Bahrain Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 25 June 2019

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T1547	ORGANIZATION OF THE SONS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES		1974	1979
T2072	ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS		1987	2011
T28	QA'IDAT AL-JIHAD		1989	2012
T9025	ISLAMIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF BAHRAIN		0	0
T9017	HEZBOLLAH HEJAZ		0	0
T9026	BAHRAINI HEZBOLLAH		0	0

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE SONS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Torg ID: 1547
Min. Group Date: 1974
Max. Group Date: 1979
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

-potential alias (or very close connections) to PFLP

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 3084. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=3084
- Bassill Mardelli. “Middle East Perspectives: From Lebanon (1968-1988).” Universe Publishing. 2012. P. 204. https://books.google.com/books?id=1_JKo17u6yYC&pg=PA204&lpg=PA204&dq=%22ORGANIZATION+OF+THE+SONS+OF+OCCUPIED+TERRITORIES%22+bahrain&source=bl&ots=xdnBEjZBmV&sig=ACfU3U3EOHhdbvkbDbuiEsdCE3c7h-CPdg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwii7OXwlYXjAhUCHzQIHSmTDwoQ6AEwAnoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22ORGANIZATION%20OF%20THE%20SONS%20OF%20OCCUPIED%20TERRITORIES%22%20bahrain&f=false

- Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson. “July 20. Netherlands.” “International Terrorism - A Chronology.” Report Prepared for the State Department and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. RAND. 1975. p. 46. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a008354.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding
Aliases: none

Group Formation: The specific date for the group’s formation is unknown. The first day the group exhibited violence was on July 20, 1973 (Jenkins and Johnson 1975).

Group End: There has been no recent evidence of the group’s activity (GTD 2018). The last time it was active was allegedly on December 5th, 1979 (GTD 2018).

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The group’s founding date is unknown. However, the first date the group came to attention as a violent group was on July 20, 1973 (Jenkins and Johnson 1975). A group of five people: one Latin American woman, one Japanese man, and three Arab men. They hijacked a Japan Air Lines flight, asking for $5 million in ransom, and flew the plane from the Netherlands to Lebanon, then to Damascus, and finally to Benghazi where they released the passengers who were held hostage and exploded the aircraft (Jenkins and Johnson 1975; Mardelli 2012). The Organization of the Sons of Occupied Territories stated that the reason the aircraft had been destroyed was because they were angry with the payments victims of the Lod Airport mass murders had received from the Japanese government and the detainment of the group’s Fedayeen associates (Jenkins and Johnson 1975; Mardelli 2012). The only fatality was the Latin American woman who had died when a grenade exploded in her hand (Jenkins and Johnson 1975). There is no specific information about the group’s ideology.

Geography

The group’s attacks took place in several international locations. The first attack was the hijacking of a plane in the Netherlands (Jenkins and Johnson 1975). The second attack was targeted at airports and aircrafts in West Berlin, West Germany (GTD 2018). The third attack was targeted at airports and aircrafts in Manama, Bahrain (GTD 2018). The different locations associated with the group indicate that it operated internationally.

Organizational Structure

There is no specific information about the group's organizational structure. However, it was revealed that the three Arab men were members of Palestinian resistance groups and the Japanese man was part of the Red Army, and both of these groups had strong ties with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Mardelli 2012). Thus, the Organization of the Sons of Occupied Territories may have received funding from this group.

External Ties

It was revealed that the three Arab men were members of Palestinian resistance groups and the Japanese man was part of the Red Army, and both of these groups had strong ties with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, known as PFLP (Mardelli 2012). Therefore, the Organization of the Sons of Occupied Territories probably has strong ties with PFLP.

Group Outcome

It is unknown when the group stopped operating. However, the last day the group exhibited violence was on December 5th in 1979 when they allegedly bombed a KLM and Gulf Airlines warehouse in Bahrain (GTD 2018). This bombing in Bahrain is the only reason the group is tied to militant activity in Bahrain.

Notes for Iris:

-there is a large gap between the group's attacks in 1973 and 1979. None of the other sources corroborate the GTD attack (cross-check with ITERATE?)

-was this an alias for PFLP? The hijackers in the 1973 attack were associated with their own groups, but might have been acting on behalf or to advance the larger aims of the Palestinian nationalists

-the Organization -- seems to operate in many countries

-odd JRA involvement

II. ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS

Torg ID: 2072

Min. Group Date: 1987

Max. Group Date: 2011

Onset: NA

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

III. QA'IDAT AL-JIHAD
Torg ID: 28
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

Part 1. Bibliography

- “Al-Qaida (The Core).” Terrorism Profiles. Mackenzie Institute. 2015. http://mackenzieinstitute.com/al-qaida-2/
- “Al Qaeda: Inside the Terror Network.” Frontline. PBS. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/network/alqaeda/indictment.html

- Jayshree Bajoria, and Greg Bruno. “al-Qaeda Backgrounder.” Council on Foreign Relations. 2012. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126
- Martha Crenshaw. “Al Qaeda” Mapping Militant Organizations. 2015. https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21
- “Al-Qaida.” US State Department FTO Profiles. 2005. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65479.pdf
- Ken Katzman. “Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment.” Congressional Research Services. FAS. 2005. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33038.pdf
- Ty McCormick. “Al Qaeda: A Short History.” Foreign Policy. 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/17/al-qaeda-core-a-short-history/
- “Al-Qaida / Al-Qaeda (The Base).” Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm
- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End* RAND. 2008. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- “Al-Qa’ida.” BAAD Database. Project on Violent Conflict. 2015. http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/al-qaida
- “Evidence of Financial Links between Saudi Royal Family and Al Qaeda.” New York Times. N.d. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/documents/evidence-of-financial-links-between-saudi-royal-family-and-al-qaeda
- Andrew Wander. “A history of terror: Al Qaeda 1988-2008.” Guardian (UK). 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida
- “Timeline of al Qaida.” The Guardian. N.d. https://www.theguardian.com/alqaida/page/0,12643,852377
- Jason Burke. “Rags to riches story of the bin Laden family is woven with tragedy.” Guardian. 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/01/rags-to-riches-story-of-the-bin-laden-family-is-woven-with-tragedy
- “A biography of Osama bin Laden.” from “Hunting bin Laden.” 2001. Frontline Investigations. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/bio.html
- “The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are aiding terrorists in Yemen.” Washington Post. 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/08/29/the-united-arab-emirates-and-saudi-arabia-are-aiding-terrorists-in-yemen/?utm_term=.ebf9b28f987c
- Mary Habeck. “What does Al Qaeda want?” Foreign Policy. 2012. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/06/what-does-al-qaeda-want/
- Christopher M. Blanchard. “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology.” Congressional Research Service. 2007. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a470199.pdf
- Julie Marks. “How SEAL Team Six Took Out Osama bin Laden.” History. 2018.
- Jim Sciutto and Laura Koran. “New allegations of Saudi involvement in 9/11.” CNN Politics. 2015.

https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/03/politics/9-11-attacks-saudi-arabia-involvement/index.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Al-Qaida was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence and ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida attempts to achieve a state governed by sharia law and a conservative interpretation of Islam (FP 2012).They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology and ascribes to Salafi jihadist ideas (CFR 2012; Global Security n.d.; Blanchard 2007, 6).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherd or farmers) (FAS 2005). The group's leader Osama bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991 to 1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016).

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was the group's sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (CFR 2012). He was originally from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in Afghanistan (Crenshaw 2015). His father, Mohammed bin Laden, moved from southern Yemen to Saudi Arabia, where he worked his way up from being a menial laborer to gaining favor with the royal family and constructing palaces and mosques for King Faisal (The Guardian 2015; PBS 2001). Osama bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia as one of fifty children (The Guardian 2015). After returning from a trip to Peshawar, Pakistan, he vocally advocated for support for the mujahideen (PBS 2001).

After collecting monetary donations for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, bin Laden first went to Afghanistan in 1982 and eventually fought in battles and established camps, which eventually

attracted more Saudis to the country (PBS 2001). Eventually, bin Laden established Al-Qa'edah, or "The Base" as the center of his mujahideen operations. After the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, bin Laden again went to Afghanistan (PBS 2001). He was unable to leave the country as he had been banned from travel for trying to spread jihad to Yemen (PBS 2001). In response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, bin Laden argued that all Arab mujahideen should be brought to defend the country (PBS 2001). Then, bin Laden learned that the United States would enter the conflict in Kuwait (PBS 2001). This was a turning point for bin Laden. He gathered religious support and led 4000 people to receive jihadist training in Afghanistan (PBS 2001). He spent a short while in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but eventually escaped from Saudi and Pakistani authorities to Sudan where he received temporary refuge (PBS 2001). In 1996, he left Sudan and returned to Afghanistan, where he conducted attacks against civilians and American forces on the Arabian Peninsula (PBS 2001). After the Taliban took over the Afghan city of Jalalabad, bin Laden joined the group (PBS 2001). The Saudis and the U.S. tried unsuccessfully many times to kidnap bin Laden (PBS 2001). He was finally defeated when American Navy SEALS raided his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan (History 2018).

Following his death, he was replaced as leader by Ayman al-Zawhiri in 2011 (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex decentralized, or cell-based, organizational structure in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head (RAND 2008). Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS 2001). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security n.d.). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). As of 2015, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary wildly by source (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Both the government of Saudi Arabia and the US Central Intelligence Agency allegedly provided money and supplies to the mujahideen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan before al-Qaida formally organized (Crenshaw 2015). Some reports claim that the CIA itself sent more than $600 million to mujahideen associated with bin Laden (Crenshaw 2015). Some reports allege that Saudi Arabia funded Al-Qaida through drug trafficking and diamonds, though these claims are now considered to have been falsified and invalid (Crenshaw 2015). Bin Laden maintained ties with key members of the Saudi royal family; some, including Prince Faisal, allegedly provided Al-Qaida with large monetary donations (Crenshaw 2015; CNN 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaida to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, The

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS 2001).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a U.S. raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

Notes for Iris:
-check to see if there's evidence of AQ wanting to move away from Afghanistan in the late 90s

IV. ISLAMIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF BAHRAIN
Torg ID: 9025
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 1063. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified July 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1063
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Bahrain." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. PDF. gDrive.
- Jason Rivera. "Iran's Involvement in Bahrain." Small Wars Journal. 2014. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/iran%E2%80%99s-involvement-in-bahrain
- Alhasan, Hasan Tariq. "The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain." Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (2011): 603-17. http://www.jstor.org.stanford.idm.oclc.org/stable/41342743. PDF. gDrive.
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Bahrain: Opposition group(s)/organization(s), operating abroad, including location and activities (1996 to February 2000), 1 March 2000, BHR33904.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad4c4.html
- Brandon Wallace. "Foreign Fighters Among the Hashd al-Shaabi." Washington Institute. 2017. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/foreign-fighters-among-the-hashd-al-shaabi

- “Bahrain Profile - Timeline.” BBC. 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14541322
- Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Shi'is in Bahrain, 2004, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38671e.html
- Michael Knights and Matthew Levitt. “The Evolution of Shia Insurgency in Bahrain.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. 2018. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/KnightsLevitt20180124-CTCSentinel.pdf
- United States Congressional Research Service, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, 14 February 2014, 95-1013, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/531857fc4.html
- Justin Gengler. “How Radical are Bahrain’s Shia?” Foreign Affairs. 2011. https://www-foreignaffairs-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/articles/bahrain/2011-05-15/how-radical-are-bahrains-shia

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: IFLB, al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li Tahrir al-Bahrayn

Group Formation: 1976 (formation, but disputed), 1981 (BBC 2018)

Group End: 1996 (GTD 2018)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain was a group formed and trained by Iran in order to assassinate important Bahraini government officials and overthrow the government (Alhasan 2011). It was created by radical Iranian and Shia leader, Ayatollah Shirazi’s nephew, Sayyid Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi (Wallace 2017). The Iranian government wanted to spark a Shia Islamic Revolution like the one in Iran in 1979 and subsequently cause similar events in other gulf countries (BBC 2018; Katzman 2014). The specific formation date of the group is disputed, as some sources believe it was created in the late 1970s while the IFLB itself claims to be founded in the 1960s (Canada IRB 2000). The best guess for the group’s formation date was January 27, 1976, although it is speculated that the group began operations and was actually created before this date (Alhasan 2011).

On December 16, 1981, seventy three members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain planned a coup, and they were headed by Hojjat ol-Eslam Hadi al-Mudarrisi who headed the plan from Iran where he was deported (GTD 2018; BBC 2018). The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain wanted to assassinate important Sunni and Bahraini

government figures and seize radio and television stations (Knights and Levitt 2018). The coup was unsuccessful and the members were promptly arrested by the Iranian government (BBC 2018). After the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain fell apart after a second failed coup attempt in 1996, it was followed by a new group called Bahrain Islamic Action Society, which was immediately outlawed (Katzman 2014).

Geography

Although the group's center focus is sparking an Islamic revolution in Bahrain, several of its key leaders are from Iran, many of whom were part of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Wallace 2017). In 1980, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain held a conference at Iran's capital, Tehran, in which they proclaimed their allegiance to the Ayatollah of Iran, noting him as a symbol of hope for the oppressed (Rivera 2014).

The first attack in February 1996 was in Manama and the second attack was a coup of the government, also in Manama, as that is the capital of the country (GTD 2018; BBC 2018).

After the second coup in 1996, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain was operating out of Lebanon as late as 2000, when they demanded that the former security chief of Bahrain be tried for humanitarian crimes in Britain (Canada IRB 200). Although the central location of the group's operations were Bahrain and Lebanon, there is evidence that there may have been offices in London, Damascus, and Tehran (Canada IRB 2000).

Organizational Structure

The first leader of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain was Sayyid Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi, a key associate of the Iranian Islamic Revolution (Wallace 2017). He fled to Bahrain after fear of persecution in Iran, and he started to work with his brother to create an Islamic Revolution in the Gulf (Alhasan 2011). In 1979, Modaressi was arrested and exiled to UAE where he would later be sent to Iraq for execution; however, this did not occur and he continued operations from Iran (Alhasan 2011). The group mainly received weapons, training, and funding from Iran and had strong ties with the Iranian government (BBC 2018; Katzman 2014).

In 1981, the group had at least 60 members because the government arrested 60 members who had allegedly received training from Iran (Canada IRB 2000). Later, that same year, 73 additional members were arrested for conspiring to overthrow the government (BBC 2018).

External Ties

The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain is linked with other Iranian-extremist organizations, such as Amal (also known as the IFLB Shirazi faction) which has strong ties with radical Shia leader, Ayatollah Shirazi (Katzman 2014). Shirazi's nephew was influenced by his teachings and headed the attempted Islamic revolution in Bahrain (Wallace 2017). Amal allegedly splintered from IFLB at an unknown date (Katzman 2014).

The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain receives weapons, funding, and military training from Iran and has strong ties with it (BBC 2018; Canada IRB 2000; Katzman 2014). Iran saw Bahrain as a strategic location to cause a Shia revolution which would spread to neighboring countries (BBC 2018, Katzman 2014). In fact, in March 2009, the advisor to Iran's supreme leader called Bahrain the 14th province of Bahrain, clearly violating its sovereignty and showing Iran's strong want for the overthrow of the country's existing government (Katzman 2014).

The group also has ties with other organizations that have similar ideologies such as the Bahrain Liberation Front, the Islamic Movement of Free Bahrainis, the Popular Front in Bahrain, and the Bahraini Liberation Front (Refworld 2004). The group's leader, Modaressi, also had ties with the Islamic Action Organization in Iran from 1980 to 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War (Wallace 2017).

Group Outcome

In 1979, Modarresi was arrested and deported to Iran where he conducted and directed the coup activities from (Alhasan 2011; Wallace 2017). After the failed coup attempt in 1981, 73 group members were convicted with three members receiving life sentences and the remaining 70 receiving lighter sentences (Alhasan 2011; BBC 2018). The 1981 coup attempt was one of the first times Bahrain explicitly called out Iran for meddling in and interfering with its domestic policies (Alhasan 2011).

In June 1996, there was a second coup attempt, and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain was immediately criticized and accused for the incident alongside with the real perpetrator, Bahraini Hezbollah (BBC 2018; Katzman 2014). Following this incident, several members were arrested and the group no longer was active (Katzman 2014).

Shortly after the group ceased to exist, it was succeeded by the Bahrain Islamic Action Society (Katzman 2014). However, the group was immediately outlawed (Katzman 2014).

Notes for Iris:
-the coup is foiled before they are able to carry out
-the group was violent outside of the coup attempt so it qualifies as a militant violence

-what happens to this group? Some evidence that the group might have partially splintered and also serves as a focal point for future Shia opposition groups
-what happens with Modaressi? He is inspired by '79 Revolution with focus on Bahrain. He was supposed to be executed in Iraq but got away and goes back to Iran where he organizes the coup. There is an external base in Iran. (what's happened to him since 1996?)

V. HEZBOLLAH HEJAZ
Torg ID: 9017
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- Hassan al Mustafa. "Hezbollah al-Hejaz: A story not yet written." Al Arabiya. 2015. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/10/01/Hezbollah-al-Hejaz-A-story-not-yet-written.html
- Toby Matthiesen. "Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of The Most Radical Saudi Shi'a Opposition Group." The Middle East Journal 64, no. 2 (2010): 179-197. PDF. gDrive.
- Toby Jones. "Embattled in Arabia." Combating Terrorism Center. 2009. https://ctc.usma.edu/embattled-in-arabia-shiis-and-the-politics-of-confrontation-in-saudi-arabia/
- Matthew Levitt. "Hezbollah's Pivot Toward the Gulf." Sentinel. Vol. 9, Issue 8. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2016. https://ctc.usma.edu/hezbollahs-pivot-toward-the-gulf/
- Toby Matthiesen. "The World's Most Misunderstood Martyr." Foreign Policy. 2016. https://foreignpolicy-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/2016/01/08/the-worlds-most-misunderstood-martyr/
- "Reform promises more of the same for Saudi Arabia's Shiites." Stratfor. 2017. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/reform-promises-more-same-saudi-arabias-shiites
- Joshua Teitelbaum. "The Shiites of Saudi Arabia." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 10. Hudson Institute. https://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1288/teitelbaum.pdf
- Bruce Riedel. "Captured: Masterminds behind the 1996 Khobar Towers attack." Brookings Institution. 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/08/26/captured-mastermind-behind-the-1996-khobar-towers-attack/
- Turki al-Suhail. "Iran planned to revive Hezbollah al-Hejaz" under al-Mughassil's Command." Asharq al-Aswat. 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170901120355/https://english.aawsat.com/turkisuhail/news-middle-east/iran-planned-revive-hezbollah-al-hejaz-al-mughassils-command

- DeVore, Marc R. "Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship: A Case Study of How State Sponsorship Affects Terrorist Group Decision-Making." Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 4/5 (2012): 85-107. PDF. gDrive.
- David Brennan. “US Demands Millions from Iran in 1996 terror attack compensation.” Newsweek. 2018. https://www.newsweek.com/us-demands-millions-iran-1996-terror-attack-compensation-1115108
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, USA/Saudi Arabia: Mastermind of Khobar Towers bombing captured after 20 years, 27 August 2015, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/55ee972f15.html
- Thomas Hegghammer. “Jihad, Yes, But Not Revolution: Explaining the Extraversion of Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 36, No. 3, Gulf Security: Legacies of the Past, Prospects for the Future (DECEMBER 2009), pp. 395-416 (22 pages). Accessed by JSTOR.
- “US v. Al-Mughassil (Khobar Indictment).” United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division. 2001. Provided by findlaw.com. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB318/doc05.pdf
- Jason Rivera. “Iran’s Involvement in Bahrain.” Small Wars Journal. 2014. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/iran%E2%80%99s-involvement-in-bahrain

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Hizballah in the Hijaz, Saudi Hizballah, Hezbollah al Hejaz, Hezbollah al-Hijaz, Hezbollah of the Hijaz, Hizballah al-Hijaz, Ansar Khat al-Imam (Followers of Imam Khomeini)

Group Formation: 1987

Group End: 1996 (arrests and rapprochement)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hezbollah al-Hijaz is a Shiite group that formed in the second half of the 1980s in Saudi Arabia (Al Arabiya 2015; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009; 398). It was formed to create political unrest and insurgencies in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, specifically to destabilize and oppose their governments (Rivera 2014). Following the successful creation of the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iranian government sought similar success in these countries; thus, they were trained at Iranian Revolutionary Guard camps under Iranian officials, received funding, and smuggled weapons into Bahrain under the guidance of the Iranian government (Rivera 2014). The group first emerged in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in 1987 following violent

confrontations between Shiites and Saudi security forces in Mecca during the Hajj pilgrimage, in which more than 400 Iranian pilgrims died (Al Arabiya 2015; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009, 398).

The group dedicated itself to using acts of violence to advocate for regime change (Al Arabiya 2005). Hezbollah al-Hijaz ascribes to Shia Islam and largely arose as a violent group in response to tensions and violence between Sunnis, who form the overwhelming majority of Saudi Arabia, and Shiites (Hegghammer 2009; 398). The group has pledged loyalty to the supreme leader of Iran and was inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini (Al Arabiya 2015; Teitelbaum n.d., 77; Hegghammer 2009, 398). The group follows the Shiite doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which gives authority to an Islamic jurist to have guardianship over others (Al Arabiya 2015). The group is center-seeking; its political aim is to use violence to bring about the demise of the Saudi regime and to replace it with an Islamic republic similar to that of Iran (Matthiesen 2009; 185). One of the group's primary objectives is to conduct violent attacks against Americans and U.S. property in Saudi Arabia (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2). The group opposes the Islamic Revolution Organization, or the Organization of the Islamic Revolution, a less radical pro-Shirazi group (Hegghammer 2009, 398; Matthiesen 2010, 179).

The group allegedly was responsible for numerous attacks in the late 1980s, including a bombing at a petrochemical plant in Jubayl, bombings of oil refineries in Ras Tanura, and attacks in Riyadh (Hegghammer 2009, 398; Matthiesen 2010, 185). Hezbollah al-Hijaz is most well-known for its 1996 attack on a tower in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, which was housing American soldiers (Al Arabiya 2015; Combatting Terrorism Center 2009; Levitt 2016, 11; Stratfor 2007; Teitelbaum n.d., 78; Brookings 2015; Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009, 398; Mattheisen 2010, 191). The attack killed 19 U.S. soldiers and injured between 400 and 500 others (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Newsweek 2018).

Geography

Hezbollah al-Hijaz primarily operates in Saudi Arabia (Al Arabiya 2015; Combatting Terrorism Center 2009; Levitt 2016, 11; Stratfor 2007; Teitelbaum n.d., 77; Brookings 2015; Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009, 398; Mattheisen 2010, 179). It has conducted attacks in cities throughout the country, but seems to have conducted most of its attacks in eastern Saudi Arabia, near Bahrain and Kuwait, especially in Eastern Province cities such as Khobar, Dhahran, Ras Tanura, Jubayl, and Qatif (Hegghammer 2009, 398; Brookings 2015; Asharq al-Aswat 2017). It has also conducted attacks in Riyadh and Mecca (Hegghammer 2009, 398).

The group has also operated in Bahrain and Kuwait, where it set up cells, planned attacks, and conducted bombings (Levitt 2016, 11-13; Newsweek 2018). The group

operated in Lebanon, where the group's leader Ahmed al-Mughassil received sanctuary from the Lebanese Hezbollah after the Khobar bombings (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Brookings 2015). Moreover, the truck bomb used in the Khobar attacks was manufactured in Lebanon (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015).

Members of the group were trained in Lebanon and Iran by members of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRCG (Brookings 2015). The group operated in Damascus, Syria, where al-Mughassil resided for some time while he planned the attacks in Khobar and Dhahran (Brookings 2015; United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2-3). The group may have also operated in Iran, where members were offered external sanctuary (DeVore 2012, 91).

Organizational Structure

Hezbollah al-Hijaz consisted of two wings: a religious and political wing and a military wing (Matthiesen 2010, 185). The clerical wing, Tajamu‘ ‘Ulama’ al-Hijaz, was formed in the 1980s when a group of Saudi Shia clerics, who supported the ideas of Khomeini, moved Qom (Matthiesen 2010, 180). Some of the leaders of Tajamu‘ ‘Ulama’ al-Hijaz, including Shaykh Hashim al-Shakhs, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karim al-Hubayl, and ‘Abd al-Jalil al-Maa, founded Hezbollah al-Hijaz (Matthiesen 2010, 184-185). Hezbollah al-Hijaz consisted of both members of Tajamu‘ ‘Ulama’ al-Hijaz and the Movement for Vanguards Missionaries, or MVM, which wanted to conduct violent attacks against the Saudi regime (Matthiesen 2010, 185). The leader of the military wing of Hezbollah al-Hijaz was Ahmed al-Mughassil (Matthiesen 2010, 185).

Al-Mughassil, a Saudi Shiite born in the Eastern Province, was a former member of the MVM (Brookings 2015; Matthiesen 2010, 185). He allegedly masterminded the attacks in Khobar and was apprehended by authorities in Beirut in 2015 (Brookings 2015; Levitt 2016, 13; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015). The leader of the group allegedly was Abdel Karim al-Nasser, who al-Mughassil and leaders of the clerical wing reported to (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 3).

Hezbollah al-Hijaz recruited youth from the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and set up camps where they received military training (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2-4). Many young men went on religious pilgrimages to the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus, Syria, where Hezbollah al-Hijaz operated (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2). There, some of the children who were considered to have potential for militancy, were recruited by Hezbollah al-Hijaz and taken to camps in Lebanon for further indoctrination and training (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 2-3). Some people joined Hezbollah al-Hijaz after defecting from the IRO, a rival Shia organization (Al Arabiya 2015). It is difficult to find specific

numbers on membership size, but it initially had approximately 14 core members (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001).

External Ties

Hezbollah al-Hijaz had an external tie to Iran, which indirectly and directly sponsored the group (DeVore 2012, 85-107). Iran financed the group and ensured that it had sufficient funds to function (DeVore 2012, 91). Iran's financing allowed Hezbollah al-Hijaz set up "a sophisticated infrastructure of training camps and administrative facilities," something it would not be able to do on its own (DeVore 2012, 91). For example, Iran signed deals with Syria, which enabled Hezbollah and Hezbollah al-Hijaz to operate more freely in regions of Lebanon like Beka'a Valley (DeVore 2012, 91). Iran also provided safe haven to group members should have needed it (DeVore 2012, 91). For example, Iran allegedly harbored Ahmed al-Mughassil in Tehran for nearly twenty years before he was apprehended in Beirut in 2015 (Asharq al-Awsat 2017). Members of Hezbollah al-Hijaz were trained in Iran and Lebanon by operatives of the Lebanese Hezbollah and by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC (Brookings 2015; DeVore 2012, 92).

In exchange for funding and promises of safe haven for the group's members, Hezbollah al-Hijaz conducted attacks on behalf of Iran such as jihad against Israel and attacks on American and French targets of the Multinational Force, a peacekeeping organization (DeVore 2012, 96-99). The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency stated that Iranian officials approved previous attacks in Saudi Arabia (Levitt 2016, 11). Iran was involved in the 1996 Khobar attacks. A U.S. federal judge ruled in favor of the victims' families and ordered the government to Iran to pay $254.4 million in compensation (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Newsweek 2018). In that judge's report, he stated that the bomb used in the attack was manufactured and assembled at the Hezbollah base in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, which was operated by Iran's government and the IRGC (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015). In 2018, another judge also demanded that Iran pay $104.7 million to the victims' families (Newsweek 2018). Saudi authorities alleged that Iran attempted to revive Hezbollah al-Hijaz by supporting camps that trained youth in the Qatif region in eastern Saudi Arabia to incite a revolution (Asharq al-Awsat 2017).

Saudi Hezbollah, or Hezbollah al-Hijaz, had ties to the Lebanese Hezbollah. Members were known to have operated in Lebanon and maintained close ties with Lebanon's Hezbollah (Brookings 2015). Moreover, operatives were trained in Lebanon both by the IRGC and by Lebanon's Hezbollah (Brookings 2015). Lebanon's Hezbollah operated a base in Bekaa Valley, which was often used by Hezbollah al-Hijaz (Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015). In fact, the truck bomb used in the 1996 Khobar attacks was assembled at the base (Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015). According to the U.S. Department of Justice 46-count indictment of Ahmed al-Mughassil and thirteen others who allegedly participated in the plotting of the attack,

the bomb was built by a member of Lebanon's Hezbollah (United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, 5-6; Brookings 2015).

Group Outcome

Authorities responded effectively to Hezbollah al-Hijaz's violent activities. In the late 1980s, the group carried out attacks on targets in eastern Saudi Arabia, including a bombing at a petrochemical plant in Jubayl and bombings of oil refineries in Ras Tanura (Hegghammer 2009, 398; Matthiesen 2010, 185).

Shortly after these attacks, group operatives were apprehended by authorities in nearby cities like Qatif and Dammam (Al Arabiya 2015). Some of the suspected attackers were executed, and others were taken into custody by Saudi authorities (Al Arabiya 2015). Some of the detained operatives received a pardon from King Fahd bin Abudlaziz and were released in 1994 (Al Arabiya 2015). Many of the group members ceased using violence and focused on religious and social work (Al Arabiya 2015). In 1993, the Saudi government initiated a general amnesty program with the Islamic Revolution Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, which negotiated on behalf of all Shia groups (Matthiesen 2010, 190). Some members were released from prison as part of this program (Matthiesen 2010, 191).

Others, however, continued using violence, and in 1996, attacked a tower in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. soldiers and injuring between 400-500 others (Al Arabiya 2015; Combatting Terrorism Center 2009; Levitt 2016, 11; Stratfor 2007; Teitelbaum n.d., 78; Brookings 2015; Newsweek 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015; Hegghammer 2009, 398; Mattheisen 2010, 191). The Saudi government was quick to accuse Hezbollah al-Hijaz and arrested individuals they suspected of being directly involved in the attacks as well as those it suspected of having indirect ties to the group (Mattheisen 2010, 191). Due to tensions between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the official indictment of the attackers by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation only occurred in 2001 (Mattheisen 2010, 192; United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division 2001, Brookings 2015; Newsweek 2018).

Hezbollah al-Hijaz ceased its violent attacks and largely disappeared in 1996 after the Khobar bombings due to the arrests of most of its members (Mattheisen 2010, 194). Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to a reproachement, which prohibited Saudi Arabia from allowing the United States to operate in Saudi Arabia to conduct attacks against Iran and prohibited Iran from continuing to support violent Shiite groups in Saudi Arabia like Hezbollah al-Hijaz (Mattheisen 2010, 194). Some Saudi officials have emphasized the importance of permitting members of Hezbollah al-Hijaz to conduct religious activities and to seek public office; Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah al-Hijaz have begun cooperating in a peaceful way (Mattheisen 2010, 195-196).

Notes for Iris:
-the Hajj incident seemed to be particularly important in formation --
-there were underlying sectarian tensions, but this seemed particularly important
-the Hajj incident didn't seem to have a diffuse effect on the other groups
-the MVM was a group of Shia Islamists that wanted to take greater effort against the Saudi government by advocating for political violence (there is no evidence it ever did take these events)
-the oil attacks take place before the group travels to Iran and these other countries. The Khobar towers attack takes place after the group travels around
-the group was affiliated with Lebanese Hezbollah, but maintained operational independence in planning and conducting its attacks
-member size is missing but relative effectiveness of arrests suggests group is small

VI. BAHRAINI HEZBOLLAH
Torg ID: 9026
Min. Group Date: 0
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Bahrain Coup Suspects Say They Trained in Iran." New York Times. 1996. https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/06/world/bahrain-coup-suspects-say-they-trained-in-iran.html
- Jason Rivera. "Iran's Involvement in Bahrain." Small Wars Journal. 2014. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/iran%E2%80%99s-involvement-in-bahrain
- Salman al-Dossary. "Bahrain's Hezbollah and Iran's Failure." Al-Aawsat. 2018. https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1408776/salman-al-dossary/bahrain%E2%80%99s-hezbollah-and-iranian-failure
- Norman Roule. "What a New Terrorist Designation Says about Iranian Action in Bahrain." Just Security. New York University Law School. 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/60818/terrorist-designation-iranian-action-bahrain/
- "Bahrain Profile - Timeline." BBC. 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14541322
- Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Shi'is in Bahrain, 2004, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38671e.html
- Michael Knights and Matthew Levitt. "The Evolution of Shia Insurgency in Bahrain." Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. 2018. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/KnightsLevitt20180124-CTCSentinel.pdf
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Bahrain: Opposition group(s)/organization(s), operating abroad, including location and activities (1996 to

February 2000), 1 March 2000, BHR33904.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad4c4.html
- Alhasan, Hasan Tariq. "The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain." Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (2011): 603-17. http://www.jstor.org.stanford.idm.oclc.org/stable/41342743.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Hezbollah-Bahrain, Hizb Allah Bahrain

Group Formation: 1993

Group End: 1997 (arrests)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Bahraini Hezbollah is a militant organization that opposed the Bahraini government and was led by Muhammed Taqi Mudarassi; it was inspired by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and considered to be an offshoot or splinter (Knights and Levitt 2018; Roule 2018). It is said that Iran wanted to spark an event similar to the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 because it sees Bahrain as a crucial state to infiltrate in order to spark revolutions throughout the Gulf states (Rivera 2014; Al-dossary 2018). Bahraini Hezbollah aimed to overthrow the regime. It also dislike the US and Saudi Arabia as it relates to their prowess in the Persian gulf and oil industry (Roule 2018). Bahrain was ruled by a group of wealthy Sunni Muslims, although the majority of Bahrain is Shia (Knights and Levitt 2018).

The group might have formed approximately 18 months before the protests of December 1994 which was found out after detainees made confessions (New York Times 1996). This would place its formation date in mid-1993. The first violent incident was an arson attack in 1996 during a wider wave of protests started by Bahrain's Shia majority population against the Sunni ruling class (Rivera 2014). Bahraini Hezbollah launched a coup on June 3, 1996 -- the same date as IFLB's coup -- provoking a response from the Bahraini government (BBC 2018; Knights and Levitt 2018).

It is important to note that some deny that the Bahraini Hezbollah was a radical organization, arguing that it was a group of intellectuals who wanted peaceful, constitutional change or merely a fake organization created to blame internal, governmental problems on others (Minorities at Risk 2004). Others argue the group was -- without a doubt-- an independent and distinct organization (Alhasan 2011).

Following the political unrest, the government began to crackdown on anti-government organizations and held a trial, leading to 57 members in detention and 27 declared guilty in absentia (Minorities at Risk 2004).

Geography

Bahraini Hezbollah is an organization that is based in Bahrain and has partners with pro-Iranian and anti-American groups (Roule 2018). The organization is mainly committed to overthrowing the Bahraini government, as it has unsuccessfully attempted two coups (Knights and Levitt 2018). The group previously received military training and assistance from the IRGC in Iran (Roule 2018).

Organizational Structure

The first leader of the Bahraini Hezbollah was Muhammed Taqi Mudarassi, and he planned the failed overthrow of the government (Knights and Levitt 2018). Bahraini Hezbollah is an Islamist, extremist, militant organization that received funding from out of country, specifically Iran as it has a large Shia population (Knights and Levitt 2018). In 2015, Bahrain gained control of Iranian Future Banks and shut it down because they were afraid that it was funding Hezbollah (Knights and Levitt 2018). In 1996, the government arrested 44 people in connection to the failed coup which suggests that the Bahraini Hezbollah had 44 or more members at that time (New York Times 1996).

External Ties

The Bahraini Hezbollah is an offshoot of the IFLB, and said to have been inspired by it (Roule 2018). It was claimed that members of Bahraini Hezbollah had trained at Iranian Revolutionary Guard camps and received military assistance (Roule 2018; Knights and Levitt 2018).

Group Outcome

Although the Iranian government attempted to create a strong Hezbollah organization similar to the one in Lebanon, its attempts were not successful and the Bahraini Hezbollah no longer exists (Al-dossary 2018). This is probably due to the Bahraini government's significant crackdown on the organization and the ruling class of Sunnis.

Following the political unrest, the government began to crackdown on anti-government organizations and held a trial in 1997 leading to 57 members in detention and 27 declared guilty in absentia (Minorities at Risk 2004).

Interesting Quote from Minorities at Risk

-”The government's charge that something called 'Hizb Allah Bahrain' was behind the unrest is not new, although no Bahraini group uses this name. This, of course, does not prove that such an organization does not exist.Strangely, though, for such a well-armed and well-financed Iranian surrogat with more than three years of training in Qom and Lebanon's Beka'a Valley, Bahrain has not witnessed a single attack involving a weapon even as rudimentary as a pistol…(ibid.).”

Notes for Iris:
-there is disputed evidence over existence of Bahraini Hezbollah
-Bahraini government is starting to scapegoat the Iranian government more and more in the 1994-1996 which would give them a pretense
-there are a ton of similarities between this group and the IFLB in terms of the coup, the crackdown, etc.
-personal assessment: threat might have been exaggerated and the group falls apart quickly

Country-Level Trends:
-all of these groups have roots in the 1970s/1980s. Very inspired by Revolution in 1979 Iran.
-Iran plays a huge role in the capabilities/political direction of these groups.
-similar tactics by these groups. None of these groups were able to really survive initial CT efforts. Groups in Bahrain weren’t able to gain as much traction as other Hezbollah/Iranian-backed groups in the ME.
-the Bahrain monarchy is very good at repression (similarity to Eritrea)