Angola Cases, 1970-2012
Last Updated: 3 December 2017

torg	gname	onset	min	max
T381	POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA-PARTY OF LABOR	1961	1956	1996
T470	SOUTH-WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO)		1960	1988
T572	NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FNLA)	1975	1962	0
T543	FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE CABINDA ENCLAVE-FORCES ARMADAS DE CABINDA	31-Dec-94	1963	2009
T186	FRENTE DE LIBERA_?O DO ENCLAVE DE CABINDA (FLEC)		1963	2010
T514	UNI?O NACIONAL PARA A INDEPEND_NCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA	11-Nov-75	1966	2002
T2257	ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUERRILLAS		1979	2006
T187	FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE ENCLAVE OF CABINDA-RENEWED	3-Jun-91	1984	2002

Note: unclear how to deal with decolonization here. Technically, MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA are insurgencies during the 1960s but against the Portuguese government which is why the dates are off.

I. POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA-PARTY OF LABOR
Torg ID: 381
Min. Group Date: 1956
Max. Group Date: 1996
Onset: NA

Aliases: Popular Movement For The Liberation Of Angola, Movimento Popular De Liberta_?O De Angola, Popular Movement For The Liberation Of Angola-Party Of Labor

Part 1. Bibliography

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- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Angola: Name of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) First Secretary in Malange prior to December 1998, whether there was a change in the Malange first secretaryship in 1999, and if so, whether the change coincided with a National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) attack on Malange, 21 December 1999, AGO33431.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aaaa34.html
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Angola: Juventude MPLA (youth wing of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) including its relationship with the government and how members are recruited (1997 - April 2001), 24 April 2001, AGO37000.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4bdf914.html

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: MPLA

Group Formation: 1956

Group End: 1975 (disarm - become the new government)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

The MPLA formed in the northern part of Congo in 1956 in opposition to Portuguese colonialism (BBC 2017; MIPT 2008). It called for decolonization and the creation of a new indigenous government (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503; MIPT 2008). It originally formed as a merger of three non-violent organizations, Vamos Escobrir, PLUA, and MINA (Global Security n.d.; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). After 1975, the group controlled the government and fought against the FNLA and UNITA for power (Schmid and Jongman 2008, 503). It espoused to a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Meijer and

Birmingham n.d., 14; Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). The group's first violent attack occurred in 1961 and launched a revolt on coffee plantations around Angola (Meijer and Birmingham n.d., 13; Global Security n.d.; BBC 2017).

Geography

The group had attacks in Luanda, Kuito, Malange, and Menonogue, Angola (GTD 2017). The group established an external base of operations in Guinea in 1959 (Global Security n.d.). The group established another external base of operations in 1963 in Brazzaville, Congo (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

The group was originally a student movement, and its founder was a poet named Mario de Adrade (MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.). Its most influential leader was Agostino Neto who took over the group in 1962 (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). The group funded itself through extortion and oil revenues (MIPT 2008). The group had an armed wing known as the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and a political wing known as the Labor Party (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503; MIPT 2008). The FAPLA had an estimated 80,000 fighters, though the date for that estimate is unknown (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). In 1974, the MPLA had approximately 10,000 guerrillas (Global Security n.d.). Members were primarily Mbundu (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group received military assistance from Cuba and training starting in 1965 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503; Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). The group also received support from the Soviet Union, Hungary, and East Germany (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). At an unknown date in the "mid-1960s" members also began traveling to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria for military training (Global Security n.d.). Sometime between 1965 and 1974, 2000-3000 Cuban soldiers traveled to Angola to help the MPLA (Global Security n.d.).

After it came into power, the group granted SWAPO sanctuary to fight against South Africa (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503).

Group Outcome

The Portuguese government arrested many members of the MPLA in 1959, forcing it to go abroad (Global Security n.d.). In 1961, the government cracked down after the plantation revolt and conflict escalated (Global Security n.d.). In 1969, the Portuguese launched a resettlement program to protect civilians (Global Security n.d.). In 1974, a

Portuguese coup led it to withdraw from the country (Global Security n.d.). The MPLA gained power in 1975 after the Portuguese decolonized; Agostino Neto became the president of Angola (MIPT 2008; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). Immediately, a power struggle formed and the MPLA fought against the FNLA and UNITA for power (BBC 2017). The MPLA's armed wing disarmed and became the new Angolan army in 1975 (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503). The group's last known violent attacks were in 1996 as a violent political party (GTD 2017).

II. SOUTH-WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO)
Torg ID: 470
Min. Group Date: 1960
Max. Group Date: 1988
Onset: NA

Aliases: None

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: SWAPO, People's Liberation Army of Namibia, PLAN

Group Formation: 1960

Group End: 1989 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

SWAPO formed in 1960 when it splintered from the Ovamboland People's Party, a non-violent nationalist party (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 621; MIPT 2008). It wanted to secede from South Africa and create an independent state (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 621). The group's first violent incident was in 1966 (Larsdott 2014; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 621; MIPT 2008).

Geography

SWAPO had external bases in Angola, Zambia, and Botswana (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 621). It established an external base in Lusaka, Zambia in 1962 (Larsdott 2014). In 1976, it moved its headquarters from Zambia to Luanda, Angola (Larsdott 2014; Claiborne 1987). The group often clashed with UNITA soldiers in Angola (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 620). It also had several attacks in Namibia including Windhoek, Katatura, Ondangua, and Ovamboland (GTD 2017). Notably, the group refused to remain in Namibia. Its modus operandi was to launch hit-and-run attacks into Namibia then retreat quickly (Claiborne 1987; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 620). Its first attacks were in Ovamboland and later the Caprivi Strip (Larsdott 2014).

Organizational Structure

The group's leader was Sam Nujoma (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 621). It had approximately 7000 to 10000 fighters, though the date for this estimate is unknown (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 621). In 1968, the group had an estimated 16,000 fighters; in 1987, the group had an estimated 8700 fighters (Claiborne 1987). Another source claims that between 1974 and 1976, SWAPO grew from 400 to 2000 fighters (Larsdott 2014). The group had an armed wing known as the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN); the PLAN had approximately 8500 members, though the date for this estimate is unknown (CIA 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 620). Members were primarily Ovambo. PLAN had approximately 6000 fighters in 1979 (CIA 1982). Its political wing remained in Namibia and was considered legal in 1982 (CIA 1982). The group recruited from refugee camps in the 1970s (Larsdott 2014).

External Ties

Fighters received military training from Cuba starting at an unknown date and from East Germany starting in 1978 (CIA 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 620). SWAPO

received sanctuary from the MPLA Angola government starting in 1975 (Larsdott 2014). SWAPO received increased weapons from the Soviet Union starting in 1975 (CIA 1982). The group often clashed with UNITA soldiers in Angola (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 620).

Group Outcome

After Portugal decolonized Angola in 1974, South Africa began to act more aggressively towards the new government in Angola, and it erected a border wall known as the 'free fire' zone (Larsdott 2014). In 1975, South Africa invaded Angola as part of "Operation Savannah" ostensibly in pursuit of SWAPO forces (Larsdott 2014). The South African Defense Forces (SADF) responded to the insurgency with "mass arrest; the creation of a 'free fire' zone; the invasion of neighboring countries where the guerrilla bases are located; the recruitment of local forces; attempts to win hearts and minds; and the deployment of 'reaction' units" (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 621). In 1984, the SADF launched Operation Askari in Angola, which forced the Angolan government to expel SWAPO from its territory (Larsdott 2014). Fighting was still intense between the South African government and SWAPO as of 1987-1988 (Claiborne 1987; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 620-621). In 1989, the South African government granted Namibia independence after it reached an agreement for Cuban troops to withdraw from Angola (MIPT 2008). SWAPO disarmed and demobilized to become a political party. It ran in the 1989 elections and won (MIPT 2008).

Interesting quote from the Claiborne article:

"The main SWAPO military headquarters and training bases are safely situated nearly 200 miles north of the Namibian border, and SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma only rarely ventures that far south from the capital of Luanda, according to military intelligence officers.

Most of the guerrilla force's key field commanders are headquartered far from the front, wary of South Africa's ability to pinpoint their movements in the south and launch hit-and-run attacks against them. This results in frequent breakdowns in communication between the commanders and the field units on the border, according to South African Army officers.

The South African Army's assessment of the guerrillas' increasing weakness was disputed by a SWAPO spokesman in an interview in Windhoek, where the group's political branch is permitted to function."

Notes: lots of interesting COIN stuff here

III. NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FNLA)

Torg ID: 572
Min. Group Date: 1962
Max. Group Date: 0
Onset: NA

Aliases: National Front For The Liberation Of Angola (Fnla), Democratic Party Of Angola, Frente Nacional De Libertacao De Angola, Frente Nacional De Liberta _o De Angola, Frente Nacional De Libertacao De Angola (Fnla), Frente Nacional De Liberta _o De Angola (Fnla), Frente Nacional Para La Liberacion De Angola, Frente Nacional Para La Liberaci_n De Angola, Frente Nacional Para La Liberacion De Angola (Fnla), Frente Nacional Para La Liberaci_n De Angola (Fnla), Military Council Of Angolan Resistance (Comira), National Liberation Front Of Angola, Union Of The Populations Of Angola (Upa)

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- “Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.” Global Security. N.d. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mpla.htm

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: None

Group Formation: founded 1961; First attack 1961

Group End: Ongoing as a political party

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In the 1960s, although most European countries removed their grip from their African colonies, Portugal held onto their possessions of Guinea-Bissau and Angola (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 179). Their failure to leave incited movements for Angolan independence, including the rise of groups FNLA and MPLA (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 179).

The FNLA was founded in 1954 by Holden Roberto under the name Union of Peoples of Northern Angola (UPNA) to promote the interests of the Bakongo people, an ethnic group consisting of Congolese tribes (Global Security n.d.; Woodson 1945; Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000; New York Times 2007). Rather than decolonization, it sought to re-establish the Kongo Kingdom through guerrilla war, and in 1957, the UNPA petitioned the UN to do so (Global Security n.d.). However, these attempts proved futile, and in 1958, the UPNA became the Union of Angola Peoples (UPA), and shifted their goals to Angolan independence from the Portuguese (Global Security n.d.; Central Intelligence Agency 1961).

In 1961, as rebels became more militarily organized, the UPA merged with the Kongo Kingdom nationalist group, the Democratic Party of Angola to form the FNLA (Global Security n.d.). Sources conflict as to when the group formed, though the majority state either 1961 or 1962 (Jongman and Schmid 1988, 502; Minorities at Risk 2004).

The group's first attack occurred in March 1961 against the Portuguese, however it was quickly crushed (Minorities at Risk 2004). It is not stated where the attack occurred.

Geography

Due to the difficulties of operating in Angola and ties with the Congolese group the Alliance of Bokongo, the FNLA established an external base in Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC (Global Security n.d.). The Kongo Kingdom, which the group has sought to re-establish, held territory in Angola, Republic of Congo, and the DRC. The group is therefore transnational (University of Iowa Museum of Art n.d.). The group initially fought in northern Angola (US State Department n.d.).

In the late 1970s, after the FNLA formed an alliance with the UNITA, conflict in Angola shifted from Bakongo regions in the north to central and southern Angola (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). UNITA, a splinter group of the FNLA, is based in central and southern Ovimbundu (Jongman and Schmid 1988).

During the Angolan war for independence, an estimated 1,000-2,000 Congolese regulars crossed the border in Angola to aid the FNLA (Global Security n.d.).

Organizational Structure

Holden Roberto was the president of the UPA (Global Security n.d.). The UPA was a political organization and operated a 'government-in-exile' in the DRC (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Global Security n.d.; Schmid and Jongman 1988, 502). As president, he declared complete authority of anti-Portuguese operations within Angola and refused to merge with any other organizations in an effort to build the FNLA into the main Angolan independence movement (Global Security n.d.). In September 1998, Roberto was removed as the head of the FNLA and replaced by Lucas Ngonda (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000). Roberto was in direct opposition to Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos (New York Times 2007).

The group consisted of an estimated 4,000-7,000 fighters (Jongman and Schmid 1988, 502). Other sources suggest the group had an estimated 5,000 members at an unknown date (Global Security n.d.). In 1961 when the UPA formed the National Liberation Army of Angola, it consisted of 5,000 untrained and poorly armed troops (Global Security n.d.). By November 1975, the FNLA army size had grown to 22,000 fighters (Global Security n.d.). The FNLA has received support from members of the ethnic groups Bakongo and Kimbundu (Global Security n.d.;Jongman and Schmid 1988, 502).

External Ties

The FNLA was a merger of the UPA and Alazo (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 502). The FNLA held strong ties with the Congolese group Mobutu Sese Seko, who were allied with the United States (Global Security n.d.). The Angolan War for Independence served as a front for a Cold War conflict, as the Soviet Union and the United States supported opposing groups in Angola (US State Department n.d.). While the United States supplied aid and military training to FNLA and UNITA troops, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided military training and equipment to the Marxist-Leninist MPLA, the opposing group to the FNLA (US State Department n.d.). The FNLA also received great amounts of military support from the Congolese army (Gleditsch 2013). Wholly, the FNLA has received explicit support from the US, Zaire, South Africa, China, and North Korea (Jongman and Schmid 1988, 503; US State Department n.d.). Sometime before 1974, 1000 to 2000 Zaire soldiers traveled to Angola to help the MPLA fight (Global Security n.d.).

The FNLA conducted attacks in Angola from their bases in Congo (Global Security n.d.). Their primary base was located in present day Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC (Global Security n.d.). After the MPLA defeated the FNLA in 1976, the FNLA retreated to its bases in the DRC and continued to launch small attacks into Angola (Global Security n.d.). However, despite previous support, in 1978, as part of the Angolan-Zairian accord, the DRC withdrew its support of the FNLA, ultimately eradicating the group's bases (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008).

The FNLA shared interests to restore the Kongo Kingdom with the Congolese group the Alliance of Bokongo (Global Security n.d.).

UNITA splintered from the FNLA in 1963 (US State Department n.d.). UNITA, FNLA, and MPLA worked together initially to fight the Portuguese, but began to fight each other in 1975 (US State Department n.d.). At its inception, the FNLA consisted of a few thousand poorly trained and armed fighters (Global Security n.d.). In 1961, FNLA fighters went to Morocco and Tunisia to train with and learn from Algerian forces (Global Security n.d.). After Algeria gained independence in 1962, it explicitly supplied the FLNA with arms and ammunition (Global Security n.d.). The group also received explicit funds from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Global Security n.d.).

Group Outcome

At the end of the Angolan War for Independence, in January 1975, the FNLA and two other groups signed the Alvor Agreement which established Angolan independence from the Portuguese (Global Security n.d.; New York Times 2007). However, despite promises of peace, the three groups quickly split, as each sought individual power in Angola and conflict resumed (US State Department n.d.; Global Security n.d.). These arguments ultimately lead to the Angolan Civil War (Global Security n.d.).

In 1976, Cuba sent military forces to support the MPLA (New York Times 2007). The FNLA was soon defeated (New York Times 2007). The MPLA has consistently been the winning party in Angola's general elections (New York TImes 2007).

Despite previous support, in 1978, as part of the Angolan-Zairian accord, the DRC withdrew its support of the FNLA, ultimately eradicating the group's bases (Global Security n.d.; MIPT 2008). This took a significant hit to the group, and in 1984, Roberto accepted the MPLA's amnesty agreement and shut down and disarmed the militant wing of the FNLA (MIPT 2008). The group's last known attack occurred in 1990, when the FNLA claimed they had planted a suitcase bomb in Luanda International Airport (MIPT 2008).

In May 1991, the opposition groups became legal political parties (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). Once parties legalized, FNLA leader Holden Roberto returned from exile and ran for president of Angola in 1992 (Minorities at Risk Project 2004).

IV. FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE CABINDA ENCLAVE-FORCES ARMADAS DE CABINDA
Torg ID: 543
Min. Group Date: 1963
Max. Group Date: 2009
Onset: 1994

Aliases: This is the armed wing of FLEC.

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This is the armed wing of FLEC.

Group Formation: This is the armed wing of FLEC.

Group End: This is the armed wing of FLEC.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This is the armed wing of FLEC.

Geography

This is the armed wing of FLEC.

Organizational Structure

This is the armed wing of FLEC.

External Ties

This is the armed wing of FLEC.

Group Outcome

This is the armed wing of FLEC.

V. FRENTE DE LIBERACAO DO ENCLAVE DE CABINDA (FLEC)
Torg ID: 186
Min. Group Date: 1963
Max. Group Date: 2010
Onset: NA

Aliases: Front For The Liberation Of The Enclave Of Cabinda (Flec), Flec/Original, Frente De Liberacao Do Enclave De Cabinda (Flec), Frente De Libera _o Do Enclave De Cabinda (Flec), Front For The Liberation Of The Cabinda Enclave, FLEC

Part 1. Bibliography

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: Liberation Front of Cabinda's Enclave (Dos Santos 1983, 104)

Group Formation: 1963

Group End (Outcome): Active (Brown 2016)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

In 1963, the Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda led by Luis Ranque Franque, the Action Committee for the National Union of Cabindans, whose leader was Henrique Tiago N'Zita, whose alias was Nzita Tiago (Brown 2016), and the Mayombe alliance merged to form the Front for the Liberation Of Cabinda Enclave (Dos Santos 1983, pg 104). FLEC originally fought for independence from Portuguese rule but continued to resist the government even after Angola gained independence on November 11, 1975 (Human Rights Watch 2004). FLEC raised an army in 1974, and began fighting against MPLA (Adelman 1975, pg 565). It acted as an ethno-nationalist separatist group.

Geography

FLEC is based in Cabinda, in the northwestern corner of Angola. Cabinda is not continuous with Angola but is actually separated from the majority of the Angola by by a narrow stretch of land belonging to the DRC (Dos Santos, 1983). FLEC operated in Kinshasa in 1974 (Dos Santos 1983, 104). FLEC never gained significant influence in the major urban areas in Angola (Human Rights Watch 2004). FLEC only controlled territory in the heavily forested inland areas of the Cabinda province (Human Rights Watch 2004). FLEC briefly moved to Brussels and Lisbon (Dos Santos 1983, 107). A faction of FLEC operated in the capitals of Zaire and the Congo (Adelman 1975, 565).

Organizational Structure

Both the Congo and Zaire financially backed FLEC (Adelman 1975, 565). Members were from the Fiote tribe (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 502). Leaders included Luiz Franque Ranque, Henriques Tiago N'zita and António Eduardo Sozinho (Global Security 2012). On August 1, 1975, FLEC announced Cabinda’s independence from Portugal, however

Angolan government forces took back control of the area from the separatists (Al-Jazeera English 2010). Before 1997, the group had approximately 400-600 troops according to UCDP (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 644). The group had approximately 7,000 fighters, though the date for that estimate is unknown (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 502). In 1997, the group had approximately 1200 fighters (Global Security n.d.). It established a political wing in 1975 or 1977 and nominated Henriques N'zita president (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 502; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 644).

External Ties

FLEC was at first supported by Abbé Youlou, the first president of Congo-Brazzaville because he wanted to annex Cabinda (Dos Santos 1983, 104). Zaire and America supported Luis Ranque Franque, a FLEC Leader (Dos Santos 1983, 105). FLEC has been linked to foreigners and mercenaries including Jean Kay, a mercenary, Jean da Costa, who had worked with the armies of France and Congo; as well as a Frenchman who allegedly had ties to the French Minister of Justice (Dos Santos 1983, 105).

FLEC was supported by the Congo and Zaire, where FLEC factions received sanctuary and received financial support in each country's capital city (Adelman 1975, 565). President Mobutu of the Congo generally supported the FLEC army (Adelman 1975, 565). Regime change in the DRC in 1997 led to a switch in support; the new government removed its support from FLEC and began to support the Angola government instead (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 645).

FLEC gave rise to two splinter groups during the late 1970s (Global Security 2012). The first was the Military Command for the Liberation of Cabinda, which splintered from FLEC in November 1977 (Ibid.). Almost two years later, in June 1979, another faction within FLEC broke away and founded the splinter group known as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda, abbreviated MPLC (Ibid.). In 1984, a separate faction, FLEC-R broke away from the group (Human Rights Watch 2004).

Group Outcome

FLEC continues to attack foreigners, specifically Portuguese, in Cabinda (Global Security 2012). Also, in September 2016, FLEC claimed responsibility for an ambush near oil fields in the northern region of Angola (Brown 2016). Twelve Angolan soldiers were killed in the September ambush (Ibid.). One of FLEC's most notorious attacks occurred in 2010, when the group attacked a bus that was carrying Togo's national soccer team (Brown 2016). After Nzita Tiago (one of FLEC's founding leaders) passed away in June 2016, FLEC increased its violence against Angolan government forces (Brown 2016). According to Brown 2016, FLEC is attributed with 50 deaths in the period of just over one month in 2016 (during August and the first week of September).

Note: this dyad fluctuates above and below the threshold
Note: FLEC and FLEC-FAC

VI. UNIAO NACIONAL PARA A INDEPENDENCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA
Torg ID: 514
Min. Group Date: 1966
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: 1975

Aliases: National Union For The Total Independence Of Angola (Unita), National Union For The Total Independence Of Angola, Uniao Nacional Para A Independencia Total De Angola, Uni_o Nacional Para A Independncia Total De Angola, Unita

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: none

Group Formation: 1966

Group End: 2002 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

Unita formed in 1966 as to resist Portuguese colonial rule and declare Angola's independence (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503; MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.(a)). It was a splinter of the FNLA (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; US State Department n.d.). Its political aim later shifted to fight the MPLA government after Angola gained independence in 1975 (MIPT 2008). The group's first violent attack was in December 1966 when it attacked a railway station in Luau, Angola (Global Security n.d.(a); Gleditsch et al. 2013, 180). The group was originally leftist, but later shifted to be conservative after 1975 in order to oppose the MPLA government (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 180).

Geography

The group's headquarters were in Jamba, Angola in the southeast part of the country along the Namibia border starting in 1975 (McGreal 1999; MIPT 2008). It was a rural movement (Global Security n.d.(a)). The group primarily operated in Angola, but also had transnational attacks in Zambia and Namibia (GTD 2017).

Organizational Structure

The leader of the group was Jonas Savimbi and Miguel N'Zau Puna (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 503; MIPT 2008; Global Security n.d.(a)). Savimbi had previously been a leader in the political wing of the FNLA, the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile, but left in 1964 over political disagreements (Global Security n.d.(a)). Savimbi received training in guerrilla warfare and Maoism in China in 1965 (Global Security n.d.(a); MIPT 2008). When he returned from China in 1966, MPLA recruited Savimbi, but he instead formed Unita (MIPT 2008). Unita was organized in a hierarchical manner (Global Security n.d.(a)). It had a political wing and an armed wing (Global Security n.d.(a)).

It had an estimated 60,000 members, though the date for that estimate is unknown (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 502). In 2002, 82,000 fighters disarmed from Unita (Global

Security n.d.(a)). The group received fighters and support from the Ovimbundu - Angola's largest ethnic group (Global Security n.d.(a); Minorities at Risk Project 2004; MIPT 2008). It recruited peasants from different clans and classes in Angola (Global Security n.d.(a)). It also forcibly conscripted up to 7,000 child soldiers (Global Security n.d.(a)).

UNITA was a splinter of the FNLA. It funded itself through diamonds (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; McGreal 1999; Macgregor 2002). It also received explicit money, weapons, instructing, and direct combat aids from the United States, South Africa, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, France, Zambia, and Morocco (Jongman and Schmid 1988, 502).

External Ties

The group fought alongside the FNLA against the MPLA government in the late 1970s (MIPT 2008). The group opposed the MPLA (MIPT 2008). Savimbi had received training in guerrilla warfare and Maoism in China in 1965 (Global Security n.d.(a); MIPT 2008). Sometime before 1974, 4000-5000 South African soldiers traveled to Angola to help Unita fight (Global Security n.d.). It received external support from South Africa, US, Côte D'Ivoire, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, France, Zambia, and Morocco (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 502). The group received military training and assistance from the CIA after 1985, and from South Africa after 1975, in order to combat the Marxist MPLA government (US State Department n.d.; McGreal 1999; Global Security n.d.(a)). In 1988, Unita allegedly lost much of its support (Global Security n.d.(a)). In 1999, the group provided logistical support for Bakongo rebels in the DRC (Minorities at Risk Project 2004).

Group Outcome

In 1988, Unita allegedly lost much of its support (Global Security n.d.(a)). In 1992, internal divisions began to emerge in Unita when two generals resigned and denounced Savimbi (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). In October 1992, Unita participated in elections, but decried the results as fraudulent (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Global Security n.d.(a)). In November 1992, fighting resumed (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Global Security n.d.(a)). In 1999, the group lost its primary base in Jamba, Angola to counterinsurgency forces (McGreal 1999). In February 2002, Angolan forces shot and killed Savimbi (MIPT 2008). Unita and the Angolan government reached a ceasefire in April that year (Global Security n.d.(a); Macgregor 2002). The group's last violent attack occurred on April 1, 2002 (GTD 2017). In November 2002, Unita signed a disarmament agreement with the Angolan government and transitioned into a legitimate political party (MIPT 2008).

Note from Ellie: The group originally used guerilla warfare but transitioned to conventional warfare tactics in 1983 (Global Security n.d.(a); Jongman and Schmid 1988).
Note: interesting election fraudulent response - similar to Renamo in Mozambique situation
Note: leadership decapitation huge here

VII. ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUERRILLAS
Torg ID: 2257
Min. Group Date: 1979
Max. Group Date: 2006
Onset: NA

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Part 1. Bibliography

Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: This name is too vague for research.

Group Formation: This name is too vague for research.

Group End: This name is too vague for research.

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

This name is too vague for research.

Geography

This name is too vague for research.

Organizational Structure

This name is too vague for research.

External Ties

This name is too vague for research.

Group Outcome

This name is too vague for research.

VIII. FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE ENCLAVE OF CABINDA-RENEWED
Torg ID: 187
Min. Group Date: 1984
Max. Group Date: 2002
Onset: 1991

Aliases: The Front For The Liberation Of The Cabinda Enclave - Renewed (Flec), Flec/R, Flec/Renovada, Flec-R, Flec-Renewed, Frente Da Liberta _o Do Enclave De Cabinda - Renovada, Frente Da Liberta _o Do Enclave De Cabinda-Renovada, Frente De Liberaco Do Enclave De Cabinda-Renovada (Flec-R), Front For The Liberation Of The Cabinda Enclave - Renewed, Front For The Liberation Of The Cabinda Enclave-Renewed, Front For The Liberation Of The Enclave Of Cabinda - Renewed, Front For The Liberation Of The Enclave Of Cabinda-Renewed, The Front For The Liberation Of The Cabinda Enclave - Renewed (Flec)

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Part 2. Basic Coding

Aliases: FLEC-R

Group Formation: 1984

Group End: 2004 (merger with FLEC)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

FLEC-R splintered from FLEC in 1984 due to “personality” disagreements between the leaders of FLEC (Human Rights Watch 2004). Like FLEC, it was an ethno-nationalist separatist organization that fought for Cabinda to secede (MAR n.d.; MIPT 2008). It is unclear when the group’s first violent attack was, but it likely occurred as late as 1993 when it kidnapped a UN officer (Global Security n.d.). It was mostly active in 1997-1998 when it attacked a series of oil sites around Cabinda (Global Security n.d.; Human Rights Watch 2004).

Geography

The group had attacks in Chibodo and Malongo, Angola (GTD 2017). The group did not appear to be transnational.

Organizational Structure

FLEC-R’s leader was Jose Tiburcio (MIPT 2008). It was well known for kidnapping oil executives, which may have been a source of funding (MIPT 2008). Members were largely from Cabinda (MAR n.d.). It allegedly had 250 members, though the date for this estimate is unknown (MIPT 2008). In 1997, FLEC-R had approximately 2500 members according to the Angolan military (Global Security n.d.).

External Ties

The group splintered from FLEC (Human Rights Watch 2004; Al Jazeera 2010; Minorities at Risk n.d.). It merged with FLEC-FAC in 2004 to reform FLEC (Al Jazeera 2010). There is no evidence of external support from other state or non-state actors.

Group Outcome

In 2001, Tiburcio announced FLEC-R was dissolving (MIPT 2008). In 2002, the Angolan government announced it had destroyed FLEC-R (Al Jazeera 2010). Its last known violent attack was in 2002 when it attacked soldiers In 2004, FLEC-R announced it was merging with FLEC-FAC to reform FLEC (Al Jazeera 2010). FDC- FLEC-Lubota splinters in 1975: last mention violent in 1998