Thailand Cases
Last Updated: 24 June 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T9000	COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND	1974	1974	1981
T252	KAYIN NATIONAL UNION (KNU)		1949	2011
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T1417	KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY		1954	2005
T621	KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ARMY		1961	2012
T556	NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONT		1962	1989
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T108	BLACK SEPTEMBER		1971	1976
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T225	MOVEMENT OF ISLAMIC ACTION OF IRAQ		1982	1982
T2072	ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS		1987	2011
T103	BER SATU		1989	2006
T870	ALL BURMA STUDENTS' DEMOCRATIC FRONT (ABSDF)		1991	2009
T150	DEMOCRATIC KAREN BUDDHIST ARMY		1993	2001
T1206	NEW PATTANI UNITED LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (NEW PULO)		1995	0
T599	MUJAHIDEEN PATTANI		1995	2004
T1425	FREE VIETNAM MOVEMENT		1995	2001
T846	GOD'S ARMY		1997	2000

T2388	NATIONAL LIBERATION ALLIANCE OF SA KAEO		1998	2006
T527	VIGOROUS BURMESE STUDENT WARRIORS		1999	2004
T475	SRI NAKHARO		2001	0
T864	YOUNG LIBERATORS OF PATTANI		2002	2002
T1459	RUNDA KUMPALAN KECIL	2003	2006	2012
T2493	NATIONAL UNITED FRONT OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST DICTATORSHIP (UDD)		2009	2009
T2536	UNITED FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY AGAINST DICTATORSHIP		2010	2010
T2680	YAKARIYA BANGO		2012	2012

I. COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND
    Min. Group Date: 1974
    Max. Group Date: 1981
    Onset: 1974

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: People of Thailand, Thailand Independence Movement, Thailand Patriotic Front

Group Formation: 1942

Group End: 1982 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1948, an anti-communist government took control in Thailand and began to persecute the ethnic Chinese minority in the area (Bartlett 1973). The CPT formed in 1942 by a group of ethnic Chinese, but did not conduct its first violent attack until 1965 (Campbell 1983; Bartlett 1973; Bergin 2016, 26). The group was a communist political party that turned violent in order to overthrow the Thai government (Bergin 2016, 26).

Geography

The group was active throughout Thailand. Its primary areas of operation were in North, Northeast, and Southern Thailand (Bergin 2016, 26). The group primarily operated in rural areas and northeastern Thailand (Bartlett 1973; Bergin 2016, 28). The group had sanctuaries in Laos and Vietnam during the 1970s (Bergin 2016, 31). The group's central committee was located near Bangkok (Bartlett 1973).

Organizational Structure

The CPT was initially organized as a political party, but developed an armed wing later (Bergin 2016, 26). The group was organized into a series of cells across Thailand (Bergin 2016, 27). The group's secretary-general was Wirat Anghathawon and the head of military operations was Son Nophakun Son. Son had previously trained in North Vietnam in guerrilla warfare and was a World War II veteran (Bartlett 1973). It had a sophisticated propaganda wing, which issued statements and news using a radio station through "The Voice of the People of Thailand." In 1965, the group had approximately 1,200 members (Bergin 2016, 27). By 1968, the group had approximately 2,500 to 3,000 members (Bartlett 1973; Bergin 2016, 27). After a 1976 election led to student protests and the murder of two students, membership rocketed to 10,000, as students joined the group (Bergin 2016, 28). At its height, the group had 12,000 militants (Campbell 1983). It primarily funded itself through raids on Thai police and arm facilities as well as local extortion (Bergin 2016, 26). Additional members were primarily refugees and ethnic

minorities like the Meo, Thai-Lao, Malay Muslims, and Vietnamese refugees (Bergin 2016, 26).

External Ties

The group received some financial support, weapons, and ideological support from the PRC in the 1960s (Bergin 2016, 26). Some members traveled to Beijing, China for training in guerrilla warfare (Bergin 2016, 26). Other members traveled to North Vietnam in the early 1960s for guerrilla training (Bartlett 1973). In 1979, China stopped providing external support for the group, harming its organizational capabilities (Bergin 2016, 32). It also had an external base in Laos and Vietnam, which the CPT used for training members (Bergin 2016, 31). After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the group acquired a large influx of weaponry and other arms from Vietnam fighters (Bergin 2016, 31).

Group Outcome

Early on, the Thai government did little to suppress communist operations on the Malaysia border because they did not want to cooperate with Malay forces (CIA 1966, 9). The Thai government's police forces tasked with suppressing the group were ill-coordinated and engaged in excessively redundant plans to address the group's grievances (CIA 1966, 9). The Thai government announced an amnesty program in 1977 or 1978 that was highly successful and led to mass defections by student members of the CPT (Campbell 1983; Bergin 2016, 33). The amnesty program was all-encompassing and did not discriminate based on ethnicity, profession, or role (Bergin 2016, 34). The Thai government also created Order number 66/33, which led to the defection of 1,000 members in 1980 (Bergin 2016, 34). Over the course of two years, 80,000 members of the CPT participated in the amnesty program and the group's last major violent incident was in 1982 (Campbell 1983; Bergin 2016, 34).

II. KAYIN NATIONAL UNION (KNU)
Min. Group Date: 1949
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 164.http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
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http://www.refworld.org/docid/5420350724.html
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- Kim Joliffe. "Ceasefires, Governance, and Development: The Karen National Union in Times of Change." Asia Foundation. 2017.
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Karen National Union, Karen National Union (Knu), Karen National Union Knu, Kayin National Union (Knu)

Group Formation: 1947 (Joliffe 2017; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.)

Group End: 2012 (ceasefire + disarmament in exchange for policy concessions)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The KNU formed in 1947 in the pursuit of a separate state and territorial autonomy for the Karen people (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Bjorklund 2010, 25-26). It formed in response to the Aung San-Attlee Agreement which excluded the Karen people from discussions about the new independent, Burmese government (Joliffe 2017, 4). The group is ethno-nationalist and seeks to promote the rights of the Karen population in Burma (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Bjorklund 2010, 24). Its first violent attack occurred in 1949 when it clashed at Insein with government forces following failed negotiations (Joliffe 2017, 4).

Geography

The group was primarily active in Burma, including in "Than Taung, Taungoo, Nyaung Lay Bin, HlaingBwe, Hpa-an, Hpapun, Kawkareik, Kyar-Inn Seik Gyi, Kyeik-don" (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). There is no clear connection to Thailand and any fighting would have to do with spillover.

Organizational Structure

The KNU had both a political wing and an armed wing. The armed wing was known as the Karen National Liberation Army and formed in 1949 following massive indiscriminate repression by government forces against the Karen population in Mergui, Burma (Bjorklund 2010, 26). It had a sophisticated organizational structure including different committees, administrative districts, judiciary, and local district wings (Joliffe 2017, 5). It controlled territory in the northern part of the Tanintharyi region where it operated (Myanmar peace Monitor n.d.; Joliffe 2017, 3). During the 1990s, the group had 4,000-6,000 members (Global Security n.d.). The group had approximately 5,000 members around 2012-2015 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The KNU financed itself through teak wood sales and then later through extortion and local taxation (Bjorklund 2010, 27; Joliffe 2017, 8).

External Ties

The KNU allied with the Communist Party of Burma and worked under the umbrella organization of the Karen National United Party in the 1950s (Bjorklund 2010, 26). Bo Mya was leader of the KNU from 1976 until 2000 (Joliffe 2017, 4). The KNU was allied with the Karen Peace Council and the KKO/DKBA (Joliffe 2017, 3). The group had tensions with the KIO over how it should negotiate and interact with the government during peace talks, although a KNU spokesman denied this (Radio Free Asia 2014).

Group Outcome

Clashes broke out in 1949 between the KNU and the Burmese government (Joliffe 2017, 4). In 1952, the Burmese government created the Karen ("Kayin") state in southeast Burma (Joliffe 2017, 5). During the 1960s, the Burmese government pursued a "four cuts" counterinsurgency policy against the KNU and other armed groups in the region (Joliffe 2017, 2). This included the use of massive indiscriminate repression ("scorched earth campaigns") in some areas as well as the forced relocation of several areas (Joliffee 2017, 3). In 1994, the government launched a massive counterinsurgency campaign against the group which resulted in massive territorial losses for the KNU (Joliffe 2017, 10). In 1997, the KNU suffered a major blow to its operations during a counterinsurgency campaign (Global Security n.d.). In 2012, the KNU signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Joliffe 2017, 1).

III. PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
       Min. Group Date: 1951
       Max. Group Date: 1999
       Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Edwards, Matthew. "The rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia: internal or external origins?." Asian Affairs 35, no. 1 (2004): 56-67.
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- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida. The RAND Corporation, 2008. 141-186. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Red Khmer (Russell 1990, 134), Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union of Kampuchea (Russell 1990, 194), Khmer Rouge, Khmer Communist Party, Party Of Democratic Kampuchea

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): no proposed change (military force (Jones and Libicki 2008, 164))

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

A man named Saloth Sar learned about Marxism while studying in France (Taylor 2014). He returned to Cambodia and called himself Pol Pot, adopting a communist, anti-imperialist, and nationalist ideology (Amendola 2005). He became the leader of the Cambodian Communist Party by 1962 (Ibid.). The Cambodian Communist Party fled to the jungle to avoid the current government under Norodom Sihanouk (Ibid.). There Pol Pot created the group's armed wing, named Khmer Rouge, and began an armed struggle using guerilla tactics (Ibid.). Khmer Rouge overthrew the Cambodian government in 1975 (BBC 2016). The group, with Pol Pot as leader, established a violent and totalitarian regime (Ibid.). Khmer Rouge officially claimed that its goals were to gain support in the countryside and win the hearts and minds of the local village people (Kubota 2013).

Having built up a presence in rural areas, Pol Pot began overseeing a violent campaign against the government in 1967 (Edwards 2004, 56-57). However, at that time, Khmer Rouge was not considered a serious threat to the government because it only had approximately 2,500 militants (Ibid.).

Khmer Rouge is widely accused of committing genocide, although the application of international law on this issue remains somewhat disputed (Taylor 2014). During the group's reign over Cambodia, from 1975 to 1979, an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians died (Ibid.). The group targeted professionals and wealthy people because its extreme communist ideology favored laborers (Ibid.). The group also targeted minorities and was fiercely anti-Vietnamese (Ibid.). In addition to the "killing fields" where massacres took place, thousands of Vietnamese also died from starvation due to insufficient agricultural policies and lack of medicine (Ibid.).

Geography

Khmer Rouge attempted to set up bases around Lake Tonle Sap (Kubota 2013). They then attempted to stir up support for their cause near Phnom Penh (Ibid.). Khmer Rouge controlled Cambodia from 1975-1979 (Leitsinger 2015).

Organizational Structure

In 1979, Pol Pot publicly retired from being the leader of the Khmer Rouge, but it is widely believed that he still ran the Khmer Rouge behind the scenes (Kubota 2013). A defector from the Khmer Rouge reported the military organization of the group (Kubota 2013). The armed wing's organizational structure was broken into a squad (twelve men), a platoon (fifty men), a company (three platoons), a battalion (three companies), a

regiment (three battalions), and a division (three regiments) (Kubota 2013). At the time, it was speculated that Khmer Rouge had 10 divisions with at least 4,500 men each in 1981, and that this number rose to 12 divisions by 1982 (Kubota 2013). However, it was later discovered that a division typically comprised only 2,500 to 3,000 men (Kubota 2013).

External Ties

The Vietnamese army defeated Khmer Rouge in 1979, ending Pol Pot's rule over Cambodia (BBC 2016). While in exile, Khmer Rouge renounced Communism in an attempt to win foreign support (Taylor 2014).

It is controversial whether the communist Chinese regime provided material support to Khmer Rouge, however it is known that Pol Pot visited China during the Cultural Revolution and it is alleged that he brought similar policies to Cambodia (Edwards 2004, 62).

Group Outcome

Even though Khmer Rouge was widely accused of genocide, they were technically a legitimate government, albeit in exile as a result of the Vietnamese invasion (Etcheson 1987; Taylor 2014). Thus, Khmer Rouge held Cambodia's seat in the United Nations for several years after being deposed (Ibid.). Khmer Rouge lost strength throughout the 1990s as a result of defections and infighting, and Pol Pot died in 1998 (Taylor 2014).

IV.   KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY
        Min. Group Date: 1954
        Max. Group Date: 2005
        Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Karenni National Progressive Party." Myanmar Peace Monitor. N.D. http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/mpsi/160-knpp?format=pdf
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, 7 May 2003, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f1311684.html [accessed 21 June 2017]
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- United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Burma [Myanmar]: Chronology of Burmese major opposition groups, 17 August 2000, MMR00002.bkk, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dedfdc24.html

- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 151. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Karenni National Progressive Party, Karenni National Progressive Party (Knpp)

Group Formation: 1957 (ICG 2003, 5; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.)

Group End: 2012

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The KNPP formed in 1957 to fight for an independent Karen state in Burma (ICG 2003, 5; Jones and Libicki 2008, 164; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It was ethno-nationalist and fought on behalf of the Karen people (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Jones and Libicki 2008, 164). It is unknown when its first violent attack occurs.

Geography

The group's headquarters were in Nyar Mu, Kayin state (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group was also active in other areas, including "Mawchi, Phasaung Loikaw, Shar Daw, Hoyar (Pharu So township), Daw Tamagyi (Dee Maw So township)" (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). There is no clear activity in or around Thailand so any activity in Thailand is likely a spillover.

Organizational Structure

The group's leader was originally Saw Maw Reh and later Hteh Bu Phe (US Citizenshipa and Immigration Services 2000; ICG 2003, 5). It had an estimated 600 members at an unknown date (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group had an armed wing known as the Karenni Army (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It is unknown how the group funds itself or where its members come from.

External Ties

A faction known as the Karenni Nationalities People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) splintered from the group in 1978 due to ideological disagreements (ICG 2003, 5). The KNPP clashed with the KNPLF several times (ICG 2003, 5). There is no evidence of external support for the group.

Group Outcome

The KNPP signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government in 1995, but fighting erupted shortly after (ICG 2003, 5). The group suffered a series of splinters in 1978, 1995, and 1999 (ICG 2003, 5). It was engaging in new ceasefire talks with the Burmese government in 2012 and its last known violent attack was in 2012 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Australia Asylum Research 2012, 95).

V.   KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ARMY
Min. Group Date: 1961
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Kachin Defense Army/Kachin Independence Organization." Global Security. N.D. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kachin.htm
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- Hannah Beech. "Inside the Kachin War Against Burma." Time Magazine. 2014. http://time.com/3598969/kachin-independence-army-kia-burma-myanmar-laiza/
- "Kachin Independence Organization." Myanmar Peace Monitor. N.D. http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/component/content/article/57-stakeholders/155-kio

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Kachin Independence Army (Kia), Kachin Independence Army, Kachin Independence Organization, Kachin Independence Organization (Kio)

Group Formation: 1961

Group End: 2016 (fighting/active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The KIA formed in 1961 to fight for a separate state for the Kachin people in Burma (Global Security n.d.; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It is ethno-nationalist and fights on behalf of the Kachin minority in Burma (Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The group operates alongside the Burmese-Chinese border (Beech 2014). Its headquarters are in Laiza, Burma (Beech 2014; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It has 8 different brigades in Puta-O, Tanine, Bhamao, Kutkai, Shan state, Sadon, Pangwa, Mongkoe, Shan state, and Indawgyi (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group's current leader is Lanyaw Zawng Hra (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group's political wing is known as the Kachin Independence Organization and the group's armed wing is known as the Kachin Independence Army (Global Security n.d.). The group had approximately 10,000 to 12,000 members at an unspecified date (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It primarily funds itself through the extraction and trade of commodity resources in and around the Kachin state area (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external ties to other groups. There is also no evidence of external support for the group.

Group Outcome

The group reached a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government in 1994, but the ceasefire fell apart in 2011 during a dam construction and fighting resumed (Global Security n.d.). KIO reached a tentative ceasefire with the Burmese government in 2013, but clashes and fighting was reported as late as 2016 (Global Security n.d.).

VI.   NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
Min. Group Date: 1962
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA [Patani Insurgent?]

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for BRN.

Group Formation: This is an alias for BRN.

Group End: This is an alias for BRN.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for BRN.

Geography

This is an alias for BRN.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for BRN.

External Ties

This is an alias for BRN.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for BRN.

VII.   BARISAN REVOLUSI NASIONAL (BRN)
        Min. Group Date: 1963
        Max. Group Date: 2012
        Onset: 2003

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Little Optimism for breakthrough in Thailand's forgotten jihad."
  http://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-conflict-insight-idUSBRE92O0Z420130325
- "Thailand: Key people and parties." Insight on Conflict. N.D.
  https://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/thailand/conflict-profile/key-people-and-parties/
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  Monitor 4(17). 2006. Jamestown Foundation.
  https://jamestown.org/program/a-breakdown-of-southern-thailands-insurgent-groups/
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  Asia Report N°270, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/559cfdf94.html [accessed
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- Human Rights Watch, No One Is Safe - Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces, 28 August 2007, Volume 19, No. 13(C), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/46d42cf32.html [accessed 21 June 2017]
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- "Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)." Handbook of Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific. Ed. Rohan Gunaratna and Stefanie Kam. World Scientific. 2016. p. 93-94. https://books.google.com/books?id=Y3XQDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA93&lpg=PA93&dq=RUNDA+KUMPULAN+KECIL&source=bl&ots=4Txt7lZj7B&sig=TMHIDiDHWaqeczhCgQDxgehxk-I&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi-u8Cbx9TUAhUHKGMKHfKvAys4ChDoAQgsMAI#v=onepage&q=RUNDA%20KUMPULAN%20KECIL&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Aliases: Barisan Revolusi Nasional (Brn), Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani (Brn), BRN-Coordinate

Group Formation: 1963

Group End: 2015 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The BRN formed in 1963 to fight for a separate state for the Pattani area (Abuza 2006; Insight on Conflict n.d.). The group is ethnonationalist and Islamic (Abuza 2006). It also ascribed to some leftist-socialist ideas in the vein of pan-Arab socialism (Abuza 2006; Human Rights Watch 2007).

Geography

The group primarily operates in the Pattani region of southern Thailand along the Thai-Malay border (Marshall 2013). Attacks occur in the Bacho, Chana, Na Thawi, Saba Yoi, and Thepa districts of southern Thailand (ICG 2015, 1; Marshall 2013). Its territorial claims include Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satan (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 671).

Organizational Structure

The BRN had three distinct factions known as BRN-Congress, BRN-Coordinate, and BRN-Uran (Abuza 2006). The leader of the BRN was originally Ustadz Haji Abdul Karim Hassan (Abuza 2006). Karim was a teacher who went underground in 1968 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 671; Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2015). It later recruited teachers from local schools to train and guide new members in various different cells (Abuza 2006). The group is organized in a series of cells across different villages (Abuza 2006). It had a political wing, economic wing, women's wing, youth wing, and armed wing (Human Rights Watch 2007, 19). The group primarily recruits from madrassas and mosques in the area (Abuza 2006). It has a student wing known as Pemuda (Youth) that has many chapters in schools (Abuza 2006). Many members attend madrassas in the Middle East before returning to Thailand and joining the organization (Abuza 2006). The group had approximately 1,000 members around 2006 and 3,000 members in 2015 (Abuza 2006; ICG 2015). Members are ethnic Malay Muslims (Marshall 2013). The group's armed wing is known as the RKK, which formed in 2002 (Gunaratna and Kam 2016, 93).

External Ties

The group is opposed to the PULO, but may have been working closely with it during the 1980s (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 671; Abuza 2006). The group had "close ties" to the Communist Party of Malaya, but it is unclear what these ties entailed if anything (Abuza 2006). Members of the RKK received military training in Indonesia (Gunaratna and Kam 2016, 93).

Group Outcome

The group splintered into three separate factions in 1980 (Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2015, 1). As of 2013, the BRN-Coordinate was the only faction still active and often just labeled as the BRN (Marshall 2013). Peace talks between the BRN and the Thai government began in 2013 (Marshall 2013). These talks quickly broke down during Ramadan as BRN militants unleashed a wave of IED attacks in normally-peaceful neighborhoods (ICG 2015, 10).

[what happened during CPT-active period?]

The Thai government initially treated the group as part of a criminal problem in southern Thailand and implemented a number of criminal reform and security measures during the 1990s to address the issue (Fearon and Laitin 2005). In 2002, the government dissolved the SBPAC and CPM 43 (Civilian-Police-Military command) which some members thought had been a safeguard against excessive repression (Human Rights Watch 2007, 29). When Thaksin came to power, he decided to escalate the conflict in southern Thailand which backfired when he used indiscriminate repression against the group (ICG 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2005).

Ev of theory in ICG (2005) report: *The roots of the violence in southern Thailand lie in historical grievances and a pattern of neglect, discrimination, and efforts at forced assimilation on the part of governments in Bangkok going back almost a century. But historical grievances do not explain why the violence suddenly surged in 2004. For that, one part of the explanation is still missing -- hard evidence of who organised the January 2004 raids. Another part, however, is clear: miscalculations, inappropriate policy responses, excessive use of force, and lack of accountability on the part of the Thaksin government have turned a serious but manageable security problem into something that looks more and more like a mass-based insurgency.*

Ev of theory in HRW (2007) report: When Thaksin Shinawatra was elected prime minister in 2001, he flatly dismissed any suggestion that ethnic Malay Muslim insurgency might have been reactivated. His government took the view that shootings, acts of arson, bombings, and raids on government arsenals in the southern border provinces were caused by banditry or turf wars between criminal gangs, or by influential people with vested interests in creating instability and undermining the government's credibility, which, they assumed, made it possible to resolve the problem quickly. It was this assessment, and a desire to put his own people in place—particularly by enhancing the role of the police (Thaksin is a former police officer) at the expense of the army—that led Thaksin to dissolve the SBPAC and CPM 43 in 2002. The leading role and authority that the army had in managing the southern border provinces was transferred to the police. Major changes in personnel and the transfer of most authority from the army to the police resulted in the politicization of security policy and the weakening of intelligence gathering and analysis regarding the identity of separatist groups, as well as the scale and trajectory of their violence.

Note significance of Thaksin leadership as turning point in escalation of onset.

VIII.   PATTANI UNITED LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PULO)
Min. Group Date: 1968
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Pattani United Liberation Organization." Global Security. N.D. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pulo.htm
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- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 173.http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- Fearon and Laitin. "Random Narratives: Thailand." 2005. https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/ThailandRN1.3.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Pattani United Liberation Organization (Pulo), PULO, Pulo

Group Formation: 1968

Group End: 2000 (dissolve)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PULO formed in 1968 to fight for an independent Pattani state in southern Thailand (Global Security n.d.; Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.). The group's ideologies are ethno-nationalist and Islamist although ethno-nationalism appears to be more prominent in their demands (Canada IRB 1994). The group was more secular than the BRN (Islam 1998, 447). It first came to attention in 1977 for an assassination attempt on the Thai king (Canada IRB 1994).

Geography

The group's territorial aims stretch through Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun (Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.). The group has a transnational base of operations in Malaysia (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group has had only 300 members (Global Security n.d.). The group's leader is Tuanku Biyo Kodoniyo (Global Security n.d.). The group has an armed wing known as the "Caddan Army" (Global Security n.d.). Members are ethnic Muslim Malay (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group is "associated" with the Islamic Party of Malaysia although it is unclear what these ties entail (Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.). The group had external offices in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Iran, and Syria, but this never translated into any major material or diplomatic support (Chalk 2008, 7-8).There is no other evidence of external ties or even coordination with other Patani militant groups.

Group Outcome

The government launched its first counterinsurgency campaign in 1968 against "Muslim rebels" in southern Thailand, but did not fully repress the group (UCA n.d.). The group splintered into two factions in 1995 known as PULO 88 and the Old Pulo (Global Security n.d.). The group's last known violent attack was in 2000 (Chalk 2008, 8). The two groups merged into an umbrella group known as Bersatu in 1997 (Fearon and Laitin 2005).

IX.   BLACK SEPTEMBER
        Min. Group Date: 1971
        Max. Group Date: 1976
        Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Jordanian Removal of the PLO," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/jordan-civil.htm
- Christopher Dobson. *Black September: its short violent history.* 1974 Macmillan: New York.
- John Wolf, "Black September: Militant Palestinianism," Current History. 1973, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1309776782?pq-origsite=gscholar
- Iris Fruchter-Ronen, "Black September: The 1970-71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity," Civil Wars, Vol. 10(3), 2008, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698240802167991
- James Ciment, Kenneth Hill. Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II, Volume 1. 2013. Routledge.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Black September, Black September Organization (Bso), Munazzamat Aylul
Al-Aswad

Group Formation: 1970/1971

Group End (Outcome): 1973 (dissolve)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Black September is a transnational terrorist organization, a special secret armed wing of
Fatah, named after events of September 1970 (Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 255). It was
formed in either late 1970 or early 1971 (Wolf 1973, 37). The group came to attention for
their attack during the Munich Olympics in 1972 (Wolf 1973, 5). The group came about
after the Jordanian King initiated a massive crackdown against Fatah in September 1970
(Wolf 1973, 6).

Geography

The group's ties to Egypt came about when they assassinated Wasfi al-Tall, Prime
Minister of Jordan, on November 27, 1971, in Cairo (Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 255; Global
Security). Black September operated out of Lebanon and used this base as an external
sanctuary to conduct guerrilla raids and operations into Israel (Wolf 1973, 7).

Organizational Structure

Members were primarily well-educated, from upper-middle class backgrounds, and were
born in refugee camps around Europe (Wolf 1973, 8).The group's first leader was
Mohammad Mustafa Syein, a former deputy chief of staff to Yasir Arafat (Wolf 1973, 8).

External Ties

The group received training in Jordan at terrorist camps where they may have also
interacted with members of the Weather Underground, the IRA, Dev Genc, and
Nicaragua's Sandinistas (Wolf 1973, 37)

Group Outcome

Fatah allegedly disbanded Black September in 1973 as it tried to pursue diplomatic negotiations and garner international recognition (Ciment and Hill 2013, 74).

Note: The group is a wing of Fatah and should be combined with them.

X.   MALAYSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
       Min. Group Date: 1980
       Max. Group Date: 1988
       Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Malaysia: 1. What is the attitude of the Malaysian authorities to Communism/communists? 2. Do the authorities charge, detain in prison and/or restrain the movement of communists? 3. Could the authorities institute other actions such as "instigating violence", "creating public unrest", and "anti-national activities" to mask action against communists? 4. Is Malaysia branding the human rights movement as communists? 5. What is the ISA Act, (Internal Security Act) in Malaysia? 6. Is it generally accepted that the ethnic Chinese have spread the Communist ideology in Malaysia? 7. What rights of association, freedom of movement, workers' rights (the right to organize and bargain collectively) and anti-discrimination rights are held by Malaysian citizens?, 16 December 2005, MYS17707, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe2ab0.html
- Fujio Hara. "The Malayan Communist Parties as Recorded in the Comintern Files." Yusof Ishak Institute. 2016. No. 1. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/WP2016-01.pdf
- Rizal Yaakop. "Malaysian Communist Party (MCP): Explaining Its Early Political Orientation." Research Gate. N.D. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mohd_Yaakop/publication/228197619_Malaysian_Communist_Party_MCP_Explaining_its_Early_Political_Orientation/links/5670f77008ae0d8b0cc105f6/Malaysian-Communist-Party-MCP-Explaining-its-Early-Political-Orientation.pdf
- GTD Perpetrator 2538, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2538
- Karl Hack. "The Long March of Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand." Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula. Ed. Michael John Montesano, Patrick Jory. NUS Press. 2008. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=B-wlX4SSp1MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA173&dq=malayan+communist+party&ots=MsDhjuNiqy&sig=ZfJQkCpe4PEuKp3pLjMpcfdsztE#v=onepage&q=malayan%20communist%20party&f=false

- Albert Jongman and Schmid. Political Terrorism. "Thailand" p. 671. 1988. https://books.google.com/books?id=NgDks1hUjhMC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=thailand&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Malayan Communist Party

Group Formation: 1930

Group End: 1989 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Malayan Communist Party formed in 1930 to overthrow the British colonial government and secure independence for Malaysia (Yaakop 2010, 1). It later pursued a communist revolution in both Thailand and Malaysia, relaunching its insurgency in the 1960s (Hack 2008, 173). Its first violent attack in Thailand occurred in 1968 when it launched a major counteroffensive from its bases in southern Thailand back into Malaysia (Hack 2008, 173). The group adhered to a Maoist ideology (Schmid and Jongman 2008, 671).

Geography

The group primarily operated in Malaysia, but had a transnational base of operations in Thailand (Hack 2008, 173). It mainly lived in forested jungle areas of Malaysia (Hack 2008, 173). The group clashed with police in Sadao, Thailand in 1980 (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

Members were ethnic Chinese (Australia RRT 2005). The group had approximately 7,000 fighters by 1951 (Hack 2008, 173). Fighters were primarily local villagers (Hack 2008, 173). The group had an armed wing established during World War II known as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which received British training and arms (Hack 2008, 173). The group had a formal political wing (Yaakop 2010). It had 3,500 fighters in 1975 and 1,300 in 1987 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 671).

External Ties

The group received military training and weapons from the British Army during World War II (Yaakop 2010; Hack 2008, 173).

The CPM splintered in "the early 1980s" into the CPM-ML and the CPM-RF (Hack 2008, 174).

Group Outcome

The colonial Malaya government responded to the CPM with the passage of the Internal Security Agent which authorized the government to search and detain suspected members without due process (Australia RRT 2005). It primarily targeted CPM members (Australia RRT 2005). The crisis in Malaya led to the first Malaya Emergency in 1951 and the Second Malaya Emergency in 1968 (Hack 2008, 173-174). The Thai military launched joint counterinsurgency offensives with the Malaya government against the group in the 1970s and 1980s (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 671). The Thai government also set-up an amnesty program - similar to the CPT amnesty - to encourage defections by members (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 671). There were reportedly mass defections in Thailand in 1987 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 671). The group fought against both the Malaysian and Thailand governments. In 1989, it reached a peace agreement with both the Thai and Malay governments (Hack 2008, 174).

XI.   MOVEMENT OF ISLAMIC ACTION OF IRAQ
Min. Group Date: 1982
Max. Group Date: 1982
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4067, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Movement Of Islamic Action Of Iraq, Islamic Action In Iraq, Organization Of Islamic Action In Iraq

Group Formation: 1982

Group End (Outcome): 2005 (politics)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group was founded, but it first came to attention in 1982 during a series of two attacks in Bangkok and Paris (GTD n.d.). The group is Shiite Muslim (Atlanta Constitution 1982). Their original goal was to overthrow the Hussein government (MIPT 2008).

Geography

According to TOPS, the group was very active during the 1991 uprising and captured Kirkuk, Duhuk, Karbala, Samawa, and Naseriya (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

It is unknown how large the group was or how it was organized during the 1980s and 1990s. In 2005, when it became a political party, it announced Alaa Hamoud Salih as its leader (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

The group allegedly has ties with Hezbollah and receives external support from Iran (MIPT 2008).

Group Outcome

The Hussein government fought back against the group during the 1991 uprising and successfully defeated them (MIPT 2008). After the 2003 invasion, the group renamed itself the Organization of Islamic Action in Iraq and became a political party which participated in the 2005 elections (MIPT 2008).

XII.   ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: NA

Aliases: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name appears too vague for research.

Geography

This name appears too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name appears too vague for research.

External Ties

This name appears too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name appears too vague for research.

XIII.   BER SATU
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA [Patani insurgents?]

Part 1. Bibliography
- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 151. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- "Thailand Islamic Insurgency." Global Security. N.D. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thailand2.htm
- "Thailand: Key people and parties." Insight on Conflict. N.D. https://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/thailand/conflict-profile/key-people-and-parties/
- "Thailand ready for talks on south." BBC. 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3741833.stm
- Jayshree Bajoria and Carrin Zissis. "The Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand." Council on Foreign Relations. 2008. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/muslim-insurgency-southern-thailand

- Peter Chalk. "The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand." 2008. RAND Corporation.
  http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP198.pdf
- Maisonti, Thammanoon. "A proposal to address the emerging Muslim separatist problem in Thailand." 2004. Calhoun Naval Postgraduate School.
  http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/1219/04Dec_Maisonti.pdf?sequence=1
- GTD Perpetrator 20106, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016,
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20106

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Bersatu, Ber Satu, Payong Organization, United Front For The Independence Of Pattani

Group Formation: 1989

Group End: 2006 (umbrella)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Bersatu formed in 1989 as an umbrella groups between the BRN-C, parts of the PULO, GMP, and Barisan Islam Pembebsan Pattani (Insight on Conflict n.d.; BBC 2004). The group's goals were to fight for an independent Pattani state in southern Thailand (Insight on Conflict n.d.; Jones and Libicki 2008, 151). It is unknown when its first violent attack occured. It appears to be an umbrella group and not an independent autonomous organization.

Geography

Bersatu operated in southern Thailand (BBC 2004). Notably, the group refuses to set up a permanent base of operations in favor of moving from place to place to avoid detection (Maisonti 2004, 13).

Organizational Structure

The leader of Bersatu was Wan Abdul Kadir Che Man (BBC 2004). The group had "10s" of members, but this seems inaccurate given firm evidence PULO and BRN had hundreds if not thousands of members during this period (Jones and Libicki 2008, 151).

External Ties

The group was an umbrella for GMIP, BRN, PULO, and BIPP (Maisonti 2004, 10). According to Jones and Libicki, the

Group Outcome

The group indicated its willingness to engage in peace talks with the Thai government in 2004 (BBC 2004). The group's last known violent attack was in 2006 (GTD 2016). However, since this is an umbrella group it should not be considered an independent organization.

XIV. ALL BURMA STUDENTS' DEMOCRATIC FRONT (ABSDF)
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 2009
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 151. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- "All Burma Students Democratic Front." Myanmar Peace Monitor. N.D. http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/unfc/154-absdf
- Htoo Zar. "In Pictures: Myanmar's student army." Al Jazeera English. 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2014/02/pictures-myanmar-student-army-201421123435818722.html
- "Struggle for Peace: The 25 Year Journey of the ABSDF." Center for Peace and Conflict Studies. 2014. http://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/ABSDF-.pdf
- Gleditsch et al. Non-State Actor Data. 2013 p. 61-62. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: ABSDF

Group Formation: 1988

Group End: 2013

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The ABSDF formed in 1988 after the 8/8 protests in Burma (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). They fought for policy changes to create a more democratic government in Burma and opposed the military junta (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

Geography

The group had a series of training camps along the Burma-Thai, Burma-India, and Burma-China border (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group primarily operated in the same areas as the KNU and KIA (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It has offices in Myawaddy and Muse (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). It also has an office in the Lahkum Bum area (Zar 2014).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the ABSDF was U Than Khae (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Zar 2014). The group had an estimated 400 members (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group had a formal political wing involving three year political terms (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 62). Members of the group were students (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 61).

External Ties

The group had external wings operating in the US and Australia although it is unclear what they received in exchange (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group was heavily dependent on support from other insurgent groups operating in Burma and fought alongside the KIA from 1998-1996 and from 2011 onward (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 61; Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

Group Outcome

The group has fought alongside the KIA in the Kachin conflict since its inception. It signed a preliminary ceasefire with the Burmese government in 2013 (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.; Struggle for Peace and Conflict 2014, 157).

XV.   DEMOCRATIC KAREN BUDDHIST ARMY
      Min. Group Date: 1993
      Max. Group Date: 2001
      Onset: NA

      Part 1. Bibliography
      ● "DKBA-5." Myanmar Peace Monitor. N.D.
        http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/myanmar-peace-center/159-dkba-5

- Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell. "Democratic Karen Buddhist Army." Pro-Government Militias. SOWI Mannheim. 2013.
  http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-public/data/pgag/280/
- GTD Perpetrator 678. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2016.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=678
- "Kayin State Profile." UNHCR Southeast Myanmar Information Management Unit. Last Updated 2014.
- Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD), Myanmar: COI Compilation - 7 October 2011 (as of 5 September 2011), 7 October 2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e9291912.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, DKBA-5, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army - Brigade 5, Karen Klo-Htoo-Baw Organisation(KKO), Kalo Htoo Baw armed group (Former Democratic Karen Buddhist Army - Brigade 5), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (Dkba), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, Democratic Karen Buddhist Association, Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization, Progressive Buddhist Karen Nationals Organization

Group Formation: 1994

Group End: 2014

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The DKBA formed in 1994 when it splintered from the KNU (Carey and Mitchell 2013). The group emerged to support the Burmese government with local security efforts to maintain the border (Austrian Center 2011, 66). Its first violent attack was in 1995 (GTD 2016).

Geography

The group fought to protect the Burmese-Thai border (Carey and Mitchell 2013). The group had several attacks in Thailand in Mae Sot, Ban Mae La, and northwest Thailand (GTD 2016). In Burma, it had attacks in the Myawaddy and Kyaikmayaw districts (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

The DKBA has an armed wing known as Klo Htoo Baw Battalion and a formal political wing known as Klo Htoo Baw or the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). Members of the group are former militants and ethnically Karen (Carey and Mitchell 2013). They had approximately 1,500 members at an unknown date (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.).

External Ties

The group splintered from the KNU in 1994 (Carey and Mitchell 1994). The group then attacked the KNU several times (GTD 2016). The group supported the Burmese government (Carey and Mitchell 2013).

Group Outcome

Many members of the DKBA left the group after it began to support the military junta (Austrian Center 2011, 66). In 2010, a splinter group known as DKBA-5 formed and took many members with it (Myanmar Peace Monitor n.d.). The group clashed with the KNU several times and was as active as late as 2014 (GTD 2016).

XVI.   NEW PATTANI UNITED LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (NEW PULO)
Min. Group Date: 1995
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
● Peter Chalk. "The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand." 2008. RAND Corporation.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP198.pdf
● Zachary Abuza. "Breakdown of Southern Thailand's Insurgent Groups." Terrorism Monitor 4(17). 2006. Jamestown Foundation.
https://jamestown.org/program/a-breakdown-of-southern-thailands-insurgent-groups/
● "TERRORISM: Peace in South Vital to Growth Triangle: Remark After News of Arrests in Malaysia." 1998.The Bangkok Post, Jan 21, 1.
https://search.proquest.com/docview/308705161?accountid=14026.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: New Pattani United Liberation Organization (New Pulo), New Pattani United Liberation Organization (New Pulo)

Group Formation: 1995

Group End: 1998

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The New PULO splintered from the PULO in 1995, but maintained the same goal of territorial autonomy for the Pattani region in southern Thailand (Chalk 2008, 7). It is unknown when it had its first violent attack, but had a similar secular ideological structure as PULO (Abuza 2006).

Geography

The group had an external base of operations in northern Malaysia (Chalk 2008, 7). It claimed territory around the Pattani region (Chalk 2008, 7).

Organizational Structure

Ar-rong Moo-reng and Hayi Abdul Rohman Bazo founded New PULO (Abuza 2006). Members were ex-militants from PULO and Muslim (Abuza 2006). The group had three distinct armed wings that operated across the country under the supervision of Haji Da-Oh Thanam to conduct attacks (Chalk 2008, 7). It is unknown how many members the group had or how it funded itself.

External Ties

The group had external offices in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Iran, and Syria, but this never translated into any major material or diplomatic support (Chalk 2008, 7-8). The group splintered from PULO (Abuza 2006). It did not appear to have any external sponsors.

Group Outcome

In 1998, the Thai and Malaysia governments successfully arrested several prominent members of New PULO (Chalk 2008, 7). These arrests led many members of the group to defect, further weakening the organization (Chalk 2008, 8). The group was last known to be active in 1998 prior to its leaders being arrested (Bangkok Post 1998; Abuza 2006).

XVII.   MUJAHIDEEN PATTANI
         Min. Group Date: 1995
         Max. Group Date: 2004
         Onset: NA [Patani Insurgent?]

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP)." Global Security. N.D.
  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/gmip.htm
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  https://books.google.com/books?id=wEih57-GWQQC&pg=PA105&lpg=PA105&dq=MUJ
  AHIDEEN+PATTANI&source=bl&ots=13_R6bSwPa&sig=q8ZNhp16IECLWumsmO1r2Q
  6FLZA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj0-4f9rtDUAhULwYMKHdj9CQQ4ChDoAQgnMAE#
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  Monitor 4(17). 2006. Jamestown Foundation.
  https://jamestown.org/program/a-breakdown-of-southern-thailands-insurgent-groups/
- "Manhunt Presses Ahead in Violence-Hit Southern Thailand." 2004.Xinhua News
  Agency - CEIS, Jan 09, 1.
  https://search.proquest.com/docview/453084149?accountid=14026.
- "Malaysian PM Wants to Cooperate with Thailand Over Terror Suspects." 2005.BBC
  Monitoring Asia Pacific, Jan 27, 1.
  https://search.proquest.com/docview/461055055?accountid=14026.
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad , 18 May
  2005, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4291a0764.html [accessed 23 June
  2017]
- "Thailand Opens Peace Talks with Southern Rebels." 2013.*Jane's Intelligence Weekly*5
  (15). https://search.proquest.com/docview/1321291856?accountid=14026.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP), Pattani Islamic Mujahideen
Movement, Pattani Islamic Holy Warriors Movement, Mujahideen Islam Pattani,
Mujahideen Pattani

Group Formation: 1995

Group End: 2012 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The GMIP formed in 1995 as an ostensibly separatist Pattani group, but tends to engage
in more criminal rather than guerrilla activities (Abuza 2006). The group's ideology is
Islamist (Abuza 2006). The group seeks to creating an independent Islamic state for the

Pattani people, but has also indicated its support for a global jihadist campaign (ICG 2005).

Geography

The group had a transnational base of operations in Malaysia where the KMM operated (Abuza 2006). It primarily operates in rural areas in southern Thailand (Abuza 2006).

Organizational Structure

The group's leaders were Nasori Saesaeng, Jehku Mae Kuteh, and Nasae Saning (Abuza 2006). All three were Afghanistan veterans (Abuza 2006). The group also recruited members who were veterans from fighting in Afghanistan (ICG 2005; Rubin 2010, 105). The group participates in extortion and other criminal activities to fund its activities (ICG 2005; Rubin 2010, 105). It is unknown how many members are in the group. The group primarily operates as a cartel and does not appear to have a formal political wing (Rubin 2010, 105; Abuza 2006).

External Ties

The group is inspired by the GMP, which was a separatist group that operated from 1986-1993 in the same area. However, the three leaders of the GMIP do not appear to have been members or splintered from the GMP (ICG 2005).

The group allegedly received "support" from the Malaysian KMM including sanctuary (Abuza 2006; Global Security n.d.). JI allegedly tried to form an alliance with the group in 1999, but there is no clear evidence this ever materialized (Abuza 2006). It assisted MILF and GAM with arms trade and arm cache movements (Abuza 2006). It appears to have closer ties to other Islamist groups in southeast Asia than other separatist groups in the Pattani region (ICG 2005).

Group Outcome

In 2003, the Thai government killed Saning and Mahma Maeroh (Abuza 2006). In 2004, the Thai government arrested Kuteh (Abuza 2006). The group's last known violent attacks were in 2006, but it was involved in peace talk negotiations as late as 2013 (Abuza 2006; Jane's Intelligence Weekly 2013).

XVIII.   FREE VIETNAM MOVEMENT
         Min. Group Date: 1995
         Max. Group Date: 2001
         Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This section is where you would include information about the group's founding date, its initial goals, ideology, and date when it first came to attention as a violent group.

Geography

This section is where you would include information about the group's operational environment including the names of areas where they operate from, the name of any external sanctuaries, the name of any cities, towns, or neighborhoods where they conduct attacks. You may also provide a generic descriptor if you cannot identify specifically where, but know what the geographic composition of the area was.

Organizational Structure

This section is where you would include information about the group's organizational structure including its leadership, membership, source of funding, and different wings.

External Ties

This section is where you would include information about the group's ties to other actors including both other armed groups as well as other countries. This includes information about external support, alliances, and splinters.

Group Outcome

This section is where you would include information about the state's response to the group, if any, and how this affects the group. You will also identify whether the group is

still active, when it stopped using violence, and what happened to the group to cause it to stop using violence.

XIX. GOD'S ARMY
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 2000
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- Seth Mydans. "Burmese Rebel Chief More Boy than Warrior." New York Times. 2000. http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/10/world/burmese-rebel-chief-more-boy-than-warrior.html
- "God's Army." Global Security. N.D. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/gods_army.htm
- "Two Little Boys." The Guardian. 2000. https://www.theguardian.com/g2/story/0,3604,347432,00.html
- "The Twin Terrors." Time Magazine. 2000. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054474,00.html
- Keith Richburg. "Child Terrorists Hold Hundred Hostages in Thailand." Washington Post. 2000. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/pmextra/jan00/24/hostage.htm
- "Briefly, Myanmar's God's Army Twins Reunite." New York Times. 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/asia/briefly-myanmars-gods-army-twins-reunite.html
- Lisa Brooten. "The 'Pint-Sized Terrorists' of God's Army." Research Gate/Journal of Children and Media. Vol. 2. No. 3. 2008. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lisa_Brooten/publication/233106984_THE_PINT-SIZED_TERRORISTS_OF_GOD'S_ARMY/links/54e757fa0cf2b199060bb2ec.pdf
- Seekins, Donald M. "MYANMAR: Secret Talks and Political Paralysis." Southeast Asian Affairs, 2002, 199-212. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27913209.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: God's Army of the Holy Mountain

Group Formation: 1997

Group End: 2000 (repressed)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

God's Army splintered from the KNU in 2000 after the Burmese military launched a huge indiscriminate violent campaign against the KNU (Time 2000; Global Security n.d.). The God's Army was a Christian group and fought as part of the larger Karen conflict in Burma (Global Security n.d.). It ascribed to Christian eschatological beliefs about the world (Mydans 2000).

Geography

The group's headquarters were in Ka Mar Pa Law in Burma (Global Security n.d.). It also had a camp in Ler Per Her at one point (Guardian 2000). The group carried out transnational attacks in Ratchaburi, Thailand (Ritchburg 2000; Mydans 2000).

Organizational Structure

The leaders of the God's Army were two twin boys named Johnny and Luther Htoo (Global Security n.d.). The boys had a cult following due to their relatively young age (9 when the group began) and messianic beliefs (Time 2000). Group members were mainly ex-fighters and students (Global Security n.d.). Members are Christian Karen (Global Security n.d.; Guardian 2000). It is estimated to have had approximately 500 members in 1998 (Guardian 2000). In 2000, the group had approximately 200 members (Time 2000).

External Ties

The group received weapons from the KNU (Global Security n.d.). It also provided some sanctuary to members of the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors in 1999 (Global Security n.d.). In 2000, the group lost support from the KNU and other Karen separatist groups after a disastrous attack on a Thai hospital killed several civilians (Ritchburg 2000; Mydans 2000).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack was in 2000 (Mydans 2000; New York Times 2013). After the hospital attack in 2000, the Burmese and Thai militaries launched joint operations to suppress the group (New York Times 2013). In 2006, Johnny Htoo and eight remaining members of the God's Army surrendered to Burmese forces (New York Times 2013).

XX. NATIONAL LIBERATION ALLIANCE OF SA KAEO
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- GTD Perpetrator 20326. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2016.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20326
- Thai authorities defuse bomb discovered in school. (2006, Apr 13). BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific Retrieved from
  https://search.proquest.com/docview/460983604?accountid=14026
- Searched gScholar
  - NATIONAL LIBERATION ALLIANCE OF SA KAEO
- Searched Proquest
  - NATIONAL LIBERATION ALLIANCE OF SA KAEO

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: NA

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2006 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It came to attention just once in 2006 when it left a bomb at a school with a note saying it was for the "nation-plundering government" (BBC 2006; GTD 2006). There is no additional information about its goals, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Geography

The incident occurred in Aranyaprathet, Thailand (GTD 2006).

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about this group. It came to attention just once in 2006 when it left a bomb at a school with a note saying it was for the "nation-plundering government" (BBC 2006; GTD 2006). There is no additional information about its goals, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

External Ties

There is not much information available about this group. It came to attention just once in 2006 when it left a bomb at a school with a note saying it was for the "nation-plundering

government" (BBC 2006; GTD 2006). There is no additional information about its goals, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Group Outcome

There is not much information available about this group. It came to attention just once in 2006 when it left a bomb at a school with a note saying it was for the "nation-plundering government" (BBC 2006; GTD 2006). There is no additional information about its goals, ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

XXI.   VIGOROUS BURMESE STUDENT WARRIORS
Min. Group Date: 1999
Max. Group Date: 2004
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 151. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- "Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors." Global Security. N.D. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/vbsw.htm
- "Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors." FAS. 2000. https://fas.org/irp/world/para/vbsw.htm
- Colleen Sullivan. "Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors." SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism. 2011. Ed. Gus Martin. P. 619-620.
- "Burmese Gunmen Seize Their Embassy in Bangkok." New York Times. 1999. http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/02/world/burmese-gunmen-seize-their-embassy-in-bangkok.html
- GTD Perpetrator 20469, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20469

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors, The Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors

Group Formation: 1999

Group End: 2004 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 1999 when its members took over the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand (New York Times 1999; Global Security n.d.). The group issued a fax demanding that the Burmese military junta release political prisoners and work to implement new democratic policy reforms (New York Times 1999; Global Security n.d.).

Geography

The group's attacks took place in Bangkok, Thailand and Hpa-an, Burma (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

The group was composed of students and had at least 12 members (New York Times 1999; FAS 2000). There is no information about the group's leadership, source of funding, or organizational structure.

External Ties

After the 1999 embassy bombing, members of the group took sanctuary with the God's Army group in Burma (Global Security n.d.; FAS 2000). There is no other evidence of external support involving the group.

Group Outcome

After the 1999 Embassy raid, members were allowed to flee in exchange for releasing all the prisoners (Global Security n.d.). The group's last known incident was in 2004 when it claimed responsibility for bombing a sporting goods store and passenger bus (GTD 2016). There is no evidence of a follow-up and it is unclear what happened to the group after this incident.

XXII.   SRI NAKHARO
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 151. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- "Terrorist Group Kills Two Hostages in Southern Thailand." 2001.Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Jun 06, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/453730059?accountid=14026.
- "Relatives Urge Police to Intensify Search for Headless Bodies." 2001.The Bangkok Post, Jun 11, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/308860815?accountid=14026.

- "Four Suspects in Yala Beheading Case." 2001.The Bangkok Post, Jun 08, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/308864542?accountid=14026.
- TOPS Profile 3680

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: 2001 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 2001 when it kidnapped and murdered several hostages after the Thai government refused to pay a ransom (Xinhua 2012). The group cites no political goal for the act nor any ideology (Xinhua 2012).

Geography

The incident occurred in Muang district, Yala in Thailand (Bangkok Post 2001).

Organizational Structure

Thai police said the group had up to 20 members (MIPT 2008). It issued a demand in Yawi which is the language of southern Thailand, but there is no evidence about group membership, leadership, or organizational structure. The group demanded a ransom which may be how they planned to fund themselves (MIPT 2008).

External Ties

There is no evidence of ties to other groups or even other separatist groups.

Group Outcome

The police identified and arrested four suspects involved in the murder in June 2001 (Bangkok Post 2001). There is no additional information about the group afterwards and it is not heard from again.

XXIII.   YOUNG LIBERATORS OF PATTANI

Min. Group Date: 2002
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: NA [Patani Insurgent?]

Part 1. Bibliography
- Seth Jones and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End. RAND Corporation. 2008. P. 151. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
- GTD Perpetrator 20478, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20478
- Akadej Niyomdej. "Chapter 2: Context of Sea Separatist and Transnational Terrorist Movements (TNTS): Definitions and Characters." The Rise of Separatist and Transnational Terrorist Movements in Southeast Asia Post 9/11. 2008. P. 24 http://digi.library.tu.ac.th/thesis/po/1258/05CHAPTER_2.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: PMP

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2002 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it came to attention in 2002 when it claimed responsibility for burning a school in Narathiwat, Thailand (GTD 2016; Niymodej 2008, 24). There is no stated goal for the attack or ideology although MIPT 2008/Niymodej 2008 speculates it is separatist-related due to its Pattani name.

Geography

The one incident took place in Narathiwat, Thailand (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

There is no information available about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

There is no evidence of any external ties to other separatist groups or state sponsors.

Group Outcome

The group's only incident is in 2002 and then it disappears. It is not heard from again (Niymodej 2008, 24). There is no evidence to corroborate Jones and Libicki's codings.

XXIV.   RUNDA KUMPALAN KECIL
        Min. Group Date: 2006
        Max. Group Date: 2012
        Onset: 2003

        Aliases: Runda Kumpulan Kecil (Rkk), Runda Kumpalan Kecil, Runda Kumpalan Kecil (Rkk), Runda Kumpulan Kecil

Part 1. Bibliography
- Zachary Abuza. "Breakdown of Southern Thailand's Insurgent Groups." Terrorism Monitor 4(17). 2006. Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/a-breakdown-of-southern-thailands-insurgent-groups/
- "Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)." Project on Violent Conflict. http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database/runda-kumpulan-kecil-rkk-2011
- "Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)." Handbook of Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific. Ed. Rohan Gunaratna and Stefanie Kam. p. 93-94. https://books.google.com/books?id=Y3XQDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA93&lpg=PA93&dq=RUNDA+KUMPULAN+KECIL&source=bl&ots=4Txt7lZj7B&sig=TMHIDiDHWaqeczhCgQDxgehxk-I&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi-u8Cbx9TUAhUHKGMKHfKvAys4ChDoAQgsMAI#v=onepage&q=RUNDA%20KUMPULAN%20KECIL&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is the armed wing of the BRN.

Group Formation: This is the armed wing of the BRN.

Group End: This is the armed wing of the BRN.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is the armed wing of the BRN.

Geography

This is the armed wing of the BRN.

Organizational Structure

This is the armed wing of the BRN.

External Ties

This is the armed wing of the BRN.

Group Outcome

This is the armed wing of the BRN.

XXV. NATIONAL UNITED FRONT OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST DICTATORSHIP (UDD)
Min. Group Date: 2009
Max. Group Date: 2009
Onset: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- GTD Perpetrator 30142. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2016. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30142
- "Profile: Thailand's reds and yellows." BBC. 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13294268
- "Thailand: Army Chief Interfering in Investigations." Human Rights Watch. 2012. https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/23/thailand-army-chief-interfering-investigations
- "Thai Red Shirts." Economist. http://www.economist.com/topics/thai-red-shirts
- "Thaksin tells Thailand's red shirt opposition: 'play dead' for now." Reuters. 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-politics-idUSKCN0RK02F20150920
- "Red Shirt v Yellow Shirt." The Independent (UK). http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/red-shirt-v-yellow-shirt-thailands-political-struggle-2057293.html
- GTD Perpetrator 30181, Global Terrorism Database, Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30181

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship, Red Shirts

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2010 (repressed) or 2015 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The UDD formed in 2006 as a loose-knit collection of Thaksin supporters following a military coup (BBC 2012). The group's first violent attack occurred in 2009 when it began to stage massive protests against the government (GTD 2016). Their goal is to overthrow the military government (BBC 2012).

Geography

The group is primarily active in Bangkok and Chiang Mai (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the Red Shirt Movement is Kwanchai Praipana (Reuters 2015). The group is heavily influenced by former Prime Minister Thaksin who now lives in exile (Reuters 2015). Members are mainly lower-class workers, students, and laborers (BBC 2012). It is unknown how many members they have or how they fund themselves. The group's armed wing was known as the "Black Shirts" (HRW 2012). This wing carried out targeted attacks against military and security force targets (HRW 2012).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external ties. The group is opposed to the Yellow Shirts (McNeill 2010; BBC 2012).

Group Outcome

The military junta implemented several new restrictions to suppress the protest movement including banned political activities and lowered rural subsidies (Reuters 2015). There were reports that the military killed many demonstrators although the army denied these abuses (HRW 2012). The group's last known violent attack was in 2010, but the group remains active and is "playing dead" according to Thaksin (Reuters 2015).

XXVI.   UNITED FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY AGAINST DICTATORSHIP
         Min. Group Date: 2010
         Max. Group Date: 2010
         Onset:

         Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is an alias for the UDD above.

Group Formation: This is an alias for the UDD above.

Group End: This is an alias for the UDD above.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for the UDD above.

Geography

This is an alias for the UDD above.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for the UDD above.

External Ties

This is an alias for the UDD above.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for the UDD above.

XXVII. YAKARIYA BANGO
Min. Group Date: 2012
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Yakariya Bango Insurgent Group, Yakariya Bango

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Major Attacks Work of One Group." Bangkok Post. 2012.
  http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/313584/

- GTD Perpetrator 40083. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last Modified June 2016.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=40083
- "Thailand: Car Blast Tied to Ambush on Soldiers." 2012.Asia News Monitor, Sep 25. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1069247721?accountid=14026.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2012

Group End: 2012 (disappear)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Yakaria Bango group first came to attention in 2012 for a car bomb in the Pattani district of southern Thailand (BBC 2012; GTD 2016). It is unknown when the group formed, but its goal was to "destroy the public's trust in the government" during negotiations to resolve the Pattani separatist conflict (BBC 2012). There is no other information available about the group's goal or ideology available.

Geography

The attacks occurred in the Sai Buru district and Mayo district in southern Pattani (BBC 2012).

Organizational Structure

There is no information available about the group's organizational structure.

External Ties

The group is opposed to the government's efforts to resolve the Patani insurgency, which could imply ties to other Patani militant groups, but it is unclear (BBC 2012).

Group Outcome

The police said they tracked the group for two weeks, but were unable to prevent the attacks (BBC 2012). The local government said they would set up a new command center in the region to increase security efforts for the group (BBC 2012).

Notes for Iris:

Fortna dataset links Patani insurgents to - Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Bersatu Mujahideen Islam Pattani, National Revolutionary Front, Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), Young Liberators of Pattani

Note: it's by definition impossible for some of Fortna's groups to be part of the UCDP civil war period because they end before the conflict starts (e.g. RKK, PULO)