Brazil Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 8 May 2018

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1340	VAR - PALMARES		0	0
T1455	MOVIMENTO REVOLUCION RIO OITO DE OUTUBRO		0	0
T412	FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA (FARC)		1964	2012
T37	ALIANCA LIBERTADORA NACIONAL		1968	0
T387	POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD (VPR)		1968	1976
T69	APRIL 19 MOVEMENT		1976	1997
T702493	BRAZILIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE (AAB)		1976	1976
T457	SHINING PATH (SL)		1978	2012
T1784	LANDLESS PEASANTS' MOVEMENT (MST)		1991	1997
T1668	COMANDO VERMELHO (RED COMMAND)		1992	2001
T1251	FIRST CAPITAL COMMAND (PCC)		1993	2006
T2575	THIRD COMMAND		1997	2001
T1156	TERENA INDIANS		2000	2001

I. VAR - PALMARES
Torg ID: 1340
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Var - Palmares, Palmares Armed Revolutionary Vanguard

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Palmares Revolutionary Armed Vanguard, Armed Revolutionary Vanguard-Palmares, Vanguarda Armada Revolucionaria

Group Formation: 1968 or 1969

Group End: 1971

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The VAR-Palmares was a communist organization founded by Carlos Alberto Soares de Freitas in late 1968 or April 1969 after the military coup in Brazil in 1964 led to a right-wing government (MIPT 2008). The group's first attack was the alleged assasination of a US Army Captain named Charles Chandler in October 1968 (CIA 1969, 4). However, other sources say the group did not emerge until six months later when the Comando da Libertacao Nacional (COLINA) group, which was on the verge of dissolving because of a number of arrests, united with the Revolutionary Popular Vanguard (VPR) in April 1969 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 510; MIPT 2008).

The VPR swelled in size quickly when it formed because it had many members from another organization that Carlos Alberto Soares had led, the Marxist Revolutionary Political Organization (POLOP) (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 2015, 131). The VAR-Palmares wanted to fight to overthrow the Brazilian military dictatorship (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The group's attacks were mostly committed inside Brazil, although they hijacked an airplane going from Uruguay to Brazil and then landed it in Cuba. The locations of their attacks inside Brazil are unknown for the most part, although they did have a branch in Sao Paulo, where they robbed the safe of a corrupt politician there and assassinated a US Army Captain. (MIPT 2008; Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 2015, 131). Later, they also carried out operations in rural areas (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by Carlos Alberto Soares de Freitas, who had previously also led the Marxist Revolutionary Political Organization (POLOP) and the National Liberation Command (COLINA) (Memorias Da Ditadura n.d.). The VAR Palmares consisted of former VPR, POLOP, and COLINA members (MIPT 2008; Gunson, Thompson, Chamberlain 2015, 131). Other leaders included Dilma Rousseff, later to become president of Brazil, and Mariano Joaquin da Silva (MIPT 2008). The group had different branches and two factions, one called the Unified Group, which prepared for armed attacks in rural areas, and the other which remained VAR-Palmares (MIPT 2008; Gunson, Thompson, Chamberlain 2015, 131). The group got most of its funding from bank raids in early 1969 (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 2015, 131). The group allegedly had "hundreds" of members at an unknown date (Jones and Libicki 2008, 184).

External Ties

The group had connections to other communist extremist groups, which included the Peking-line Communist Party of Brazil and the Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party (CIA 1969, 4). The VPR, which had originally united with COLINA to create the VAR-Palmares, split from the organization shortly after, in September of 1969 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 512).

Group Outcome

The group suffered a splinter early on due to disagreements over whether to pursue political change through violent means. The VPR, which had originally united with COLINA to create the VAR-Palmares, split from the organization shortly after, in September of 1969 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 512). In October 1970, a government crackdown arrested almost all members of the Sao Paulo branch (Gunson, Thompson, Chamberlain 2015, 131). In November 1970, 5000-10000 more militants were arrested by police during Operation Birdcage (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 2015, 131). These arrests led to further splintering including a new group known as VAR-Palmarest (Unified Group) (MIPT 2008). In early 1971, the group's founder and leader Carlos Alberto Soares de Freitas was arrested (MIPT 2008; Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 2015, 131). Two prominent members, Dilma Rousseff and Mariano Joaquin da Silva, also leaders in the group were also arrested in 1970 and subject to torture in prison (Independent 2010; AP 2016). The group's last known violent attack was in 1971 (Teles 1971; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 510; Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 2015, 131) or 1972 (Jones and Libicki 2008) due to government repression.

Notes for Iris:
-why is there such a mismatch between the start dates? The first violent attack was likely in 1968 and proved the viability of the concept
-the first attack is likely strongly related to the group

II. MOVIMENTO REVOLUCION RIO OITO DE OUTUBRO
Torg ID: 1455
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Revolutionary Movement Of October 8 (Mr-8), Movimento Revolucion Rio Oito De Outubro

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: MR-8, Movimento Revolucionário Oito de Outubro

Group Formation: 1968

Group End: 1972-stopped using violence due to mass defections and arrests; still active as a political group that is part of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

MR-8 was a Marxist-Leninist guerilla organization formed in 1968, after it broke away from the Brazilian Communist Party (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 513; Bicudo and Veras 2009). It was named after the date that the Bolivian socialist revolutionary Che Guevara was captured (MIPT 2008; Pedahzur and Weinberg 2013; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 513). Its main goal was to overthrow the military dictatorship in Brazil and replace it with a leftist government (MIPT 2008). It's most publicized violent act was the 1969 kidnapping of the US ambassador to Brazil, but it is unclear whether this was its first attack (MIPT 200; Freire 2016, 203). The group worked with the Action for National Liberation (ALN) to carry out the kidnapping, and demanded fifteen political prisoners as ransom (MIPT 2008; Freire 2016, 203).

Geography

The group was based in Parana, Brazil, and was also opernational in Bahía (Dassin 1998, 88; Pedahzur and Weinberg 2013; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 513). It conducted the kidnapping of the US ambassador in Rio de Janeiro (Train 1994).

Organizational Structure

The leadership of the group is unclear, although it is known that some leaders of the organization were arrested during a government crackdown on the group in the early 1970s (Pedahzur and Weinberg 2013). Most of the organization's members were university students who left the Brazilian Communist Party (Bicudo and Veras 2009). Fernando Gabeira was a member of the group, and an important part of the execution of the kidnapping of the US ambassador became the federal deputy of Rio de Janeiro later and wrote a book about it (Association of Diplomatic Studies & Training n.d.). The leader of the Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria (VPR), Carlos Lamaraca, asked for his organization to become a part of MR-8 after the VPR split into different groups in 1971 (Dassin 1998, 88). Lamarca was killed in a government attack, and the group began to dissolve after his death (ibid). At its peak, the group is estimated to have had hundreds of members (Jones and Libicki 2008). Its source of funding is unclear.

External Ties

The group was a splinter of the Brazilian Communist Party (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 513; Bicudo and Veras 2009). The group worked with the Action for National Liberation (ALN) and also took in members from the Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria (VPR) when their leader, former army captain, Carlos Lamarca asked for part of the group to be taken in by the MR-8 (MIPT 2008; Freira 2013; Dassin 1998, 88). It was also allied with the VAR-Palmares (MIPT 2008). It is also associated with radical student groups at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and the Marxist Revolutionary Organization-Workers' Politics (POLOP) (Pedahzur, Weinberg 2013; Dassin 1998, 93).

Group Outcome

In 1971, the group took in members from the Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria (VPR) after Carlos Lamarca asked for entry into the group (MIPT 2008; Freira 2013; Dassin 1998, 88; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 513). The group stopped using violence as early as 1972, when most of the group's members left for Chile, and some members and leaders were arrested in Brazil (Pedahzur and Weinberg 2013; Schmid and Jongman 1988; 513).

However, the group restarted many times between 1972 and 1978, but as a non-violent, less extremist group with changing political views (Freire 2016, 203; Pedahzur and Weinberg 2013). In 1973, MR-8 worked with the Marxist Revolutionary Organization-Workers' Politics (POLOP) to publish a magazine called Socialist Brazil (Dassin 1998, 97) Later, the organization remerged as a part of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, a Brazilian political party and remains active, publishing a newsletter called Hora do Povo (MIPT 2008).

III. FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA (FARC)
Torg ID: 412
Min. Group Date: 1964
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Revolutionary Armed Forces Of Colombia (Farc), Armed Revolutionary Forces Of Colombia (Farc), Bolivarian Movement For A New Colombia, Farc, Farc [Armed Revolutionary Forces Of Colombia], Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia - Ejercito Del Pueblo (Farc-Ep), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia (Farc)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Southern Bloc, Ejército del Pueblo

Group Formation: 1964 (new)

Group End (Outcome): 2017 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The FARC formed in 1964 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party (BBC 2016). Responding to the “La Violencia” period and the Marquetalia Massacre, the group sought to overthrow the central government (Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015). The FARC’s primary grievances were income inequality and perceived discrimination against rural communities by the Colombian government (BBC 2016; Crenshaw 2015). The group follows a Marxist-Leninist ideology (BBC 2016). Its first violent attack occurred in 1964 after the Marquetalia Massacre (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group primarily operates in rural areas in Colombia (BBC 2016). It controls territory in eastern and southern Colombia (BBC 2013). This includes the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Chocó, and Antioquia (Insight Crime n.d.). It originally operated out of their stronghold in Marquetalia, Tolima (Insight Crime n.d.).

The FARC is a transnational group and has a presence in Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, and Panama (Crenshaw 2015). It receives sanctuary in Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador (Global Security n.d.). FARC perpetrated one attack in Iquitos, Peru in 1996 (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

Manuel Marulanda and Jacob Arenas founded FARC in 1964. In 2016, Rodrigo Londono Echeverri led the group. The FARC recruits farmers, peasants, and other "land workers" as fighters. Recruits include both men and women. There are disputed reports about whether it recruits members forcibly (BBC 2016). Approximately 20-30% of FARC members are minors when they join (Mackenzie Institute 2015). When it started in 1964, the group had approximately 50 members, but this figure quickly grew (Crenshaw 2015; Insight Crime n.d.). The group had approximately 18,000 fighters in 1999; 20,000 fighters in 2002; and 6,000-7,000 fighters in 2016 (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016). Furthermore, FARC relies on a large cadre of civilian support which numbers or possibly outnumbers the total active fighters it has (BBC 2016).

The group has a political wing known as the Patriotic Union, which it created in 1985 to participate in legislative elections (Crenshaw 2015). The political wing fell apart due to a series of high-profile assassinations and kidnappings of UP members during the 1980s and early 1990s (Crenshaw 2015). The group is organized regionally into small platoon-like divisions, which are organized into regional brigades (BBC 2016). The group has a very hierarchical structure (Insight Crime n.d.). There is a leadership council composed of a dozen individuals known as the High Command or Secretariat group (Mackenzie Institute 2015; BBC 2016). One senior military commander is Jorge Briceno (Global Security n.d.).

The group primarily funds itself through extortion, drug trafficking, and kidnapping (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016). One report estimates that it collects $150-500 million per year from drug trafficking (Insight Crime n.d; Renwick and Felter 2017; UN n.d.).

External Ties

The group fought against Colombian paramilitary groups, including Death to Kidnapps and the United Self-Defense Force of Colombia (Crenshaw 2015). There are conflicting reports about FARC's relationship with the ELN. Although the FARC fought against ELN from 2005-2009, the FARC cooperated with and received support from the ELN during an unknown time frame (Insight Crime n.d.; Mackenzie Institute 2015).

FARC received funding from Cuba and Venezuela (Crenshaw 2015). Chavez was a well-known advocate for FARC and lobbied for it to be recognized as "belligerents,"

which provides certain international legal protections (Global Security n.d.; Crenshaw 2015).

The FARC has allegedly “been in contact and worked together in the drug trade” with Shining Path in Peru (Crenshaw 2015). The group may also coordinate bomb training techniques with the IRA and Sinn Fein (Global Security n.d.).

The FARC was a member of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board, which was an umbrella group of Marxist groups in Latin America, from 1987 to 1991. Members included ELN, EPL, and M-19 (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

The FARC initially emerged from the Marquetalia Massacre. It engages police, military, and pro-government paramilitary forces (BBC 2016). In 1982, the group and the Colombian government held their first peace talks, which resulted in the Uribe Accords (Crenshaw 2015). The resulting ceasefire fell apart when private Colombian citizens began creating their own right-wing paramilitary groups (Crenshaw 2015).

In 2002, President Alvaro Uribe launched an intense and highly successful counterinsurgency offensive against the FARC (BBC 2013). Although the group remained intact for many years, the death of key leaders and Plan Colombia (the U.S. plan to train and equip Colombian security forces) severely damaged the group’s capacity to fight (BBC 2016). FARC leader Manuel Marulanda died in 2008, and his successor, Alfonso Cano, died soon after in 2011 (BBC 2016). In 2008, Colombian forces also killed Raul Reyes, a military leader and influential member in the Secretariat (Crenshaw 2015).

The demobilization and deaths of many fighters eventually led the FARC to renew peace talks with the Colombian government in 2012 (BBC 2013; BBC 2016). The group signed a formal ceasefire agreement with the Colombian government in June 2016 (Global Security n.d.)

IV. ALIANCA LIBERTADORA NACIONAL
Torg ID: 37
Min. Group Date: 1968
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: Alianca Libertadora Nacional (Aln), Acao Libertadora Nacional, Aç_o Libertadora Nacional, Alianca Libertadora Nacional, National Liberation Action, National Liberation Alliance

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Ação Libertadora Nacional, Action for National Liberation, National Liberation Action (ANL)

Group Formation: 1968

Group End: 1970 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was formed in 1968 by Carlos Marighella, Joaquim Câmara Ferreira and Virgílio Gomes da Silva, who had left the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) because of political disagreements (Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). Carlos Marighella became the leader of the group (ibid). The group wanted to conduct guerilla attacks in urban areas as a means of rebelling against the military dictatorship, oligarchy, and wealthy foreigners (ibid). It ascribed to a Marxist-Leninist ideology. The group’s first attacks were on banks, radio stations, and military bases around 1968 (MIPT 2008) The group’s most known attack was the kidnapping of the US ambassador to Brazil, Charles Burke Elbrick, in Rio de Janeiro that

they conducted in collaboration with MR-8 on September 4th, 1969 (Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009).

Geography

The group operated in mostly urban areas, such as Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (MIPT 2008; Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). There is no evidence it was transnational.

Organizational Structure

The founders of the group were Carlos Marighella, Joaquim Câmara Ferreira and Virgílio Gomes da Silva, former PCB members who had left the group because of disagreements (Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). Marighella was the former leader of the PCB, and resigned because other members did not agree with his idea of an armed rebellion (Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). Many of the members of the group were students, intellectuals and communists (MIPT 2008). It had about 2000 members before it ended (Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). The group got its funding from raiding banks (Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). In 1969 after Marighella, the leader, was killed in Sao Paulo by the police, he was replaced by Joaquim Câmara Ferreira (ibid). In October of 1970, Ferreira was arrested and died of a heart attack in prison. (MIPT 2008; Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009).

External Ties

The group collaborated with the MR-8 in the kidnapping of the US ambassador (MIPT 2008, Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). The Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR) was also an ally (MIPT 2008). Some guerilla fighters associated with Carlos Marighella received training in Cuba, and Cuba even offered weapons and funding to the group, but Marighella did not accept it (CIA 196). Many splinter groups emerged from the remnants of the ALN (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 512). They include the Movement of Popular Liberation (MPL), Marx, Mao, Marighella and Guevara (M3G) and the Front for the Liberation of the North East (ibid).

Group Outcome

In 1969, police clashed with Marighella in Sao Paulo resulting in his death (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 512). The police arrested many members of the organization after the death of Marighella, and other members left the country (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 512; MIPT 2008, Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of

Brazil 2009). By 1970 most of the group had dissolved, and it became inactive (MIPT 2008; Memorias da Ditadura n.d.; Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). Remaining members of the group formed the Leninist Tendency of the ALN, whose main goal was to investigate the disintegration of the ALN (Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). The group split into two, with one group joining the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), and the other becoming part of the Debates magazine, which eventually became the Union of Communists (ibid). There were also many other splinter groups that arose from the ALN (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 512). They include the Movement of Popular Liberation (MPL), Marx, Mao, Marighella and Guevara (M3G) and the Front for the Liberation of the North East (ibid). The group's last attack was the kidnapping of the German ambassador in June of 1970 (Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil 2009). They worked with Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR) and demanded 44 prisoners as ransom (ibid).

Notes for Iris:
-what is the relative strength or threat posed by these different groups? ALN didn't seem to be as strong as VPR and VPT
-there wasn't as much violence reported by ALN
-the ALN is also one of the first groups to go under (he had the most attention?)
-why did these leftist groups disappear so quickly? It was unclear where there resources came from and there aren't reports of external support/large numbers of followers
-most of these groups supported each other, but it's also possible they might have competed against each other for resources. This could have weakened the groups and made them more susceptible
-the government was HIGHLY effective in arresting top leadership about the group and not letting them grow very strong/violent before intervening (great counterfactual)

V. POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD (VPR)
Torg ID: 387
Min. Group Date: 1968
Max. Group Date: 1976
Onset: NA

Aliases: Popular Revolutionary Vanguard, Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (Vpr) Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria (Vpr)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1968

Group End: 1976

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group formed in 1968 in opposition of the military dictatorship in Brazil. It was a reorganization of the Marxist Revolutionary Organization -- Workers' Politics movement (POLOP) (MIPT 2008). The group was led by army Captain Carlos Lamarca and Joao Quartim (ibid). It was a pro-Castro communist organization that aimed to overthrow the Brazilian military government (CIA 1970; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 514; MIPT 2008). It is unknown when its first attack occurred. It was responsible for a prominent

kidnapping of a Japanese Consul General in Sao Paulo as late as March 1970 (GTD 2018, CIA 1970). In exchange for the Consul General, the group asked for the government to release five prisoners (CIA 1970).

Geography

The group conducted its attacks in the Brazilian cities of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Porto Alegre (GTD 2018). It also had a training school in Vale de Rebeira, San Paulo (MIPT 2008). It was not transnational.

Organizational Structure

Most of the members of the VPR were students and former soldiers (MIPT 2008). The leaders of the group were Carlos Lamarca and Joao Quartim (MIPT 2008; Jongman, Schmid 1988, 514). In 1969, the group merged with COLINA to form a new group, named VAR-Palmares (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 514). However, soon after the joining of the two organizations, Lamarca removed part of the VPR from VAR-Palmares, and started operations in rural areas (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 514).

External Ties

The group joined with COLINA in 1969 to form the VAR-Palmares (MIPT 2008; Jongman and Schmid 1988, 514). It also joined with the MR-8 later (MIPT 2008). The Action for National Liberation (ALN) and VAR-Palmares were allies (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

In 1969, the group merged with COLINA to form a new group, named VAR-Palmares (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 514). However, soon after the joining of the two organizations, Lamarca removed part of the VPR from VAR-Palmares, and resumed operations in rural areas (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 514).

The group started to dissolve after the Brazilian government began a series of raids against the group (MIPT 2008). In 1970, the government attacked the group's training school in Vale de Rebeira, San Paulo with Napalm (ibid). In 1971, Lamarca requested help from the MR-8, and asked for the VPR to become a part of the MR-8 (Dassin 1998, 88). Lamarca was killed in 1971 Bahía (MIPT 2008). The government imprisoned many members of the group during the years it was active (Jongman, Schmid 1988, 514). Most of the group was dismantled in 1973, when a police officer oversaw the killings of the VPR militants that were left (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 514). The group's last attack was in 1976, with the bombing of a business (GTD 2018). Arrests of VPR members continued until 1978 (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 514). In

1979, reports came in that VPR members were training in PLO camps (Jongman and Schmid 1988, 514).

VI. APRIL 19 MOVEMENT
Torg ID: 69
Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1997
Onset: NA

Aliases: M-19 (Movement Of April 19), 19 April Movement, April 19 Movement, April 19 Movement (M-19), M-19, Movimiento 19 De Abril, Movimiento 19 De Abril (M-19)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ADM-19, Acción Democrática-Movimiento 19 (Democratic Action-Movement 19), ADM-19, Alianza Democrática M-19, Democratic Alliance M-19

Group Formation: 1972/1973

Group End (Outcome): 1989 (disarm, create a political party)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

M-19 formed between 1972 and 1973 in Colombia in response to what members perceived as a “stolen” presidential election (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). The group retroactively declared its birth as April 19, 1970 (Idaho State n.d.). The group fought to overthrow the government and replace the leader they believed had stolen a previous election (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003; Crenshaw 2015). The group first came to attention for a series of violent robberies in 1973 and the January 1974 robbery of Simon Bolivar’s sword (Crenshaw 2015). The group ascribed to Marxism-Leninism and a populist ideology (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group primarily operated in Colombian cities (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). The group’s operations concentrated in the Southern front in Putomayo and Western front in Caldas, Cauca, Valle de Cauca, Quindio, and Tolima (Crenshaw 2015). The group is tied to one attack in Lima, Peru, where it kidnapped an Italian diplomat. However, there is no evidence of other violent activities in Peru or other countries beyond Colombia (GTD).

Organizational Structure

One of the group’s leader - Jaime Bateman Cayon - was a former member of FARC. Ivan Marino Ospina also had a leadership role in the movement. Alvaro Fayad was the group’s chief military and political strategist (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

Members came from middle to upper middle class backgrounds and included university students, unions, doctors, and families with ties to the government (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). The organization had approximately 1,500-2,000 members in 1985. These numbers decreased to 500 in 1987 (Crenshaw 2015).

The group’s political wing, the ADM-19, later splintered and became a legitimate political party (Crenshaw 2015).

The M-19 organized itself along two military fronts: one in the south of Colombia and the other in the west. The group subdivided the fronts into smaller units, which operated in different cities (Idaho State University n.d.).

The group funded itself through drug trafficking and kidnapping (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

External Ties

The group fought MAS, a paramilitary group that participated in drug trafficking (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

The group received military training in guerrilla warfare from Cuba (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

In 1980, the Colombian army arrested M-19 leader Jaime Bateman, which triggered an Embassy hostage crisis in Bogota (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

In 1984, the Colombian government negotiated a disarmament deal with several factions, which led to the creation of the ADM-19 political group (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

In 1985, when the political agreement fell apart, the Colombian government launched a major counterinsurgency offensive against the M-19 in Bogota (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). In 1987, security forces killed Alvaro Fayad, which hurt the group's ability to continue operations (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

In 1989, the government and M-19 negotiated a secondary political agreement. The agreement led most members to disarm by 1990. Many former M-19 members joined the ADM-19 political group (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

VII. BRAZILIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE (AAB)
Torg ID: 702493
Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1976
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: AAB, Aliança Anti-Comunista do Brasil, Alianca Anticomunista Brasileira

Group Formation: 1974

Group End: 1976

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Brazilian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAB) was a far-right group that was created in 1974 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 510; Schneider 2019, 167). The group was formed as a result of the opposition party’s success in the 1974 elections (US Special Operations Command 1975). It fought against President Geisel’s loosening of authoritarian rule (called decompression) in Brazil (Skidmore 1988, 190). The group first threatened assassinations on December 12, 1974, after the elections (US Special Operations Command 1975). Its first confirmed violent act occurred in August of 1976, when it bombed the Brazilian Press Association (GTD 2018, Skidmore 1988, 190).

Geography

The group conducted its attacks in Brazilian cities like Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Nova Iguaca (GTD 2018). It was not transnational.

Organizational Structure

Members of the group were allegedly connected to the police and military (Skidmore 1988, 190). It is unknown who exactly founded the group (Schneider 2019, 168). The source of funding is also unclear.

External Ties

Members of the group were allegedly connected to the Brazilian police and military (Skidmore 1988, 190).

Group Outcome

The government did not not change it's "decompression" campaign after the AAB's attacks (Skidmore 1988, 190). It is thought that the people responsible for the AAB attacks were connected to the police and military and were told by higher level officials to end the attacks, or they stopped the violence themselves (ibid). The group primarily targeted the church and the press in their attacks (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 510). The group's last attack was the kidnapping of a Bishop in Nova Iguaca in September of 1976 (GTD 2018).

Notes for Iris:
-the group was operating in the military's interests
-govt had a neutral stance towards the group and it disappeared soon after it began using violence
-the military was still in control during the period that they were operating

VIII. SHINING PATH (SL)
Torg ID: 457
Min. Group Date: 1978
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Shining Path (SI), Sendero Luminoso (SI), Shining Path

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Shining Path, Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Partido Comunista del Peru, Communist Party of Peru, The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the Thoughts of Chairman Gonzalo, Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru – By Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui, PCP – por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui, PCP and PCP-SL

Group Formation: 1980

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Shining Path (SL) initially formed in the 1960s at a series of student meetings at a Peruvian university (Gregory 2009). Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor at the University of San Cristóbal del Huamanga in Ayacucho, Peru, created the group. Shining Path has sought the overthrow of the Peruvian government (Graun 2008, 6-7). SL

ascribes to a Marxist-Lenninst ideology (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 7). The group's first violent incident occurred in 1978 in Ayacucho, Peru (GTD 2016). The group formally launched their armed campaign against Peru in 1980 (Graun 2008, 7). In 1983, it escalated its attack when it began to kill both noncombatants and political officials (Gregory 2009).

Geography

The group formed in Ayacucho at the University of San Cristóbal del Huamanga in Ayacucho, Peru (Gregory 2009). The group's primary base of operations was initially in Ayacucho. The group has had bases in Huanta and Vilcabamba, Peru (COHA 2008).

Organizational Structure

Guzmán, a leftist university professor, was the sole leader of SL (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 4-5, 9). SL has funded itself through extortion, kidnapping, and drug-trafficking (COHA 2008; Gregory 2009). SL believed in a foco-style of revolution, which could eventually inspire rural communities to rise up and join the fight.

Most of Guzmán's followers comprised of his former students and other peasants in the area, most of whom were Quechua-speaking natives (Graun 2008). SL had approximately 5000-1000 members at its peak in 1989-1993 (Gleditsch et al. 2009, 315; Mackenzie Institute 2016). It has organized around a hierarchical structure (COHA 2008).

External Ties

Guzmán rejected outside influence and did not receive any type of external support from other actors (Gregory 2009; Templeman 2009; Gleditsch et al. 2009). The group competed against the MRTA for supporters and resources (Gregory 2009). Evidence exists that Guzman visited China in the mid-1960s. No evidence exists whether this trip involved training in guerrilla warfare or other types of education (COHA 2008).

Group Outcome

Initially, SL had large success against the Peruvian government. The Peruvian military's indiscriminate use of violence against noncombatants, in part, aided SL's success (Graun 2008). In 1988, "the tide had begun to turn" and the military started gathering better intelligence and used force more discriminately (Graun 2008, 13). In 1991, the Army implemented a wide-standing reform program including the Civil Defense Committees to train and organize local communities to resist SL (Graun 2008, 13-14).

In 1992, the government captured and imprisoned Guzmán, who remains incarcerated (Graun 2008, 7; Gregory 2009). Support for the group turned as it continued to employ indiscriminate violence against combatants (Graun 2008; MIPT 2008). Membership for the group shrunk from 10,000 members at its peak to approximately 500, as of 2008 (MIPT 2008). After serving long sentences, several other high-ranking revolutionaries of SL began release from prison in 2012 (Economist 2012). Operating from a small base along the Peru-Brazil border, SL still conducts intermittent attacks today (Economist 2012).

// **NOTE for Iris**: “Despite his veneration of communists like Mao and Lenin, Guzmán often disregarded the rural poor he sought to recruit. He once ordered the slaughter of an entire village for suspected collusion with the government (Starn n.d.).” [Exclude? Cannot find corroboration for first sentence.]

IX. LANDLESS PEASANTS' MOVEMENT (MST)
Torg ID: 1784
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 1997
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Movement of Landless Rural Workers, MST, Movimento dos Trabalhadores sem Terra, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra

Group Formation: 1979

Group End: 1997 (last attack), 2019 (still active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group was formed in 1979. It was created so that poor rural peasants could occupy farms and government owned buildings in order to galvanize land reforms (Human Rights Watch 2001). The group's first occupation was in 1979 (Carter 2015). From 1979 to 1984, the MST's tactics were mostly peaceful (Carter 2015). Starting in 1985, the group began violently mobilizing against ranches (Carter 2015). By 1994, the violence had ended, but the group was still actively trying to gain the reforms it wanted (ibid). The group gained more media attention in the 1990s and grew in size after the 1996 incident (Ondetti 2008, 2).

Geography

The organizations headquarters were in Porto Alegre when it first began (Carter 2015). In 1986, the headquarters shifted to Sao Paulo (ibid). The MST had camps across Brazil, with the largest number of people occupying camps in the Northeast area of Brazil (ibid). The group set up the camps in order for landless families to be able to farm together (Robles and Veltmeyer 2015).

Organizational Structure

Most of the group's members are gaúcho, or Rio Grande do Sul natives (Carter 2015). Members came from poor rural peasant communities to organize against the government (Human Rights Watch 2001) The leadership of the group has been described as authoritarian (Pahnke 2018), 56. Many leaders had been Catholic church activists before joining the MST, such as João Pedro Stedile (Ondetti 2008, 119; Watts 2014). The movement receives funding from dues that members pay (ibid). In 1997, the group had at least 100,000 members participating in protests and marches against the government (Watts 2014). In 2001, the group had an estimated 500,000 members (Robles 2001, 147). As of 2014, there were 350,000 families living in government recognized camps, and 90,000 members on camps that are not recognized by the state (Watts 2014).

External Ties

The Catholic Church's Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) helped mobilize the group (Carter 2015). The MST also supported the Worker's Party (PT) (Carter 2015). It worked with other landless movements, including the National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG), the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), the Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB) and the Movement of Small Farmers (MPA) (Pahnke 2018, 48) .

Group Outcome

In April of 1996, the MST led the occupation of a ranch close to Eldorado dos Carajás with more than 100 members (Watts 2014). The police killed 19 people, making it one of the worst massacres in Brazilian history (ibid). The group's last violent attack was in 1997 when it attacked a ranch in Brazil (GTD 2018).

The Cardoso government in Brazil criminalized land occupations in 2001 (Robles 2001; Veltmeyer 2015). The government also used wiretaps and infiltrated the group to prosecute many members of the movement (ibid). The group is still active, and the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, says that the government will consider occupations by the MST and other Land Movements terrorist attacks (Spring and Boadle 2019).

Notes for Iris:
-the group's violence generally seems to arise from clashes with police during occupations
-tons of supporters and tons of mobilizations
-mixed to little success with tactics

X. COMANDO VERMELHO (RED COMMAND)
Torg ID: 1668
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: Comando Vermelho (Red Command), Comando Vermelho, Red Command

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Falange Vermelha (Red Phalanx), CV

Group Formation: 1979

Group End: 2018 (still violent)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Red Command was created in a Ilha Grande prison in 1979 to help protect inmates (Insight Crime 2018; Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.). It was called Falange Vermelha (Red Phalanx), and in 1980 was renamed Comando Vermelho (Red Command) (Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.). The group originally was an alliance between leftists and criminal, but later operated as a criminal organization (UCDP n.d.; Canada IRB 2015). There is no evidence of politicized opposition against the state.

Geography

The group operates in favelas across Rio de Janeiro (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). It has connections in Bolivia, Paraguay, Colombia, Peru, and Suriname (ibid). It is also linked to the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital, First Capital Command) in Sao Paulo (ibid).

Organizational Structure

Many members of the Red Command are children (Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.). As of 2015, it was estimated to have around 20,000 members (Canada: Immigration and

Refugee Board of Canada 2015). Isaias da Costa Rodrigues, Luis Claudio Machado, and Luiz Fernando da Costa are reported to be important leaders in the organization (ibid). It is supposed that the founders of the organization are either imprisoned or have died (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999).

The group has different factions established in many favelas, and each faction supports the others (Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.). Its support structure was very decentralized (Canada IRB 2015). There is a ranking system in each favela, with positions that include "bosses," "coordinators," lawyers, leaders, general managers, and security (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999; Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.). It earns money from robbing banks, drug trafficking, and arms dealing (Canada IRB 2015).

External Ties

The group is linked to another large Brazilian crime organization, called PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital, First Capital Command) and some members also received training from soldiers in the Brazilian military (Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.). It had ties to Family of the North (Família do Norte – FDN) in Manaus, Brazil until disagreements ended their collaboration in 2018 (Insight Crime 2018). It also works with Colombian drug cartels, and is connected to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) (Insight Crime 2018). Amigo dos Amigos, another drug trafficking organization is said to have formed as a splinter of the Red Command (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). A rival gang, Third Command was founded by former Red Command members (Insight Crime 2018).

Group Outcome

The group is considered one of the largest gangs in Brazil (Reuters 2018). In 2008, the government started using Police Pacification Units (UPPs) in favelas in Rio de Janeiro to tackle crime organizations (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). They also attacked the Red Command's headquarters in 2010 (ibid). Red Command members attack the police when they enter favelas (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). The Red Command's presence in favelas has decreased due to rival gangs and the deployment of UPPs (ibid). However it has expanded internationally, and has increased operations in Paraguay and Bolivia (Insight Crime 2018). The Red Command is still active.

XI. FIRST CAPITAL COMMAND (PCC)
Torg ID: 1251
Min. Group Date: 1993
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: First Capital Command (Pcc), Primeiro Commando Da Capital Movement (Pcc)

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: no additional aliases found

Group Formation: 1993

Group End: still active

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The First Capital Command (PCC) was a criminal gang that originally formed in Taubate Penitentiary in Sao Paulo in 1993 (Insight Crime 2018). It was created to take revenge for the 1992 prison massacre in which the police killed over a hundred prisoners (Council on Foreign Relations 2006; Insight Crime 2018). It also campaigned for rebellion and ending the capitalist system (Insight Crime 2018). Its main purpose is to advocate for prisoners' rights and drug trafficking and bank robbery are merely to fund the organization (Council on Foreign Relations 2006). The group's first attack was in 1999, the group robbed a bank, stealing almost $32 million (Insight Crime 2018). There is no evidence of politicized opposition against the state.

Geography

The organization has members throughout Brazil (Insight Crime 2018). It also set up operations in Bolivia and Paraguay (ibid). They also launder money in China (ibid). There is no evidence of transnational activity.

Organizational Structure

Members of the original group that founded the PCC, Jose Marcio Felicio, alias and César Augusto Roriz da Silva left the PCC and created the competing Third Capital Command (Terceiro Comando da Capital — TCC) (Insight Crime 2018). The leader of the group since 2002 has been prisoner Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho and the next in the chain of command is Abel Pacheco (Council on Foreign Relations 2006; Insight Crime 2018). Both are imprisoned (Council on Foreign Relations 2006; Insight Crime 2018). Many of the group's leaders were killed in late 2017 and early 2018 (Insight Crime 2018). The PCC began to gain members from FARC after FARC signed a peace agreement with the Colombian government (Foreign Policy 2017).

As of 2018, the group had around 11,000 members in Brazil (Insight Crime 2018). There are another 140,000 prisoners who claim membership for fear of retaliation by the PCC (Council on Foreign Relations 2006). Members of the group are either soldiers, towers, or pilots (ibid). The tower is the leader of the group in a specific prison and the pilot is in charge of communication (ibid). The group gets its funding from the fees that members pay as well as drug trafficking and robbery (ibid).

External Ties

The group used to be closely connected to the Red Command, until a territorial argument broke their ties in 2016 (Council on Foreign Relations 2006; Insight Crime 2018).Through the Red Command, they also have ties to the Combian guerilla group FARC (ibid). They are also allegedly linked to Paraguayan crime organizations, from

whom they receive weapons (ibid). They are connected to an Italian mafia, 'Ndrangheta (Insight Crime 2018). The First Catarinense Group (Primeiro Grupo da Catarinense – PGC) used to be an ally of the PCC (ibid). They supported the Brazilian crime organization Amigo dos Amigos, a rival of the Red Command, after their ties to the Red Command ended (Insight Crime 2018).

Group Outcome

The group sometimes clashes with police as seen in 2006 (GTD 2018). The government attempted to dissolve the PCC by transferring inmates and breaking up the leaders of the gang, but this merely extended the group's influence across prisons (Insight Crime 2018). In 2001, the group was able to carry out a series of planned rebellions in 29 prisons throughout Sao Paulo (ibid). The government's efforts to dissolve the group are not very successful (Council on Foreign Relations 2006). Guards are often bribed by prisoners (ibid). The PCC is still active.

Notes for Iris:
-the group does partially oppose the government's policy against inmates. Their main goal is not just drug trafficking, but to improve prisoner rights
-still active in prison

XII. THIRD COMMAND
Torg ID: 2575
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: Terceiro Comando, Third Command

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding
Aliases: Tercer Comando

Group Formation: mid 1980s

Group End: 2002 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In the mid 1980s, the Third Command was formed by members of another drug gang known as the Red Command (Insight Crime 2018). Members split from the Red Command in order to create a more organized drug empire (ibid). The first reported violence that occurred was in January of 1994, when the rival Red Command was trying to take back territory now under the authority of the Third Command (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). The ensuing violence resulted in the deaths of thirteen people (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999; Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.).

Geography

The group based its operations in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and each favela's faction collaborated with the others (Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The organization had no one leader, but operated in a series of decentralized favelas (Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.). Many members of the group started as children from the ages of 7 to 12 (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). The kingpin of the Third Command in Complexo da Mare was Nei da Conceição Cruz (Insight Crime 2018). Nei da Conceição Cruz left the group in 2002 due to a disagreement between him and the leader of Amigo dos Amigos, Paulo Cesar Silva dos Santos (Insight Crime 2018). After he left, he created a new group, called Pure Third Command (ibid). In September of 2002, much of the Third Command's leadership, already imprisoned, was killed by members of the competing Red Command and Amigos dos Amigos (ibid). Its funding came from drug trafficking, arms trading and robbing banks (Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.).

External Ties

The group worked with another drug cartel formed by former Red Command members, called Amigo dos Amigos after their leader died (Insight Crime 2018; Uppsala Conflict

Database n.d.). Members of the Third Command were trained by soldiers in the Brazilian Army (Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.). The kingpin of the Third Command later left and created the Pure Third Command (Insight Crime 2018).

Group Outcome

The police did intervene in the Third Command's operations, although it is unclear when it happened and how it affected the group (Uppsala Conflict Database n.d.). Much of the leadership of the Third Command was imprisoned by 2002, and later was killed by the Red Command and Amigo Dos Amigos (Insight Crime 2018). The rest of the members left for competing drug syndicates (ibid). The group is now inactive.

Notes for Iris:
Why did this group fall apart so quickly? Lot of rivalry with the Red Command and turf wars -- competition for resources. Red Command controlled more turf and was trying to expand so they were able to block the Third Command.

XIII. TERENA INDIANS
Torg ID: 1156
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 2001
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: 2001 (last attack)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Terena Indians are a tribe native to Brazil (Garcia-Navarro 2013). The tribe wants to have their ancestral lands returned to them (Boadle and Stauffer 2013). The Terena tribe, along with other indigenous tribes, occupy lands owned by farmers (Garcia-Navarro 2013). Their first violent attack was the kidnapping of Rogerio Alves de Resende and Geraldo Duarte in March of 2000 (GTD 2018). They kidnapped the men as leverage to be able to talk to the president of the Federal Indian Bureau (GTD 2018). The group aimed to negotiate for land to be returned to them (GTD 2018).

Geography

The tribe is native to the area that is now the Mato Grosso do Sul state in Brazil (Zhang, et.al 2002).

Organizational Structure

The tribe has a hierarchy, with the *naati,* or the leaders, and *waherê-txané*, the common people (Countries and Their Culture n.d.)

External Ties

External ties of the Terena Indian Tribe are unknown. It was one of several indigienous tribes operating in Brazil.

Group Outcome

The group's last violent incident was in 2001 when it kidnapped thirteen journalists in an effort to pressure the Brazilian government to step down (GTD 2018). The government ostensibly agreed to give the land back and two days later the journalists were released (GTD 2018). In 2013, violent emerged again when Terena men clashed with police during a cattle ranch occupation (Watts 2013). Evictions of Terena Indians by the Brazilian sometimes result in deaths for the indigenous people (Watts 2013). The group continues to occupy land owned by farmers, with most resulting in evictions, and injuries or even fatalities of the Terena Indians (The Economist 2013; Watts 2013).

Notes for Iris:
-why is this group so violent? The other tribes mostly just occupied the land while this group actually resorted to violence to achieve its aims
-the government reneged on their promise
-the tribe is much more diffuse so its not clear whether its an organized set of non-state actors or not

Country-Level Trends:
-3 groups: leftist students in the early 70s, the gangs, and ethnonationalist self-defense groups fighting for land reform and one right-wing minor group (AAB)
-the gangs have been operating for a long time but the leftist groups were relatively minor
-the Terena and MST groups were much bigger
-Command groups are growing