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/119
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- "Megateo: el capo del Catatumbo." Semana. 2013. http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/megateo-capo-del-catatumbo/351401-3

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: group formed 1991 (San Diego Union Tribune 2015), but conducted first attack in 1992 (GTD 2016)

Group End: 2014 (Crenshaw 2015)- peace agreement with government

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Librado Moratoro Front (LMF) was a faction that splintered from the EPL after a peace agreement in 1991 (Crenshaw 2015; San Diego Union Tribune 2015; McDermott 2016). Not all EPL members agreed with demobilizing, and some factions remained armed, including the LMF (Crenshaw 2015; San Diego Union Tribune 2015; McDermott 2016). Victor Ramon Navarro Serrano “Megateo,” former leader of the EPL, led the LMF. The LMF became independent of the EPL in 1991 (Crenshaw 2015; San Diego Union Tribune 2015).

Like the EPL, the LMF adhered to leftist, Maoist, and Marxist ideologies (San Diego Union Tribune 2015; Crenshaw 2015; McDermott 2016). The group was center-seeking, as it disapproved of the Colombian government and desired a more leftist regime (Crenshaw 2015). The LMF believed the 1991 peace agreement did not provide a fair deal and did not trust the government to enforce.

Geography

The group conducted an attack in 1992 in Ocana, Colombia (GTD 2016). In Catatumbo, in the North of Santander region in Colombia, the group said it collected a “tax on drugs” to acquire funding (San Diego Tribune 2015; McDermott 2016). According to US officials, the group trafficked cocaine to the United States and the Dominican Republic (McDermott 2016).

Organizational Structure

Not all EPL members agreed with demobilizing, and some factions remained armed, including the LMF (Crenshaw 2015; San Diego Union Tribune 2015; McDermott 2016). Victor Ramon Navarro Serrano, a former leader of the EPL and referred to as “Megateo,” led the LMF (Crenshaw 2015; San Diego Union Tribune 2015). Megateo was 15 when the EPL demobilized (McDermott 2013). Members were ex-militants from the EPL.

In 1992, the group conducted an attack in Ocana, Colombia, targeting the government (GTD 2016). In Catatumbo, in the North of Santander region in Colombia, the group said it collected a “tax on drugs” to acquire funding (San Diego Tribune 2015; McDermott 2016). More specifically, the group trafficked cocaine (McDermott 2016). At its start, the group had an estimated 50 members (McDermott 2016). The group was also responsible for various kidnappings (Crenshaw 2015). In 2014, the group had between 70 and 100 members (Crenshaw 2015). Victor Navarro was only 15 years old when he started the group (San Diego Tribune 2015).

External Ties

The group worked with the FARC, ELN, and the Rastrojos (McDermott 2013). The police reported that the group bought cocaine from the FARC and ELN labs in Colombia (McDermott 2016).

Group Outcome

Throughout the early 2000s, the group continued attacks alongside the ELN and FARC (Crenshaw 2015). The group conducted its final attack in 2014 (Crenshaw 2015). Finally, in 2014, the FARC and ELN initiated peace talks with Colombian government (Crenshaw 2015). Megateo, the group's leader, expressed that he wanted to join the peace agreements (Crenshaw 2015; McDermott 2016; Semana 2013). In 2015, Megateo was killed in a military operation on the Colombia-Venezuela border (San Diego Tribune 2015). There is no evidence the group participated in peace talks or partook in a peace agreement before Megateo's death (Crenshaw 2015; McDermott 2016; Semana 2013).

VI. COMANDO INDEPENDIENTE REVOLUCIONARIO
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 2052, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2052
- Luis Alberto Villamarin Pulido. El Eln por dentro: Historia de la cuadrilla Carlos Alirio Buitrago. Self-published. 2015. P. 108. https://books.google.com/books?id=8bhNCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA108&lpg=PA108&dq=%22COMANDO+INDEPENDIENTE+REVOLUCIONARIO%22&source=bl&ots=GLz5OpywpR&sig=KQKmTmIpPjAVPHa1nskYyQ_2f0s&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiwm9SW5O3UAhXjxYMKHVxcDoMQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&q=%22COMANDO%20INDEPENDIENTE%20REVOLUCIONARIO%22&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: CIR

Group Formation: 1987 (Pulido 2015 p 109).

Group End: 1992 (GTD 2016) - begins merging into CAB in 1990 and eventually stops acting as the CIR around 1992 (Pulido 2015, 109).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Comando Independiente Revolucionario (CIR) formed under Palizada, Aníbal, William, and Marcos in 1987 (Pulido 2015, 108). The group's ideology was communist. Palizada taught his young group members to fight for the communist revolution (Pulido 2015, 108). The group's political aims were center seeking, as the group fought for a more leftist regime. It is unknown precisely when the group's first attack occurred, but it is documented that the group perpetrated an attack in 1992 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group was active in San Luis, Doradal, Monteloro, El Fierro, Manizales, and Granada (Pulido 2015, 108). The group often conducted attacks on the highway between Medellin and Bogota (Pulido 2015, 108). The group was based in La Granja, Colombia (Pulido 2015, 172). In 1992, the group attacked an educational institution in Medellin, Colombia (GTD 2016). There is no evidence that the CIR was transnational.

Organizational Structure

The group killed local criminals for funding (Pulido 2015, 172). The group's leaders were teenagers (Pulido 2015, 171). In 1990, the group worked together with the CAB, whose members were also teenagers (Pulido 2015, 109). The group often conducted attacks on the highway between Medellin and Bogota (Pulido 2015, 108). More information about group funding and structure is unknown. Palizada, along with Aníbal, William, and Marcos, formed the group (Pulido 2015, 108).

External Ties

The CIR conducted attacks in the name of the ELN (Pulido 2015, 108). By 1990, Palizada had eight bandits under his direction and accepted an offer to (re) join the CAB (Pulido 2015, 109).

Group Outcome

In 1992, the CIR conducted its final attack under the CIR name (GTD 2016). It is unclear whether the group merged with the CAB. Other information about the CIR's outcome could not be found.

VII. EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO GUEVARISTA (ERG)
Min. Group Date: 1993
Max. Group Date: 2000

Onset: NA

Aliases: Ejercito Revolucionario Guevarista (Guevarist Revolutionary Army), Ejercito Revolucionario Guevarista, Ejercito Revolucionario Guevarista (Erg), Guevarista Revolutionary Army (Erg), Pro-Guevara Revolutionary Group

Part 1. Bibliography

- "EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO GUEVARISTA (ERG)." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 48, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dbf5n9nS6k1aWmypsBAxszbOxLRHBaDvklRdprXFMPY/edit
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- Jeremy McDermott. "Colombia seeks rebels' surrender." BBC. 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7582292.stm

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1993 (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 2005; Urrea 2015; McDermott 2008).

Group End: 2008 - demobilization due to peace treaty and decreased number of members due to army and loss of members to the FARC and ELN (Urrea 2015; Semana 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The ERG splintered from the ELN in 1993 (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 2005; Urrea 2015; BBC 2008). Jesus Sanchez Caro, a former member of the ELN, formed the group (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 2008; Urrea 2015). He decided to form a splinter because he did not agree with the way the ELN handled finances and the group's poor organization (Urrea

2015). The Sanchez Caro family had an estimated 100 members, of which many joined the ERG (El Tiempo 2008; Semana 2008).

Like the ELN, the ERG was a leftist group (MIPT 2008). The group also said it fought for justice and equality in the government (Urrea 2015).

Geography

The group originated from Carmen del Altrato, a Colombian municipality (Semana 2008; El Tiempo 2005; BBC 2008). The group has been active in Choco, Risaralda, Bagado, Guaduas, Antioquia, and el Valle (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 2008). There is no evidence that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

The ERG was an ELN faction and splintered in 1993 (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 2005; Urrea 2015; BBC 2008). Members were former militants from the ELN. When the group formed in 1993, it consisted of Jesus Sanchez Caro and 18 other guerilla fighters (El Tiempo 2005; Urrea 2015). At its peak, the group reportedly had between 200 and 400 members (El Tiempo 2005; Semana 2008). The group used kidnapping for ransom as a source of funding (El Tiempo 2005). The group also burned cars and assassinated government officials, civilians, and police (El Tiempo 2005)

Jesus Sanchez Caro, a former member of the ELN, formed the ERG (MIPT 2008; El Tiempo 2008; Urrea 2015). He decided to form a splinter because he did not agree with the way the ELN handled finances and also claimed that the ELN had poor organization (Urrea 2015). His brothers, Efrain Sanchez Caro and Lizardo Sanchez Caro, later joined in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Efrain and Lizardo also became leaders of the ERG (El Tiempo 2005). The brothers served mainly as representatives of the group (El Tiempo 2005). The Sanchez Caro brothers are sons of a poor farmer (El Tiempo 2005). Jesus Sanchez Caro, the main leader, is very skilled with military tactics and well-read despite limited schooling (El Tiempo 2005).

In the early 2000s, government attacks and group desertions reduced the group's active combatants to 48. Moreover, Colombian government had imprisoned 13 group members (El Tiempo 2005; Urrea 2015). Other guerillas also vigorously attacked the group in the early 2000s, which further reduced group size (El Tiempo 2005; Semana 2008). When president Alvaro Uribe came into power, the government initiated a stronger policy to end the insurgency. In response, the FARC and ELN wanted the ERG to merge with them in order to increase their strength (Urrea 2015; McDermott 2008).The ERG lost some men to those guerillas in the 2000s (Semana 2008). At its end, the group had about 45 members (McDermott 2008; Semana 2008).

External Ties

The group expressed great animosity towards the “paras” (paramilitary groups), as paras often massacred villages like Guaduas in 1998 (El Tiempo 2005). The group also often fought with the ELN and the FARC over territory (El Tiempo 2005). When president Alvaro Uribe came into power, the government initiated a stronger policy to end the insurgency. In response, the FARC and ELN wanted the ERG to merge with them in order to increase their strength (Urrea 2015; McDermott 2008). The ERG lost some men to those guerillas in the 2000s (Semana 2008).

Group Outcome

The group’s last recorded attack took place in 2002 (MIPT 2008). In 2002, Alvaro Uribe came into power in Colombia with a “tough on crime” political stance. This materialized in both military counterinsurgency operations and increased efforts to restart peace talks (Urrea 2015). These policies greatly impacted all of the ERG’s operations and severely weakened the group (Urrea 2015). In the early 2000s, the Colombian government attacked the group and imprisoned 13 members (El Tiempo 2005; Urrea 2015). Other guerillas also vigorously attacked the group in the early 2000s, which further reduced the group’s size (El Tiempo 2005; Semana 2008). When president Alvaro Uribe came into power, the government initiated a stronger policy to end the insurgency. In response, the FARC and ELN wanted the ERG to merge with them in order to increase their strength (Urrea 2015; McDermott 2008).

In the 2000s, the ERG lost membership due to individual defections and rival guerillas (Semana 2008). The other guerillas so intensely demanded the ERG merge with them that Jesus Sanchez Caro realized that he either had to give his men to them or to the government. Caro preferred the latter (Urrea 2015). The group ended with about 45 members (McDermott 2008; Semana 2008). In August 2008, the group officially demobilized. The group was one of the only groups to completely demobilize in Colombia in those years (Urrea 2015; McDermott 2008). Jesus Sanchez Caro said that the group’s main accomplishment was demobilizing. According to Caro, demobilization illustrated that his group listened to the people, who had said they were tired of the ERG (Semana 2008).

Notes for Iris:

- This is considered a model case for demobilization and disarmament in Colombia in contrast to the 1991 talks and the other talks with the 2003. Interesting effect of government counterinsurgency response and durability of disarmament peace talk.
- Cristina thinks the group’s small size was advantageous in making the peace agreement more durable

- This is one of the first time a counterinsurgency operation really undermines the group's capabilities in Colombia in contrast to other

VIII. PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP)
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 2005
Onset: NA

Aliases: People's Revolutionary Army (Erp), Revolutionary Army Of The People, Ejercito Revolucionario Del Pueblo (Erp), Ejercito Revolucionario Del Pueblo (Erp) (Colombia), Ejercito Revolucionario Del Pueblo (Erp) (Dominican Republic), People's Revolutionary Army (Colombia), Revolutionary People's Army (Erp)

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- "PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 84, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dbf5n9nS6k1aWmypsBAxszbOxLRHBaDvklRdprXFMPY/edit
- Martha Crenshaw. "People's Revolutionary Army (Colombia)." 2012. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/135
- Luz Victor Martinez. "Gobierno Uribe da por muerto al Erp." El Tiempo. 2007. http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-2479563

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1996 (Crenshaw 2015; Martinez 2007).

Group End: 2005 last attack (Crenshaw 2015) - officially demobilized in 2007 due to government pressure (Martinez 2007)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The People's Revolutionary Army of Colombia (ERP) splintered from the ELN in 1996 (MIPT 2008). Nilson Antonio Simanca Bello and Rafael Enrique Simanca Bello founded the group (Crenshaw 2015; Martinez 2007). The group emerged from the Jose Solano Sepulveda front (Crenshaw 2015). The ERP conducted its first attack in 1997 (Crenshaw 2015). The group's ideology was likely communist and revolutionary, as was the ELN's (MIPT 2008; Crenshaw 2015). The group claimed that the government was the real

criminal in Colombia (MIPT 2008).This center-seeking group sought to take over as many government institutions as possible (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group was active in southern Colombia, specifically in Bolivar and Montes de Maria (Crenshaw 2015). The group was also active in the Colombian municipalities of San Jacinto, Marialabaja, El Carmen de Bolívar, San Juan Nepomuceno, Ovejas, Chalan, Las Palmitas, and Choloso (Martinez 2007).

Organizational Structure

The ERP splintered from the ELN (MIPT 2008). The group emerged from the Jose Solano Sepulveda front (Crenshaw 2015).

At an unknown date, the group had several hundred members (MIPT 2008). In 2007, the group had 48 members (Crenshaw 2015). The group kidnapped a few Colombian government officials and civilians (MIPT 2008).

The group usually conducted kidnappings and stole cattle for funding (Crenshaw 2015). The group also used illegal roadblocks in order to conduct crime (MIPT 2008; Crenshaw 2015).

Colombians living in poverty usually joined the group because they perceived the ransom earned from kidnapping as an opportunity to gain money (Crenshaw 2015).

External Ties

The ERP had a rivalry with the FARC over access to resources, territory, and support largely because the groups operated in the same geographic area (Crenshaw 2015). Since the ERP was so small, the rivalry was quite minor and did not turn violent in the same way it did with the ERG (Crenshaw 2015). More information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

The group's last attack occurred in 2005. The attack occurred near the Magdalena River and involved mass kidnappings (Crenshaw 2015). In 2007, due to government pressure, the remaining members, including Rafael Enrique Simana Bello, turned themselves in with their weapons (Martinez 2007).

Notes for Iris:

- It's odd that the clash with FARC is so different against this group and not the ERG. Think about differences between these groups and others?

IX. COLOMBIAN UNITED SELF-DEFENCE GROUPS (AUC)
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 2009
Onset: NA

Aliases: United Self Defense Units Of Colombia (Auc), Autodefensas Unidas De Colombia, Colombian United Self-Defence Groups (Auc), Las Autodefensas Unidas De Colombia (Auc), United Self-Defense Forces Of Colombia (Auc), United Self-Defense Group Of Colombia

Part 1. Bibliography

- "COLOMBIAN UNITED SELF-DEFENCE GROUPS (AUC)." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 126, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dbf5n9nS6k1aWmypsBAxszbOxLRHBaDvklRdprXFMPY/edit
- Martha Crenshaw. "United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia." Mapping Militant Organizations. 2015. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/85
- "AUC." InsightCrime. 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/auc-profile
- "AUC." Global Security. N.D. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/auc.htm
- "Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)." Mackenzie Institute. 2015. http://mackenzieinstitute.com/autodefensas-unidas-de-colombia-auc-3/
- "United Self Defenses Forces/Group of Colombia." FAS. 2016. https://fas.org/irp/world/para/auc.htm
- Stephanie Hanson. "Colombia's Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups." Council on Foreign Relations. 2008. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-right-wing-paramilitaries-and-splinter-groups
- Caitlin Trent. "AUC." Colombia Reports. 2012. https://colombiareports.com/auc/
- "Profile: Colombia's armed groups." 2013. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1997 (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security N.D.) - first attack in 1999 (Crenshaw 2015)

Group End: 2008- reason for disarmament peace treaty and extradition of some members (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The AUC, a paramilitary umbrella group, formed in 1997 (Insight Crime 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2015; FAS 2016; Hanson 2008; Trent 2012; BBC 2013; MIPT 2008). The AUC consisted of seven different regional groups that defended their corresponding regions (Insight Crime 2015; Crenshaw 2015). The Castaño brothers (Carlos Castano was the main leader) founded the AUC. Nevertheless, each regional group had its own leader (Insight Crime 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Hanson 2008). The group's ideology was right wing (Insight Crime 2015).

Geography

The group operated in two-thirds of Colombia, including near the Colombian-Panamanian Border and in the Caribbean Coast region (Insight Crime 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group was also active in Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre Putumayo, and Bolivar (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security N.D;FAS 2016.). The group was involved in transnational drug trafficking (Global Security n.d).

Organizational Structure

The AUC, a paramilitary umbrella organization, formed in 1997 (Insight Crime 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2015; FAS 2016; Hanson 2008; Trent 2012; BBC 2013; MIPT 2008). The AUC consisted of seven different regional groups that defended their corresponding regions (Insight Crime 2015; Crenshaw 2015). The Castaño brothers (Carlos Castano was the main leader) founded the AUC. Nevertheless, each regional group had its own leader (Insight Crime 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Hanson 2008).

The AUC had an estimated 30,000 soldiers at its peak in 2000 (Insight Crime 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group allegedly paid all its members a salary (Global Security n.d.). Members of the group were formed local paramilitaries dispersed across the country that were united under the AUC umbrella.

The group funded itself through kidnappings, drug trafficking, and extortion (Insight Crime 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Hanson 2008; Trent 2012; BBC 2013). In 2003, drug trafficking became a primary source of

funding for the AUC (Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group attacked narco groups, which allowed it to gain vast amounts of money from the drug trade (Insight Crime 2015). The group was responsible for hundreds of murders and kidnappings (Crenshaw 2015). Leader Carlos Castano admitted that about 70% of group funding came from drug trafficking (Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.; FAS 2016; MIPT 2008).

In order for a group to "protect" an area from guerillas, the civilians of that area had to pay the AUC (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.). This money provided another source of funding for the group (Mackenzie Institute 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Global Security n.d.). Additionally, economic elites greatly supported the AUC (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015 ;Trent 2012; MIPT 2008).

The group became increasingly violent overtime and killed anyone that they deemed "guerrilla sympathizers" (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

External Ties

The AUC originally operated in the early 1990s, as a non-violent local militia for self-defense in northwestern Colombia under the leadership of the Castano brothers. In 1994, Carlos Castano formed the ACCU, which was an armed group. Castano later formed the AUC in 1997 and merged the ACCU with it.

Members of the group formed local paramilitaries dispersed across the country and that were united under the AUC umbrella. Colombian military officials allegedly supported the AUC (Insight Crime 2015).

The AUC attacked Escobar's Medellin Cartel (Hanson 2008; Trent 2012). The group, however, primarily attacked FARC and ELN (Insight Crime 2015; Global Security n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2015; FAS 2016; Hanson 2008; MIPT 2008).

The US government announced it would help end drug trade in Colombia (Insight Crime 2015). The AUC feared the anticipated US action and subsequently expressed openness to peace negotiations (Insight Crime 2015).

Group Outcome

In 2003, the group's focus shifted from paramilitary activity to drug trafficking (Global Security N.D.; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The US announced it would help end drug trade in Colombia (Insight Crime 2015). Carlos Castano, afraid of US action, expressed willingness to engage in peace negotiations in 2003 with President Uribe (Insight Crime 2015; Global Security n.d.; Hanson 2008; Trent 2012; BBC 2013).

In 2004, the other AUC leaders, including Vicente Castano, said that Carlos posed a “risk to the group” because of his efforts for peace negotiations. As a result, they killed him (Mackenzie Institute 2015;Trent 2012).

Victor Castano soon saw the enormous personal wealth he could receive from the group’s drug trafficking and began to take much of the group’s earnings for himself (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

Peace agreement negotiations began in 2003 with Carlos Castano and ended in 2006 (Insight Crime 2015; Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015; Trent 2012). In 2005, Vicente Castano went into hiding (Mackenzie Institute 2015). Many members continued to commit crimes even after demobilization (Insight Crime 2015; Global Security n.d.; BBC 2013). Many joined Los Rastrojos, Los Urabenos, and other criminal groups (Trent 2012).

The Justice and Peace Law was amended to put an end to the paramilitaries (Hanson 2008; Trent 2012). The Justice and Peace Law dealt with rebel disarmament and rehabilitation.

The AUC members entered into political talks with the government after it started peace negotiations in 2003 (Trent 2012; MIPT 2008). After the peace talks started, allegations arose about corrupt interactions between the AUC and the Colombian government.

In 2008, the AUC allegedly attacked Colombian and Ecuadorian citizens (Crenshaw 2015). The government extradited a few members to the US for violating the peace agreement (Trent 2012; BBC 2013; MIPT 2008). By 2008, over 30,000 members had demobilized (Global Security N.D.). In 2009, the government confirmed that the AUC had officially dissolved (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015).

Colombia Cases, Part 5: 1998-2012
Last Updated: 12 July 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T630	CASANARE SELF-DEFENSE GROUP		1998	0
T2323	HUMAN RIGHTS RENEWAL MOVEMENT (RENOVACION POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS)		1999	1999

T2288	COLOMBIAN PATRIOTIC RESISTANCE		1999	1999
T2286	CIVIL ASSOCIATION FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA, ASOCIPAZ		2000	2001
T583	JOSE MARIA MORELOS Y PAVON NATIONAL GUERRILLA COORDINATING GROUP		2000	2000
T268	LATIN AMERICAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (EPLA)		2001	0
T706	BLACK EAGLES		2009	2012
T2682	LOS RASTROJOS (COLOMBIA)		2009	2009
T2498	PARAGUAYAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (EPP)		2010	2012

I. CASANARE SELF-DEFENSE GROUP
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Paramilitary Violations of International Humanitarian Law." Colombia. Human Rights Watch. 1998. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/colombia/Colom989-04.htm
- "Militia willing to consider disarming." Chicago Tribune. 2004. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-08-06/news/0408060215_1_paramilitary-united-self-defense-forces-casanare
- Alexandra Farfan. "Peasant Militias at War in Colombia." UPI. 2004. http://www.upi.com/Archives/2004/05/14/Peasant-militias-at-war-in-Colombia/2901084507200/?spt=su
- "Colombia's Paramilitary Faction Proposes to Set Up Two Separateconcentration Zones." 2004.Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Aug 04, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/452957256?accountid=14026.
- "Colombia: ACC Leader on Fighting with Centauros Bloc, Peace Negotiations." 2003.BBC Monitoring Americas, Sep 30, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/460214817?accountid=14026.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Peasant Self-Defense Group of Casanare, ACC, Self Defense Forces of Casanare

Group Formation: 1983 (UPI 2004; BBC 2003)

Group End: unclear - 2006 (Xinhua 2004) - peace negotiations

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hector Buitrago formed the Casanare Self-Defense Group (ACC) in 1983 in an attempt to rally a group that would attack the leftist guerrillas in Colombia (Farfan 2004; BBC 2003). Martin Llanos, Buitrago's son, succeeded Buitrago as leader of the group (BBC 2003). The group had a right-wing ideology (Chicago Tribune 2004). A group commander, "Ruso," explained that the group was always dedicated to peasant defense from leftist guerrillas. During the group's later years, however, the group defended itself from attacks by other paramilitary groups, including the ACCU (Farfan 2004). The group's first violent attack could not be determined. The group began to face significantly more violence in 2003, when the paramilitaries began to attack the group extensively (Farfan 2004).

Geography

The group operated in eastern Casanare, Colombia (Chicago Tribune 2004). The group was also active in southern Meta, Colombia (BBC 2003). There is no evidence that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Group members are young people from Casanare. Many of the people the group defended knew group members personally (Farfan 2004). After other right-wing groups began attacking the ACC, it switched its primary focus from defending peasants to fighting other right wing groups (Farfan 2004). The Centauros Bloc, a group under the umbrella of the ACCU, was the group's principal rival (Chicago Tribune 2004; Farfan 2004). The group had intense territorial fights with the Centauros Bloc (Farfan 2004). The territory the groups fought over, however, had no economic value (Farfan 2004).

The AUC under Miguel Arroyave conducted attacks against the group and attempted to violently take over the group's territory (BBC 2003).

In 2004, the group had 3,500 members (Farfan 2004).

Although "Ruso" denied drug trafficking as a form of funding, the Colombian army commander Eliseo Pena Sanchez claimed that the group used money from drug trafficking, smuggling, and extortion of cattle ranchers to fund its operations (Farfan

2004). Later in 2003, group leader Martin Llanos claimed that the ACC did not partake in drug trafficking. According to Llanos, the ACC charges taxes on drugs grown in its area but does not traffic drugs (BBC 2003).

External Ties

Other right-wing paramilitary groups violently attacked the ACC. As a result, the ACC switched its primary focus from defending peasants to self-protection (Farfan 2004).

The group's principal rival was the Centauros Bloc, a group under the umbrella of the ACCU ("AUC") (Chicago Tribune 2004; Farfan 2004; Xinhua 2004). The ACC had intense territorial fights with the Centauros Bloc (Farfan 2004).

The AUC under Miguel Arroyave conducted many attacks against the ACC and attempted to violently take over the group's territory (BBC 2003; Xinhua 2004). The Centauros Bloc began peace negotiations, which included terms of demobilization, by 2006. It is unclear whether the ACC also participated in these negotiations (Xihua 2004).

Group Outcome

In a 2003 interview, Llanos said that he hoped the government would intervene in the ACC's war against the other self-defense groups, particularly the AUC (BBC 2003). Llanos also expressed his desire for the government to reform corrupt behavior and help increase security (BBC 2003). Most importantly, Llanos commented that the ACC would demobilize if the government promised to help his men successfully return to civil life and to permit the group to participate in government debates (BBC 2003).

In 2004, president Uribe ordered that the ACC and its rival, the Centauros Bloc, relocate to a demobilization zone in Santa Fe de Rialto (Xinhua 2004).

The group's last violent incident could not be determined.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS RENEWAL MOVEMENT (RENOVACION POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS)
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20197. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20197
- Searched gScholar
    - HUMAN RIGHTS RENEWAL MOVEMENT colombia
    - RENOVACION POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS colombia
- Searched proquest
    - HUMAN RIGHTS RENEWAL MOVEMENT colombia
    - RENOVACION POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS colombia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 1999 (GTD 2017)

Group End: 1999 (GTD 2017) - reason for ending violence unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Human Rights Renewal Movement (Renovación Por Los Derechos Humanos) first came to attention as a violent group in 1999, when it conducted an attack in Cúcuta, Colombia (GTD 2017). More information about group ideologies and founding could not be found.

Geography

The group conducted an attack in Cúcuta, Colombia (GTD 2017). There is no evidence that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group conducted an attack in 1999 targeted at the government (GTD 2017). Other information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group. The group's only documented attack occurred in 1999 (GTD 2017). More information about the group's outcome could not be found.

III. COLOMBIAN PATRIOTIC RESISTANCE
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 1999
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20127. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20127
- US State Department. Political Violence Against Americans. DIANE Publishing. 1999. P. 13. https://books.google.com/books?id=B6aqciIXBdQC&pg=PA13&lpg=PA13&dq=COLOMBIAN+PATRIOTIC+RESISTANCE&source=bl&ots=xBwEnUpmvb&sig=wtmO_7XxXhAL9r4ZrKEEOceKtt0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi2pt_cpITVAhVN1mMKHXopCoQQ6AEINjAE#v=onepage&q=COLOMBIAN%20PATRIOTIC%20RESISTANCE&f=false
- "Unnamed." Central Intelligence Agency Briefing. Declassified 2008. P. 3 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001525913.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: RPC (CIA 2008, 3)

Group Formation: November 1999 (CIA 2008, 3)

Group End: December 1999 (DIANE 1999, 13; GTD 2017)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Colombia Patriotic Resistance first came to attention as a violent group in 1999. The group's first attack allegedly occurred in November 1999, when the group set off an explosive near the "El Tiempo" printing center in Cali, Colombia (CIA 2003, 3). In December 1999, the group released a pamphlet against US extradition of Colombian citizens (DIANE 1999, 13). More information about the group's formation could not be found.

Geography

The group was active in Colombia in the cities of Cali and Bogota (DIANE 1999, 13; GTD 2017). There is no evidence that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group conducted attacks targeted at business and media (DIANE 1999, 13; GTD 2017; CIA 2008, 3). Information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group. The group's last attacks occurred in December 1999 (GTD 2017; DIANE 1999, 13). The group's reasons for ceasing violent activities could not be determined.

IV. CIVIL ASSOCIATION FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA, ASOCIPAZ
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: Civil Association For Peace In Colombia, Asocipaz, Asocipaz, Civil Association For Peace In Colombia, Civil Association For Peace In Colombia (Asocipaz)

Note: it appears this is an NGO representing rebel groups in peace talks?

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20122. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20122
- "Colombia busca acuerdo para zona de encuentro con ELN." BBC. 2000. http://www.bbc.co.uk/spanish/news/news001226colombia.shtml

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no other aliases

Group Formation: 2000 (BBC 2000)

Group End: 2001 (GTD 2017) - reason for stopping use of violence unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Civil Association For Peace In Colombia, Asocipaz, first came to attention in 2000 (BBC 2000). Asocipaz claimed to represent the municipalities of Cantagallo, San Pablo, Santa Rosa, Bolivar, Yondo, and Antoquia. In 2000, Asocipaz participated in the ELN peace talks and opposed demobilization of the municipalities it represented (BBC 2000). Celse Gomez and Camilo Gomez represented the group and these municipalities during the talks (BBC 2000). In 2001, the group allegedly conducted an attack targeted at a business in Puerto Wilches, Colombia (GTD 2017). More information about the group's formation could not be found.

Geography

The group participated with the ELN in peace talks in 2000 and opposed demobilization in the municipalities of Cantagallo, San Pablo, Santa Rosa, Bolivar, Yondo, and Antioquia (BBC 2000). In 2001, the group allegedly conducted an attack targeted at a business in Puerto Wilches, Colombia (GTD 2017). There is no evidence that the group was transnational.

Organizational Structure

Celse Gomez and Camilo Gomez represented the group during the 2000 peace talks (BBC 2000). Other information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The group participated with the ELN in peace talks in 2000 (BBC 2000). In 2001, the group allegedly conducted an attack targeted at a business in Puerto Wilches, Colombia (GTD 2017). Other information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group. The group participated with the ELN in peace talks in 2000 (BBC 2000). In 2001, the group allegedly conducted an attack targeted at a business in Puerto Wilches, Colombia (GTD 2017). Reasons why the group ceased violent activities could not be determined.

V. JOSE MARIA MORELOS Y PAVON NATIONAL GUERRILLA COORDINATING GROUP
Min. Group Date: 2000

Max. Group Date: 2000
Onset: NA

Aliases: Group Of Guerilla Combatants Of Jose Maria Morelos Y Pavon (Cgnjmmp), Cgnjmmp, Coordinadora Guerrillera Nacional Jose Maria Morelos Y Pavon
Group Of Guerilla Combatants Of Jose Maria Morelos Y Pavon, Jose Maria Morelos Y Pavon National Guerrilla Coordinating Group, Jose Maria Morelos Y Pavon National Guerrilla Council

Part 1. Bibliography

- "JOSE MARIA MORELOS Y PAVON NATIONAL GUERRILLA COORDINATING GROUP." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4041, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dbf5n9nS6k1aWmypsBAxszbOxLRHBaDvklRdprXFMPY/edit
- Ramon Mird. "The Jose Maria Morelos y Pavon National Guerrilla Council." Criminal and Terrorist Activity in Mexico. Library of Congress. 2003. http://edocs.nps.edu/govpubs/LOC/FRD/Feb03_OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf

Note: Mird and MIPT nearly identical

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 2001 (MIPT 2008; Mird 2003)

Group End: 2001 (MIPT 2008; Mird 2003) - reasons for ending violence unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Jose Maria Morelos Y Pavon National Guerrilla Coordinating Group (Cgnjmmp) was an umbrella organization comprised of three of the Popular Revolutionary Army's splinter groups: the Clandestine Revolutionary Committee of the Poor, Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People, and Villista Revolutionary Army of the People (MIPT 2008; Mird 2003). The group had revolutionary beliefs and opposed globalization (MIPT 2008). It is unknown when the umbrella formed. The group's initial reported attack occurred in 2001, when the group bombed a car dealership and attempted to bomb a McDonald's in Mexico City (MIPT 2008; Mird 2003). The group was named after a Mexican patriot who fought against Spain in the Mexican War of Independence in the early 1800s (MIPT 2008).

Geography

All the groups within the umbrella were based in Guerrero, Mexico (MIPT 2008). The group's initial attack occurred in 2001 when the group bombed a car dealership and attempted to bomb a McDonald's in Mexico City (MIPT 2008; Mird 2003). The group was not transnational.

Organizational Structure

The Jose Maria Morelos Y Pavon National Guerrilla Coordinating Group (Cgnjmmp) was an umbrella organization comprised of three of the Popular Revolutionary Army's splinter groups: the Clandestine Revolutionary Committee of the Poor, Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People, and Villista Revolutionary Army of the People (MIPT 2008; Mird 2003). More information about the group's organizational structure could not be found.

External Ties

The Jose Maria Morelos Y Pavon National Guerrilla Coordinating Group (Cgnjmmp) was an umbrella organization comprised of three of the Popular Revolutionary Army's splinter groups: the Clandestine Revolutionary Committee of the Poor, Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People, and Villista Revolutionary Army of the People (MIPT 2008; Mird 2003). More information about the group's external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group's outcome. The last recorded attack the group perpetrated occurred in 2001 (Mid 2003; MIPT 2008). Reasons why the group stopped using violence could not be determined.

Note: It is unknown why this group is listed with ties to Colombia.

VI. LATIN AMERICAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (EPLA)
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Latin American Patriotic Army (Epla), Ejercito Patriotico Latino Americano (Epla)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "LATIN AMERICAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (EPLA)." Terrorist Organization Profile No. 3586, MIPT Knowledge Base, 2008, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism,

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dbf5n9nS6k1aWmypsBAxszbOxLRHBaDvklRdprXFMPY/edit

- Andreas Feldmann. “A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence: Non-Governmental Terrorism in Latin America since the End of the Cold War.” Rev. cienc. Polit. V. 25. N.2 2005. http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2005000200001
- Searched gScholar
    - “Ejercito Patriotico Latino Americano”
    - “Latin American Patriotic Army”
- Searched Proquest
    - “Ejercito Patriotico Latino Americano”
    - “Latin American Patriotic Army”

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 2001 (MIPT 2008)

Group End: 2001 (MIPT 2008)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Latin American Patriotic Army (Ejercito Patriotico Latino Americano/ EPLA) formed in 2001 when a few FARC members took the name “Ejercito Patriotico Latino” and kidnapped a Venezuelan farmer (MIPT 2008). Since FARC members formed the group, the group likely had a leftist ideology (MIPT 2008; Feldmann 2005). More information about this group’s formation could not be found.

Geography

The EPLA primarily operated within Colombia (Feldmann 2005). The group also operated along the Venezuelan border in Colombia (MIPT 2008). In 2001, this transnational group kidnapped a farmer in Venezuela (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The Latin American Patriotic Army (Ejercito Patriotico Latino Americano/ EPLA) formed in 2001 when a few FARC members took the name “Ejercito Patriotico Latino” and kidnapped a Venezuelan farmer (MIPT 2008). It could not be determined whether the EPLA was a faction within the FARC or a splinter group. Other information about the group’s organizational structure could not be found.

It is unknown if the group was a splinter that was repressed after this one incident or was a faction that merged back into FARC after this one incident.

External Ties

The Latin American Patriotic Army (Ejercito Patriotico Latino Americano/ EPLA) formed in 2001 when a few FARC members took the name “Ejercito Patriotico Latino” and kidnapped a Venezuelan farmer (MIPT 2008). It could not be determined whether the EPLA was a faction within the FARC or a splinter group. Other information about the group’s external ties could not be found.

Group Outcome

There is little known about this group. The group did not conduct any known attacks beyond 2001 (MIPT 2008). More information about the group’s outcome could not be found.

VII. BLACK EAGLES
Min. Group Date: 2009
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 30099, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2017, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30099
- “Aguilas Negras.” Insight Crime. 2017. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/aguilas-negras
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Colombia: Whether the Black Eagles (Águilas Negras) have links to former paramilitary groups, such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC); criminal activities of the Black Eagles, including extortion and drug trafficking; state response to the Black Eagles (2008 - February 2011), 4 April 2011, COL103710.E , available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4db7bf7b2.html
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Colombia: The Black Eagles (Águilas Negras), including areas of operation and criminal activities; whether the Black Eagles seek out individuals within Colombia and abroad; state protection available (2014-March 2015) , 20 March 2015, COL105125.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5534ac604.html

- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Colombia: Organizational structure of the Black Eagles (Águilas Negras), including whether the group operates under a unified command and the nature of cooperation among different Black Eagles groups across the country; activities in 2015; relationship to the government, including instances of infiltration or collusion (March 2015-May 2016), 10 May 2016, COL105522.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/575524044.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Aguilas Negras

Group Formation: 2006 (Insight Crime 2017)

Group End: 2015 (Canada IRB 2015) - whether or not still active unknown

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles) refer to dissident paramilitary groups that emerged after the Colombian peace negotiations in the 2000s. The Aguilas Negras are not an armed group or umbrella organization (Insight Crime 2017; Canada IRB 2011).

In the early 2000s, the Colombian government initiated peace negotiations with paramilitary groups that agreed to demobilize by 2006 (Insight Crime 2017 ; Canada IRB 2011). The peace negotiations were not completely successful as many dissident groups emerged from the process. These groups are referred to as Aguilas Negras (Insight Crime 2017; Canada IRB 2011; Canada IRB 2016). The name Aguilas Negras was first used in 2006 when “Aguilas Negras” were at cocaine transit routes in Narino, North Santander, and Catatumbo, Colombia (Insight Crime 2017).

The Colombian government referred to these dissident groups as Aguilas Negras to avoid branding these groups as neo-paramilitaries (Canada IRB 2011). Referring to these groups as neo-paramilitaries would concede that the government demobilization agreements and efforts had mostly failed (Canada IRB 2003).

Many of the dissident groups are former AUC members (Insight Crime 2017; Canada IRB 2011). Many of the groups continued with paramilitary aims, but some only conducted criminal activities, especially drug trafficking (Insight Crime 2017).

A specific first violent attack perpetrated under the name of Aguilas Negras could not be identified. The Aguilas Negras primarily possessed financial, rather than ideological, goals (Insight Crime 2017; Canada IRB 2011).

Geography

The Aguilas Negras first emerged in Narino, Catatumbo, and North Santander (Insight Crime 2017). Groups identifying as “Aguilas Negras” have been active in Cuaca, Casanare, Guajira, Bolívar, Magdalena, Sucre, and Cordoba (Insight Crime 2017). They have also been active in Uraba and Choco and Bogota (Canada IRB 2011). The groups referred to as the Aguilas Negras are not transnational.

Organizational Structure

The Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles) refer to dissident paramilitary groups that emerged after the Colombian peace negotiations in the 2000s. The Aguilas Negras are not an armed group or umbrella organization (Insight Crime 2017; Canada IRB 2011). Many of the groups continued paramilitary activities, but others reverted to predominantly criminal activities, especially drug trafficking (Insight Crime 2017).

In 2008, the Aguilas Negras comprised an estimated 160 members (Canada IRB 2011; Insight Crime 2017). Many groups are former AUC members (Insight Crime 2017; Canada IRB 2011).

Many of the groups, however, participate in drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, and extortion as forms of funding (Canada IRB 2011). Groups have also threatened journalists (Canada IRB 2011).

Alejandro Avila Meza, Erlin Javier Arroyo Mosquera, Alexander Mosquera Sosa, and Leiser Mosquers Sosa have been identified as Aguilas Negras leaders (Canada IRB 2015). It is unclear if these individuals led an overarching group known as Aguilas Negras or were individual leaders of the paramilitary groups referred to as Aguilas Negras.

External Ties

The groups under the Aguilas Negras name ally with other gangs and drug traffickers (Insight Crime 2017; Canada IRB 2011). In order to gain more knowledge and access to drug trafficking routes, some Aguilas Negras groups ally with the ELN and FARC, even though they were previously enemies (Insight Crime 2017; Canada IRB 2011).

Group Outcome

Though originally an alternative name for neo-paramilitaries, Aguilas Negras came to refer to other criminal and drug trafficking bands as well (Canada IRB 2011). In 2015, the government began arresting anyone associated with the Aguias Negras but failed to

capture the suspected leaders (Canada IRB 2015). It is unknown whether the groups associated with the Aguilas Negras remain active.

VIII. LOS RASTROJOS (COLOMBIA)
Min. Group Date: 2009
Max. Group Date: 2009
Onset: NA

Aliases: Los Rastrojos (Colombia), Los Rastrojos

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: In 2006 the group began splintering (Alsema 2012) and finished in 2008 independently operated (Insight Crime 2017)

Group End: 2013 (GTD 2017)- group is still active

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Los Rastrojos first formed in 2002 as an armed wing under Wilber Varela, who sought to fight a rival in the Norte de Valle Cartel (Insight Crime 2017; Cortés 2009). Diego Rastrajo was a lieutenant and recruited cartel members to form the armed group (Insight Crime 2017; Cortés 2009). In 2003, Varela's group took the name Popular Peasant Control in order to enter the paramilitary peace negotiations. Nevertheless, the

Colombian government did not allow the group to participate (Insight Crime 2017). In 2006, the Norte de Valle Cartel weakened and practically terminated due to group infighting (Alasema 2012). As a result, factions splintered from the group (Alsema 2012). In 2008, the armed wing became increasingly powerful. Members murdered Varela because they believed he did not allow them to expand the group's operations (Insight Crime 2017;Cortés 2009). That year, the group then officially began operating on its own under the leadership of Diego Rastrojo, Daniel Barrera, and the Comba brothers (Insight Crime 2017; Cortés 2009).

The group has no clear political aim or ideology. Los Rastrojos is a criminal, narco-terrorist group (Insight Crime 2017).

Geography

Los Rastrojos began its operations around Colombia's Pacific Coast (Insight Crime 2017). The group was later active in Quindio, Risaralda, Caldas, Cali, Meta, and La Guajira (Insight Crime 2017). The group also conducted attacks in Ecuador and Venezuela (Insight Crime 2017). The group has exported mass amounts of cocaine to the US, Asia, and Europe (Cortés 2009). The group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

Leaders of Los Rastrojos included Diego Rastrajo, Daniel Barrera, and the Comba brothers (Insight Crime 2017; Cortés 2009). Barrera primarily led the drug trafficking, while Rastrajo had greater involvement with the rural Rastrajos (Insight Crime 2017). The Comba brothers predominantly coordinated assassinations and exports to the US (Insight Crime 2017; Cortés 2009).

The group became one of the most powerful Colombian drug cartels. A single shipment to the US from the group could include over 3 tons of cocaine (Cortés 2009). Although the group's main focus was cocaine, they also fabricated ecstasy (Cortés 2009).

When the group began operating independently around 2008, it had an estimated 1,500 members (Cortés 2009). In 2012, the group had about 800 members (BBC 2012).

External Ties

The group was a close ally of the ELN and the FARC (Insight Crime 2017). The group has often fought with the Urabaños (Insight Crime 2017). The group has worked with the Aguilas Negras (Cortés 2009). The group also has had alliances with the Sinaloa Cartel from Mexico (Cortés 2009).

Group Outcome

In 2012, one of the Comba brothers, Javier Calle Serna, turned himself in to the US government (Insight Crime 2017). Later in 2012, the other Comba brother, Luis Enrique, also turned himself in to US authorities. Barrera was later captured (Insight Crime 2017; Alsema 2012). In 2012, Venezuelan troops captured Rastrajo and handed him over to the Colombian government (BBC 2013; Insight Crime 2017; Alsema 2012). In 2013, Diego Rastrajo was extradited to the US (Insight Crime 2017). This left the group with no clear leader. That same year the US, under the Kingpin Act, placed sanctions on the remaining members of the Cartel (Insight Crime 2017). As of 2017, the group has remained active and has an estimated 310 members (Insight Crime 2017).

IX. PARAGUAYAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (EPP)
Min. Group Date: 2010
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 2001 (The Economist 2010; Gagne 2016

Group End: 2016 (GTD 2017) - group is still active

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Paraguayan People's Army (EPP) formed in 2001 after the breakup of the Free the Fatherland group (Global Security n.d.). Many former militants of the Free the Fatherland group joined the EPP. Additionally, a part of the Movimiento Patria Libre armed wing splintered and joined the EPP (Blair 2015). The EPP is a Marxist-Lennist, Guevarist guerilla group (Blair 2015; Global Security n.d.). This center-seeking group seeks to overthrow the Paraguayan government (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The group is active in different departments in Paraguay, including Horqueta, San Pedro, and Concepcion (Blair 2015; Clavel 2017). There is no evidence that the group conducts attacks outside of Paraguay. The group, however, participates in transnational marijuana trade (Clavel 2017).

It is unclear why they have a connection to Colombia.

Organizational Structure

In 2010, the group had an estimated 20 members (The Economist 2010).

The group funds itself by charging a tax from peasants and falsing promising protection (Blair 2015). The EPP also funds itself through kidnapping and ransom (Global Security n.d.). The group has conducted high profile kidnappings (The Economist 2010). Furthermore, the group profits from the marijuana trade (Clavel 2017).

The EPP's operational plan includes the following steps: operate in urban areas, gain trust from urban regions, attack criminals, publicize attacks, and seek support from urbanites and progressives (Gagne 2016).

In 2014, an EPP splinter group called the Armed Campesino Group (ACA) formed (Blair 2015). By 2015, the group had killed 50 people (Blair 2015).

No information about the group's leadership could be found.

The group does not have a known political wing.

External Ties

The Free the Fatherland group broke apart in 2001, and many former of its militant members joined the EPP (Global Security n.d.). A part of the Movimiento Patria Libre splintered to form the center of the EPP (Blair 2015). In 2014, an EPP splinter group called the ACA formed (Blair 2015).

Many individuals from local populations refused to report information about the EPP to authorities and allegedly provided supplies to the group (Blair 2015; Clavel 2017).

Group Outcome

President Lugo reported that the EPP only posed a minor threat to Paraguay (Global security n.d.). In April 2011, President Lugo asked permission to use Paraguay's "emergency power" and sent a total of 3,000 troops to the region in which the EPP supposedly operated (The Economist 2010). The troops only managed to arrest a coordinator of the group, Jesus Ortiz (The Economist 2010).

In 2013, under president Horacio, the government created a mixed military unit to specifically target the EPP (Clavel 2017). In 2016, the military attempted to attack the EPP but instead lost 8 soldiers at the hand of the group (Clavel 2017).

The military waged an ineffective campaign against the armed groups. The military fought with local police, created fake fines to extract money from locals, and raided a girl's fifteenth birthday party (The Economist 2010). These behaviors led to widespread feelings of annoyance and anger towards the military group from the locals (The Economist 2010).

The EPP appears to remain active.

Notes for Iris:

- Military has really poor intel
- They capture like one guy and also they just employ indiscriminate tactics
- The local population gets more mad at the military and makes it harder to get more intel