Bangladesh VNSA Cases
Last Updated: 18 March 2018

torgid	gname	onset	min	max
T737	JAMAAT E ISLAMI		1941	2012
T955	UNITED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT		1964	2012
T1637	BANGLADESH COMMUNIST PARTY		1968	1991
T1441	CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS UNITED PEOPLE'S PARTY	1975	1972	2009
T1447	PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF KANGLEIPAK		1977	2012
T931	PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (INDIA)		1978	2012
T1457	REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES FRONT (RPF)		1979	0
T20400	HARKATUL JIHAD-E-ISLAMI		1980	2011
T1634	AWAMI LEAGUE		1981	2012
T2458	UNION PARISHAD		1983	2007
T1640	PURBA BANGLAR SARBAHARA PARTY (MAOIST PUNARGATHAN KENDRA)		1986	2001
T1908	SHANTI BAHINI - PEACE FORCE		1986	1997
T1712	FREEDOM PARTY		1987	1989
T2072	ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS		1987	2011
T28	AL-QA'IDA		1989	2012
T319	NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF TRIPURA (NLFT)		1989	2012
T38	ALL TRIPURA TRIBAL FORCE (ATTF)		1990	2009
T1487	BANGLADESH NATIONAL PARTY		1990	2012
T1995	ISLAMI OIKYA JOTE		1991	0
T1639	BANGLADESH ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS		1992	1992

	FEDERATION			
T1672	COMMITTEE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF KILLER COLLABORATORS		1992	1992
T1735	HILL STUDENTS COUNCIL		1992	1992
T1898	ROHINGYA SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION		1992	2012
T1923	SUPPORTERS OF LEFTIST GANA-OIKYA FRONT		1992	1992
T2054	BANGLADESH JIHAD MOVEMENT		1992	0
T1638	BANGLADESH NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY		1992	1992
T357	PURBO BANGLAR COMMUNIST PARTY	2005	1993	2011
T545	ACHIK NATIONAL VOLUNTEERS' COUNCIL (ANVC)		1995	2001
T915	KAMTAPUR LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (KLO)		1995	2012
T929	JAMAATUL MUJAHIDEEN BANGLADESH (JMB)		1997	2010
T1474	UNITED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UPDF)		1998	2012
T111	BOROK NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TRIPURA (BNCT)		2000	0
T1996	BANGLADESH CHHATIA LEAGUE (BCL)		2000	0
T2284	CHAKMA TRIBAL GROUP		2000	2001
T681	COORDINATION COMMITTEE OF MAOIST PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA		2001	0
T234	ISLAMI SHASHANTANTRA ANDOLAN (ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION MOVEMENT)		2002	2002
T2346	SHAHADAT AL HIKMA		2003	2011
T209	HIKMATUL ZIHAD		2004	0
T1572	UNITED ACHIK NATIONAL FRONT (UANF)		2004	0
T2245	AL-QA'IDA NETWORK FOR SOUTHWESTERN KHULNA DIVISION		2006	2006
T2337	JADID AL-QA`IDAH BANGLADESH (JAQB)		2007	2007

T1980	HYNNIEWTREP NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL (HNLC)		2008	2012
T2379	GONO BAHINI (GB)		2009	2009

I. JAMAAT E ISLAMI
   Min. Group Date: 1941
   Max. Group Date: 2012
   Aliases: Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh), Islami Chhatra Shibir, Islami Chhatra Shibir (Ics), Jaamat-E-Islami Bangladesh, Jamaat E Islami, Jamaat E Islami (Bangladesh)
   Jamaat E Islami (Jei), Jamaat I Islami, Jamaat I Islami (Bangladesh), Jamaat I Islami (Jei), Jamaat-E-Islami, Jamaat-E-Islami (Jei), Jamaat-I-Islami, Jamaat-I-Islami (Bangladesh), Jamaat-I-Islami (Jei)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1941 (religious organization), 1971 (violence)

Group End: 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Jamaat-e-Islami was created in 1941 in India as a fundamentalist religious organization (Lintner 2003; Triphathi 2015). Its goal was initially to create an Islamic state within Bangladesh through education and government reforms, and modeled itself off of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Taliban (Hindu-American Foundation n.d; Indian Express 2016). The group came to attention as a rebel party during the 1971 War of Liberation (Haqqani 2005). "JeI and ICS activities since 1971 have been focused on creating chaos and instability" and the group has engaged in low-level activities and sometimes received tacit support from the government (1977-1987, 2001-2006) (Hindu-American Foundation n.d.).

Geography

The group primarily operates in Dhaka and Chittagong province (Tripathi 2015). It has six divisions across the country in "Dhaka Division, Chittagong Division, Sylhet Division, Rajshahi Division, Khulna Division and Barisal Division" (Tripathi 2015).

Organizational Structure

JeI was founded by Abul Ala Maududi who argued for an Islamic democracy in Bangladesh built through education and government reforms (Haqqani 2005; Indian

Express 2016). Its current leader is Motiur Rahman Nizami, a Pakistani militant (Lintner 2003).

JeI's organizational structure is cadre-based and primarily composed of students recruited through Islami Chhatria Shibir (ICS), which is the student wing of JeI (Haqqani 2005; Hindu-American Foundation). ICS's leader is Nurul Islam Bulbul (Tripathi 2015). ICS primarily recruits from the University of Chittagong, University of Dhaka, University of Jahangirnagar, and University Rajshahi (SATP n.d.). The group's tactics involve indiscriminate violence against non-combatants, especially Hindus, in Bangladesh. The group funds itself through monthly dues required by all members (Gohel 2014).

External Ties

ICS fought against other Marxist student groups during the 1960s and 1970s (Zahid 2016). The group received external support from Pakistan ISI and from Saudi Arabia until the Gulf War (Haqqani 2005). JeI's opposition to the separation of Pakistan resulted in their allying with the Pakistan Army as well as carrying out large scale attacks against Bengali nationalists (Indian Express 2016). JeI allegedly sent ICS students to train under the Taliban during the 1990s (Tripathi 2015). The group also has ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba and many domestic VNSAs in Bangladesh including JMB (Tripathi 2015; Hindu-American Foundation). The group also has ties to other Islamist groups in Bangladesh, including HUJI-B and the umbrella organization Islami Oikyo Jote (Tripathi 2015). The group has also provided support to the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) (Lintner 2003).

Group Outcome

After the 1971 war, the group was banned along with other Islamist parties (Indian Express 2016). It either temporarily ceased to exist or went underground (Indian Express 2016; Zahid 2016). However, reports that the group continued targeting civilians, especially students on university campuses during this period, suggests the Indian Express version of facts is inaccurate (Zahid 2016; Hindu-American Foundation n.d.) In 1977, General Zia Rahman came to power in a coup d'etat. He created the Bangladesh National Party, which was an Islamist political party, and chose to accommodate the JeI movement rather than fight it. This resulted in the state providing various support for the ICS wings across campuses and efforts to repress competitors to ICS (Zahid 2016).

From 2001-2009, JeI was part of the Bangladesh National Party's ruling coalition, but was forced to go underground when the Awami League regained power (Gohel 2014). The AL has targeted the group for war crimes committed during the 1971 war (Gohel 2014). It had several seats and was the third largest political party in Bangladesh in 2001, with 17 seats in Parliament and two ministers in Bangladesh's government (Lintner 2003). The group has a large presence on university campuses (Tripathi 2015).

The group remains active through today continuing to target civilians, police, and infrastructure in Dhaka and Chittagong province (Haqqani 2005; Hindu-American Foundation). In particular, it has been associated with several prominent incidents since 2009 (Gohel 2014). In 2013, Bangladeshi officials began to target an extremist wing of ICS known as Ansarullah Bengali Team (ABT), leading to high-profile arrests (Gohel 2014). Members of JeI have also been put on trial for war crimes perpetrated during the 1971 War of Liberation (Gohel 2014). The Bangladesh government is now considering banning the group because it is once again under the control of the Awami League (Indian Express 2016). The group's last violent attack was in 2016 (GTD n.d.).

Note: interesting minor guerrilla/evolution of group in-between early years
Note: difference in government response depending on whether BNP or AL is in power

II. UNITED NATION LIBERATION FRONT
   Min. Group Date: 1964
   Max. Group Date: 2012
   Aliases: NA

   Proposed changes
   Formation: 1964

   Part 1. Bibliography

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   Part 2. Basic Coding

   Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1964

Group End: 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The United National Liberation Front is an Indian-Meitei ethnonationalist group pursuing the creation of a separate state in the province of Manipur (SATP n.d.). The group argues it hopes the new state will have a socialist government (SATP n.d.). The group was formed on November 24, 1964, by Areambam Samrenda Singh (SATP n.d.; Global Security n.d.). The group aims at establishing a "revolutionary front" by consolidating all militant groups located in Northeast (Global Security n.d.). The United National Liberation Front's Marxist ideology is to create a society positioned in equality for the people living in the Northeast region (Global Security n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 535). The group's first attack was estimated to be on November 05, 2003 (GTD n.d.).

Geography

The group currently operates out of Jiribam valley in Assam province (SATP n.d.). In the 1980's, the group's armed wing's bases were confined to three Valley districts - Imphal, Thoubal and Bishenpur, and in the 1990's, the wing migrated to the rural areas of Bangladesh (Global Security n.d.). The wing is currently located in Churachandpur, and parts of the Chandal district of Bangladesh, and the UNLF has bases in the Jiribam sub-division (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group's leader is Rajkumar Meghen. It is unclear how the group is organized, but it has several different wings. The student wing was created in 1968 and is called the pan-Manipuri Youth League (SATP n.d.). The armed wing is called the Manipur People's Army and was formed in 1990 (SATP n.d.; Global Security n.d.). The MPA's armed wing has three mobile task forces - Wangbran Task Force, Maril Task Force, and the Siroy Task Force (Global Security n.d.). The group also has a propaganda wing and a women's wing (SATP n.d.). The group funds itself through extortion of public officials in and around Assam. It acquires weapons from the black market in Thailand, Singapore, and Cambodia which they then sell to other insurgencies in and around India for extra profit (Global Security n.d.). The group had approximately 500-800 fighters in 2000 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 535).

External Ties

Several factions splintered away in the late 1960s, including PREPAK, Kangleipak Communist Party, and the Revolutionary Government of Manipur (Cline 2005). UNLF Oken splintered from the group in 1990 following the revived insurrection and then merged with PREPAK (Global Security n.d.; Dutt and Bansai 186). They have been fighting against NSCN-IM whom they accuse of anti-Meitei policies (Global Security n.d.).

The group receives some external support from Bangladesh including military training (SATP n.d.). The group also has ties with National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang group) located in Upper Myanmar (Global Security n.d.). It also has an external base of operations in Bangladesh and Burma (SATP n.d.). The group also has a relationship with China and Pakistan although it is unclear whether this relationship entails diplomatic, military, or material support (SATP n.d.). The group attempted to form an alliance with other insurgent groups in the region called the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (Cline 2005).

Group Outcome

India undertook a massive counterterrorism operation in 1971 resulting in the arrest of most of its leaders (Cline 2005). The group went quiet for two decades, but then decided to launch a new armed struggle in 1990 (Global Security n.d.). In 1994, the group escalated to the 25 battle death threshold according to UCDP (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 535). Bangladesh takes no direct military action against them. The group's last violent incident was in 2016 (GTD n.d.).

Notes for Iris:
-why 1964? There is a large burst of groups in northeast India
-the armed wings in these groups are a much more spread out

III. BANGLADESH COMMUNIST PARTY
Min. Group Date: 1968
Max. Group Date: 1991
Aliases: Communist Party of Bangladesh (BCP)

Note: This seems to be an error. The 1991 GTD incident was by BCP against BCP.

Part 1. Bibliography
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1968 (change from Communist Party of Pakistan)

Group End: 1971 (last violent incident)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Communist Party of Bangladesh stems from the Communist Party of Pakistan which was created in 1948 following British decolonization (OFPRA 2014). The group renamed itself CPB after Bangladesh gained independence in 1971 (OFPRA 2014). The group was re-organized in 1968 electing Barin Datta (Abdus Salam) as secretary. They fought as part of the liberation war in 1970 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 505; OFPRA 2014). Unlike other communist parties, it seeks political integration and representation rather than the overthrow of the entire state (OFPRA 2014).

Geography

The Communist Party of Bangladesh operated around Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Organizational Structure

The group was originally a political party with an armed wing. Following the 1971 War of Liberation, the group's armed wing disarmed and it returned to being a communist political party (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 505).

External Ties

It was temporarily allied with the AL and BNP in the 1970s. It supported both the Soviet Union and India, but it is unclear if it garnered any external support from either party (OFPRA 2014).

Group Outcome

In 1973, CPB joined with the Awami League and BNP to form Gana Oikye Jote - an umbrella political organization interested in socialist reform (OFPRA 2014). The military government attacked the CPB in 1975 and banned the organization in 1977 (OFPRA 2014). The group was re-integrated in 1978 (OFPRA 2014). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the CPB was heavily fragmented. Its last known violent incident was in 1991 according to GTD when a BCP member assassinated an opponent in Jhenaidah (GTD). The group has not really been an organized violent group since the 1970s and is an active political party today (OFPRA 2014).

IV.   CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS UNITED PEOPLE'S PARTY
Min. Group Date: 1972
Max. Group Date: 2009
Onset: 1975
Aliases: Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (Pcjss) - Bangladesh, Chittagong Hill Tracts United Peoples Party, Chittagong Hill Tracts United People's Party, Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti, Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity, Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (Pcjss), PCJSS

Part 1. Bibliography
● Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "Bangladesh vs JSS/SB." Non-State Actor Data. 2013.
  http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
● Aftab Ahmed, "Ethnicity and Insurgency in Chittagong Hills Tract Region," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 2008,
  http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14662049308447665?journalCode=fccp19
● Amnesty International, "Bangladesh: Unlawful Killings and Torture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts," 1986
● "Chittagong Hill Tracts Political Parties," Global Security n.d.,
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● PCJSS-SHT Official Party Website, http://www.pcjss-cht.org/
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Shanti Bahini

Group Formation: 1972 (form), 1975 (Attack)

Group End: 1997 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

PCJSS was formed in 1972 by members of the Chittagong Hills Tract (CHT) tribe in eastern Bangladesh (UNDP 2005). They created an armed wing, the Shanti Bahini, in 1973 (UNDP 2005). The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Mujib, rejected their claims and threatened to send even more settlers into the region (UNDP 2005). Initially, the group was very hopeful it could bargain a negotiated settlement with the government, but eventually started their armed campaign after Mujib was assassinated in 1975 (UNDP 2005). The group uses Marxist guerilla war tactics in order to achieve its aims (Ahmed 1999).

Geography

The group comprises three districts: Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachari, all located in the CHT district (Chowdhury 2002; Ahmed 1999). It operates in the Chittagong Hills district.

Organizational Structure

The PCJSS leader was Manobendra Narayan Larma, who fled to India after Mujib's assassination and organized the insurgency from India (UNDP 2005; Salam and Aktar 2014). His brother Manobendra Narayan also helped him lead the group (Ahmed 1999). The group was composed of ethnic CHT (Gleditsch et al. 2011). MAR argues the group has a "high level of group organization and cohesion," but provides no evidence why (MAR 2006). The group's armed wing was divided along several different fields including a medical wing, communication, and tech teams (Ahmed 1999). It studied Marxist guerrilla tactics and appointed J.B. Larma the leader (Ahmed 1999). The UCDP estimates the group had 2,000-7,000 guerrillas during the war (Gleditsch et al. 2011). It has been recorded that 64 PCJSS members were reinstated into their jobs, 675 PCJSS members were appointed to police services, and 11 members of the group were appointed to police positions, by the government (CHT Commission, 2013). The group primarily funded itself through extortion and taxation of officials (Ahmed 1999).

External Ties

In late 1975 or early 1976, India began providing external support to the PCJSS and SB under the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (Ahmed 1999; Gleditsch et al. 2011). SB had an external base in Tripura, received military training from Indian security forces, and also had Indian weaponry (UNDP 2005). India later denied these claims (Gleditsch et al. 2011).

Group Outcome

As early as 1973, the government began increasing its military response in the area. The JSS formed in response to "came in the wake both of Sheik Mujib's refusal to consider autonomy and of a series of sweeping and indiscriminate reprisal raids against the CHT" (Leven 1999, 357). Bangladesh banned the PCJSS political group, leading to the creation of an armed wing (Leven 1999; Dowlah 2013). The government responded to the group in 1975 with a massive military campaign including a full-scale occupation of the CHT (UNDP 2005). When Rahman came to power in 1976, he deployed 150,000 military personnel to the region, which forced the JSS/SB to go underground and increase their level of effort against Rahman (Dowlah 2013). Larma was arrested in 1975 (Ahmed 1999). It also tried to make some accommodations including the creation of the Chittagong Hills Development Board in January 1976 (Chowdhury 2002). A conflict in the PCJSS leadership led to the assassination of Larma on November 10, 1983 (Chowdhury 2002).

Talks between Zia and the PCJSS fell through repeatedly during his tenure due to a lack of trust between parties (UNDP 2005). The government continued its militant, hard-line approach until 1991 when the BNP - a civilian government - initiated peace talks and began to treat the insurgency as a political movement (UNDP 2005). An eventual peace accord was reached on December 2, 1997, granting the CHT some greater autonomy and a fixed number of seats in the Parliament (UNDP 2005). The group's last violent attack was in 1997 (GTD n.d.).

Why 1975 onset?

The PCJSS/SB conflict escalated in 1975 for at least two reasons. First, the government refused to negotiate with the group despite early attempts by the PCJSS to reach a negotiated settlement. This led to the creation of the armed wing, setting up the organizational structure to conduct an insurgency. Second, the government miscalculated the necessary level of effort to deter the movement. Bangladesh sent 150,000 soldiers to the area despite the fact PCJSS only has 2,000 guerrilla fighters and engaged in wide-sweeping massive repression against the CHT community. This radicalized moderates, exacerbated grievances, and drove the SB to launch their insurgency, acquire additional support, and boost their efforts. This is consistent with the theoretical claim that governments may miscalculate the necessary level of counterinsurgency effort necessary to deter a group. Expending too much effort (sending in too many soldiers to an area) can backfire and catalyze the SB to increase their level of effort. The pairwise combination of effort by both parties results in a higher level of observed violence consistent with "civil war levels" of violence.

Alternate Explanations
- *Reputational Incentives for Rahman?* Walter (2006, 2009) argues governments might have reputational incentives to respond forcibly to separatist groups in order to deter future challengers. This is more likely in countries with higher levels of ethnic groups. However, Bangladesh is relatively homogenous (98% are Bengali) so there was not a strong expectation for Rahman about future potential separatist challengers. It's possible that Rahman was concerned about any type of armed group challenge, but the only other prominent challengers in this period are JeI, BCP, and some transnational Indian groups using Bangladesh as a sanctuary. Rahman accommodates JeI and attacks BCP around the same time. This has to do with a general pledge to ban political parties and political movements inconsistent with his Islamist view.
- *Shock to Capabilities?* Indian external support for the group could boost their capabilities relative to the Bangladesh government. External support from India appears to occur *after* initial hostilities between the government and the PCJSS (Feb. 1975) (Ahmed 1999; Gleditsch et al. 2011). This is also consistent with the theory that government mis-allocating resources against a potential armed group - in this case overspending - leads the group to respond by also boosting their efforts, increasing the observable

levels of violence.
- *Window of Opportunity?* The 1975 coup could be seen as providing a 'window of opportunity' for the group to launch their insurgency against Bangladesh, but seems unlikely. First, conflict onset pre-dates the coup d'etats by several months although this could be measurement error on UCDP part. The conflict started in February 1975 and the coups occurred in September and November 1975. Second, the decision to become violent and launch an insurgency cannot happen as quickly as this theory predicts. The decision to become violent, form an armed wing, train, acquire resources, etc. takes a lot of time and typically occurs several months up to a couple years before violence actually starts (c.f. Mandela, Biddle, Kilcullen). Shanti Bahini is too organized when it launches the insurgency.

V.   PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF KANGLEIPAK
       Min. Group Date:1977
       Max. Group Date: 2012
       Aliases: PREPAK

       Part 1. Bibliography

       ● "People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak." South Asia Terrorist Portal,
          http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/prepak.htm
       ● "People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)." Global Security n.d.,
          http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/prepak.htm
       ● "India: The People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), in particular whether this group conducts forced recruitment in the region of West Imphal; the arrest of two activists in June 2001." Refworld/Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2003. http://www.refworld.org/docid/403dd1f8c.html
       ● GTD Perpetrator 20361. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
          http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20361
       ● Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "India vs PREPAK."
          Non-State Actor Dataset. 2013. P. 537-538.
          http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

       Part 2. Basic Coding

       Aliases: None

       Group Formation: 1977

       Group End: 2016 (active)

       Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

PREPAK was formed on October 9, 1977, by R.K. Tulachandra with a goal to establish a separate Meitai state in Manipur (Global Security n.d.). It ascribes to a Maoist ideology (Canada IRB 2003). The group represents the Meiteis, an ethnic group whose origins lie in the Tibetan-Burmese area, and is the largest group in Manipur (Canada IRB 2003). The group's aim is to drive foreigners out of Manipur (SATP n.d). It is unknown precisely when the group's first violent incident occurred.

Geography

The group primarily operates out of the Imphal Valley, Mizoram, Assam, North Tripura, Chantel Mon (Global Security n.d.; Canada IRB 2003). There is no evidence the group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

The PREPAK chairman is a man referred to as "Achamba" and "Tajila" and acts as commander-in-chief of the group (Canada IRB 2003). A faction splintered off in 1988 to form the Kangleipak Communist Party (Global Security n.d.). Currently, the group has a hierarchical decision-making body with a political wing, a military wing called the Red Army, and a women's wing (Global Security n.d.). Members received training in Sajik Tampak, on the Nagaland-Myanmar border, and reportedly in Bangladesh (SATP n.d.; Global Security n.d.). Each wing has a district command with military-like leadership overseeing organization (Global Security n.d.). The group originally funded itself through extortion, but stopped this practice in 2002 (Global Security n.d.). The group is thought to have approximately 200 members at an unknown date (SATP n.d.). The group had approximately 200 to 700 fighters in 2008 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 537).

External Ties

The group used to buy weapons and training from the KIA of Myanmar (Global Security n.d.). PREPAK's funding used to come from the extortion of businessmen, contractors, and members of the state government (Global Security n.d.). PREPAK is alleged to have received weapons and training in exchange for money, from the Kachin Independence Army of Myanmar (Global Security n.d.). PREPAK has ties with the All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT).

Group Outcome

Police assassinated Tulachandra on November 12, 1985 (Global Security n.d.). He was eventually replaced by Urrikhinbam Sarat (Global Security n.d.). The group suffered a series of setbacks and factional infighting right after Tulachandra's death, but then re-structured and re-organized. The group is still active as of 2012. Currently, the group has no chairman (Global Security n.d.). The group's last violent incident was in 2016 (GTD n.d.).

Notes for Iris:
-why 1977? No major political shock at the time. Seems to be the culmination of domestic grievances against the Indian government to rise up and challenge the state.

VI.   PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (INDIA)
Min. Group Date: 1978
Max. Group Date: 2012
Aliases: PLA (India)

Proposed changes
Formation: 1978

Part 1. Bibliography
- "People's Liberation Army." South Asia Terrorist Portal. n.d. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/Pla.htm
- "Revolutionary People's Front and People's Liberation Army." Global Security n.d.. n.d. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/rpf.htm
- "All about the PLA, the terror outfit active in Manipour." News18. 2016. http://www.news18.com/news/india/all-about-the-pla-the-terror-outfit-active-in-manipur-1195459.html
- GTD Perpetrator 6001. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=6001
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "India vs PLA." Non-State Actor Dataset. 2013. P. 534-535. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1978

Group End: 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PLA was formed on September 25, 1978, by N. Bishewar Singh with a goal to create an independent state in Manipur (Global Security n.d.; SATP n.d.). The group splintered from the UNLF (Global Security n.d.). It is composed of Meiteis, Nagas, and Kukis, but members are primarily Meitei (SATP; Global Security n.d.). The PLA ascribes to a Marxist ideology (Global Security n.d.). It has a secondary goal to unite many separatist groups operating in northeast India to expel police and state forces from the area (Global Security n.d.). The group's first attack occurred on September 22, 1979, in an unknown location within India (GTD n.d.).

Geography

The group primarily operates out of Imphal Valley, Chandel, Churachandpur, Manipur, Assam, and the Jiribam sub-division of Imphal district (Global Security n.d.). The group allegedly had external bases in Bangladesh and Burma (SATP n.d.; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 535).

Organizational Structure

The PLA has a political wing called the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF) created in either 1979 or 1989. Irengbam Chaoren is the leader of the PLA (Global Security n.d.). The military wing of the PLA is very well-organized and comprises four to six divisions organized across three regions (SATP; Global Security n.d.). The PLA has a vice-president, a general secretary, secretaries in charge of Health and Education, Home, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Social Welfare, and Publicity and Communication (SATP n.d.). It allegedly also had a Muslim cell at some point, but it was disbanded (Global Security n.d.). The group funds itself through extortion measures (SATP n.d.). It has at least 1,000 members (SATP n.d.). In 2000, the group had 500 to 600 fighters (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 535).

External Ties

The PLA operates out of Bangladesh (SATP n.d.). The group mainly receives support from the Meitei community (SATP n.d.). PLA is allied with NSCN and reportedly receives external support from Pakistan IS and Myanmar's KIAI as well (Global Security n.d.; SATP n.d.). It is also allied with UNLF and PREPAK (Global Security n.d.). The group maintains an external base of support in Myanmar and Bangladesh (SATP n.d.). The group receives most of its funding from extortion (Global Security n.d.). The PLA is alleged to have received weapons and training in exchange for money, from the Kachin Independence Army of Myanmar (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Indian government declared a state of emergency in 1980, banned the RPF in 1981, and killed Bishewar and several PLA members during a counterterrorism campaign in 1981 (Global Security n.d.). A second raid in 1982 killed the PLA's replacement leader (Global Security n.d.). The group's last violent attack was in 2016 (GTD n.d.).

Notes for Iris:
-the PLA and PREPAK had a lot of the same external ties so they may be related as part of the larger Meitei conflict

VII.   REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S FRONT (RPF)
Min. Group Date: 1979
Max. Group Date: 0
Aliases: RPF

Proposed changes
Formation: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Revolutionary People's Front and People's Liberation Army," Global Security n.d., http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/rpf.htm
- "Revolutionary People's Front," Global Security n.d., http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/rpf-m.htm

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

RPF is the political wing of the PLA and is an alias.

Geography

RPF is the political wing of the PLA and is an alias.

Organizational Structure

RPF is the political wing of the PLA and is an alias.

External Ties

RPF is the political wing of the PLA and is an alias.

Group Outcome

RPF is the political wing of the PLA and is an alias.

VIII.　HARKATUL JIHAD-E-ISLAMI
Min. Group Date: 1980
Max. Group Date: 2011
Aliases: Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), Movement of Islamic Holy War, HUJI-B

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Harkat ul Jihad al Islami Bangladesh." South Asia Terrorist Portal. N.D.(a) http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm
- "Harkat ul Jihad al Islami (HuJI)." South Asia Terrorist Portal, N.D.(b) http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/HuJI.htm
- "Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh," Refworld/US State Department, 2014, http://www.refworld.org/docid/5362298b14.html
- Martha Crenshaw. "Harkat ul Jihad al Islami." Mapping Militant Organizations. Last modified 2016. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/217
- "Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) (Movement of Islamic Holy War)," Intelligence Resource Program. Federation American Scientists. Last Updated 2004. http://fas.org/irp/world/para/huji-b.htm
- Bertil Lintner. "The Plights of Ethnic and Religious Minorities and the Rise of Islamic Extremism in Bangladesh." Asia Pacific Media Services. 2003. http://asiapacificms.com/papers/pdf/ethnic_and_religious_minorities_bangladesh.pdf
- Anurag Tripathi. "Profiling Non-State Armed Groups of Bangladesh." Himalayan and Central Asian Studies. 2015. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1705723022?pq-origsite=gscholar
- Paul Cochrane. "The Funding Methods of Bangladesh Terrorist Groups." Combatting Terrorism Center. 2009. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-funding-methods-of-bangladeshi-terrorist-groups

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Movement of Islamic Holy War, Jamiat Ansarul Afghaneen, JAA, the Party of the Friends of the Afghan People, HuJi-Bangladesh, Harkat ul Jihad al Islami Bangladesh, HUJI-B, Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh

Group Formation: 1984 (Pakistan), 1992 (Bangladesh)

Group End: 2012 (last known incident)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

HUJI was originally formed in 1984 by a group of seminary students in Pakistan (SATP n.d.; Mapping Militants n.d.). Its original leader was Qari Saifullah Akhtar (Mapping Militants n.d.). The group was originally named Jamiat Ansarul Afghaneen and renamed itself in the mid-1980s (SATP n.d.). HUJI implements a Deobandi ideology, and aims to create an independent Islamic state by waging war on resistance forces (South Asia Terrorist Portal n.d.b). HUJI's first attack occurred in 1984 (Mapping Militants 2016). A group tied to HUJI, HUJI-B was formed on April 30, 1992, by Shawkat Osman and several followers with a goal to create an Islamic state in Bangladesh (Tripathi 2015). These 17 men were ex-veterans of the Soviet-Afghanistan war and had fought with the mujahideen in the 1980s (Cochrane 2009). The group came to attention in 1996 after the Awami League gained power (SATP n.d.a). It is unknown precisely when its first attack occurred, but was as late as 1995 (SATP n.d.a).

Geography

The group primarily operates in the Chittagong Hills Tract area and controls the area from Chittagong to Cox's Bazaar (SATP n.d.a). The group is estimated to have at least six bases within Bangladesh (Lintner 2003). The group had suspected attacks in Jessore, Kotalipara, Dhaka, and Gopalganj, Bangladesh (SATP n.d.(a)). HUJI-B operates a series of training camps and bases in Kormi and Kasia, Bangladesh (SATP n.d.). The group also carried out attacks in Indian cities but it is unclear whether this was the Pakistan or Bangladesh branch (Crenshaw 2016).

Organizational Structure

The 17 original members were ex-veterans of the Soviet-Afghanistan war and had fought with the mujahideen in the 1980s (Cochrane 2009). The group models itself off of the Taliban and allegedly received assistance from Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front when it was created (SATP n.d.). It is estimated to have approximately 10-15,000 recruits at an unknown date (Cochrane 2009; SATP n.d.). The U.S. State Department speculates up to 400 members might be ex-veterans (US State Department 2014).

Another estimate said the group had "several thousand members" at an unknown date (FAS 2004). It receives de facto support from BNP given that it opposes the Awami League and many leftist groups (SATP n.d.). It primarily funds itself through diaspora donations from Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (SATP n.d.). Its leader is Shawkat Osman who organizes the group from Chittagong (Lintner 2003; Tripathi 2015). Most of its recruits are students from madrassas (Lintner 2003; Crenshaw 2016).

External Ties

HUJI-B operates a series of training camps and external bases in Kormi and Kasia, Bangladesh (SATP n.d.). The CTC claims it has ties to Al-Qaeda and it may also have ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba (Cochrane 2009; US State Department). The group signed UBL's fatwa in 1998 (US State Department 2014; Lintner 2003). It might also receive military and training support from the Pakistan ISI (Tripathi 2015; SATP n.d.; Crenshaw 2016). Some members also allegedly received training in Afghanistan and were ex-combatants from the Soviet-Afghanistan war (SATP n.d.).

The group may also receive shelter and logistical assistance from the SIMI group (Crenshaw 2016).

Group Outcome

The group was re-banned in October 2005 under the BNP (Cochrane 2009; US State Department 2014). The Bangladesh government arrested Mufti Abdul Hannan in 2005 (SATP n.d.A). HUJI's last alleged attack was a bombing within the Indian High Court in Delhi in 2011 (Crenshaw 2016). The group has not been active since 2012. Between 2012 and 2016, police arrested numerous members or seized large caches of weapons, but it is unknown if they perpetrated any more incidents (SATP n.d.a). A splinter group known as the Bangladesh Jihadi Group formed around 2016 (SATP n.d.a).

Additional Aliases: Jamiat Ansarul Afghaneen, JAA, the Party of the Friends of the Afghan People

Notes for Iris:
-it should be listed as a faction of HUJI
-sort of like a proto-Al Qaeda
-why aren't they as organized? The attacks haven't been targeted and there haven't been that many attacks
-also security forces concentrate

IX. AWAMI LEAGUE
Min. Group Date: 1981
Max. Group Date: 2012
Aliases:

Proposed changes
Formation: 1948

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Bangladesh - Awami League." Australia Refugee Review Tribunal. US Department of Justice. 2008.
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/11/Awami%20League-Chatra%20League.pdf
- "Bangladesh: Ruling Awami League wins election marred by boycott and violence." Independent (UK). 2014.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bangladeshs-ruling-awami-league-wins-election-marred-by-boycott-and-violence-9041436.html
- Joseph Grieboski. "Bangladesh: Democracy Under Attack." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 2014.
http://journal.georgetown.edu/bangladesh-democracy-under-attack/
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https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/mapping-bangladesh-s-political-crisis
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Bangladesh." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. p. 505
- Syed Ahsan. "The Awami League in our History." BDNews24. 2015.
http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2015/06/22/the-awami-league-in-our-history/
- "Political Conflict, Extremism, and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh." International Crisis Group. Asia Report. 2016.
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf
- Md Nurul Amin. "Maoism in Bangladesh: The Case of the East Bengal Sarbahara Party." Asian Survey. Vol. 26(7), 1986
- GTD Perpetrator 311. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=311

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1948 (form), first date unknown (but as late as 1971)

Group End: 2016 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

AL was formed in 1948 by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to help Bangladesh gain independence from Pakistan (Australia RRT 2008). He was assassinated in 1971, forcing AL to leave the country and set-up an exile government in India (Amin 1986). The group fought in the 1971 Liberation War before becoming a major political party in the 1978 election (OFPRA 2014; Australia RRT 2008).

Geography

The group is primarily active in Dhaka, Rasjani, and the Kushtia District (GTD 2017). The group conducted attacks in Nasirnager, Rajshahi, Dhaka, Chittagong, Laxmipur, and Satkania, Bangladesh (GTD 2017). The group's headquarters are in Dhaka. There is no evidence the group is transnational or had an external base of operations.

Organizational Structure

The Awami League is a political party in Bangladesh. Its leader since the 1970s has been Sheikh Hasina whose family control of party politics has entrenched corruption (Independent 2014). The group was excluded from power from 1975-1996, but won a plurality of seats in the 1996 election taking control of the Bangladesh government again (Australia RRT 2008). Its student wing is called the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) (Australia RRT 2008). BNP is the main opposition party of the AL (Australia RRT 2008).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support for the group although AL originally utilized India as a base of operations (Australia RRT 2008). However, the AL does have a strong opposition to the Bangladesh National Party, and the BNP has participated in many attacks targeting the AL (International Crisis Group 2015; US Department of Justice 2008).

Group Outcome

The group technically disbanded in 1975 to become a political party, but continues to use electoral violence (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 505). AL is one of the main political parties active today. BNP is the main opposition party of the AL (Australia RRT 2008). In 2014, the Awami League was able to win over 232 of the 300 elected seats of the

Election Commission within Bangladesh, and was successfully able to form its own government (Independent (UK) 2014). The group's last violent attack was in 2016 although most of its violence is generally electoral-related (GTD 2017).

X.   UNION PARISHAD
Min. Group Date: 1983
Max. Group Date: 2007
Aliases:

<u>Proposed changes</u>
Formation: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Union Parishad (Union Council) in Bangladesh."
  http://www.kabirhat.com/union_parishad.html
- "Bangladesh: Seven Deaths mar Union Parishad Polls," Benar News, 2015,
  http://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/election-deaths-03222016162606.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found about this "group."

Geography

No information could be found about this "group."

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this "group."

External Ties

No information could be found about this "group."

Group Outcome

No information could be found about this "group."

Note: Union Parishad is a position and not a formal entity. It's unclear what this group refers to. There is no reference in GTD.

XI. PURBA BANGLAR SARBAHARA PARTY (MAOIST PUNARGATHAN KENDRA)
Min. Group Date: 1986
Max. Group Date: 2001
Aliases: Bangladesh Sarbahara Party, Maoist Punargathan Kendra, Proletarian Party Of East Bengal, Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party, Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (Maoist Punargathan Kendra), PBSP

Proposed changes
Formation: 1971

Part 1. Bibliography
- Md Nurul Amin. "Maoism in Bangladesh: The Case of the East Bengal Sarbohara Party." Asian Survey. Vol. 26(7). 1986.
- M. Aynul Islam. "Mapping Terrorism Threats in Bangladesh." BIISS. 2008. http://www.academia.edu/8634578/MAPPING_TERRORISM_THREATS_IN_BANGLADESH
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Bangladesh: 1) Information on the Purba Banglar Sarbohara Party (PBSP) and its treatment by the government of Bangladesh; 2) Information on the slain leader of the PBSP, Siraj Sikder; 3) Information on the Mao Gobeshanapar Group; 4) Information on the Purba Bangla Sramik Anoolan Group, 1 September 1992, BGD11694, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aaf178.html
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Bangladesh." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. p. 505
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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: East Bengal Proletarian Party, Purba Bangla Sharbohara

Group Formation: 1971

Group End: 1975 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The PBSP was formed on June 3, 1971, by Siraj Sidkar (Amin 1986; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 505). It stemmed from a pro-China wing of the original Bangladesh Communist Party (Amin 1986). The group was Maoist (Amin 1986). The group originally sought to help Bangladesh gain independence from Pakistan as well as the Awami League and Indian army (Amin 1986). It later fought to overthrow the Mujibur Rahman government (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 505).

Geography

The party was active in Dhaka, Fotikchari, Chittagong, and Barisal (Amin 1986).

Organizational Structure

Most members were middle-class, opposed the Awami league, and were teachers, doctors, and businessmen (Amin 1986). No reliable size estimates were found, but the group "reached its peak" in 1974 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 505).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support. JeI tried to destroy the group early on (Amin 1986).

Group Outcome

The group was opposed to Rahman's government from 1972-1975 and attacked it, but fell apart "as a result of repression" (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 505). Sidkar was assassinated in 1975 by Rakkhi Bahini (Amin 1986). The group re-structured and chose Ziauddin as its new member, but was never able to challenge the Awami League for power again the same way it did during the mid-1970s (Amin 1986).

XII.   SHANTI BAHINI - PEACE FORCE
        Min. Group Date: 1986
        Max. Group Date: 1997
        Aliases:

Proposed changes

Formation: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

- Zarein Ahmed, "Shanti Bahini," IPCS, 1999
  http://www.ipcs.org/article/bangladesh/shanti-bahini-293.html
- Sanjoy Hazarika, "Bangladeshi Insurgents say India is supporting them" New York Times, 1989,
  http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/11/world/bangladeshi-insurgents-say-india-is-supporting-them.html
- Kunal Chakrabarti, Shubhra Chakrabarti, Historical Dictionary of the Bengalis, p. 134
- Gleditsch et al. "JSS/SB," Non-State Actor Data, 2011,
  http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf
- Iqthyer Uddin Zahed, "Conflict between government and the indigenous people of Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh," IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 2013, http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol16-issue5/O01658691.pdf?id=7840

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

SB is the armed wing of the PCJSS. It should be considered an alias or subset.

Geography

SB is the armed wing of the PCJSS. It should be considered an alias or subset.

Organizational Structure

SB is the armed wing of the PCJSS. It should be considered an alias or subset.

External Ties

SB is the armed wing of the PCJSS. It should be considered an alias or subset.

Group Outcome

SB is the armed wing of the PCJSS. It should be considered an alias or subset.

XIII. FREEDOM PARTY
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 1989
Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Bangladesh: Information on the current status of the Freedom Party (Maijdee), including whether there were any reports that members faced any problems in 1996 and 1997." Canada Immigration and Refugee Board. 1998.
  http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab2b54.html
- "Col Rashid's daughter held for blast link." Daily Star. 2009.
  http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-111249
- "Bangladesh: Information on the Freedom Party, including their present status and treatment by the ruling BNP." Canada Immigration and Refugee Board. 2003.
  https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/07/BGD41983.E.pdf
- GTD Perpetrator 2350. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2350

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Maijdee

Group Formation: 1980's (form), 1987 (First attack)

Group End: 1996 (Arrested)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Freedom Party was founded by a group of military officials who were part of the 1975 military coup and assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, but it is not clear when they were founded (Canada IRB 1998). It is estimated that the group formed in the 1980's (Canada IRB 1998). It is unclear what their goal was apart from general political opposition to the government. The group's first violent attack occurred as late as 1987 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group had an attack in Chittagong and Dhaka, Bangladesh (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The Freedom Party's youth wing was named Jubo (Canada IRB 1998). The leader of the youth wing was Mian Abdur Rashid (Canada IRB 1998). The Freedom Party was founded by Farooqur Rahman with support from Colonel Abdur Rashid (Canada IRB 1998). Colonel Abdur Rashid was considered a top leader of the group; he fled Bangladesh to seek asylum in 1997 (Canada IRB 1998). The Freedom Party was founded by a group of military officials who were part of the 1975 military coup and assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, but it is not clear when they were founded (Canada IRB 1998).

External Ties

The group had ties to the BNP. Rashid's wife, Zobaid Rashid, was part of the BNP leadership (Canada IRB 1998). It is considered a terrorist group although it is unclear what type of political violence it engages in. Colonel Abdur Rashid was considered a top leader of the group; he fled Bangladesh to seek asylum in 1997 (Canada IRB 1998).

Group Outcome

The group's last known attack was in 1990. After the Awami League regained power in 1996, they arrested several members of the Freedom Party in 1997 for their involvement in the 1975 coup (Canada IRB 1998). After the arrests, the group went silent.

Notes for Iris:
-they don't have any real clear aims
-their attacks might be tied to who is in government at the time
-unclear if they even oppose the government. No clear evidence of politicized opposition.

XIV.   ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS
Min. Group Date: 1987
Max. Group Date: 2011
Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

This name is too vague for research.

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

XV.   AL-QA'IDA
       Min. Group Date: 1989
       Max. Group Date: 2012
       Aliases:

       Proposed changes
       Formation: 1989

       Aliases: Al-Qa'ida, Al Qaeda, Al Qaida, Al-Qa`Ida, Al-Qaeda, Qaidat Al-Jihad, Qa'idat Al-Jihad, The Base

       Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Group End (Outcome): 2016 (active) (Crenshaw 2015)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Osama Bin Laden founded al-Qaida in 1988 (Mackenzie Institute 2016). The group's initial goals were to completely remove Western influence/ideas and to abolish the United States and Israel (BAAD 2015). They conducted their first attacks against the US embassy in Africa in 1998 (BAAD 2015; Global Security N.D). Al-Qaida first came to global attention after 9/11 but was active prior to that in its region (FAS 2005). The group has a radical Sunni Muslim ideology (CFR 2012; Global Security N.D).

Geography

Al-Qaida operated mainly within Peshawar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (CFR 2012; PBS N.D). The group hid within cities and hills with particularly mountainous terrain in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan (as shepherds or farmers) (FAS 2005). Bin Laden had a base of operations in Sudan from 1991-1998 (Mackenzie Institute 2016)

Organizational Structure

Al-Qaida was headed by Osama Bin Laden, who was their sole leader until his assassination in 2011 (although rumors exist that he died earlier or didn't die at all) (CFR 2012). He was from Saudi Arabia and had helped fight the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (Crenshaw 2015). He was replaced by Ayman al-Zawhiri in 2011. (Crenshaw 2015; CFR 2012). The group used a complex system in which members reported to couriers who reported to other couriers eventually making their way up to the head who was initially Bin Laden (RAND 2008). This is what we call a decentralized or cell-based organizational structure. Funding for the organization came from many places, including donations (FTO 2005). The group had different councils to deal with different aspects. For example, they had a "military committee" to deal with "military" matters, and a "consultation council" to plan out terrorist attacks and deal with financial matters (PBS N.D). They have no formal political wing (BAAD 2015). Al-Qaida can be considered an umbrella group that consisted of many other terrorist groups within (ibid; Global Security N.D). The organization had an estimated 75 members when it was first formed and up to 18,000 at its peak in 2004 (Crenshaw 2015). Today, it is thought to have less than 1000 members, but these estimates vary (Crenshaw 2015; BAAD 2015).

External Ties

Saudi Arabia allegedly gave some funding to AQ through drug trafficking and diamonds, but these were never proven true (Crenshaw 2015). Iran also allegedly trained and supported AQ members in the early 1990s (ibid; BAAD 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan allow Al-Qaeda to operate training camps within their borders (ibid). The group has ties to several other terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiya (CFR 2012; PBS N.D).

Group Outcome

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to find and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements operating in Afghanistan (BAAD 2015). The group's first leader Osama bin Laden was killed during a raid in 2011 (CFR 2012; BAAD 2015). The group is still active today.

XVI.   NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF TRIPURA (NLFT)
Min. Group Date: 1989
Max. Group Date: 2012
Aliases:

Proposed changes
Formation: 1989

Part 1. Bibliography
- "National Liberation Front of Tripura." South Asia Terrorist Portal. N.d.
  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/tripura/terrorist_outfits/NLFT.HTM
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  Weekly. 2001. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410771?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- GTD Perpetrator 794. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to
  Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=794
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "India vs NLFT." Non-State Actor
  Dataset. Last modified 2013. P. 483-484
  http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1989 (form), 1992 (first attack)

Group End: 2015 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The NLFT was formed in 1989 by Dhananjoy Reang with a goal to create an
independent Christian, Tripura state in northeast India (SATP n.d.; Global Security n.d.).
The group planned to create this state through an armed struggle following Bangladesh's
liberation from 'Indian neo- colonialism and imperialism' and the group aimed to further a
'distinct and independent identity' (SATP n.d.). The group ascribed to a Christian
ideology (Knapp n.d.). Its first violent incident was in 1992 in Chak Gujran, India (SATP
n.d.; GTD 2017).

Geography

The group operates from an external base in Khagrachari, Bangladesh (SATP n.d.). The group has conducted attacks in Chak Gujran, Hejampura, Agartala, Singur, Dhalai, Amarpur, Chawmanu, Manu, Bangdar, Tripura, Jirania, Paharpur, Bishramganj, Jampui, Belbari, Jampuijala, Laxmipur, Mohanpur, Baghpur, Kailashahar, Agartala, Bampu, Kantakobrapara, Singicherra, Mandai, Santarampada, Rathinjaihalampara, Thanabulhalampara, Champahaur, Hazrapura, Gandacherra, Pusparampara, Bhagirath Para, Ambassa, Mauzam, Manikpur, Rajiv Nagar, Korbok, West Phaileng, Malda Kumar Roajapara, Damparengpui, Faileng, Gomati, Parsurampara, Khantlang, Mamit, and Maldakumar Para, which are all areas within India (GTD 2017).

The group also maintains external camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Sylhet, Habiganj, Maulavi Bazar, and Comilla areas of Bangladesh (SATP n.d.). The group has also maintained trans-border linkages in Myanmar and Bhutan, and can be considered transnational (SATP n.d.).

Organizational Structure

NLFT's leaders were Nayanbasi Jamatiya and Biswamohan Debbarma who came to power after Reang left the group in 1993 to form the Tripura Resurrection Army (SATP n.d.). The group splintered in 2001 with each of the two main leaders taking a faction (SATP n.d.). The NLFT has at least 65 cadres along with family members who stay in these external camps (SATP n.d.). The political wing was known as the IFPT. The group had an estimate of 150 fighters in 1996, 150-500 in 1998, 150-800 in 2001, and 800 in 2003 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 483).

External Ties

The group allegedly receives military support from the Pakistan ISI (SATP n.d.). It also operates out of eastern Bangladesh and has some training camps in the Chittagong Hills Tract region (SATP n.d.).

Group Outcome

India banned the group in April 1997 (SATP; Global Security n.d.). Many members surrendered to Indian security forces after 2001 (Global Security n.d.). Despite some initial negotiations in 2001, nothing more has materialized (Global Security n.d.). The group is still active and had its last violent attack in 2015 (GTD n.d.).

Notes for Iris:
-Christian extremist group

-only conducted attacks in India
-wants to secede from India
-why 1989? Large spread of Christianity post-independence in the 1950s, but no clear incident
-the group decided it wanted to secede much earlier

XVII.   ALL TRIPURA TRIBAL FORCE
Min. Group Date: 1990
Max. Group Date: 2009
Aliases: All Tripura Tiger Force, All Tripura Tribal Force

Proposed changes
Formation: 1990

Part 1. Bibliography
- Lawrence E. Cline. "Insurgency Environment in Northeast India," Small Wars and Insurgencies. Vol. 17 (2). 2006. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592310600562894
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- Times of India. "ATTF Chief offers to play peace-broker." May 19, 2016. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/agartala/ATTF-chief-offers-to-play-peace-broker/articleshow/52335278.cms
- GTD Perpetrator 287. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=287
- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. "India vs NLFT." Non-State Actor Dataset. Last modified 2013. P. 482-483 http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1990

Group End: 2011 (merger)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The ATTF was founded on July 11, 1990, by Ranjit Debbarma and a group of Tripura National Volunteers (SATP n.d.). The group's goal was to expel Bengali settlers in Tripura and establish an independent Tripura state. The group was originally composed of tribal extremists (SATP n.d.). Its ideology leans left although it is not salient (Cline 2006). The group is thought to have an objective to remove all Bengali-speaking settlers who entered Tripura after 1956, restore land to tribes under the 'Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act' of 1960, and remove the names of all settlers within Tripura who entered after 1956, from the electoral roll (SATP n.d.). Its first confirmed attack was in 1992 (SATP n.d.; GTD 2017).

Geography

The group has an external base in Taraborn, Bangladesh which they also share with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) (SATP; Cline 2006). It fights in Tripura. Chief Minister Manik Sarkar, disclosed the locations of sixteen of the group's bases and camps, which are located in Satcherri, Parakutal, Kelenga, Barchu Halai, Silai Halai, Thaipong Halai, Biswamanipara, Dalucherra, Khasiapunji, Takhirai, Taraban, Matiranga, Khagrachhari, Laugang, Dhaka, and Chittagong (SATP n.d.).

Organizational Structure

It's leader is Ranjit Debbarma. The group primarily recruited youth and tribal members in and around Tripura (SATP n.d.). 70% of members are Debbarma and 90% are Hindus (SATP n.d.). The group had approximately 1,600 members by 1994, but was later estimated to only be 600 (SATP n.d.). The group had 200 fighters in 1997, 200 in 1999 and 200, and 500-600 in 2003 (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 482). Many members receive training in Bangladesh before launching hit-and-run tactics into Tripura (SATP n.d.). The group has a political wing called the Tripura People's Democratic Front (TPDF) (SATP n.d.). It is unknown how the group funds itself.

External Ties

The group has an external base in Taraborn, Bangladesh which they also share with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) (SATP; Cline 2006). Many members receive training in Bangladesh before launching hit-and-run tactics into Tripura (SATP n.d.). The group has ties with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN -K), the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF), and the National Liberation Front of Arunachal Pradesh (NLFA) (SATP n.d.).

India claimed that Pakistan provided logistical and military assistance to the group, but this was never confirmed (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 482).

Group Outcome

India has banned the group (Roul 2010). Indian security forces have launched numerous security operations to rout out and arrest different members (SATP n.d.). On a few occasions in 1994 and 1999, ATTF members surrendered to forces under a proposed amnesty plan (SATP n.d.). In 2011, the group kidnapped some individuals (SATP n.d.). In August 2011, the group announced a new alliance with the NLFT under the title NLFT-BM (SAPT n.d.). In 2012, police arrested Rajit Debbarama, the group leader, and Chitta Debbarama, the head of the armed wing (SATP n.d.). In 2011, the group announced it was merging with NLFT (SATP n.d.).

In 2016, Debbarma offered to negotiate peace talks between India and the NLFT (Times of India 2016). No progress has been made to initiate peace mandates so far.

XVIII. BANGLADESH NATIONAL PARTY
Min. Group Date: 1990
Max. Group Date: 2012
Aliases: Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), BNP, Bangladesh National Party

Part 1. Bibliography
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- "Bangladesh: Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), including its leaders, factions, associate organizations and activities; treatment of members and supporters by authorities (2007-September 2012)." Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 2012. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/07/BGD104178.E.pdf
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- "Bangladesh: A Handbook." Central Intelligence Agency. Declassified. 1982. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83S00854R000200070002-6.pdf

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1978

Group End: 2016 (active as political party)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Bangladesh National Party (BNP) formed in 1978 as a center-right political party in Bangladesh to challenge the Awami League for political control (Canada IRB 2015). It formed one year after Ziaur Rahman became president of Bangladesh through a coup d'etat. The group's objectives are believed to be increasing democracy through Bangladeshi nationalism, removing coloinialism within Bangladesh, increasing economic development through a free market economy system, and using the teachings of Islam to preserved Bangladeshi values and traditions (Canada IRB 2015). Its first violent incident was in 1990 during the mass uprising against General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group primarily operates in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The group has also conducted attacks in Chittagong, Bangladesh (Canada IRB 2015). It conducted several attacks in Dhaka (GTD 2017). There is no evidence the group is transnational.

Organizational Structure

The group originally organized as a political party to challenge the AL's power in Bangladesh. Its founder was General Ziaur Rahman, the president of Bangladesh (Canada IRB 2012). BNP's leader is Khaleza Zia, Tarique Rahman, and Mirza Fakhrul Islam (Canada IRB 2015). It is heavily dominated by one family and is very personalist (Canada IRB 2012).

The group has a youth wing called Jubo Dal and a student wing named Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (Canada IRB 2015). The leader of Jubo Dal is Syed Moazzem Hossain (Canada IRB 2012). The leader of JCD is Sultan Salauddin Tuku (Canada IRB 2012). The student group often attacks and engages in political violence against the student wing of the AL (Canada IRB 2015).

The group has many front organizations including: Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Muktijoddha Dal, Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Jubo Dal, Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Mohila Dal, Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Samajik Sangskritik Sangstha, Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Krishak Dal, Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Sechchasebak Dal, Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Tanti Dal, Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Olama Dal, and Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Matshayajibi Dal (ibid.) (Canada IRB 2015).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support. The group is allied with JeI and competes with the AL for political power (Canada IRB 2015). It is also allegedly allied with Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) and Jamaat-e-Islami (Canada IRB 2012).

Group Outcome

The BNP conducted several attacks against the government in 1990 and 1991 during the democratic transition. Prior to the 2014 elections, the group bombed Hindu homes and businesses with JeI (Canada IRB 2015). The AL arrested many members of the BNP and placed Zia on house arrest (Canada IRB 2015). The government has also publicly prosecuted, detained, and tortured many BNP members (Canada IRB 2012). BNP Secretary Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir was arrested in January of 2015, on charges of arson, bombings, and vandalism (Canada IRB 2015). He was released on bail six months later (Canada IRB 2015). The group had suspected involvement in several attacks in 2016 (GTD 2017).

XIX.   ISLAMI OIKYA JOTE
Min. Group Date: 1991
Max. Group Date: 0
Aliases: Islami Oikya Jote, Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), Islami Oiyka Jote, Islami Oiyka Jote (IOJ), IOJ

Part 1. Bibliography

● "Bangladesh Today." International Crisis Group. 2006.
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  http://asiapacificms.com/papers/pdf/ethnic_and_religious_minorities_bangladesh.pdf
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  http://www.daily-sun.com/post/150778/Jamaat-behind-terror-attacks:-Islami-Oikya-Jote

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- Bertil Lintner. "Bangladesh Extremist Islamist Consolidation." SATP. n.d. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume14/Article1.htm

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: N/A

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

IOJ is an Islamist political party with a goal of winning seats in parliament and garnering greater political influence (Lintner 2003; Riaz and Rahman 2016, 66). It is unclear when it formed, however, the group came into attention first in 2001 when they won the October 2001 election (Lintner 2003).

Geography

It is unclear if the group was ever violent so it is difficult to identify where violent attacks occurred if at all. The group reports activities and a political office in Dhaka (Daily Sun 2016).

Organizational Structure

At some point, its leader was Azizul Huq, who also advised HuJI (Lintner SATP n.d.). Currently, the leader of IOJ is Misbahur Rahman Chowdhury (Daily Sun 2016). The group is organized as a political party, but there is little information beyond that as to the membership, size, or funding mechanisms of the group.

External Ties

It is allied with the BNP and was part of their coalition that came to power in 2001 (Lintner 2003).

Group Outcome

The group is still active as of 2012 as a political party (Daily Sun 2016). It was politically integrated into a political coalition as early as 2001 (Lintner 2003).

Note: There is no evidence of this group being violent according to GTD
-if there is any connection to violence, it is part of alliance with BNP and JeI
-there is no evidence the group is ever violent

XX.   BANGLADESH ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS FEDERATION
         Min. Group Date: 1992
         Max. Group Date: 1992
         Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Transport workers call strike in Chittagong for Monday." New Age. 2016.
- http://newagebd.net/228201/transport-workers-call-strike-in-chittagong-for-monday/
- "Transport strike in Ctg May 9." Independent BD. 2016.
  http://www.theindependentbd.com/arcprint/details/42965/2016-05-07
- GTD Perpetrator 2218. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses
  to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
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- Lexis Nexis.
  http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=5G31-68B1-JDKC-R27
  C&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma
  =true

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: N/A

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Bangladesh Road Transport Workers Federation is a union-like organization
representing all transportation sectors throughout Bangladesh. It is unknown when it
formed, but it first came to attention in 1992 for a bus attack, which killed 20 (GTD 2017).
It is unclear why they became violent in 1992, although their workers are targeted by the
Awami League's student wing – BCL – suggesting they are caught up in the larger
violent fight between AL and BNP (Lexis). The group does have an aim to allow auto-
rickshaws within Bangladesh without any obstructions, and they hope to stop the torture
on the workers by the police force (New Age 2016). The group also aims to stop the

collection of tolls on the Meghna and Gomoti bridges within Bangladesh (New Age 2016).

Geography

The group had two attacks in Dhaka, Bangladesh (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The current president of the group is Mrinal Chowdhury (New Age 2016). The group consists mainly of auto-rickshaw drivers.

External Ties

No additional information could be found about the group.

Group Outcome

The group's only violent incident was in 1992 when it attacked a bus and clashed with the BCL (GTD 2017; Lexis). The group continued to operate as a union as late as 2016 (New Age 2016).

XXI.   COMMITTEE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF KILLER COLLABORATORS
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Aliases: Killer-Collaborator Elimination Committee, Ghatak-Dalal Nirmul Committee

Part 1. Bibliography
- GTD Perpetrator 1771. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1771
- Ishtiaq Ahmed. The Politics of Religion in South and Southeast Asia. Taylor and Francis. 2011. p. 34.
  https://books.google.com/books?id=2T8oSfy3GZgC&pg=PA34&lpg=PA34&dq=COMMIT
  TEE+FOR+THE+ELIMINATION+OF+KILLER+COLLABORATORS+bangladesh&source
  =bl&ots=YgdYRBoWnd&sig=vT_DKcPWoOizP-cpAB2jepi0M6A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ah
  UKEwi-kvbs6dvPAhVFRyYKHfbACRYQ6AEIITAC#v=onepage&q=COMMITTEE%20FO
  R%20THE%20ELIMINATION%20OF%20KILLER%20COLLABORATORS%20banglades
  h&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1992

Group End: 1992

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Committee formed around March 1992 after supporters of the Spirit of the Liberation War held a public trial convicting Ghulam Azam, a JeI leader, of war crimes from the 1971 war. The trial organizers called them the Killer Collaborators and the AL endorsed their actions (Ahmed 34). The group had one attack in 1992 when it attacked JeI members and killed 50 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group's one attack occurred in Dhaka, Bangladesh (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about the organizational structure of the group.

External Ties

The AL supported the group's action (Ahmed 34).

Group Outcome

No information could be found about this group after its one incident in 1992 (GTD 2017). The group is not heard from again.

XXII.   HILL STUDENTS COUNCIL
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Aliases: Pahari Chattra Parishad, PCP

Proposed changes
Formation: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
● "Hill Student Council," United People's Democratic Front, http://updfcht.com/?page_id=38

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is the student wing of the UPDF.

Geography

This is the student wing of the UPDF.

Organizational Structure

This is the student wing of the UPDF.

External Ties

This is the student wing of the UPDF.

Group Outcome

This is the student wing of the UPDF.

XXIII.   ROHINGYA SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Aliases:

Part 1. Bibliography
● Bertil Lintner. "The Plights of Ethnic and Religious Minorities and the Rise of Islamic Extremism in Bangladesh." Asia Pacific Media Services. 2003. http://asiapacificms.com/papers/pdf/ethnic_and_religious_minorities_bangladesh.pdf

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  http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-rohingya-and-islamic-extremism-a-convenient-myth/
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  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume14/Article1.htm
- GTD Perpetrator 1770. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=1770

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1982

Group End: 2001 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In the late 1970s, the Myanmar Defense Services launched a series of attacks in the Arakan State, which led to the displacement of these Rohingya Muslims, and an ensuing refugee crisis. This led to the emergence of several Rohingya groups (Diplomat 2015). The RSO was founded around 1982 by Mohamed Yunus, a medical doctor, with a goal to "secure greater rights for the Rohingya people" and a separate state (Lintner 2003; Diplomat 2015). The group was considered a splinter of the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), a front set up by Muhammad Jafar Habib in 1974 (Lintner 2003). Its first violent incident was as late as 1992, but likely earlier given the ARIF-CT response (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group claims Rakhine state in Burma as their home (Reuters 2014). The group had one attack in Shailerdoba, Bangladesh, but primarily attacked Burmese forces in Arakan

state (GTD 2017; Diplomat 2015). It is unclear where the refugee camps are in Bangladesh which would tie the RSO to Bangladesh. The group had its headquarters in Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh (Diplomat 2015). It had bases opposite the Burmese Maungdaw state (Reuters 2015). It allegedly had attacks in Rakhine state in 2015 (Reuters 2015).

Organizational Structure

The group was composed of Rohingya Muslims who fled Burma and were living in refugee camps in Bangladesh during the 1970s and 1980s (Diplomat 2015). In late 2017, it was estimated that there were over 1,000,000 Rohingya refugees living within Bangladesh (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

Allegedly, some RSO rebels received training in Afghanistan from Hizb-e-Islami alongside ICS members (Lintner SATP n.d.). Yunus denies external ties or support from international organizations (Diplomat 2015). The group trained cadres in Bangladesh until the 1990s, but then stopped for an unknown reason (Reuters 2014). The group has received support from the Jamaat-e-Islami within Bangladesh and Pakistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami residing in Afghanistan, and the Angkatan Belia Islam sa-Malaysia (ABIM) which is the Islamic Youth Organisation of Malaysia (Lintner 2003).

Group Outcome

In 1986, the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) was set up by Nurul Islam, consisting of members of the RPF and the RPO (Lintner 2003). Burma launched a massive counteroffensive against the RSO in Bangladesh in 1991, expelling 250,000 Rohingya refugees from Arakan (Lintner SATP n.d.). In 2001, the Bangladesh military attacked RSO camps forcing it to go underground (Diplomat 2015). The group is not very active today and Burma has attempted to exaggerate the threat of RSO by falsely tying it to Al-Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups (Diplomat 2015). The Burmese government continues to attack the RSO, however, because it enables them to collect counter-terrorism funds from the US and other entities (Diplomat 2015). In 2015, Yunus denied the group was still active. A similar group - ARSA formed in 2015. RSO allegedly had attacks in Rakhine state as late as 2015 although some disputed whether the RSO actually perpetrated them (Reuters 2015).

XXIV.　SUPPORTERS OF LEFTIST GANA-OIKYA FRONT
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Aliases:

Proposed changes
Formation: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

● Searched proquest, gscholar, google with name + dates

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

No information could be found about this group.

Geography

No information could be found about this group.

Organizational Structure

No information could be found about this group.

External Ties

No information could be found about this group.

Group Outcome

No information could be found about this group.

XXV.   BANGLADESH JIHAD MOVEMENT
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 0
Aliases:

Proposed changes

Formation: NA

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is an alias for Harkat-Ul-Jihadi Al-Islami Bangladesh.

Geography

This is an alias for Harkat-Ul-Jihadi Al-Islami Bangladesh.

Organizational Structure

This is an alias for Harkat-Ul-Jihadi Al-Islami Bangladesh.

External Ties

This is an alias for Harkat-Ul-Jihadi Al-Islami Bangladesh.

Group Outcome

This is an alias for Harkat-Ul-Jihadi Al-Islami Bangladesh.

XXVI.   BANGLADESH NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY
Min. Group Date: 1992
Max. Group Date: 1992
Aliases: Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD)

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Bangladesh: The Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) political party (1998-2000)." Canada Immigration and Refugee/Refworld. 2000. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad4c68.html
- "Bangladesh: The Inu faction of the Jatiya Samajtantrik (JSD), including the party's structure, its leaders, its activities, its policies, and its alliances with other parties; whether members face problems with the government or police authorities (2000-2003)," Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/07/BGD42046.E.pdf
- Ali Riaz and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Bangladesh. Routledge. 2016.
- Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. "Bangladesh." Political Terrorism: A New Guide. Routledge. 1988. p. 506
- GTD Perpetrator 2220. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2220

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1972

Group End: 1992 (last attack), 1999 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

JSD is a leftist political party, which formed in 1972 when it splintered from the Awami League (Riaz and Rahman 2016, 425; Canada IRB 2000).The group formed to launch a socialist revolution and did so by creating both an armed wing, the People's Revolutionary Army (Gono Bahini), and a secret organization within the army called the RSO (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 506). The group's only known violent attack was in 1992 when it attacked a car envoy (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group was primarily active in Dhaka (Canada IRB 2000). It conducted an attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The group formed to launch a socialist revolution and did so by creating both an armed wing, the People's Revolutionary Army (Gono Bahini), and a secret organization within the army called the RSO (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 506). The group's leader was Major JA Jalil and the head of the armed wing was Colonel Abu Taher (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 506).

External Ties

The group splintered in the 1990s with one faction - JSD(Rab) joining the BNP and the rest supporting the Awami League in the 1996 elections (Canada IRB 2000). JSD was the target of several high-profile assassinations in 1998-1999 carried out by the PBCP and Biplobi Communist Party (Canada IRB 2000). JSD supporters followed by engaging in violent gunfight against PCP members and creating an armed wing called Gono Bahini (Canada IRB 2000). The group backs a student wing, Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) (Canada IRB 2003). BCL attacked Mirza Anwarul Huq, but it is unclear why (Canada IRB 2003). The group is thought to have developed ties with CPB and the Gonotantri Party (GP) as well (Canada IRB 2003).

Group Outcome

The government banned the group 1975 after the military coup and most of its members were arrested (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 506). Jalil was arrested and Taher executed (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 506). In 1998, police arrested 25 additional JSD members. A number of additional members surrendered to police in 1999 through an amnesty program (Canada IRB 2000). The group's first and only known violent incident was in 1992 (GTD 2017).

XXVII.   PURBO BANGLAR COMMUNIST PARTY
Min. Group Date: 1993
Max. Group Date: 2011
Onset: 2005
Aliases: Purbo Banglar Communist Party, PBCP, Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP)

Proposed changes
Formation: 1968

Part 1. Bibliography
● "PBCP." South Asia Terrorist Portal. n.d. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/PBCP.htm
● "East Bengal Communist Party." US Department of Justice. 2013. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/11/East%20Bengal%20Communist%20Party.pdf

- Anurag Tripathi. "Profiling Non-State Armed Groups of Bangladesh." Himalayan and Central Asian Studies. 2015.
  http://search.proquest.com/docview/1705723022?pq-origsite=gscholar
- "Incidents and Statements involving PBCP." South Asia Terrorist Portal. n.d.
  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/PBCP_tl.htm
- GTD Perpetrator 565. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=565

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1968

Group End: 2012

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

PBCP formed in 1968 as a splinter in the Bangladesh Communist Party (SATP n.d.). It aims to launch a revolution against the state and is heavily influenced by Maoist communist thought (SATP n.d.). The group sought to instigate a communist revolution within Bangladesh by violent means, and was influenced by the Chinese Communist Revolution (SATP n.d.; US Department of Justice 2013). It is unknown precisely when its first violent attack occurred (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group primarily operates out of south-west Bangladesh and has almost de facto control over the area (SATP n.d.). This includes Pabna district, Meherpur district, Chuadanga district, Satkhira, and Kushtia. The group also has influence in Khulna, Satkhira, Meherpur, Narail, Kushtia, Jessore, Bagerhat, Magura, Jhenidah, Chuadanga and Pirojpur (SATP n.d.).

Organizational Structure

Its leader is Mofakkar Chowdhury (Tripathi 2015; SATP n.d.). PBCP funded itself through extortion and taxation of local landowners in the region (SATP n.d.). It obstructs road work and appropriates land from elites in the south for its own purposes, and the group primarily attacks and extorts from these landowners and contractors (SATP n.d.). It is unclear what its membership structure looks like.

External Ties

PBCP has no external support although has indicated it would be interested in an alliance with the Naxalites in India (SATP n.d.).

Group Outcome

General Zia Rahman banned the group during his rule from 1975-1981 (Tripathi 2015). There are reports that the AL lets the PBCP continue to engage in violence to undermine the power of the ruling BNP. Prior to the AL's election in 2001, they released several hundred PBCP members from jail (SATP n.d.). This release led to an increase in attacks in 2002 and beyond (SATP n.d.; GTD 2017). The group's last recorded attack was on November 6, 2012, when armed members were stopped in the Balughata Primary School within Pabna District (SATP n.d.).

Notes for Iris:
-its origins are really murky
-its unclear when its first violent attack and whether it participates in the War of Independence
-the group had some attacks in the 1990s and a large increase in attacks in 2002-2003
-they primarily targeted landowners
-PBCP was just a name and not very well organized

XXVIII. ACHIK NATIONAL VOLUNTEERS' COUNCIL (ANVC)
Min. Group Date: 1995
Max. Group Date: 2001
Aliases: None

Proposed changes
Formation: 1995

Part 1. Bibliography
● "Achik National Volunteer Council." South Asia Terrorist Portal. n.d. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/anvc.htm
● Rani Das, "Assam and Meghalaya: Threats of Violence in Garo Heartland." IPCS. 2013. http://www.ipcs.org/print_article-details.php?recNo=4227
● GTD Perpetrator 20008. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20008

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1995

Group End: 2000

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The ANVC formed in December 1995 with a goal to create a separate state in the Garo Hills area of Meghalaya, Kamrup, and Assam (SATP n.d.). It was an ethnonationalist group in India and its first violent attack was in 2001 (GTD 2007).

Geography

It operates from Cheram in Garo hills, but also maintains some external training camps in Bangladesh (SATP n.d.). It is unclear where these camps in Bangladesh are.

Organizational Structure

Its leader is Dilash Marak and has publicly named several other officials as part of its command, including a commander-in-chief, finance secretary, and publicity secretary (SATP n.d.). The commander-in-chief is Jerome Momin, the general secretary is Wanding R. Marak, the publicity secretary is Artist Sengsrang Sangma, the joint secretary is Janggam Momin, and the finance secretary is Rickie Sangma (SATP n.d.). ANVC maintains strict control over its members using threats of punishment for defection or rogue behavior (SATP n.d.). It has four operation zones and a commander for each. The commanders include Chenang Marak, Goran Sangma, Batjang Shera, and Ranggam Marak (SATP n.d.). The group funds itself through kidnapping, ransom, and extortion, and has produced fake currency as well (SATP n.d.).

External Ties

It allegedly receives external support from the Pakistan ISI (SATP n.d.).

Group Outcome

The group agreed to a ceasefire agreement with the Indian government in 2004. It has been periodically extended and no new incidents have been found (SATP n.d.; Das 2013). Its last attack was a suspected incident in 2014 (GTD 2017).

XXIX.   KAMTAPUR LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (KLO)
Min. Group Date: 1995
Max. Group Date: 2012
Aliases: NA

Proposed changes
Formation: 1995

Part 1. Bibliography

- "Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO)." South Asia Terrorist Portal. n.d.
  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/Klo.htm
- "Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO)." Global Security n.d.
  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/klo.htm
- "Top Kamtapur Liberation Organisation leader arrested in Nepal." Times of India. 2014.
  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/Top-Kamtapur-Liberation-Organisation-leader-arrested-in-Nepal/articleshow/29966455.cms
- "Kamtapur Liberation Organisation." GK Today (India). 2014.
  http://www.gktoday.in/kamtapur-liberation-organisation/
- GTD Perpetrator 20256. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20256

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1995

Group End: 1999

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

KLO formed on December 28, 1995, by students seeking the creation of a separate Kamtapur state in India (SATP n.d.). The group was originally formed as an overground organisation developed due to large scale unemployment, perceived ignorance of its language, eviction, and economic deprivation. It later transformed into an armed group (Global Security n.d.). The group's first incident was in 2000 (GTD 2017).

Geography

The group operates out of West Bengal and Assam, claiming these areas should form their new state while also using parts of Bangladesh as an external sanctuary (SATP n.d.). The group primarily works within South Dinajpur, North Dinajpur, Coochbehar, Jalpaiguri, Malda, Darjeeling, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Dhubri, and Goalpara (SATP n.d.). The group also maintains camps in the Wangchu river of Bhutan, and in the Bhangar and Lhamoizingkha areas of Bhutan (SATP n.d.). The group also had attacks in Jalpaiguri, India (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

KLO's leader was Tamir Das (Jibon Singha). He was arrested in October 1999, but released in 2002 after Indian officials thought he would convince other members to surrender (SATP n.d.). Eventually, he was replaced by Tom Adhikary, an associate of Das, who was arrested by Indian officials during a counterterrorism campaign (Operation All Clear) in Bhutan in 2003 (Times of India). Originally, the group was a break-away of the All Kamatapur Student Union (AKSU) (Times of India 2014). The group started with 60 members, but allegedly grew to 300 members at some point (SATP n.d.). It had a formal military wing called the Koch-Rajbongshi Organization (KRLO) which eventually splintered and joined the ULFA (Global Security n.d.). It initially funded itself by extorting tea gardens in Dooars, north Bengal and with help from the ULFA (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

It allegedly receives external support from the Pakistan ISI (SATP n.d.). The group initially had military training in Geleghu, Bhutan and Kalaikhola, Bhutan (SATP n.d.). It also operates from a base in Bangladesh. It may have also received training from UFLA militants (Global Security n.d.). KLO has ties with the ULFA, NDFB, NSCN-IM, and Maoist insurgencies in Nepal although it's unclear what this relationship entails (SATP n.d.). It is believed ULFA was supporting the group financially and materially for a nubmer of years in the 1990s (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

As of 2014, the group was banned by India, but it still remains active, however, after Jibon Singha, chairman of KLO, was arrested in October 1999, there was no active leadership of the group (GK Today 2014; SATP n.d.). Some members were arrested during Operation All Clear in 2004 (Times of India 2014). The group's last violent incident was in 2015 (GTD 2017).

XXX. JAMAATUL MUJAHIDEEN BANGLADESH (JMB)
Min. Group Date: 1997
Max. Group Date: 2010
Aliases: Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Awakened Muslim Masses Of

Bangladesh, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Jama'atul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB), Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh, Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB)

<u>Proposed changes</u>
Formation: 1998

Part 1. Bibliography
- Supriya Singh. "JMB: A Profile." IPCS (Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies) Special Report 11. February 2006.
  https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/100225/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf
- Ali Riaz and Christine Fair. Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh. Routledge. 2010.
- "Jamaat e Islami." Hindu-American Foundation. N.d.
  http://www.hafsite.org/sites/default/files/JamaatBrief.pdf
- "Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)." South Asia Terrorist Portal. n.d.
  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm
- "Jama'atul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB)," South Asia Terrorist Portal. N.d.
  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm
- Anurag Tripathi. "Profiling Non-State Armed Groups of Bangladesh." Himalayan and Central Asian Studies. 2015.
  http://search.proquest.com/docview/1705723022?pq-origsite=gscholar
- Paul Cochrane. "The Funding Methods of Bangladesh Terrorist Groups." Combatting Terrorism Center. 2009.
  https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-funding-methods-of-bangladeshi-terrorist-groups
- GTD Perpetrator 20234. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20234

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998

Group End: 2016 (active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

JMB formed in 1998 in Dhaka with a goal to create an Islamic state in Bangladesh (IPCS 2006; Tripathi 2015). It is thought to be a splinter or youth wing of the Al-Mujahideen

group (IPCS 2006). It seems to adhere to a Salafi interpretation of Islam (IPCS 2006). It came to attention in 2002 after a series of high-profile bombings in Dhaka (IPCS 2006).

Geography

It mainly operates in northern Bangladesh and has four areas of operation, including Chittagong, Dhaka, Rajshahi, and Khulna division (IPCS 2006). The group maintains a presence within the districts of these four areas, including Bogra, Sirajganj, Dinajpur, Jaipurhat, Gaibandha, Naogaon, Nator, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Tahkurgaon, Bagerhat, Jessore, Khulna, Meherpur, Satkhira, Jamalpur, Mymensingh, Netrokona, Tangail, Chandpur, Laxmipur, and Chittagong (IPCS 2006).

Organizational Structure

JMB's leaders are Maulana Abdur Rahman, Siddiqui Islam, and Mohammad Aadullah al-Galib (IPCS 2006). Rahman was formerly a member of ICS and JeI before starting JMB. He had fought in Afghanistan under the Taliban in the early 1990s. Most of its supporters are also supporters of JMJB, and many members appear to come from madrassas. It is believed to have approximately 10,000 militants spread across several different wings, including finance, recruitment, publicity, armed, and politics (SATP n.d.). Militants within the JMB usually receive extensive training in explosive making (SATP n.d.). The group has invested in shrimp farms and cold storages within Bangladesh, and has conducted money laundering to finance itself (SATP n.d.). It also receives some financial support from JeI and Muslim diasporas (IPCS 2006).

External Ties

JeI provides political and monetary support to JMB. JMB also receives external support from Muslim diasporas in Kuwait, Pakistan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and al-Haramaine (IPCS 2006). The group receives financial support from many NGOs in countries such as Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Libya (SATP n.d.). The group has ties with the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) (IPCS 2006).

The group was able to restart its activities after the BNP regained power in 2001 because many JMB members were also once members of ICS - BNP's student wing so had tacit permission to continue fighting leftist organizations like the PBCP (SATP n.d.).

Group Outcome

The Bangladesh government banned the group in 2005 after US, EU, UN, and World Bank officials criticized Bangladesh for not doing enough to combat domestic terrorism (IPCS 2006). The Bangladesh government also arrested 734 individuals including JMB leadership in a mass raid soon after (Cochrane 2009). In 2007, the Bengali government

executed Rahman and Islam (SATP n.d.). The group was able to restart its activities after the BNP regained power in 2001 because many JMB members were also once members of ICS - BNP's student wing so had tacit permission to continue fighting leftist organizations like the PBCP (SATP n.d.). The group recovered and began increasing their attacks in 2010 (GTD 2017). The group's last violent attack was in 2016 (GTD 2017).

Notes for Iris:
-in 1998, there was a surge in attacks by other armed groups which might have provided an opportunity to form?
-banning the group has a tendency to lead to a drop in support (can you measure/examine?)
-why did the group recover so well? It is spread out across 4 districts that are relatively poor
-this group had territorial control over small areas and set up micro-governments or areas of control
-what separates this group from PBCP? The organizational structure of JMB is different from PBCP. JMB has a better financial structure. Similar currency manipulation in another previous group. This group mimics and improves on older armed groups.

XXXI.   UNITED PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UPDF)
Min. Group Date: 1998
Max. Group Date: 2012
Aliases: United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) - Bangladesh, United People's Democratic Front (UPDF), UPDF

Proposed changes
Formation: 1999

Part 1. Bibliography
● Iftekharul Bashar. "Bangladesh's Forgotten Crisis: Land, Ethnicity, and Violence in Chittagong Hill Tracts." Nanyang Terrorism Studies International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research.
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTTA-April11.pdf
● "Chittagong Hill Tracts Political Parties." Global Security. n.d.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/bangladesh/political-parties-cht.htm
● Wilson John, "The Roots of Extremism in Bangladesh." Jamestown Foundation. 2005.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=27379&tx_tt
news%5BbackPid%5D=180&no_cache=1#.V3GQL5MrLkI
● "Bangladesh Backgrounder." South Asia Terrorist Portal.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/backgrounders/index.html
● Office UPDF Website. http://updfcht.com/?page_id=47

- GTD Perpetrator 30184. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30184

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 1998 (form), 2001 (First attack)

Group End: 2015 (Active)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The UPDF was formed in 1998 after PCJSS/Shanti Bahini demobilized after the 1997 CHT Peace Accord (SATP n.d.). UPDF was initially structured as a regional political party that formed as a splinter of Shanti Bahini following demobilization. It later turned to violence after UPDF militants staged a kidnapping in 2001 (SATP n.d.). It claims to still fight for complete secession of the CHT (SATP n.d.). The group's objective is to oppose the government in power, which may question the legitimacy of the CHT Accords (SATP n.d.; Wilson 2005).

Geography

The group is active in the Chittagong district (SATP n.d.). It also conducted attacks in Matiranga (GTD 2017). The group's first attack in 2001 occurred in Naniarchar forests of the Rangamati Hill District (SATP n.d.)

Organizational Structure

UPDF was initially structured as a regional political party that formed as a splinter of Shanti Bahini following demobilization. It later turned to violence after UPDF militants staged a kidnapping in 2001 (SATP n.d.). It is unclear how UPDF funds itself or how it is organized. The group has been accused of extortion and kidnapping PCJSS members in what has become a prominent intergroup rivalry in eastern Bangladesh (Bashar 2011).

External Ties

The UPDF had a rivalry against the PCJSS (Iftekharul n.d.). There is no evidence of other support from other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

The group's last violent attack was in 2014 (GTD 2017). It is also unclear what types of counterterrorism activities have been undertaken by the state against the group. The group participated in the 10th parliamentary elections, in January 2014 (UPDF n.d.).

Notes for Iris:
-peace accord caused a lot of tension because the government wasn't upholding it so the UPDF decided to take up arms
-the UPDF is fine with the agreement but after 3 years they start to use violence
-their violence is more ad hoc (electoral violence?)
-the violent attacks are primarily kidnappings and not targeted at police and military
-violent political party

XXXII.   BOROK NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TRIPURA (BNCT)
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 0
Aliases:

Proposed changes
Formation: 2000

Part 1. Bibliography
- "National Liberation Front of Tripura." South Asia Terrorist Portal. N.d. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/tripura/terrorist_outfits/NLFT.HTM
- "Militant Group Profiles." Center for Development and Peace Studies. http://cdpsindia.org/tripura_mgp.asp

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: 2006

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

BNCT splintered from NLFT in September 2000 due to ethnic differences between different members from Halam and Debbarma tribes (SATP n.d.). It was an ethno-nationalist separatist group in India. It is unknown when the group's first violent

attack occurred.

Geography

The group primarily operated in Tripura, India and has external bases in Bangladesh (SATP n.d.).

Organizational Structure

Its leader, and founder, was Joshua Debbarma (CDPS n.d.). Its organizational structure and funding sources are unknown. NLFT members were primarily Christian and Tripura.

External Ties

The group has a set of external bases in Bangladesh, but it is unclear where (SATP n.d.).

Group Outcome

The group was never able to gain much traction and was re-integrated into the NLFT around 2006. BNCT now acts as a recruitment and financial manager for the NLFT (CDPS n.d.).

XXXIII.   BANGLADESH CHHATIA LEAGUE (BCL)
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 0
Aliases: Bangladesh Chhatia League, Bangladesh Chhatia League (BCL), Bangladesh Chhatra League, Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL)

Proposed changes
Formation: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- "BCL to form committees at all private leagues," Daily Star, 2016, http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/bcl-form-committees-90-private-universities-1254484
- "Bangladesh Chaatra League," Indian Express, 2013, http://indianexpress.com/about/bangladesh-chhatra-league/
- Tazeen Murshid, "Democracy in Bangladesh: Illusion or reality," Contemporary South Asia, 1995, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09584939508719762?journalCode=ccsa20

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is the student wing of the Awami League.

Geography

This is the student wing of the Awami League.

Organizational Structure

This is the student wing of the Awami League.

External Ties

This is the student wing of the Awami League.

Group Outcome

This is the student wing of the Awami League.

XXXIV.   CHAKMA TRIBAL GROUP
Min. Group Date: 2000
Max. Group Date: 2001
Aliases:

Proposed changes
Formation: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Tribal People of Bangladesh." Nijhoom. n.d. http://nijhoom.com/tribal-people-bangladesh/
- Kamal Ramprit Diskit and Jutta Dikshit. "North-East India: Land, People and Economy." Springer Science. 2013. p. 343

https://books.google.com/books?id=iorHBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA343&lpg=PA343&dq=CHAK
MA+TRIBAL+GROUP&source=bl&ots=BHq8fOo22C&sig=21V1vLAvceriUKr6KXDfzaxp
zwE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwixg5238tvPAhWm24MKHXxwDuMQ6AEIWzAJ#v=on
epage&q=CHAKMA%20TRIBAL%20GROUP&f=false

● GTD Event ID 200102160001. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200102160001

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2000

Group End: 2001

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The Chakma is the largest ethnic group in Bangladesh with the majority living in the
Chittagong Hills Tract region (Nijhoom 2015). The group seems to follow Buddhism, and
their origin comes from the Arakan region, from where they migrated to Tripura passing
the Chittagong Hills (Diskhit and Dikshit). Muslim settlers in the CHT discriminated
against the Chakma forcing many to flee to northeast India as refugees (Diskhit and
Dikshit, 343). Bangladesh signed a peace agreement with the Chakma in 1998 (Dikshit
and Dikshit). Ethnic groups cannot really have formation dates. It is unknown whether
they were formally organized as VNSAs, their goals, ideology, and ties to other groups.

Geography

They are only tied to one incident in GTD which is a kidnapping and ransom of some
transport workers in the CHT district.

Organizational Structure

It is unknown whether they were formally organized as a different armed group. The
population of Chakma refugees reached 56, 000 in 1992 (Diskhit and Dikshit).

External Ties

It is unknown whether they were formally organized as VNSAs, their goals, ideology, and
ties to other groups.

Group Outcome

It is unknown whether they were formally organized as VNSAs, their goals, ideology, and ties to other groups.

Notes for Iris:
-Chakma tribal people migrated to India. Many people associated with the ethnic group became angry, but the group never formally organized. They were Buddhist and heavily discriminated against.

XXXV.   COORDINATION COMMITTEE OF MAOIST PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA
Min. Group Date: 2001
Max. Group Date: 0
Aliases: Coordination Committee Of Maoist Parties And Organizations Of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), Coordination Committees Of Maoist Parties And Orgainsations, Coordination Committees Of Maoist Parties And Organisations (CCOMPOSA), Coordination Committees Of Maoist Parties And Organizations, Coordination Committes Of Maoist Parties And Organizations (CCOMPOSA)

Proposed changes
Formation: 2001

Part 1. Bibliography
● "Coordination of Committee Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia." South Asia Terrorist Portal. n.d.
  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/southasia/documents/papers/CCOMPOSA.htm
● Swati Parasha. Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Implications for South Asia. 2005. Pearson Education India.
  https://books.google.com/books?id=cAE-bxSXayMC&pg=PA112&lpg=PA112&dq=COOR DINATION+COMMITTEE+OF+MAOIST+PARTIES+AND+ORGANIZATIONS+OF+SOUT H+ASIA&source=bl&ots=o5ie7M30E3&sig=gnOXGq8DX7tQlC4awVmUDxDH4js&hl=en &sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjdlbf-8tvPAhVL5IMKHVVrAQYQ6AEISjAH#v=onepage&q=COOR DINATION%20COMMITTEE%20OF%20MAOIST%20PARTIES%20AND%20ORGANIZ ATIONS%20OF%20SOUTH%20ASIA&f=false

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2001

Group End: N/A

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

CCOMPOSA formed in 2001 as an alliance of ten leftist groups operating in India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, including CPI-ML, MCC, PBSP, Bangladesh Samyabadi, and Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist) (SATP n.d.). They issued a joint communique announcing their alliance on July 1, 2000, when they all agreed to fight US imperialism, capitalism, and redouble their fighting efforts (Parashar 2005).

Geography

The group is present in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka (SATP n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The alliance network is a vague link between all groups, but there is no centralized control. It has been indicated that the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)(People's War), Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist), Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (MLM), Communist Party of India (ML)(Nakshalbari), Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (Maoist Punarghathan Kendra), Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (CC), Communist Party of Ceylon (Maoist), and Bangladesh Samyabadi Party (ML), are all part of the committee (SATP n.d.).

External Ties

It is unclear whether the network aid each other following this announcement or provide any other form of external support for each other.

Group Outcome

While individual members of the alliance network continue to exist, it is unclear what happens to the alliance networks after this.

Note: this is not really a group, but an alliance network.

XXXVI.   ISLAMI SHASHANTANTRA ANDOLAN (ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION MOVEMENT)
Min. Group Date: 2002
Max. Group Date: 2002
Aliases: Islamic Shashantantra Andolon (ISA), Islami Shashantantra Andolan (Islamic

Constitution Movement), Islami Shashontantra Andolan, Islamic Constitution Movement, Islamic Shashantantra Andolon, ISA, Bangladesh Islamic Movement

<u>Proposed changes</u>
Formation: 1987

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Terrorism: Islamic Terror Comes to Bangladesh." Strategy Page 2005, https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/urbang/articles/20051211.aspx
- Ali Riaz and Christine Fair.Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh. Routledge. 2010.
- "Bangladesh Today." International Crisis Group. n.d. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/bangladesh-today
- "Panic grips Ahmadiyyas in Barisal, Patuakhali." Daily Star. 2004. http://www.thepersecution.org/world/bangladesh/2004/05/ds040511na.html
- "Islamic militants bomb a movie theater and a Hindu fair, throw bombs at women performers - 10 dead." Free Republic. 2002. http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/759143/posts

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2002

Group End: 2002

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

ISA was formed in 1987 by Syed Fazlul Karim with a goal to create an Islamic state in Bangladesh (Riaz and Fair 2010, 56). The group came to attention as an armed group in 2002 when it was accused of bombing a movie theater and a circus for being 'indecent' (Daily Star News 2002). This was a major attack as it killed at least three, and wounded 125, however, the group was only suspected to have caused the incident (Free Republic 2002).

Geography

The attacks at the movie theater and circus occurred in Satkhira (Free Republic 2002).

Organizational Structure

Karim was a well-respected Sufi teacher who successfully mobilized his religious followers to join his political movement (Riaz and Fair 2010, 56). The group is organized as a political party with three wings to oversee decision-making and consultation. ISA defaults to the decisions and wisdom of Karim and Karim appoints all members of the executive council (Riaz and Fair 2010, 56). The group's current leader is Chormonai Pir (Daily Star 2004).

External Ties

There is no evidence of external support. However, the group did support the eviction movement of the Khatme Nobuat Committee, when the organization decided to evict 27,000 people belonging to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat in the Barisal and Patuakhali districts (Daily Start 2004).

Group Outcome

It is unclear if the group continued to engage in violence or not after 2002. In 2008, the group changed its name to the Bangladesh Islamic Movement (Riaz and Fair 2010, 56).

XXXVII.   SHAHADAT AL HIKMA
Min. Group Date: 2003
Max. Group Date: 2011
Aliases: Shahadat-E Al Haqima, Shahadat Al Hikma, Shahadat Al Hikma (SAH),
   Shahadat-E Al Haqima (SAH), Shahadat-E-Al Haqima, SAH

Proposed changes
Formation: 2003

Part 1. Bibliography
- Anurag Tripathi. "Profiling Non-State Armed Groups of Bangladesh." Himalayan and Central Asian Studies. 2015.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1705723022?pq-origsite=gscholar
- "Shahadat-e al-Hikma (SAH)." Global Security. n.d.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/sah.htm
- Paul Cochrane. "The Funding Methods of Bangladesh Terrorist Groups." Combatting Terrorism Center. 2009.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-funding-methods-of-bangladeshi-terrorist-groups

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2003

Group End: 2003 (repression)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

SAH was formed on February 8, 2003, by Kawsar Hossain Siddique with a goal to overthrow the Bangladesh government; however, it might have formed earlier (Global Security n.d.; Tripathi 2015). It ascribed to an Islamic ideology and argues that the pending revolution will be an Islamic one (Tripathi 2015). Cochrane (2009) notes the group was violent, but it is unknown when or where these violent attacks occurred.

Geography

It is unknown where any attacks occurred by the group. The group formed in Rajshahi, Bangladesh (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group is allegedly funded by a Bengali mafia Dawaood Ibrahim (Global Security n.d.). The leader claims the group had 10,000 militants, but these claims are unsubstantiated (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

SAH claims to have ties to Al-Qaeda, but these are also unsubstantiated (Global Security n.d.; Cochrane 2009).

Group Outcome

The Bengali government - headed by BNP - banned the group in 2003 (Tripathi 2015; Global Security n.d.). It is believed the group is now operating clandestinely (Cochrane 2009).

Notes for Iris:
-good example of group misrepresenting capabilities
-no clear source of outside support which hurt its capabilities
-unclear motivation for why the mafia would want to create an Islamic state
-might have conducted some minor attacks because the BNP banned them so they probably had violent attacks. Cochrane also confirms they had violent attacks.

XXXVIII.   HIKMATUL ZIHAD

Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 2004
Aliases: Hikmatul Zihad, Hikmat Ul Jihad, Hikmat Ul Zihad, Hikmat Ul-Jihad, Hikmat
Ul-Zihad, Hikmat-Ul-Jihad, Hikmat-Ul-Zihad, Wisdom Of Jihad

<u>Proposed changes</u>
Formation: 2004

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Two killed in Bangladesh bomb blast.' ABC (AU). 2004.
  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2004-09-05/two-killed-in-bangladesh-bomb-blast/2038490
- "Hikmatual Zihad vows to kill Hasina in a week." Daily Star. 2004.
  http://archive.thedailystar.net/2004/08/25/d4082501033.htm

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End: 2004

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Hikmatul Zihad first came to attention in August 2004 when it bombed an Awami League
rally and proclaimed it would assassinate AL leader Sheikh Hasna (Daily Star 2004). The
attack killed Ivy Rahman and hurt 200. A week later, a military compound outside Sylhet
was bombed; newspapers thought it might be an HZ attack, but it was never confirmed
(ABC 2004)..

Geography

There was an attack in Dhaka and Sylhet, Bangladesh (Daily Star 2004; ABC 2004).

Organizational Structure

It remains unclear what its ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or state
responses were.

External Ties

It remains unclear what its ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or state responses were. The group does seem to oppose the Awami League, as they declared that they had an objective to assassinate AL President Sheikh Hasina (Daily Star 2004).

Group Outcome

The Bengali government claimed it was going to identify the group based on the IP address from an email sent, but it was never confirmed whether this happened (Daily Star 2004). The group was not heard from again. It remains unclear what its ideology, organizational structure, external ties, or state responses were.

XXXIX.   UNITED ACHIK NATIONAL FRONT (UANF)
Min. Group Date: 2004
Max. Group Date: 0
Aliases:

<u>Proposed changes</u>
Formation: 2004

Part 1. Bibliography
- "People's Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M)." South Asia Terrorist Portal. n.d. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/plf_m.htm
- "One more terrorist outfit from Meghalaya." Meghalaya Times. 2012. http://www.meghalayatimes.info/index.php/42-archive/editorial/february-2012/3785-one-more-terrorist-outfit-from-meghalaya

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2004

Group End: N/A

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The UANF was formed in March 2004 by Nemos Marak when it splintered from the PLF-M (Meghalaya Times 2012). Its stated aim was to create an independent Garo state and was ethnonationalist (Meghalaya Times 2012). It is unclear what the group's ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

Geography

The group is active in the Garo Hills district in India (Megahalaya Times). It is unclear what the connection to Bangladesh is.

Organizational Structure

The group's commander-in-chief is Nemos Marak (Meghalaya Times 2012). It is unclear what the group's ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

External Ties

It is unclear what the group's ideology, organizational structure, or external ties are.

Group Outcome

The group was still active as of 2010 when it was implicated along with several other groups by the Meghalaya governor in terrorism (SATP n.d.).

XL.   AL-QA'IDA NETWORK FOR SOUTHWESTERN KHULNA DIVISION
       Min. Group Date: 2006
       Max. Group Date: 2006
       Aliases:

       Proposed changes
       Formation: NA

       Part 1. Bibliography
       ● Kanchan Lakshman. "Islamist Extremist Mobilization in Bangladesh." 2005. Jamestown
         Foundation.
         http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=507&tx_ttne
         ws%5BbackPid%5D=180&no_cache=1#.V3GI_JMrLkI
       ● "Al-Qaida's fatal terrorism under Osama bin Laden." START Background Report. 2012.
         https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/br/AQAttacks_20120501.p
         df
       ● GTD Perpetrator 20492. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses
         to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
         http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20492

       Part 2. Basic Coding

       Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2006

Group End: 2006

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

It is unclear what this group name refers to or when this group formed. The group may be the predecessor to AQIS or Al-Qaeda on the Indian Subcontinent. AQIS was the result of a merger of several Jihadist groups all opposed to the Indian, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar governments. GTD reports two incidents ascribed to this group in 2006 both in Bangladesh. AQ is suspected because a man claims to be an organizer for this group, but no additional information is found (GTD 2017). If the group is a member of the AQ network, it likely promoted the same transnational jihadist claims.

Geography

The two GTD incidents occur in Amantapour and Kushtia district (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

This section is where you would include information about the group's organizational structure including its leadership, membership, source of funding, and different wings.

External Ties

It is unclear what this group name refers to. However, the one incident in Amanatpur, severely injured a local Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader, so the network may oppose the BNP (GTD 2017).

Group Outcome

It is unclear what this group name refers to. The group disappeared after its incidents in 2006.

Note: The group may be the predecessor to AQIS or Al-Qaeda on the Indian Subcontinent. AQIS was the result of a merger of several Jihadist groups all opposed to the Indian, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar governments.

XLI.   JADID AL-QA`IDAH BANGLADESH (JAQB)
         Min. Group Date: 2007

Max. Group Date: 2007

Aliases: Jadid Al-Qa`Idah Bangladesh (JAQB), Jadid Al-Qa`Idah Bangladesh, Jadid
    Al-Qa`Idah Bangladesh (JAQB), Jadid Al-Qa'idah Bangladesh, Jadid Al-Qa'idah
    Bangladesh (JAQB)

Proposed changes
Formation: 2007

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Bomb planted by Jadid found in Rajshahi." Daily Star. June 2007.
  http://archive.thedailystar.net/2007/06/15/d70615012313.htm
- Ali Riaz and Christine Fair. Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh. Routledge.
  2010
  https://books.google.com/books?id=SpFaBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73&dq=jmjb+ja
  did+al+qaeda&source=bl&ots=QvduOXFl-8&sig=IlgLhiAHM07CTrNnexMgVRrwBG0&hl
  =en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjkhOaC8cvNAhULyWMKHXjvDnwQ6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&
  q=jmjb%20jadid%20al%20qaeda&f=false
- GTD Perpetrator 20230. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses
  to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017.
  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20230

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2007

Group End: 2007

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Jadid al-Qaeda came to attention in 2007 after it bombed a number of railway stations in
Dhaka, Chittagong, and Sylhet (Riaz and Fair 2010; GTD 2017). Daily Star reported the
group was "newly-emerged" (Daily Star 2007). The attacks occurred at a university (GTD
2017). The group's aims may be a part of the larger al Qaeda network in Bangladesh.

JAQ left some bombs at a dormitory threatening to detonate if any members were
arrested, but bomb experts at Rajshani called this a ploy (Daily Star).

Geography

The attack occurs in Rajshahi, Bangladesh (Daily Star 2007).

Organizational Structure

It is unknown if the group is still active and its ideology, aims, organizational structure, and external ties are unknown.

External Ties

It is unknown if the group is still active and its ideology, aims, organizational structure, and external ties are unknown. The group seems to have an opposition to the PBCP, as it has been linked to the murder of a member of this group (Riaz and Fair 2010).

Group Outcome

In 2007, the group planted a bomb in the Rajshahi University of Engineering and Technology (Daily Star 2007). It is unknown if the group is still active and its ideology, aims, organizational structure, and external ties are unknown.

Notes for Iris:
-bomb a campus and a railway, but they never claim responsibility for their attacks so unclear what their goals are
-seem like random people

XLII.   HYNNIEWTREP NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL (HNLC)
Min. Group Date: 2008
Max. Group Date: 2012
Aliases:

<u>Proposed changes</u>
Formation: 1992

Part 1. Bibliography
- "Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)." South Asia Terrorist Portal. N.d. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/hnlc.htm'
- "One more terrorist outfit from Meghalaya." Meghalaya Times. 2012. http://www.meghalayatimes.info/index.php/42-archive/editorial/february-2012/3785-one-more-terrorist-outfit-from-meghalaya
- GTD Perpetrator 30035. Global Terrorism Database. Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Last modified June 2017. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30035

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: 2008

Group End: 2012

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

HNLC formed in 1992 by Julius K Dorphang when it splintered from the HALC (Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council) (SATP n.d.). HNLC's goal is to create a separate state of Meghalaya in India (SATP n.d.). It is unknown precisely when the group's first violent incident occurred.

Geography

The group operates from an external base in Dhaka, Bangladesh and also has a number of training camps in the CHT region (SATP n.d.). Within India, it operates in Khasi Hills and Shillong, Meghalaya (SATP n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group is primarily composed of Hynniewtrep and seeks to expel Garo members from the region (SATP n.d.). The group has ties with NSCN-IM and the NLFT. It is alleged that they jointly engage in extortion activities around Jaintia Hills to fund themselves (SATP n.d.). Julius K Dorphang is the leader of the group (SATP n.d.). Cheristerfield Thangkhiew is the group's "General Secretary," the 'Publicity Secretary' is M. Diengdoh, the 'Commander-in-chief' is Bobby Marwein, and the 'Operations group' consists of Khraw Bian, Shynshar Nongbri, Bantei Kharkongor, Raju BlahStar Synkhli, and Kynteilang Kharkongor (SATP n.d.).

External Ties

There is also alleged support from the Pakistan ISI, including "the circulation of fake currency" (SATP n.d.). The group has ties with NSCN-IM and the NLFT. It is alleged that they jointly engage in extortion activities around Jaintia Hills to fund themselves (SATP n.d.).

Group Outcome

India banned the group in 2000 (Meghalaya Times 2012; SATP n.d.). The group is still active and had its last violent attack in 2016 (GTD 2017).

XLIII.   GONO BAHINI (GB)
Min. Group Date: 2009
Max. Group Date: 2009
Aliases: People's Army, People's Revolutionary Army

Proposed changes
Formation: NA

Part 1. Bibliography
- "JS sees debate over role of Gono Bahini," Daily Star, 2014,
  http://www.thedailystar.net/js-sees-debate-over-role-of-gono-bahini-31691
- "Rivals kill another outlaw at IU,"Daily Star, 2009,
  http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-94615
- "The birth of Bangladesh," Socialism Today, 2011,
  http://www.socialismtoday.org/154/bangladesh.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Any additional aliases you may have encountered

Group Formation: What is the earliest year the group was active?

Group End: What is the last year the group was active? Why did it stop using political violence?

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is the armed wing of the JSD (Daily Star 2014).

Geography

This is the armed wing of the JSD (Daily Star 2014).

Organizational Structure

This is the armed wing of the JSD (Daily Star 2014).

External Ties

This is the armed wing of the JSD (Daily Star 2014).

Group Outcome

This is the armed wing of the JSD (Daily Star 2014).

Observations of Bangladesh Group

Types of Groups
- Political parties (AL vs BNP)
- separatist groups (UPDF, JSS/SB)
- leftist groups (PBCP, PBSP)
- islamist groups

Potential Catalysts/WOO? [less obvious in Bangladesh case]
- End of war of liberation ('71)
- Coup 1982
- Assassination 1978
- 1990 peaceful transition to democracy

Why do VNSAs not reach threshold?
- Gain political power/concessions (BNP vs AL)**
- Group Competition (leftist vs islamist groups, AL vs BNP)
  - AL "releases" PBCP and other communist/LWE groups when comes into power
  - BNP tacitly coordinates with Islamist groups
  - Each round up and rotate/re-arrest when come into power
- Too many center-seeking groups/political violence institutionalized?
- Mainly political groups with little military experience
- Islamist groups have hard time gaining traction – competition?
- Lose external support (Soviet Union)

PBCP
- Political utility far from periphery to fight
- Unclear 2005 shock

JSS/SB
- 'Son of soil' conflict
- ethnic/early
- Initially hopeful to negotiate (unusual), but rises after 1975 assassination
- Rahman tries chittagong development board (as concession/early negotiation), but not enough - keep fighting
  - Note: very similar to mfdc in senegal