Peru VNSA Cases
Last Updated: 4 May 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T412	REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC)		1964	2012
T1826	MOVIMIENTO DE LA IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIONARIA	1965	1965	1988
T1839	EJERCITO DE LA LIBERACION NACIONAL	1965	1965	1990
T1427	ARGENTINE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION MOVEMENT (MANO)		1970	1975
T1560	REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD		1974	1975
T1043	CONDOR ORGANIZATION		1974	1978
T69	M-19 (MOVEMENT OF APRIL 19)		1976	1997
T1045	COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS		1976	1977
T457	SHINING PATH	1982	1978	2012
T500	TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)	1984	1983	1997
T284	MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT (FPMR)		1983	1997
T1244	PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND (CRP)		1985	1986
T1135	JAVIER HERAUD REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDO		1985	1985
T1897	RODRIGO FRANCO COMMAND		1988	1991
T1920	STRUGGLE AGAINST MISERY AND EXPLOITATION OF PEASANTS		1989	1989
T1230	PATRIOTIC LIBERATION FRONT		1990	1990
T1865	PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA FRONT		1992	1992
T944	ETNOCACERISTA MOVEMENT		2000	2005

I. REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC)
Min. Group Date: 1964
Max. Group Date: 2012
Onset: NA

Aliases: Revolutionary Armed Forces Of Colombia (Farc), Armed Revolutionary Forces Of Colombia (Farc), Bolivarian Movement For A New Colombia, Farc, Farc [Armed Revolutionary Forces Of Colombia], Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia - Ejercito Del Pueblo (Farc-Ep), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia (Farc)

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Who are the FARC?" BBC, 2016,
  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769
- Martha Crenshaw. "Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army." Mapping Militant Organizations. Last Updated 2015.
  http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/89
- Danielle Renwick and Claire Felter. "Colombia's Civil Conflict." Council on Foreign Relations. 2017. http://www.cfr.org/colombia/colombias-civil-conflict/p9272
- "FARC." Insight Crime. Last Updated 2017.
  http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile
- "The guerrilla groups in Colombia." UN Regional Information Center for Western Europe.
  http://www.unric.org/en/colombia/27013-the-guerrilla-groups-in-colombia
- "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia." Mackenzie Institute. 2015.
  http://mackenzieinstitute.com/fuerzas-armadas-revolucionarias-de-colombia-farc-2/
- "Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia." Para-Military Groups Latin America. Global Security. No Date. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/farc.htm
- "Profile: Colombia's Armed Groups." BBC. 2013.
  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950
- GTD EventID 19960706001, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Modified June 2016,
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199607060001

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The FARC was formed in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party to overthrow the central government after La Violencia and the Marquetalia Massacre (BBC 2016; Crenshaw 2015; Mackenzie Institute 2015). Its primary grievances revolved around income inequality and discrimination against rural communities by the Colombian government (BBC 2016; Crenshaw 2015). The group ascribes to a Marxist-Leninist ideology (BBC 2016). Its first violent attack occurred in 1964 during the Marquetalia Massacre (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group primarily operates in rural areas in Colombia (BBC 2016). It controls territory in eastern and southern Colombia (BBC 2013). This includes Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Narino, Choco, and Antioquia (InSight Crime n.d.). It originally operated out of Marquetalia, Tolima (InSight Crime n.d.).

It has a transnational presence in Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, and Panama (Crenshaw 2015). It receives sanctuary in Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador (Global Security n.d.). There was one attack by FARC in Iquitos, Peru in 1996 (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

FARC was founded by Manuel Marulanda and Jacob Arenas (BBC 2016). In 2016, the leader of the group was Rodrigo Londono Echeverri (BBC 2016). It recruits farmers, peasants, and other "land workers" as fighters (BBC 2016). There are disputed reports about whether it recruits members forcibly (BBC 2016). It also recruits men and women (BBC 2016). Approximately 20-30% of FARC members are minors when they join (Mackenzie Institute 2015). When it started in 1964, the group had approximately 50 members, but quickly grew (Crenshaw 2015; InSight Crime n.d.). The group had approximately 18,000 fighters in 1999, 20,000 fighters in 2002 and 6,000-7,000 fighters in 2016 (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016). In addition, FARC relies on a large cadre of civilian support which numbers or even slightly outnumbers the total active fighters it has (BBC 2016).

The group has a political wing known as the Patriotic Union, which it created in 1985 to run in legislative elections (Crenshaw 2015). The political wing fell apart due to a series of high-profile assassinations and kidnappings of UP members during the 1980s and early 1990s (Crenshaw 2015). The group is organized regionally into small platoon-like divisions, which are organized into regional brigades (BBC 2016). It has a very hierarchical structure (InSight Crime n.d.). There is a leadership council composed of a dozen individuals known as the High Command or Secretariat group (Mackenzie Institute 2015; BBC 2016). One senior military commander is Jorge Briceno (Global Security n.d.).

The group primarily funds itself through extortion, drug trafficking, and kidnapping (Crenshaw 2015; BBC 2016). One report estimates that it collects $150-500 million per year from drug trafficking (InSight Crime n.d; Renwick and Felter 2017; UN n.d.).

External Ties

The group fought against Colombian paramilitary groups like Death to Kidnappers and the United Self-Defense Force of Colombia (Crenshaw 2015). There are conflicting reports about its relationship with the ELN. It fought against ELN from 2005-2009 (InSight Crime n.d.). It also cooperated and got support from the ELN at an unknown point (Mackenzie Institute 2015).

FARC received funding from Cuba and Venezuela (Crenshaw 2015). Chavez was a well-known advocate for FARC and lobbied for them to be recognized as "belligerents" which provides certain international legal protections (Global Security n.d.; Crenshaw 2015).

It has allegedly "been in contact and worked together in the drug trade" with Shining Path in Peru (Crenshaw 2015). It may also coordinate bomb training techniques with the IRA and Sinn Fein (Global Security n.d.).

It was a member of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board, which was an umbrella group of Marxist groups in Latin America, from 1987-1991. Members included ELN, EPL, and M-19 (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

FARC initially emerged from the Marquetelia Massacre (BBC 2016). They engage police, military, and paramilitary forces who they believe are fighting on behalf of the Colombian government (BBC 2016). The government had peace talks with the Colombian government for the first time in 1982 which resulted in the Uribe Accords (Crenshaw 2015). The ceasefire fell apart when private Colombian citizens began to create their own right-wing paramilitary groups to attack like the AUC and MAS (Crenshaw 2015).

In 2002, President Alvaro Uribe launched a huge counterinsurgency offensive against the FARC, which was highly successful (BBC 2013). The group was resilient for many years, but the death of key leaders and Plan Colombia (the U.S. plan to train and equip Colombian security forces) has severely damaged the group's capacity to fight (BBC 2016). Manuel Marulanda died in 2008 and his successor, Alfonso Cano, died soon after in 2011 (BBC 2016). In 2008, Colombian forces also killed Raul Reyes, a military leader and influential member in the Secretariat (Crenshaw 2015).

Many fighters have demobilized or been killed, which eventually led the FARC to pursue peace talks with the Colombian government starting in 2012 (BBC 2013; BBC 2016). The group signed a formal ceasefire agreement with the Colombian government in June 2016 (Global Security n.d.)

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Southern Bloc, Ejercito del Pueblo

Group Formation: 1964

Group End (Outcome): 2017 (disarm)

II. MOVIMIENTO DE LA IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIONARIA
    Min. Group Date: 1965
    Max. Group Date: 1988
    Onset: 1965

    Aliases: Movement Of The Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Peru), MIR, Movimiento De La Izquierda Revolucionaria

Part 1. Bibliography
- Leon Campbell. "The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerrilla Movement, 1960-1965." Latin America Research Review. http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/peru/peru-guerrilla.pdf
- Matthew Templeman. "Ideology versus Reality: The Rise and Fall of Social Revolution in Peru." Dissertation. University of Texas at Austin. 2009. https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2009-12-432/TEMPLEMAN-THESIS.pdf
- "Intelligence Memorandum: Review of Insurgency Problems." Central Intelligence Agency. 1966. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001467972.pdf
- Antonio Zapata. "Las guerrillas de 1965 y el Gral. Velasco." La Republica (Peru). 2015. http://larepublica.pe/columnistas/sucedio/las-guerrillas-de-1965-y-el-gral-velasco-21-01-2015
- "Peru." Ed. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick. 1988. Google Drive.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria: MIR) split from the APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) in 1960 and renamed itself the MIR in 1962 (Templeman 2009, 1; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The APRA was a non-violent political movement (Campbell, 53). The group's first violent incident was in 1964 (Templeman 2009, 1). They formally launched their campaign in June 1965 by blowing up a police station (Templeman 2009, 19).

The MIR's goal was "agrarian reform" which was only accomplishable through revolution (Templeman 2009). The MIR was a leftist organization heavily influenced by Maoist and Marxist-Leninist ideology (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 644).

The group, lead by De La Puente, split from the APRA in 1960, due to dissatisfaction with way the party had begun to lean right, and became the APRA Rebelde, but officially changed their name to MIR in 1962 (Templeman 2009; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 644).

Their first recorded violent incident was an attack on a bridge, a mine, several haciendas, and a police station, in June of 1965 (Templeman 2009).

Geography

The goal of the MIR was to operate on three different fronts: the north, the center and the south of the "ceja de selva" (eyebrow of the jungle, a specific region of the mountains), However, they failed in the north and ended up operated on just the second two (Antonio Zapata). De La Puente believed that, due to the size of Peru, if this revolution were to succeed it must be fought on more than one front; he also believed it must start in the "sierra" (Templeman 2009).

Between 1960 and 1964, the MIR created three bases in various "zones" of the Sierra in order to achieve this multi-front effect (Templeman 2009). The headquarters were located on Mesa Pelada, a mountain near Machu Picchu; the other leaders, Guillermo Lobatón and Gonzalo Fernandez, set up other headquarters on the central and northern fronts, respectively (Templeman 2009, 18).

Organizational Structure

 Luis de la Puente Uceda was a lawyer who led MIR (Schmid and Jongman 1988). He modeled the group's structure and tactics after the Cuban Revolution and Castro's successful guerrilla movement (Campbell, 53; Templeman 2009, 16-17). He visited Cuba in 1959 where he decided the "foco" model of revolution should be implemented in Peru (Templeman 2009, 16). During its one major offensive in 1965, the group split into three fronts; each front operated in a different area of the Sierras and was led by a different leader of the group (Templeman 2009). The northern front was led by either Elio Portocarrero or Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco (CIA 1966, 5). The south front at Mesa Pelada was led by De La Puente, and the Central front was led by Guillermo Lobatón. Both these fronts engaged in combat activities against the Peruvian government, but the northern front never commenced operations (Templeman 2009).

The group funded itself through external support from Cuba, Russia, and China (Schmid and Jong 1988, 644; Templeman 2009, 17). It is unknown how many members it had or

whom it recruited from. Its original members were left-wing Apristas from APRA (Templeman 2009, 16). The foco-structure of the insurgency implies it hoped to recruit peasants at some point, but it's unclear if that ever occurred.

External Ties

The MIR was a splinter of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 644).

The MIR received some external aid from Castro and Cuba (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 644). It sent members to Russia and China for training prior to launching its violent campaign in 1964 (Templeman 2009, 17) It also secured weapons, funding, and other types of logistical support from Russia and China (Templeman 2009, 17). They also moved weapons at least through both Brazil and Chile, though it remains unclear if that was with the knowledge of either of those governments (Templeman 2009, 17).

De La Puente met with Hugo Blanco, another Peruvian revolutionary, to discuss tactics and ideas (Templeman 2009). Blanco had tried to launch an insurgency in 1963, but was quickly defeated because he did not use guerrilla tactics (Templeman 2009, 19). The group also coordinated some actions with the ELN, but disagreed over some fundamental operational decisions (Templeman 2009, 19).

Group Outcome

Initially, the group enjoyed a period of success, as the Peruvian government was unprepared to combat guerrilla tactics (Templeman 2009). "The Peruvian government sent in the Guardia Civil, who found the insurgents more difficult to dislodge than Hugo Blanco in 1963. Blanco did not use (nor believe in) guerrilla tactics; many of the MIR guerrillas had trained in unconventional warfare in China and Russia. *The Guardia Civil quickly realized that it was neither trained nor organized for the kind of guerilla warfare the groups used*. The insurgents enjoyed relatively high success against the Guardia Civil by using ambushes, raids, and other asymmetric tactics" (Templeman 2009, 19-20).

On July 2, 1966, President Belaúnde deployed armed forces and suspended civil liberties for 30 days, however, the military eventually pressured him into handing over control of the operation. After that, they managed to force De La Puente to retreat, and he was killed (likely in combat) on October 23. The group was quickly destroyed by the army and its most prominent leaders were arrested until 1970 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 644). The central front managed to continue fighting until January 1966 (Templeman 2009). The northern front's leaders died or fled to Ecuador (CIA 1966, 5). This was essentially the end of the MIR. The group's last known attack is a series of scattered bombings in February of 1966 (Central Intelligence Agency 1966).

The MIR was essentially dormant between 1966 and 1982, though it went through many iterations during this time. Many surviving members created other splinter groups none of which achieved the same success as MIR (Templeman 2009, 21-23).

Two wings, the MIR-EM and PSR-ML, merged in 1980 reiterating their call for revolution and renamed themselves the MRTA in 1982 (Templeman 2009, 23). The group secretly prepared and launched its campaign in 1984 (Templeman 2009, 23).The MRTA, which operated at the same time as Shining Path was influenced by the perceived rivalry between the two anti-state groups, and also seemed to have developed a deep anti-U.S. sentiment (NSA Archive, MORI DocID 766907). Their biggest and final action was the Japanese Ambassador's Residence hostage operation in 1997, where all 14 MRTA revolutionaries were killed (reportedly in combat, but it is suspected some were executed) by the Peruvian military (Templeman 2009).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: MIR, MIR-EM (MIR El Militante), MIR IV (MIR 4th stage) MIR Voz Rebelde, MIR-5, PSR-ML--MIR-EM

Group Formation: 1960 was when De La Puente officially split from the APRA, yet 1962 was when the group officially adopted the name "MIR" (Templeman 2009).

Group End (Outcome): 1966 (military/lose civil war)

III. EJERCITO DE LA LIBERACION NACIONAL
Min. Group Date: 1965
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: 1965

Aliases: National Liberation Army (Peru), Ejercito De La Liberacion Nacional, Ejercito De La Liberaci_n Nacional, National Liberation Army, National Liberation Army (ELN)

Part 1. Bibliography
- Leon Campbell. "The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerrilla Movement, 1960-1965." Latin America Research Review. http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/peru/peru-guerrilla.pdf
- Matthew Templeman. "Ideology versus Reality: The Rise and Fall of Social Revolution in Peru." Dissertation. University of Texas at Austin. 2009. https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2009-12-432/TEMPLEMAN-THESIS.pdf
- "Intelligence Memorandum: Review of Insurgency Problems." Central Intelligence Agency. 1966. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001467972.pdf

- Antonio Zapata. "Las guerrillas de 1965 y el Gral. Velasco." La Republica (Peru). 2015. http://larepublica.pe/columnistas/sucedio/las-guerrillas-de-1965-y-el-gral-velasco-21-01-2015
- "Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Perú (ELN)." Movimientos Guerrilleros Peru. n.d. http://perso.wanadoo.es/guerrillas/movguerrperueln.htm
- "Peru." Ed. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick. 1988. Google Drive.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The ELN was formed by Juan Pablo Chang Navarro in 1962 when it splintered from the Peruvian Communist Party (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 644; Campbell, 56). It launched violent operations in 1965; the same year, it also published a manifesto proclaiming its goal for a workers revolution in Peru (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 644). Templeton compares another leader, Héctor Béjar, to De La Puente of the MIR, both men believed in Che Guevara's theory of revolutionary warfare, agrarian reform, and that the "party should grow out of the revolutionary struggle," (Templeman 2009).

Due to a set of accidental circumstances, the ELN had set up their base between two of the MIR bases, and therefore felt obligated to begin their operations at the same time as the MIR, in June of 1965 (Templeman 2009).

Geography

The ELN set up their base between the Sierras and the Jungle in the province known as the "dog's ear" but officially called "Ayacucho" (Zapata 2015). The group was also active in Apurimac, Peru (CIA 1966, 5). Its members were originally from Lima (Templeman 2009, 19).

Organizational Structure

The ELN was initially led by Juan Pablo Chang Navarro (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 644). They were led by Héctor Béjar from at least June 1965 to February 1966 (Templeman 2009). Béjar was also less organized and put less time into the specifics of his organization than De La Puente did (Templeman 2009). Béjar also stressed "unity" of the country (Templeman 2009).

The group was incredibly unorganized and arrived in Ayacucho in the fall of 1964 without warm clothes or any knowledge of the local language of Quechua (Templeman 2009, 19). ELN members eventually managed to recruit locals in exchange for medical

assistance (Templeman 2009). The CIA assessed the group in 1966 as "hav[ing] shown little capability for serious insurgent activity" (CIA 1966, 5). It also thought the group might be facing serious in-fighting problems that were leading it to self-destruct (CIA 1966, 5).

External Ties

The group was ideologically influenced by Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution (Zapata 2015).

The ELN was also influenced by Héctor Béjar, a former Peruvian revolutionary who had launched a failed insurgency in 1963 (Templeman 2009).

Whether they ever had any direct funding from Che Guevara and the ELN in Bolivia is unclear (Templeman 2009). When the surviving group members were forced to flee in 1966, many of them fled to Bolivia (Templeman 2009).

Templeton claims that the ELN and MIR were too different ideologically to work together; however, there was at least some element of incidental coordination, if only because they operated in the same area for the same time-frame (Templeman 2009, 19).

Group Outcome

Due to Béjar inexpertly placing his headquarters between those of De La Puente, when the MIR began to act in June of 1965, the ELN followed suit despite not being as well-prepared as the MIR (Templeman 2009) The ELN survived and managed to outlast the more organized and more powerful MIR *despite* being less effective (Templeman 2009). "*A case of dumb luck, the ELN's lack of preparation and ineffectiveness spared it the brunt of the Army's wrath*" (Templeman 2009, 21). Bejar was captured either in December 1965 or February 1966 effectively destroying the insurgency (Campbell, 56; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 644). They carried out a few attacks on local haciendas, and lasted until February; however, the army finally caught up with them and Béjar was captured and the rest fled to Bolivia (Templeman 2009).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: No proposed changes

Group Formation: 1962

Group End (Outcome): 1966 (Templeman 2009, 21)

Note: this group is a hot mess.

IV.   ARGENTINE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION MOVEMENT (MANO)
Min. Group Date: 1970
Max. Group Date: 1975
Onset:

Aliases: Argentine National Organization Movement (MANO), Movimiento Armado Nacionalista Organizacion (MANO)

Part 1. Bibliography
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida.* The RAND Corporation, 2008. 168. <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf>
- Terrorist Organization Profile No. 4139, MIPT Knowledge Base. 2008. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the group formed, but it first came to attention in 1974. The only recorded attack is the letter bombing at the Cuban embassy in Peru, where the group claimed it wanted to "stop Communist" activity against the central government (MIPT 2008). Its ideology was anti-communist or right-wing and did not appear to oppose the Peruvian state (MIPT 2008).

Geography

The Cuban Embassy where the one incident took place is in Lima, Peru (MIPT 2008).

Organizational Structure

Jones and Libicki (2008) say the group had "tens" of members although there is no additional evidence to support this claim (Jones and Libicki 2008, 168). It is unknown how it was organized, its size, membership, leadership, or source of funding.

External Ties

There is no evidence of external ties to other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

According to Jones and Libicki, the group ended due to "politics" but there is no additional evidence to support this coding. The group does not claim credit for any additional incidents and disappears (MIPT 2008).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none.

Group Formation: 1974

Group End (Outcome): 1974 (disappear)

Note: Like the TOPS description, the RAND "How Terrorist Groups End" is also about the MANO based in Peru or Mexico, not the Argentine group: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf.

V.   REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD
     Min. Group Date: 1974
     Max. Group Date: 1975
     Onset: NA

     Aliases: None

     Part 1. Bibliography
     ● Charles D. Ameringer. Political Parties of the Americas, 1980s to 1990s: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies. Greenwood Publishing. 1992. p. 518 https://books.google.com/books?id=kD5qi3MyEHYC&pg=PA518&lpg=PA518&dq=REVO LUTIONARY+VANGUARD+peru&source=bl&ots=9VHP6QPD3F&sig=1KFLg2-yqMgu8g cSf_xB3Pc74fo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjgxJCaoKnRAhWps1QKHc8MBbQQ6AEI NjAF#v=onepage&q=REVOLUTIONARY%20VANGUARD%20peru&f=false
     ● Martin Pique. "Vete a Peru a hacer una guerrilla." Pagina 12. 2004. https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-42148-2004-10-10.html
     ● "Ricardo Napuri: Crónicas autobiográficas de un militante revolucionario." Rebelión. http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=133015
     ● GTD Perpetrator 4003, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=4003
     ● Phil Gunson, Andrew Thompson, and Greg Chamberlain. The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of South America. Routledge. 2015, 77. https://books.google.com/books?id=7J9ACwAAQBAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77&dq=Revolut ionary+Vanguard+(Communist+Proletarian)+Shining+Path.&source=bl&ots=TJo15zc584 &sig=tlVxVYr-zEIAA5Cvc8bamIOuQqg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjv1KTYyNTTAhVI3 2MKHTDQCxwQ6AEIOjAE#v=onepage&q=vrpc&f=false

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Revolutionary Vanguard was founded by Ricardo Napuri "after the failure of the MIR" in 1969 (Pique 2015). Its first violent incident occurred in 1974 for an attack in Lima, Peru (GTD 2016). The group was a Communist political party that turned violent, but no goal behind the attacks could be found.

Geography

Both terrorist attacks occur in Lima, Peru (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the Revolutionary Vanguard was Ricardo Napuri who had previously fought with the MIR during the short-lived insurgency (Pique 2015). Napuri was also a former Air Force lieutenant with extensive combat experience (Pique 2015). The group is organized as a political party (Napuri 2015; Ameringer 1992, 518). No information could be found about funding, membership, or size.

External Ties

Napurí was a former member of MIR who had trained with Che Guevara in Cuba (Piqué 2015). A splinter of the Revolutionary Vanguard merged with Shining Path (Gunson et al. 2015, 77).

Group Outcome

The group's last known violent incident was in 1975. The Revolutionary Vanguard merged in 1984 with a coalition of other parties (Piqué 2015; Rebelion n.d.). A splinter of the Revolutionary Guard - the Communist Proletarian Revolutionary Guard - joined the Shining Path (Gunson et al. 2015, 77).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none.

Group Formation: 1969 (Piqué 2015).

Group End (Outcome): 1984 (merger with political parties or SL)

VI.   CONDOR ORGANIZATION

Min. Group Date: 1974
Max. Group Date: 1978
Onset: NA

Aliases: Condor Organization, Condor

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Operation Condor/Operacion Condor." Past Wars - Military. Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/operation-condor.htm
- "Operation Condor." Ed. Carlos Osorio. National Security Archive. George Washington University. 2015. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB514/
- "Operation Condor: Cable Suggests US Role." National Security Archive. George Washington University. 2001. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/20010306/
- McSherry, J. Patrice. "Operation Condor: Deciphering the U.S. role." Global Policy Forum. July 2001. Accessed October 30th, 2016. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/28173.html.
- "Operation Condor: Operation Condor: Accountability for Transnational Crimes in Uruguay.". 2016 MENA Report. Proquest.
- GTD Eventid 197409190002. Global Terrorism Database. START Project. Last Modified June 2016. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197409190002

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Condor Organization was a CIA-sponsored mission first envisioned in 1972 and formally created in 1975 (Osorio 2015). The goal of the mission was to undermine and assassinate "enemies" of the state across Latin America (Osorio 2015). It was opposed to populist, Marxist, and socialist movements/groups (McSherry 2001).

Geography

The group initially formed and operated in Chile to assassinate enemies of Pinochet (Osorio 2015). It later operated and targeted individuals in Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Bolivia (Osorio 2015). The one Peruvian incident occurred in Arequipa, Peru (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

The group was led through a series of intelligence-sharing efforts among different intelligence agencies in Chile and, at least, Argentina (National Security Archive 2001). In 2001, a judge implicated the former Chilean head of intelligence, Manuel Contreras,

Paraguayan leader Alfredo Stroessner, and Argentinean leader Jorge Videla as involved in part of Operation Condor (McSherry 2001).

External Ties

The Condor Organization was heavily sponsored by the US and the Central Intelligence Agency (Osorio 2015). It received key telecommunications assistance from the US (McSherry 2001). In order to carry out its raids and attacks, Operation Condor employed multinational teams from participating nations and was structured "like a US special forces team" (McSherry 2001).

Group Outcome

The group was active through the 1980s, but it is unknown what year specifically that the mission stopped (Osorio 2015; Global Security n.d.). Since the group had the support of the intelligence and executive agencies in most of the countries where it was operating, it faced no clear resistance from state security forces and operated relatively unhindered (Osorio 2015; Global Security n.d.). Many of its members were eventually implicated in judicial proceedings in 2016 after the program was disclosed in 2001 (National Security Archive 2001; Global Security n.d.).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Operacion Condor

Group Formation: 1975

Group End (Outcome): "1980s" (unknown/finished mission)

VII. M-19 (MOVEMENT OF APRIL 19)
Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1997
Onset: NA

Aliases: M-19 (Movement Of April 19), 19 April Movement, April 19 Movement, April 19 Movement (M-19), M-19, Movimiento 19 De Abril, Movimiento 19 De Abril (M-19)

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Part 2. Narrative

This group operated in Colombia.

Group Formation

M-19 formed in either 1972 or 1973 in Colombia in response to what they perceived as a stolen presidential election in 1970 (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). The group retroactively declared it was founded on April 19, 1970 (Idaho State n.d.). The group fought to overthrow the government and replace a leader they believed had stolen an earlier election (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003; Crenshaw 2015). The group first came to attention for a series of violent robberies in 1973 and the January 1974 robbery of Simon Bolivar's sword (Crenshaw 2015). The group ascribed to a Marxist-Leninist/populist ideology (Crenshaw 2015).

Geography

The group primarily operated in Colombian cities (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). They also operated in two different areas of the country - Putumayo and Caldas, Caucua, Valle de Cauca, Quinine, and Tolima (Crenshaw 2015). The group is tied to one attack in Lima, Peru where it kidnapped an Italian diplomat, but there is no evidence of other operations or politicized opposition to the Peruvian government (GTD).

Organizational Structure

One of the group's leaders - Jaime Bateman Cayon - was a former member of FARC (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). Another leader was Ivan

Marino Ospina (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). Alvaro Fayad was the group's chief military and political strategist (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

Members came from middle class to upper middle class backgrounds and included university students, unions, doctors, and families with ties to the current government (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). It had approximately 1,500-2,000 members in 1985 which shrunk to 500 in 1987 (Crenshaw 2015).

The group had a political wing - the ADM-19 - which later formally spun off and became a legitimate political party (Crenshaw 2015). It was also organized along two military fronts in the south and the west. The fronts were subdivided into smaller units which operated in different cities (Idaho State University n.d.).

The group funded itself through drug trafficking and kidnapping (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

External Ties

The group fought MAS, a drug trafficking para-military (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

The group received military training in guerrilla warfare from Cuba (Crenshaw 2015).

Group Outcome

In 1980, the Colombian army arrested Jaime Bateman which triggered an Embassy hostage crisis in Bogota (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

In 1984, the Colombian government negotiated a disarmament deal with several factions, which led to the creation of the ADM-19 political group (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

In 1985, when the political agreement fell apart, the Colombian government launched a major counterinsurgency offensive against the M-19 in Bogota (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). In 1987, security forces killed Alvaro Fayad which hurt the group's ability to continue (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

In 1989, the government and M-19 negotiated a secondary political agreement which led most members to disarm by 1990 and join the ADM-19 political group (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: ADM-19, Acción Democrática-Movimiento 19 (Democratic Action-Movement 19), ADM-19, Alianza Democrática M-19, Democratic Alliance M-19

Group Formation: 1972/1973

Group End (Outcome): 1989 (disarm, create a political party)

VIII.   COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
Min. Group Date: 1976
Max. Group Date: 1977
Aliases: CORU, United Revolutionary Organizations Commando (Anderson, 33),

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU) ceased attacks in 2000 and has been inactive since 2012 (Bardach 2006). The founding of CORU is disputed, with most reporting its origins as either in Chile in 1975 (S&J 1998, 527) or in the Dominican Republic in June of 1976 (NSA Archive 1, 1978). CORU's initial goal was a change in the Castro regime (Sweig 2009, 83). Through acts of sabotage and misinformation about who was responsible, CORU sought to undermine Cuba's relationships with other states in the Americas (Schmid and Jongman 1998, 527; NSA Archives 1978). A C.I.A. report attributes 17 acts of international terrorism during 1976 to CORU, three of which occurred in the U.S. (C.I.A. 1997, 5).

The founders of CORU were Cuban exiles Orlando Bosch (a medical doctor) and Luis Posada Carriles (often known as Posada rather than Carriles). Bosch and Posada were schoolmates from the University of Havana, who said they became disillusioned by the Castro regime's unfulfilled promises and oppression (Bardach 2006).

Geography

Using false names and passports, CORU leaders traveled to countries with Cuban exile communities including Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Venezuela (Martin 2011; NSA Archives, 6 re: Venezuela).

Organizational Structure

CORU was an umbrella organization for five anti-Castro paramilitary groups. These groups were: Acción Cuba, Cuban Nationalist Movement, Cuban National Liberation Front, Association of the Veterans of the Bay of Pigs Brigade 2506, and the 17th of April Movement (NSA Archive 1, 1978).

An F.B.I. report described the group as organized in "secret cells." However, Bosch and Posada were familiar to both law enforcement and the Cuban exile community since the 1960s (NSA Archives 12, 1978; Bardach 2006).

Posada and Bosch are alleged to have organized the mid-flight bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight 455, which resulted in the deaths of all 73 people on board on October 6, 1976 (Sweig 2009, 83). The flight was en route to Havana from Guayana, and had layovers in Trinidad, Barbados, and Jamaica. The plane crashed in the sea about ten minutes after departing from Barbados, and it was the first act of airline terrorism in the Americas (Bardach 2006). According to a declassified C.I.A. memo from June 22, 1976, the CIA had knowledge that CORU was planning to bomb a Cubana Airline Flight (Bamford 2016).

External Ties

The right-wing military in Argentina and CORU both had strong ties to the covert paramilitary network Operation Condor, which reportedly aimed to weaken leftist groups, including the Cuban government (Martin 2011; Kohut and Vilella 2010). U.S. Government investigators have considered it possible (although never confirmed), that the Argentine military may have provided support to CORU as part of the multinational Operation Condor (Bardach 2006).

In fact, Bosch received housing and logistical support from the Chilean military in the latter half of the 1970s. Following the 1973 military coup in Chile that deposed democratically-elected, socialist President Salvador Allende, the Chilean secret police allegedly helped Bosch plan the assassination of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier in September 1976 (Martin 2011; Bardach 2006; Bamford 2016; Kohut and Vilella 2010). A bomb was placed under Letelier's car, killing him and his American aide Ronni Karpen Moffitt (Ibid.).

Bosch and Posada allegedly had ties to the CIA beginning in the 1960s. The C.I.A. allegedly provided financial support to Posada until 1976, according to declassified documents and an unclassified summary of his career from court records (McKinley). Bosch has claimed that he received direct support from the C.I.A. for brief paramilitary training in Florida in the early 1960s (Bardach 2006). CORU also had supporters in the Cuban exile community in Miami, Florida (Martin 2011).

Group Outcome

After six prior arrests, Bosch was sentenced to ten years in federal prison in Miami in 1968, though he earned parole in 1972. Bosch and Posada were arrested in Caracas, Venezuela, in connection with the bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight 455 (Bamford 2016). Florida's then-governor Claude Kirk was among those who lobbied for Bosch's parole (Bardach 2006; Martin 2011). Posada fled Venezuela in 1985 and Bosch was released on appeal in 1987 (Bardach 2006).

In November 2000, Posada and three additional Cuban exiles attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro at an international summit in Panama (Bardach 2006; Sweig 2009). Panamanian officials, in collaboration with Cuban intelligence agents, arrested the four plotters, who were found in possession of explosives, a map of Fidel's route, and the summit's agenda (Sweig 2009). The four plotters served three and a half years in Panamanian prison but were then pardoned by President Mireya Moscoso. The reason for the pardon is unclear, although Sweig notes that Moscoso faced allegations of corruption during his presidential term (Ibid.).

The U.S. Justice Department called for Bosch to be deported from Miami in 1989, alleging that Bosch was responsible for 30 acts of sabotage in the United States, Puerto

Rico, Panama, and Cuba between 1961 and 1968 (Martin 2011). However, both Bosch (who died in 2011) and Posada (alive as of 2012) were allowed to remain in Florida.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: no proposed change

Group Formation: no proposed change

Group End (Outcome): 2000 (Posada's last known major plot, assassination attempt against Castro, ends with arrest of Posada and colleagues in Panama.)

IX.   SHINING PATH
        Min. Group Date: 1978
        Max. Group Date: 2012
        Onset: 1978

        Aliases: Shining Path (SL), SL, Sendero Luminoso (SL), Shining Path

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

Shining Path was established by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor at the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho with a goal to overthrow the Peruvian government (Graun 2008, 6-7). The group initially formed "in the 1960s" through a series of student meetings at the local university (Gregory 2009). Its first violent incident occurred in 1978 in Ayacucho, Peru (GTD 2016). The group formally launched their armed campaign against Peru in 1980 (Graun 2008, 7). In 1983, it escalated its attack when it began to kill both noncombatants and political officials (Gregory 2009). SL ascribed to a Marxist-Leninst ideology (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 7).

Geography

The group began in Ayacucho at the university where Guzmán taught (Gregory, Katherine). The group's primary base of operations was in Ayacucho and Huanta as well as Vilcabamba, Peru (COHA 2008).

Organizational Structure

Guzmán was the sole leader of the Shining Path and a leftist university professor (Gregory 2009; Graun 2008, 4-5, 9). SL funded itself through extortion, kidnapping, and drug-trafficking (COHA 2008; Gregory 2009). SL believed in a foco-style of revolution, which could eventually inspire rural communities to rise up and join the fight (

Guzmán drew most of his followers from his former students and other peasants in the area, most of whom were Quechua-speaking natives (Graun 2008). SL had approximately 5,000-1,0000 members at its peak in 1989-1993 (Gleditsch et al. 2009, 315; Mackenzie Institute 2016). It was organized around a hierarchical structure (COHA 2008).

Despite his veneration of communists like Mao and Lenin, Guzmán could be extremely contemptuous of the very rural poor he was trying to recruit. He once ordered the slaughter of an entire village for suspected collusion with the government (Starn n.d.).

External Ties

Guzman was averse to outside influence and did not receive any type of external support from other actors (Gregory 2009; Templeman 2009; Gleditsch et al. 2009). The group competed against the MRTA for supporters and resources (Gregory 2009). There is evidence that Guzman visited China in the mid-1960s, but there is no evidence whether this is involved training in guerrilla warfare or other types of education (COHA 2008).

Group Outcome

Initially, SL had large success against the Peruvian government, aided in part by the Peruvian military's indiscriminate use of violence against noncombatants (Graun 2008). In 1988, "the tide had begun to turn" and the military was able to start gathering better intelligence and use force discriminately (Graun 2008, 13). In 1991, the Army implemented a wide-standing reform program including the Civil Defense Committees to train and organize local communities to resist SL (Graun 2008, 13-14).

Guzmán was captured and imprisoned in 1992 where he remains to this day (Graun 2008, 7; Gregory 2009). Support for the group turned as it continued to employ indiscriminate violence against combatants (Graun 2008; MIPT 2008). Membership for the group shrunk from 10,000 members at its max to approximately 500 as of 2008 (MIPT 2008). Several other high-ranking revolutionaries of the Shining Path began being released from prison in 2012 after serving long sentences (Economist 2012). The group still conducts intermittent attacks today from a small base along the Peru-Brazil border (Economist 2012).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: Shining Path, Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Partido Comunista del Peru, The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the Thoughts of Chairman Gonzalo, Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru – By Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui, PCP – por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui, PCP and PCP-SL

Group Formation: 1980

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active)

X. TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)
    Min. Group Date: 1983
    Max. Group Date: 1997
    Onset: 1984

    Aliases: Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Movimiento Revolucionario
    Tupac Amaru (MRTA)

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The MRTA emerged from the remnants of the MIR via a political organization known as the PSR-ML-MIR-EM (Templeman 2009, 23). The organization emerged in 1980 and was renamed the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in 1984 (Templeman 2009, 23). It first came to attention for an attack on a US security guard residence in 1983 (CIA 1991, 1).The group ascribed to a Marxist ideology and sought to overthrow the Peruvian government (Gregory 2009; Templeman 2009).

The three founding leaders: Victor Polay, Miguel Rincon and Nester Cerpa like De La Puente, had been part of the political party APRA (Baer 2003). The group published their 12 part platform in 1984 and then retroactively stated they had taken their first armed action in 1982 despite no evidence supporting this (Templeman 2009).

Geography

It was initially active in Lima, Peru (McCormick 2005). It was also very active in the northern region including the towns of San Martin, Lambayeque, and La Libertad (McCormick 2005).The MRTA launched its rural operations in 1987 (McCormick 2005; Baer 2003).

Organizational Structure

The group was led by three men, Victor Polay, Miguel Rincon, and Nester Cerpa. Victor Polay and Miguel Rincon were classic middle class revolutionary leaders, but Nester Cerpa was from a working-class family and had previously participated in other reform attempts (Baer 2003). It mainly wanted to target wealthy elites to demonstrate the inequalities of the system (Templeman 2009). The group funded itself through drug-trafficking sales, extortion, and robberies (CIA 1991, 2; Baer 2003). Jones and Libicki state the group had "tens" of members but the CIA estimated the group had approximately 1,000 hardcore members (Jones and Libicki 2009, 182; CIA 1991, 2). Members were middle and upper-class and included peasants, students, professors, and lawyers (CIA 1991, 2). The group was never very well-organized and had a difficult time recruiting members (McCormick 2005). It originally was urban-based and operated as a set of cells (McCormick 2005). Operations later shifted to be a series of five different wings including Political, Military, Communications, Logistics, and Intelligence (CIA 1991, 2).

External Ties

The group was "Cuban-inspired" and a child of the MIR (Gregory 2009). It allegedly received training, arms, and funding from Cuba (CIA 1991, 2). It may have also had training and travel support from Libya in the late 1980s (CIA 1991, 2). They were competing for prominence and followers with the Shining Path and had difficulty acquiring the necessary resources, members, or community support to thrive and sustain an insurgency as effectively as SL (Templeman 2009, 24).

It provided some training and coordination with Colombia's ELN and CNPZ/ELN in Bolivia (CIA 1991, 2).

Group Outcome

The group enjoyed varied success between 1984-1987 due to the military's simultaneous fight with SL (McCormick 2005). The CIA reported "resource constraints, poor intelligence, rampant corruption, and interservice rivalry limit its [counterterrorism] effectiveness" (CIA 1991, 2-3). Due to beginning their revolution slightly after the Shining Path, the MTRA underestimated how adept the Peruvian army had become at dealing with groups such as these (Templeman 2009). As a last effort to revive the movement, the MTRA occupied the Japanese embassy in December 1996 and took 72 hostages for four months (Gregory 2009). The Peruvian government responded with Operation Chavin de Huantar, which killed all 14 MRTA members and effectively killed the movement (Templeman 2009).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1984 (Templeman 2009).

Group End (Outcome): 1997 (military) (Templeman 2009)

XI.   MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT (FPMR)
Min. Group Date: 1983
Max. Group Date: 1997
Onset: NA

Aliases: Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), El Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR), FPMR, FPMR Party, FPMR-D, Fpmr-Dissidents, Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front - Dissidents (FPMR-D)

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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

FPMR formed in 1983 as the armed wing of the Chilean Communist Party (Canada IRB 2004). It was a leftist (Maoist) organization, opposed to the central government, and sought to overthrow Pinochet (Canada IRB 1990; MIPT 2008). The group first came to attention for an armed attack in 1984 when it attacked a radio station (Canada IRB 1990).

Geography

The group was primarily an urban guerrilla organization in Chile (Canada IRB 2004). It was associated with attacks in Santiago (Canada IRB 1990). It also had associated attacks in Antofagasta, Chile, Temuco, Chile, Vina del Mar, Chile, and one incident in Lima, Peru where it bombed a liquor store in 1988 (GTD 2016). Its base of operations was around Santiago, Chile (Canada IRB 1995) and the incident in Peru seems transitory.

Organizational Structure

The group was led by Daniel Huerta (Canada IRB 1990). They were an urban Maoist group, but its organizational structure is unknown (Canada IRB 1990; Canada IRB 2004). The group had at least 200 members around 1993 (Canada IRB 2004). The group allegedly had 50-100 members in 1997 (FAS 1998). At its peak, it may have had

500-1,000 members (MIPT 2008). It is unknown how it recruited members or how it funded itself.

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support for the group from other state or non-state actors (FAS 1998). The group splintered in 1988, but there is no evidence of in-fighting as one side disarmed and became a political organization (Canada IRB 1995).

Group Outcome

In 1988, the Chilean National Police launched a large counteroffensive against the FPMR, which resulted in the arrest of 26 members and the seizure of a large cache of weapons (CIA 1988). In the late 1980s and up through 1993, the Chilean government launched a very successful counterinsurgency campaign which led to the arrest of 200 members including FPMR/A leaders (Canada IRB 2004). There was a drop in FPMR/A violence following these arrests (MIPT 2008).

A faction of FPMR splintered away in 1988 to become a political party called the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Movement (MPMR) (FAS 1998; Canada IRB 1995). It was legally recognized as a political party in 1991 (Canada IRB 2004). A second faction called either FPMR/A or FPMR-Autonomo (Autonomous) or FPMR-Dissident remained, renamed themselves, and continued to carry out attacks against US businesses and other soft targets (Canada IRB 2004).

The group's last known violent attack was in 1997 (GTD 2016). In 2004, two FPMR members announced the group was shifting to a populist platform and planned to protest the Spanish Embassy although no violent incidents were recorded (Canada IRB 2004).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: FPMR/A, FPMR-Autonomo (Autonomous)

Group Formation: 1983

Group End (Outcome): 2004 (disarm)

XII.   PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND (CRP)
Min. Group Date: 1985
Max. Group Date: 1986
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

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- "Peru: Challenges Facing the New Administration," FOIA Reading Room, Central Intelligence Agency, December 1985, Declassified 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00589R000400490005-6.pdf

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The CRP was a splinter of MRTA which formed in July 1985 (Declassified Cable 1986; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 645; CIA 1985). It was a leftist organization (Declassified Cable 1986; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 645; CIA 1985). There is some uncertainty about its goals although they may be similar to MRTA's.

Geography

The group had attacks in 1985 and 1986 in Lima, Arequipa, and Trujillo, Peru (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about the group's organizational structure. It arose at a time several leftist splinter groups were emerging from SL and MRTA due to the defection of younger members (Declassified Cable 1986). It is unknown how the group funded itself, its size, membership, leadership, or organizational structure.

External Ties

The group was a splinter of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 645; Declassified Cable 1986). It is unknown why the group splintered.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group. It's last known attack was in 1986 and there is no evidence about whether the group disarmed, dissolved, or died due to repression (GTD 2016; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 645).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1985

Group End (Outcome): 1986 (unknown)

XIII.   JAVIER HERAUD REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDO
Min. Group Date: 1985
Max. Group Date: 1985
Onset: NA

Aliases: Javier Heraud Revolutionary Commando, Javier Heraud Revolutionary Command

Part 1. Bibliography
- Perpetrator 2847, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2847
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Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unknown when the Javier Heraud Revolutionary Command formed, but it first came to attention in 1985 for an attack on the US Consulate in Lima, Peru (Los Angeles Times 1985). The group claims it is opposed to "US support for repressive forces in Peru" (Los Angeles Times 1985). It is named after the Javier Heraud front which was an elite faction of the ELN led by Hector Bejar (Templeman 2009, 18).

Geography

The attack occurred in Lima, Peru (Los Angeles Times 1985).

Organizational Structure

No information is available about the group's organizational structure, leadership, size, funding, or membership.

External Ties

No information is available about the group's external ties to other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happens to the group. The incident in Lima is the one public incident tied to the group and there is no evidence of a militarized response by Peruvian security forces in response (Los Angeles Times 1985).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1985

Group End (Outcome): 1985 (disappear)

XIV. RODRIGO FRANCO COMMAND
Min. Group Date: 1988
Max. Group Date: 1991
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography
- Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. "Los Asesinatos del Comando Paramilitar Autodenominado Rodrigo Franco (1985-1990)." p. 195, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.19.%20COMANDO%20RODRIGO%20FRANCO.pdf
- Perpetrator, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2364
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- Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell. "Commando Rodrigo Franco (Peru)," Pro-Government Militias, 2013, Mannheim, http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-public/data/pgag/302/

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Rodrigo Franco Command formed in November 1988 as a pro-government paramilitary group (Carey and Mitchell 2013). Its goal was to carry out attacks against Shining Path members (Riding 1988). It was pro-government (Riding 1988; Carey and Mitchell 2013).

Geography

The group operated in Lima, Peru and Ayachuco, Peru (Carey and Mitchell 2013; Riding 1988; GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

It was composed of party officials from APRA - the ruling party in Peru - and local police officers (Carey and Mitchell 2013). 150 Peruvian police officers received counterterrorism training and 200 members traveled to North Korea for training (Riding 1988).

External Ties

The group was sponsored by the Peruvian government (Carey and Mitchell 1993; Riding 1988). The North Korean government also allegedly provided training for the group (Riding 1988).

Group Outcome

The group ended in 1990 potentially due to disarmament (Carey and Mitchell 2013). The Peruvian government later denied the group even existed (Carey and Mitchell 2013).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988

Group End (Outcome): 1990 (disarm)

XV.   STRUGGLE AGAINST MISERY AND EXPLOITATION OF PEASANTS
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 1989
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography
- GTD Perpetrator 2774, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2774
- Google
    - "Struggle against misery and exploitation of peasants"
    - Struggle against "misery and exploitations" of peasants
    - "Struggle against misery and exploitation of peasants" peru
    - Struggle against "misery and exploitations" of peasants peru
- ProQuest
    - "Struggle against misery and exploitation of peasants"
    - Struggle against misery and exploitations of peasants peru
    - Huacho farmer 1989
- Lexis
    - Struggle against misery and exploitations of peasants peru
    - Struggle against misery and exploitation
    - Huacho farmer 1989

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. The group only comes to attention for an attack against a farmer in 1989 in Huacho, Peru (GTD 2016). No other information could be found about the group's formation, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Geography

The group only comes to attention for an attack against a farmer in 1989 in Huacho, Peru (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

No other information could be found about the group's formation, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

External Ties

No other information could be found about the group's formation, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Group Outcome

No other information could be found about the group's formation, organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1989

Group End (Outcome): 1989 (unknown)

XVI.   PATRIOTIC LIBERATION FRONT
Min. Group Date: 1990
Max. Group Date: 1990
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography
- GTD Perpetrator 1988, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1988
- United States Defense Intelligence Agency. Peru: Pre-Election Violence. March 21, 1990. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679166267?accountid=14026.
- "Peru: Prisoners of Conscience." Amnesty International. AI Index: AMR 46/09/96. 1996. P. 17

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The FPL formed in 1990 when several former Peruvian Communist Party members resigned from the PCP (Amnesty International 1996, 17). The group first came to attention in March 1990 for bombing several human rights offices prior to an April 8 national election (US DIA 1990). The group had "political objectives" tied to the presidential election (US DIA 1990).

Geography

The group's attacks occurred in Lima, Peru (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

The FPL was allegedly led by Juan Albert Huapaya Palomino although a court case later ruled there was no admissible evidence to support this allegation (Amnesty International 1996, 17). Palomino was a union trade leader who lived in Lima (Amnesty International 1996, 18). The group was composed of former members of the Peruvian Communist Party (Amnesty International 1996, 17).

External Ties

The MRTA claimed credit for the bombings as well as the FPL (US DIA 1990).

Group Outcome

It is unknown what happened to the group after 1990 and there are no additional attacks. There is one attack after the April 8 election and the June 10 run-off, but the group is otherwise not heard from again (GTD 2016). It is unknown what happens and there is no evidence of police arrests.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: FPL

Group Formation: 1990

Group End (Outcome): 1990 (disappear)

XVII.   PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA FRONT
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography
- Perpetrator ID 2247, Global Terrorism Database, START Project, Last Modified June 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2247

- Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky. "Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations." Routledge 2012. P. 12
  https://books.google.com/books?id=F_lrBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12&dq=%22people%27s+guerrilla+front%22+peru&source=bl&ots=6J4yl31uVF&sig=3YiL3FKSRJVdDYWC_7DYn1Exs4s&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjV0YrIoNTTAhVK8WMKHYk_CW0Q6AEIJTAB#v=onepage&q=%22people's%20guerrilla%20front%22%20peru&f=false

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

There is not much information available about this group. It came to attention in 1992 for murdering eight people in Huaral, Peru (GTD 2016). No information could be found about the group's goal, the target, their organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Geography

It came to attention in 1992 for murdering eight people in Huaral, Peru (GTD 2016).

Organizational Structure

There is not much information available about this group. It came to attention in 1992 for murdering eight people in Huaral, Peru (GTD 2016). No information could be found about the group's goal, the target, their organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

External Ties

There is not much information available about this group. It came to attention in 1992 for murdering eight people in Huaral, Peru (GTD 2016). No information could be found about the group's goal, the target, their organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Group Outcome

There is not much information available about this group. It came to attention in 1992 for murdering eight people in Huaral, Peru (GTD 2016). No information could be found about the group's goal, the target, their organizational structure, external ties, or outcome.

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End (Outcome): 1992 (disappear)

XVIII.　ETNOCACERISTA MOVEMENT
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 2005
Onset: NA

Aliases: Etnocacerista Movement, Ethnocacerista, Movimiento Nacionalista Etnocacerista

Part 1. Bibliography

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- "Peru: Ollanta Humala habla con la BBC." BBC. 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_4143000/4143315.stm
- Luis Fleischman. "Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States." Potomac Books. 2014. https://books.google.com/books?id=QY3WXOP_CQQC&pg=PT28&lpg=PT28&dq=ETNOCACERISTA+MOVEMENT+peru&source=bl&ots=eZBWNUDs2Z&sig=RE1K_4KwS6Eq3EaGXmRdyqXlRdg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwitvsO0odTTAhUQ2GMKHVW4CkkQ6AEIKTAB#v=onepage&q=ETNOCACERISTA%20MOVEMENT%20peru&f=false
- "PERU: Indigenous Politics Fails to Mobilise." 2009.Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, Mar 10, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/192453316?accountid=14026.
- "PERU: Siege Highlights Public Order Problems." 2005.Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, Jan 11, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/192442866?accountid=14026.
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  NOCACERISTA+MOVEMENT+peru&source=bl&ots=S7Q-QCH2Xy&sig=1fwdrFkom1U
  mgRUsb3UMY6dWVfs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiT0MufpdnTAhVIjFQKHSXhACYQ
  6AEIRTAl#v=onepage&q=ETNOCACERISTA%20MOVEMENT%20peru&f=false

Part 2. Narrative

Group Formation

The Etnocacerista Movement was formed in October 2000 when Ollanta Humala announced an armed campaign against the Peruvian government (BBC 2005b). Etnocacerista sought to force Alejandro Toledo, the Peruvian President, to resign, creating a new government that protects the rights of the Incan Community (BBC 2005a; BBC 2005b). It also wanted "to establish one Indian nation that would include Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador...Argentina, and parts of Chile" (Fleischman 2014). The group is ethno-nationalist (BBC 2005b; Oxford Analytica 2005).

Geography

The group came to attention for attacks in Andahyaylas, Peru and Tacna, Peru (BBC 2005a).

Organizational Structure

The group was first led by Ollanta Humala, a former Army officer, in the 2000 uprising (BBC 2005a). He was pardoned following the first uprising and replaced by his brother, Antauro Humala, who was also a former Army officer (BBC 2005b). Both had experience in counterinsurgency operations against SL and MRTA in the 1980s (Oxford Analytica 2005). Ollanta Humala became president of Peru in 2011 and served until 2016 (Economist 2011; Fleischman 2014). The group was primarily composed of former soldiers and did not have many indigenous members or support despite representing Incan interests (Fleischman 2014).

According to Jones and Libicki, the group had "100s" of members, but there is no additional evidence to corroborate this (Jones and Libicki 2009, 155). The group had at least 50 members during its initial 2000 attack (Xinhua 2005). The group had 150 members when it led an attack in 2005 (Xinhua 2005). It is unknown how the group funded itself or its' organizational structure.

The group created a political wing called the Peru Nationalist Party (PNP) in 2005 and has since worked through the political organization to gain political power and influence (Lansford 2014, 1131; Economist 2011).

External Ties

Etnocacerista tried to create an alliance with Bolivia and Ecuador under the auspices of the Tahuantinsuyo Axis, but it is unknown whether it ever received any clear support from the group (Flesichman 2014).

Group Outcome

The Peruvian government labeled the group "subversives'' and drug-traffickers (BBC 2005a). In 2000, the Peruvian government pardoned Ollanta Humala after the first uprising and let him return to his military activities (BBC 2005b). *"Antauro [Humla], a major, began to build the ethnocacerista movement, which was never a large force, but was perceived by government intelligence officials and foreign diplomats as a potential threat if left unchecked" (Oxford Analytica 2005).* After the 2005 stand-off, most members of the Etnocacerista Movement surrendered and police arrested them (Oxford Analytica 2005; Xinhua 2005). Ollanta Humala also retired from the defense ministry at the same time, likely due to pressure from the government (Oxford Analytica 2005).

In 2006, Humala's campaign and attention from the 2005 attack led him to just narrowly lose the vote to the presidency (Oxford Analytica 2009). Ollanta Humala became president of Peru in 2011 and served until 2016, riding off of support for the Etnocacerista Movement (Economist 2011; Fleischman 2014). The group has not been involved in any violent attacks since 2011, but remains active (Lansford 2014).

Part 3. Proposed Changes

Aliases: PCP

Group Formation: 2000

Group End (Outcome): 2012 (active)